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THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER

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"And this subject of the different characters of dispositions is one of those things wherein the common discourse of men is wiser than books—a thing which seldom happens. . . .

"Wherefore out of these materials (which are surely rich and abundant) let a full and careful treatise be constructed . . . so that an artificial and accurate dissection may be made of men's minds and natures, and the secret disposition of each particular man laid open, that, from a knowledge of the whole, the precepts concerning the cures of the mind may be more rightly formed. . . . And not only the characters of dispositions impressed by nature should be received into this treatise, but those also which are otherwise imposed upon the mind by the sex, age, country, state of health, make of body, etc. And again those which proceed from fortune, as in princes, nobles, common people, the rich, the poor, magistrates, the ignorant, the happy, the miserable etc."—Bacon, 'De Augmentis Scientiarum,' B. vii. ch. iii.

". . . Ethology, is still to be created. But its creation has at length become practicable. The empirical laws, destined to verify its deductions, have been formed in abundance by every successive age of humanity; and the premises for the deductions are now sufficiently complete."—J. S. Mill, 'A System of Logic,' B. vi. ch. v. § 6.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER

Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments

BY

ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A.

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PREFACE

A SCIENTIFIC treatment should not diminish, but increase the general interest taken in character. To bring together the various aspects of the subject,—which, in literature, are treated in isolation from one another; to lead up to a general conception of it; to study the methods by which the knowledge of it may be increased in accuracy and extent; these are to make approaches to a scientific treatment of character. While I have had chiefly to confine myself to a study of the tendencies of the emotions and sentiments, this has been, throughout, my aim. This book, then, is a study of method. Yet I do not claim that this method is essentially new. It is in the main the hypothetical method of the sciences; it has had to be adapted to the treatment of character: that is all. Yet for a long time, like the philosophers of old, I was trying to find indisputable foundations. How long it took me before I saw the necessity of being content with good working hypotheses! Hence, as I only try to find such hypotheses, to interpret the facts of character as far as I have grasped them, I do not put them forward as finally true or adequate theories. On the contrary, I have tried to show how they may be corrected and improved as the facts come to be systematically investigated. And I have sought to give them such a form that they can be made use of and improved by others without being wholly abandoned. To make real progress possible has been my aim throughout. I have wondered whether, in following a plain method of science and common sense in the treatment of a subject, around which such an amount of valuable opinion has accumulated, we cannot ensure an

orderly development; so that each age, taking up the conclusions of the preceding age, not contemptuously, but with respect and hope, may first master its knowledge and wisdom, and discern their legitimate applications, before attempting to judge in what respects they are defective and inadequate:— just as the progress of physical science depends on our first mastering the knowledge already attained in some branch of it, and on conserving that, before attempting to solve the new problems there suggested.

What has astonished me is that the thoughts of the past that bear on life and character are not thus regarded, but either despised and neglected, or reverenced in that wrong way according to which these thoughts have only to be accepted and preserved. Whence arise, in respect of the wisdom of life, what are called "platitudes," and in respect of political life, rigid institutions; and both of these, instead of protecting mankind against the revolutionary spirit, invite it.

A great difficulty which I have found in the course of my work has been to collect the facts or observations of character on which I had to rely. I wish I could have collected them on such a scale as Prof. Westermarck has achieved in his wonderful book on "The Development of the Moral Ideas." Such material as I have obtained has been drawn much more from literature than from any other source; and this was inevitable, because psychology has hardly begun to concern itself with these questions. After our own great poets, my chief resource has been the great French prose writers; and I take this opportunity of expressing my unqualified admiration for that literature, and my indebtedness to it. Everywhere I have found in it that psychological curiosity so frequent in the dramas of Shakespeare, but so rare in our prose writings.

One of the principal hypotheses in this book is the theory of the sentiments which I published in *Mind* nearly twenty years ago. I have to thank Prof. G. F. Stout who was the first to adopt it, and to make it more widely known in his admirable "Manual of Psychology." Since then it has been accepted, or at least found serviceable, by a number of eminent writers, among whom I may mention Prof. E. Westermarck,

Prof. James Sully, Mr. W. McDougall, F.R.S., Prof. Boyce Gibson, Prof. A. Caldecott. I have specially to thank Mr. McDougall for the generous praise in his "Social Psychology," of what little I had accomplished, which, coming to me at a time when I was uncertain as to the plan of my book, was a great encouragement and help. I have also to thank Dr. F. W. Mott, F.R.S., for valuable physiological suggestions, and also his daughter, Miss P. Mott, for having collected some cases for me, and provided their references. Finally I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to Prof. Carveth Read for the labour and self-sacrifice involved in reading and correcting my proofs, which he did in the thorough and conscientious way characteristic of him; for his having drawn my attention to certain omissions, and for many valuable suggestions. Prof. Stout and Mr. McDougall also kindly read certain parts of the proofs bearing specially on the treatment of 'instinct.'

I hope to publish before long another volume treating of the sentiments in the same detail which I have in the present volume given to the primary emotions. This is necessary to complete the plan of my work.

A. F. S.

LONDON,
February, 1914.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

I.

A COMPLETE science of mind would include a science of character. The best approach to such a science through the study of the primary emotions and their connected instincts. This study to be directed to an analysis of tendencies. How far we can study the emotions in isolation, pp. 1-2.—The bearing of the James-Lange theory on this problem, pp. 3-5.—Mr. McDougall's theory, as bringing into prominence the active side of emotion, p. 6.

II.

Such knowledge of character as we possess unsystematic and inexact, p. 6.—Neglect of the true nature of the wisdom of life in fables, proverbs and maxims, p. 7.—The advantage of a science of character in education, p. 8.—and in interpreting the ruling ideas of the past and present, p. 9.

BOOK I.

THE CONCEPTION OF CHARACTER.

CHAPTER I.

MILL'S CONCEPTION OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER.

His conception of Ethology, as founded on the Laws of Psychology, p. 13.—as connecting generalisations about character with these laws, p. 13.—His conception of Empirical Laws, as subject to exception, p. 14.—of Causal Laws or Laws of Mind; of Laws of Ethology, as *axiomata media*, and of the method of this science as deductive, p. 14.—His conception of its practicability, dependent on the existence of a sufficient number of empirical laws and of laws of

mind ; the former have not been collected, p. 15.—His "Laws of Mind" are no other than the laws of association, the laws of retentiveness and of "mental chemistry," p. 16.—These laws unsuitable for interpreting facts of character, pp. 17–19.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF ORGANISATION AS IT IS DISCLOSED IN THE MIND.

Two kinds of forces in character, the one working to higher forms of organisation, the other, to lower : both pursue ends and organise the means to them, thereby producing systems, pp. 20, 21.—The Law of Organisation as the fundamental law of character, exemplified by all the forces and systems of character, pp. 21, 22, 23.—These organic laws alone capable of interpreting popular generalisations about character, p. 23.

CHAPTER III.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE EMOTIONS.

1. *Of the Constitution of Character.*

The organic laws of character, those of our instincts, emotions and sentiments : character as constituted by these forces, pp. 24, 25.—What we attend to in the stream of perception and thought largely determined by these forces ; their tendencies often counteracted by the mechanical laws of association, pp. 25, 26.—In contrast to this conception, popular conceptions of character reduce it to a number of detached qualities, p. 26.

2. *Of the Nature of an Emotional System, and of the Different Primary Emotions.*

The systems of character being forces, the first to be considered those of the primary emotions : part of these systems organised in the body, part in the mind, pp. 27, 28.—Fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy and sorrow, include instincts or innate tendencies in their systems : the appetites classed with these primary systems, pp. 28-31.—Also the impulses for repose and exercise ; for self-display and self-abasement ; all of them include instinctive tendencies, and pursue innately determined ends, pp. 28–34.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (I).

1. *Of the Innate Bond Connecting the Primary Emotions.*

Consideration of the greater systems of the Sentiments that organise many of the lesser systems of the emotions, p. 35.—The base of the greater systems, an innate organisation of the dispositions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, pp. 36–38.

2. *Of the Sentiment of Parental Love.*

This sentiment also called the "parental instinct": not one instinct; includes a variety of instincts of different kinds, nutritive, defensive, offensive, sportive; also a variety of emotions, as fear, anger, joy, sorrow, and others. The sight of offspring tends innately to arouse this sentiment: its disinterested character, pp. 38–43.

3. *Of the Source of Disinterested Action.*

The source of disinterested action traced by biologists to certain instincts; by psychologists to either sympathetic or tender emotions: neither of these essentially disinterested, pp. 43–45.—Independently of these emotions, love naturally disinterested. The emotions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, organised in maternal love, are disinterested, because innately connected with a disinterested, instinctive behaviour, pp. 45–47.—The disinterestedness of pity, not dependent on its quality of tenderness, p. 48.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (II).

1. *Of the Theory that Love and Hate are Emotions.*

The representations of Love in dramatic poetry evidence that love includes a number of emotions, pp. 51–54.—Spencer's theory of love as a compound emotion cannot interpret the diversity of its behaviour, pp. 55–56.

2. *Of the Sentiments that are most Commonly Found among Men.*

Self-love, sexual love, family affection, friendship; the sentiment for games; impersonal sentiments; the sentiments of respect and hate pp. 56–58.

3. *Analysis of Hatred.*

The emotional system of hatred contrasted with that of love, pp. 58–61.—The chief problem of the sentiments to understand the laws of their growth, constitution and decline, pp. 61–62.—The "laws of mind" to be sought for among the systems of character, p. 62.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WILL AND INTELLIGENCE AS CONSTITUENTS OF CHARACTER.

We must personify the systems of the emotions and sentiments in order to isolate them and to simplify our problem, pp. 64–65.—The will and intelligence evoked in subordination to some impulse, emotion or sentiment. The question of 'real' or indeterminate choice and 'pure reason' beyond a science of character, pp. 65–67.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER (I.

1. *Of "The Laws of Mind."*

Mill assumed that "the laws of mind," as laws of tendency, are not merely "approximate generalisations," p. 68.—Of the reciprocal relation of the laws of organisation and the laws of association, p. 70.—The laws of mind as laws of organisation. We cannot attach a higher validity to the form given to them than to the form given to "empirical laws." They are empirical laws. Their function as laws of tendency to interpret empirical generalisations about character, pp. 70–72.

2. *Of the "Empirical Laws," and the Difficulty of Discovering Them.*

No one has made a collection of these laws: the great thoughts of literature seldom expressed in the form of laws of character, pp. 72–74.

3. *Of the Nature of the Wisdom of Life Contained in Fables, Proverbs and Maxims.*

Fables imply laws of character but do not express them; proverbs contain advice, exhortation, reproof, consolation, maxims, advice or reflections, pp. 75–80.—Mill formed a mistaken opinion of the nature of the material to be obtained from literature for the inductive base of the science, pp. 80–81.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER (II).

1. *Of Certain Qualifications which the Method of a Science of Character should possess.*

A chief deficiency of Mill's method due to his not regarding a conception of character as an indispensable part of it, p. 82.—The conception of his successors, due to the influence of analytical psychology, suggested unfruitful problems, p. 83.—Our conception synthetic, and in harmony with the point of view of literature; can utilise its material; which suggests natural, instead of artificial problems. Our conception to be used as a hypothesis; becoming, as it unfolds, a number of hypotheses, and including all the provisional laws we adopt; becoming ever more complex, and therefore more adaptable to the variety and complexity of the facts of character; suggesting fresh problems, and leading to the discovery of new laws, because furnishing the clues to such discovery, pp. 83–87.—Besides being employed as a method of discovery, to be used as a method of gradual proof by directing attention to the facts which conflict with its hypothetical laws, pp. 87–88.—Examples to show how the laws may be progressively raised to the standard of scientific laws, pp. 88–92.—The importance of continuity of development. The urgent need at present of a sufficient number of hypothetical laws, which it is the aim of the present work to furnish, pp. 92–93.

CHAPTER IX.

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER.

1. *The Qualities of Conduct.*

The method of observation, as directed to the knowledge of character, gives no knowledge of what the forces of character are ; seems to give this, because we attribute to character the qualities observed in conduct, pp. 94–97.—Analysis of the method of characterisation of Theophrastus, La Bruyère and others : a quality of conduct, an emotional disposition, or a sentiment (or several of them together) employed to compose a character, pp. 97–100.

2. *The Conception of Conduct.*

Conduct as the expression or behaviour of some system of character is a part of this system ; the will of this system implicated in it : the qualities of conduct in this sense also qualities of character ; we can voluntarily aim at acquiring such qualities, pp. 100–103.—Other qualities, proper to character itself, as qualifying its emotions and sentiments ; thence taken to qualify the conduct of these systems. Hence two kinds of qualities, (1) those first observed in conduct and attributed afterwards to character ; (2) those first belonging to character and attributed afterwards to conduct. Our conception of character, taken at first to include the systems of the emotions and sentiments, now to be advanced a further stage to include both kinds of qualities, pp. 103–104.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

This problem suggested by the last addition to our conception of character : What qualities of character any given emotion or sentiment tends to foster. Assumption that every sentiment tends to acquire the qualities it needs, as it tends to organise the emotions it needs, pp. 105–109.—Of the injustice of our affections, pp. 109–110.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE RELATIVE ETHICS OF THE SENTIMENTS.

1. *Of the Virtues of Sentiments.*

In the first stage of Love its qualities and virtues develop spontaneously ; in the second stage, only through effort and reflection, as we become conscious of possessing these qualities in insufficient degree. Hence the Ideals of a sentiment, pp. 111–112.

2. *Of the Ideals of Sentiments.*

All the qualities of a sentiment may suggest such ideals, and tend to develop certain emotions appropriate to them, as aspiration, admiration, remorse and shame, pp. 112–113.

3. *Of the Duties of Sentiments.*

Besides ideals and the special emotions supporting them, sentiments of love tend to develop duties relative to their ends, with complimentary emotions of self-approval and self-reproach. These three, the virtues as the fruit of their wills, the ideals as the aspirations of their wills, and the duties as the commands of their wills constitute the Relative Ethics of sentiments, pp. 113–116.—Particular sentiments, besides what are common to all, apt to have characteristic virtues and duties of their own, pp. 116–117.—The function of ideas of duty to arouse the self-control of the system as a whole, pp. 117–118.—Hate, in distinction from love, has no relative ethics, and tends to destroy all sense of obligation toward its object, pp. 118–119.

4. *Of the Distinction between the Relative Ethics of Sentiments and the Conscience.*

The Relative Ethics of sentiments partial to their objects, the Ethics of conscience approximate to impartiality, pp. 119–120.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SENTIMENTS AS THE SOURCE OF TYPES OF CHARACTER.

The qualities which a particular sentiment acquires tend to qualify the character as a whole ; but those qualities of the character which it does not need, tend, apart from other influences, to atrophy. Hence every sentiment tends to develop a type of character of its own, pp. 121–127.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE TEMPERAMENT ON THE CHARACTER.

1. *Of the Distinction between Temper and Temperament.*

Our temperament part of the innate constitution of the mind, including, not the emotional dispositions in general, but the particular manner in which these are felt and manifested by different persons. The way in which, in a given individual, a particular emotion is felt and manifested is its temper in him ; the way in which the emotions in general are felt and manifested by him is his temperament, pp. 128–129.—The temper of an emotion subject to great change in the course of life, pp. 130–131.

2. *The Doctrine of the Temperaments.*

Its assumption that certain emotional qualities attach to all emotions. The superficiality of the sanguine, the depth of the bilious, as affecting their character as a whole. The irascible, though superficial in respect of anger, not therefore in respect of all other emotions. The child superficial in many directions, but generally liable to feel fear more deeply than adults. Impossible to suppose that the 'depth' of the bilious attaches to all their sentiments, pp. 131–137.—Conflicting

opinions concerning the nervous and the phlegmatic. The quickness of the nervous may not attach to all mental processes, and may not include quickness in respect of emotion. The slowness of the phlegmatic may be due to deficient energy or to low grade of intelligence. They may be quick in responding to the stimuli of certain emotions, as anger or fear. Slowness may be due to lack of interest, or to self control, pp. 137–142.

Of the Chief Defects of the Classical Doctrine of the Temperaments.

(1) The assumption that the same emotional quality pervades all the emotions in the same type of temperament. (2) The distinctions between the types are based on conceptions of degree which are necessarily vague. (3) These types are exaggerations. The sanguine and bilious at opposite poles in respect of superficiality and depth ; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. The nervous and phlegmatic at opposite poles in respect of quickness and slowness ; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. All real temperaments mixtures of the four pure temperaments in varying proportions. (4) The classical doctrine does not enable us to infer anything of the temperament of a given individual beyond what we have observed it to be, pp. 142–147.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL TEMPERS ON THE STABILITY OF SENTIMENTS (1).

1. *How Far the Temper of one Emotion Involves a Corresponding Temper in Other Emotions.*

The natural tempers of fear and anger probably not the same in either sex, p. 148.—Sensibility to an emotion taken to mean the degree and manner of its response to stimuli.—Five qualities of sensibility (1) range ; (2) quickness of response ; (3) delicacy ; (4) intensity, and (5) durability of the emotional response, pp. 149–150.—Cannot infer that the natural temper of one emotion attaches to all others, but may infer that it attaches to other emotions having affinities with its own. Thus the joyous temper renders us correspondingly insensible to repugnance, sorrow, despondency and despair, but correspondingly sensible to hope and confidence. The sorrowful temper renders us correspondingly sensible to despondency and despair, but correspondingly insensible to joy, hope and confidence, pp. 150–157.

2. *Of the Influence of the Stability of Sentiments of Tempers that have a Broad Sensibility to Joy.*

The more the sensibility to joy approaches the widest possible range, the more it increases the instability of all sentiments ; the more widely and evenly it is distributed over a given class of objects, the more unstable it renders the sentiments formed for members of the class : a limiting condition, the varying degree of enjoyment obtainable from different objects, pp. 157–162.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL TEMPERS ON THE STABILITY OF SENTIMENTS (II).

1. *Of the Influence of the Tempers that have a Narrow or Restricted Sensibility to Joy.*

In proportion as the range of sensibility to joy, in respect of a given class of objects, is narrow, the love formed for any individual member of the class is constant, pp. 163–169.—In proportion as the sensibility to joy is narrow, the joy is more intense and lasting, and capable of establishing a durable bond between itself and its object, pp. 169–171.—The conception of character unfolded in this book has suggested many problems of character, and led to our formulating provisionally many laws of character to serve as hypotheses for the foundation of the science, pp. 171–173.

BOOK II.

The Tendencies of the Primary Emotions.

CHAPTER I.

INSTINCT AND EMOTION.

1. *The Meaning to be Assigned to the Terms Instinct and Emotion.*

Emotion defined to include both a cognitive and conative attitude as well as an attitude of feeling, p. 178.—Emotion, a system, because its constituents are organised for an end. Three principal parts in the system of an emotion, (1) the emotion itself in consciousness, (2) the instincts and other tendencies organised in the nervous system, (3) the external behaviour by which the end of the emotion is attained, pp. 179–180.—The term 'instinctive' most generally used to denote behaviour the capacity to form which is inherited; sometimes also used to denote emotions when aroused by stimuli innately connected with their excitement. The term 'instinct' defined as an inherited disposition excited innately by certain stimuli, evoking innately in response a specific kind of behaviour, and directed innately to achieve a certain end, pp. 180–183.—Some instincts produce actions complete and useful; others, actions incomplete and useless apart from other and acquired actions combined with them. Human instincts belong to the latter class, and become serviceable through other actions acquired by experimentation and imitation: these methods inherited, not acquired, pp. 183–185.

2. *The Relation of Instinct to Emotion.*

The system of a primary emotion may contain several instincts. One or other of these instincts may be excited, and evoke the specific behaviour characteristic of it, without simultaneously exciting the emotion.

One or other of these instincts may sometimes be found organised in the system of a different emotion. An emotion tends to include in its system all instincts and other dispositions that subserve its end, pp. 185–192.

3. *Of the Significance of the Physiological Theory of Emotion for the Science of Character.*

The functional changes connected with an emotion either do or do no subserve its end. On the whole, though their influence is often bad, they do subserve it, when not too marked. The function of its instincts is to furnish the proximate ends of the emotion, and a specific mode of behaviour instrumental to this end, pp. 192–194.—The excitement and maintenance of emotions by ideas destroys the original balance of the instincts, and renders possible the debasement, as well as the elevation, of human character, pp. 195–196.

CHAPTER II.

FEAR.

1. *Of the Meaning to be given to the Terms 'End,' 'Object' and 'Cause' of Emotion.*

Emotions are systems because they have ends, namely, those results which they are organised to achieve in order to satisfy their impulses. 'Cause' means some conspicuous condition on which the emotion depends; 'object,' the thing to which the emotion is referred, pp. 197–199.

2. *The Primitive Varieties of Fear.*

These to be distinguished by some instinctive mode of behaviour peculiar to each, and the proximate end to which this behaviour is directed: as (1) flight, (2) concealment, (3) silence, (4) a clinging to something, (5) a shrinking from something, (6) immobility or simulation of death, (7) crying out for protection, (8) defence by aggressive actions, (9) disinterested action on behalf of young, pp. 199–206.

3. *The Varieties and Functions of Fear in the Sentiments.*

The end of primitive fears to safeguard the organism. Man develops other ends and new forms of behaviour adapted to them, pp. 206–207.—There are endless different ways in which man learns to counteract the occurrence of some event that he fears because of his love of an object, pp. 207–210.

4. *The Common End of Fear.*

The common end of fear to prevent the occurrence of an event, threatening either the life of the body or the fulfilment or maintenance of the end of some sentiment, pp. 210–215.—This end too abstract to distinguish the end of fear from the end of anger. Fear distinguished from anger by its generally pacific behaviour. Fear necessary for the biological end, as well as for the ends of sentiments, pp. 216–217.

5. *Of the Growing Control of the Instincts of Fear by the Emotion.*

As long as the instinctive behaviour of fear remains under the exclusive control of the stimuli that innately evoke it, the emotion is a mere accessory of instinct. The emotion, placed in supreme control of the instinctive and acquired dispositions of its system in proportion as it is aroused by ideas, foresees its end, and is organised in sentiments, pp. 217–219.

6. *Of Fear as One of the Primary Emotions and Root-Forces of Character.*

The tests of a primary emotion: (1) Its early appearance in child-life; (2) Its diffusion in the animal-world: (3) Its irresolvability into other emotions; (4) Its innate excitability by sensory stimuli, and (5) its manifestation in some form of instinctive behaviour. Judged by these tests, fear seen to be a primary system. Former attempts to resolve it into a mixture of sorrow and aversion, pp. 219–223.

CHAPTER III.

ANGER (I).

1. *The Primitive Varieties of Anger.*

These varieties distinguished by different forms of instinctive behaviour directed to different proximate ends, as (1) Destruction; (2) Overcoming opposition; (3) Prevention of attack; (4) Revenge or punishment; (5) Securing obedience or subordination; (6) The doing of any of these things on behalf of others. This disinterested anger may be instinctively aroused; and though, in its behaviour, it employ egoistic forms of anger, these are modified to secure defence of another animal; this modification appears in part to be innate, pp. 224–241.

CHAPTER IV.

ANGER (II).

1. *Of the Varieties of Anger that are Acquired in the Sentiments.*

The anger directed to inflict pain probably acquired, both in respect of its behaviour and end, pp. 242–245.—Of anger as directed, under the control of love, to the end of reformation,—also to the end of recalling the loved object to the forgotten duties of love, pp. 245–246.—The anger of pride directed to the end of humiliating its object. In these acquired varieties anger has a lower emotional intensity than in the primitive, pp. 246–247.

2. *Of the Common End of Anger.*

Wherever we find one or other of the instinctive or acquired dispositions of anger present and active, there we shall say that anger is present, whether the emotion is or not, pp. 249–250.—The same difficulty about the common end of anger as of fear: no end that

distinguishes the one system from the other. It is their modes of behaviour that distinguish them. The aggressive behaviour of anger sufficiently distinguishes it from fear. Its utility consists in the sudden increase of energy it imparts, and in the number of forms of aggressive action which it puts at the service of the emotions and sentiments, pp. 250–251.

3. *The Relation of the System of Anger to the Emotion.*

In the development of anger, as in the case of fear, the emotion comes to assume a position of supreme importance in relation to the instinctive and acquired tendencies of its system, pp. 251–252.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE LAWS OF THE INTERACTION OF FEAR AND ANGER.

1. *Of the Complicated Relation of the Systems of Fear and Anger.*

That the systems of anger and fear do not wholly tend to exclude one another, but that their respective emotions do, pp. 253–256.

2. *Of the Relation of Jealousy to Fear and Anger.*

The behaviour of jealousy shows it to be a derivative of fear and anger, which implies the action of self-love and a lowering of its self-valuation ; hence concealed out of shame. The emotion of jealousy, though unique, has a variable composition, inclining sometimes more to anger, sometimes more to fear ; and its end requires the support of the tendencies of both emotions. In jealousy the systems, and even the emotions, of fear and anger appear to be harmonised, pp. 256–262.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT THAT HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN ANGER AND FEAR.

1. *How far the Quality of Courage Belongs to Anger.*

Anger innately possesses the quality of courage, defined as a readiness to risk the life of the organism to which it belongs for the attainment of ends, pp. 263–265.

2. *To what Kinds of Fear the Quality of Cowardice Belongs.*

The egoistic varieties of fear innately possess the quality of cowardice, as tending to avoid risking the life of the organism to which they belong, p. 265.

3. *Of Disinterested Fear as an Innate Source of both Courage and Caution.*

Fear on behalf of others implies love ; is an innate source of courage and caution, pp. 265–268.

4. *Of the Derivation of Cruelty from Certain Kinds of Anger.*

Cruelty, a quality of that variety of anger which aims at inflicting pain as its end. The revengeful type of anger tends to become deliberately cruel under the restraints of fear. Cruelty may also become the object of a sentiment, affording enjoyment in the exercise of it, without admixture of either anger or fear, pp. 268–270.

CHAPTER VII.

JOY (I).

1. *Of the Distinction Between Joy and Pleasure.*

Pleasure is an abstraction; joy is one of the concrete facts from which we abstract it. Bodily pleasure and pain when they reach a certain intensity tend to attract attention to themselves; but pleasant and painful emotions tend to attract attention not to themselves but to their objects, pp. 272–274.—Bodily pain and pleasure, when below a certain intensity, tend to arouse and become part of some emotional mood. Mental pleasure and pain always constituents of some emotional attitude, pp. 275–276.

2. *The Common Varieties of Joy.*

That, failing to distinguish these by their differences of tendency, we have to fall back on the differences of their objects, pp. 276–278.—That joy is not in all cases a wholly pleasant emotion, and sometimes involves more pain than pleasure, pp. 278–279.

3. *The System and Laws of Joy.*

The system of an emotion is that higher kind of system that we may call an organisation, because its constituents promote a common end. Is joy a system in this sense? Joy attracts attention and thought to its object, and tends to maintain this object and our relation to it, and is therefore such a system, pp. 279–281.—But where joy is undisturbed this impulse is scarcely felt; and in proportion as this impulse is felt, enjoyment is diminished, pp. 282–285.

CHAPTER VIII.

JOY (II).

4. *The Play-Impulse and the Behaviour of Play.*

Play distinguished from work or serious activity: if it exercises the same instincts, what makes it play? The same instincts here organised in the system of joy, instead of in the systems of anger, fear and appetite, and subordinated to its end. Hence two new features: (1) the same instinctive behaviour apt to repeat itself in play because it is here an object of joy; and (2) in social plays, the destructive instincts are partially inhibited, so that their activities may be consistent with enjoyment, and not arouse fear or anger, pp. 288–299.

—The system of joy, as manifested by play, contains more instincts than any other primary system ; but they are all borrowed except the one that originally belongs to it, which gives to it its characteristic behaviour and essential end, pp. 299–300.

CHAPTER IX.

SORROW.

1. *Of the Common Varieties of Sorrow and Melancholy.*

Two out of the four common types are 'mixed,' and none of them are based on inherent differences of tendency, pp. 301–305.—In melancholy and 'melancholia,' sorrow or sadness is frequently connected with fear: law of their connection, pp. 305–309.—If we disconnect sorrow from other emotions that complicate its behaviour, its varieties seem reduced to two,—the depressed and the excited, pp. 309–310.

2. *Of the Causation of Sorrow.*

Sorrow, except where caused by a state of the body, arises from the frustration of some impulse or desire, pp. 310–314.

3. *Of the Nature of the System of Sorrow.*

Sorrow, as an emotion of weakness caused by frustration of impulse has, as its innately determined end, to obtain from others the help of which it stands in need: the instinctive behaviour of its system is the cry for help. The appeal for relief, distraction and sympathy, a development of this primitive cry. The system of sorrow, therefore, includes an instinct, pp. 314–317.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE LAWS OF THE TENDENCIES OF SORROW IN THE SENTIMENTS.

1. *Of Two Different Tendencies of Emotion.*

Tendencies of emotion are either conative or non-conative, pp. 319–320.

2. *The Law of Attraction.*

The sorrow of love by voluntary recollection of the object, by augmentation of its own suffering, by resistance to consolation, by its ideal of constancy, manifests its attraction to its object, pp. 320–323.

3. *The Law of Restoration.*

The sorrow of love strives to restore that state of the beloved object, or that relation to it, the loss of which causes the sorrow, pp. 323–326.

4. *Of the Source of the Tendencies of Attraction and Restoration in Sorrow.*

The tendency of attraction in sorrow is derived from joy, according to the law that innate and acquired tendencies of one system may be also organised in some other system to which they are serviceable, pp. 326–328.—The tendency of restoration does not belong to the system of joy, but is innately connected with interruption or frustration of its impulse. The tendency of restoration belongs to the system of sorrow, but is sometimes felt without eliciting the emotion. When the tendencies of attraction and restoration in sorrow are themselves frustrated, then sorrow—other things equal—is at its maximum intensity. The behaviour of these tendencies seems to be in part instinctive, pp. 328–333.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE LAWS OF THE INCREASE AND DIMINUTION OF SORROW.

Sorrow increased by the precedency of joy, or by our remembrance of it, or by our witnessing the signs of it around us, or even by our thought of it, pp. 334–336.—Sorrow diminished by the precedency of sorrow, by remembrance of it, by the perception of the signs of it around us, or by the thought of it around us, pp. 336–339.—Sorrow increased when it is sudden and unexpected ; but, when it is either foreseen or the mind prepared for it, not felt with the same intensity pp. 339–341.—Sorrow diminished by the knowledge that another sorrows with us, but increased by the knowledge that another rejoices at our suffering. Sorrow tends to become more painful by being kept secret ; but to be eased by being disclosed, pp. 341–342.—The intensity of sorrow diminished by self-control, and increased by loss of control ; increased also by the knowledge that misfortune is caused by our own folly ; or by anything that once belonged to us : or by one whom we love, pp. 343–346.

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE LAWS OF THE NON-CONATIVE TENDENCIES OF SORROW

1. *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Arouse Anger.*

We cannot define the conditions under which sorrow when opposed tends to arouse anger ; we know only that the opposing force must not be too strong and that there must be sufficient energy to resist it, pp. 347–349.

2. *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Break the Spirit.*

When the opposition to the impulse of sorrow is too great to arouse anger, the impulse of sorrow being frustrated, sorrow is increased ; and in proportion as this frustration occurs again and again, it tends to destroy all hope, courage and energy of resistance, pp. 350–352.

3. *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Destroy the Value Set upon the Objects of other Sentiments and to Increase the Value set on its own.*

The sorrow of love, in proportion to its persistence, diminishes or destroys the value placed on the objects of other sentiments of love, because it diminishes or destroys our capacity to receive joy from them, pp. 352–355.—So far as sorrow diminishes the value placed on other objects, it increases that placed on its own. Joy an original source of judgments of value, pp. 355–360.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE TENDENCY OF SORROW TO STRENGTHEN AND PERFECT THE CHARACTER OR TO WEAKEN AND DEGRADE IT.

1. *Of the Opposite Opinions Concerning the Value of Sorrow.*

Some great writers hold that sorrow is useless and has a bad influence on character ; others, that it has a great use and value, pp. 361–364.

2. *Attempt to Estimate the Value of Sorrow by Estimating the Value of its Functions in Different Systems.*

The function of primitive sorrow, to obtain help. In the sentiment of love, sorrow has a variety of functions : to build up a stable connection with the object, so that the love for it may be strong ; when the object is destroyed to preserve the love for it ; to preserve union with the object or so much of it as remains ; to restore the former union or former state of the object. Where sorrow appears to be useless, its end unattainable, it still tends to develop the union of thought with the object, and to elicit beliefs or hopes of a fuller union hereafter. Where its object is degraded, it tends also by its persistency to find some way of restoring it ; where directed to the evil in our own nature, to restore it by repentance. The function of sorrow in self-love, to preserve the love of those things that for self-love alone have value, and to recover those, the possession of which has been lost, pp. 364–369.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISGUST.

1. *Of Primitive Disgust and its Distinction from the Emotion Developed from it.*

That primitive disgust is not an emotion, but an instinct with its connected impulse : nevertheless both this and the later emotion are the same force in different stages of development, pp. 370–374.

2. *Of the Innate and Acquired Tendencies of Disgust.*

Different reflex acts, according to the part of the body affected,—vomiting, coughing up, blowing out the infected air, thrusting out with the lips, pushing away with the hands : in the later varieties, turning

the eyes, head and body away from the disgusting object; turning away attention from disgusting thoughts. The emotion of disgust inhibits curiosity about its object, and curiosity tends to exclude disgust. Disgust tends to exclude all disinterested emotion on behalf of its object, pp. 374–378.

3. *Of the Instinctive Tendencies of Tactile Disgust.*

Shrinking from the object when near or approaching; shuddering and shaking of the body when the object is upon the surface of it; rushing wildly about; cleansing the part of the body when the object sticks to it, by licking or rubbing it, pp. 378–383.

4. *Of the Laws of the Development of Disgust.*

When the emotion of disgust develops it must have some object, however vague, to refer its thought to and distract it from its own sensation, so that these may fall into the background of consciousness and colour the emotional attitude, pp. 384–486.

5. *Of Primitive Tactile Disgust.*

There is a primitive disgust caused by sensations of touch and temperature localised in other parts of the body than the organs of taste and smell. The instinctive activities connected with this disgust at first accomplished too rapidly for the emotion of disgust to be felt. Before the emotion can be felt, there must therefore be some condition present that delays the instinctive response, pp. 386–389.

6. *Of the Nature and Function of the Emotion of Disgust.*

The emotion of disgust accompanied by a partial revival of the instincts of ejection,—as evidenced by its expression: its central tendency to turn away from and avoid the disgusting object. It organises in a single system a number of instincts of diverse origin, and controls their manifestations, pp. 389–394.

CHAPTER XV.

REPUGNANCE.

1. *Of Repugnance as a Primary Emotion.*

Repugnance a primary emotion opposite to joy, distinct from disgust, pp. 395–398.

2. *The Meaning of the Terms 'Displeasure,' 'Distaste,' 'Repugnance,' 'Aversion,' 'Antipathy.'*

'Displeasure' popularly used to signify an emotion of repugnance implying a certain degree of anger, but distinct from disgust, pp. 398–400.—The term 'aversion' emphasises the conative side of an experience opposite to desire. The term 'distaste,' a weaker form of disgust.

'Antipathy' expresses better than 'distaste' the distinctness of this emotion; but also used to signify opposite emotions to the sympathetic, pp. 400–401.

3. *The Mood of Repugnance.*

Shown by aversion to things in general; by pursuit of solitude; by fault-finding; by anger; by sorrow. It often appears as if the mood were one of irascibility or anger. Tends to develop either misanthropy or pessimism; and to destroy all capacity for love, pp. 401–408.

4. *Of the Relation Between Repugnance and Disgust.*

Repugnance possesses the same central tendency as the emotion of disgust, namely to exclude the perception or thought of its object. Proposal to employ the term 'repugnance' in a more general sense so as to include disgust, pp. 408–410.

5. *Ennui.*

A kind of repugnance, induced by a feeling of mental fatigue at having to attend to, or be occupied with, uninteresting objects, pp. 410–412.

6. *Discontent.*

A late variety of repugnance aroused exclusively by ideas; implies the conception of a better state than our own, and, except in discontent with ourselves, includes a feeling of inequality or injustice. In distinction from ennui, which inclines to sadness, discontent always connected with anger; hence the difference of its expression, pp. 412–416.

CHAPTER XVI.

SURPRISE.

1. *Adam Smith's Theory of the Causes of Surprise and Wonder.*

That the new is not the only cause of wonder, nor is surprise always caused by the unexpected,—as Adam Smith thought. Surprise stronger in proportion as present experience disagrees with other or past experience, pp. 417–421.

2. *Adam Smith's Theory of the Nature of Surprise.*

Smith's theory that surprise was only the first shock accompanying any other emotion suddenly aroused; that it increases the intensity of the emotion blended with it. How far his opinion is correct that it is more akin to joy than sorrow, pp. 421–423.

3. *Of the Chief Varieties of Surprise and what they have in Common.*

Two chief varieties of surprise, sensational and cognitive surprise; in the latter we must cognise the object as a condition of feeling surprise, in the former, not. Sensational surprise put an end to by cognition of the object; so also the cognitive surprise, if cognition satisfies the

curiosity it evokes. Surprise is an emotion of shock and confusion of mind that occupies the interval between the sudden event and the cognition that explains it, pp. 423–427.

4. *Of the Tendencies of Surprise.*

The essential attitude of surprise one of exclamation, excluding curiosity. It has no impulse, and therefore cannot be an emotional system, pp. 428–430.—Its tendencies, non-conative. It indirectly excites the mind to attend to the object, but only as surprise declines. Surprise tends to free the mind from what before occupied it; also tends to diminish the efficacy of the emotion with which it blends; also tends to arrest the impulses of the emotion excited with it, sometimes excluding the emotion itself from being felt, pp. 430–434.

5. *Of the Question Whether Surprise is a Primary Emotion.*

Bain's theory that surprise is a "neutral" excitement and, therefore, a distinct emotion. If its feeling is not "indifferent," surprise may still sometimes be a distinct emotion, pp. 434–437.

CHAPTER XVII.

CURIOSITY.

1. *The Impulse of Curiosity.*

Curiosity an impulse and instinct but not an emotion. The eagerness of curiosity like the eagerness of any other impulse. Many of our primary emotions include the impulse of curiosity, and subordinate it to their ends, pp. 438–442.

2. *The Nature of Wonder.*

Wonder includes an arrested impulse of curiosity; also cognitive surprise or astonishment; also joy; though this may be counteracted in wonder at evil things, pp. 442–448.

3. *Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Knowledge.*

Curiosity, in wonder, tends to pursue knowledge as an end; in other emotions, as means to their ends, pp. 449–450.

4. *Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Mystery.*

Curiosity, in this variety of wonder, tends to maintain ignorance, because held in check by delight in, and astonishment at, the marvellous. Here joy stronger than curiosity, pp. 450–454.

BOOK III.

The System of Desire.

CHAPTER I.

THE SYSTEM OF DESIRE.

1. *Of the differences of Impulse, Appetite and Emotion.*

Three orders of systems: (1) the simplest; the systems of impulses, each including some instinctive or other tendency; (2) the systems of the appetites and emotions, including some of the former tendencies; (3) the most complex: the systems of the sentiments, including some of both the preceding, pp. 457–460.

2. *The Emotional System of Desire.*

Desire sometimes dependent for the foresight of its end on obstruction to its impulse; sometimes the thought of an end occurs first and arouses desire for it, pp. 460–461.—Once desire has arisen, dependent on obstruction for eliciting the potentialities of its system: (1) in respect of the search for and choice of means; (2) for transforming the "uneasiness" of its impulse into definite prospective emotions, corresponding to the checks and releases to which it is subject. These emotions are 'hope,' 'confidence,' 'disappointment,' 'despondency,' 'anxiety,' 'despair.' They belong only to desire; its system essentially contains their dispositions, pp. 461–463.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAWS OF THE EMOTIONAL SYSTEM OF DESIRE.

The prospective emotions of Desire depend on the thought of its end, and on some modification of this thought which acts as the stimulus of one or other of them; and on some obstruction of its end, and on some supposed change of situation affecting the prospective fulfilment of this end, pp. 464–465.—We cannot define the thoughts on which the prospective emotions of hope, anxiety and despondency depend, because states of bodily health or ill health, and innate tempers, predispose us to one or the other. But we cannot feel despair or confidence, unless we have the thought and belief that the end is either certain or unattainable. In disappointment, expectation is suddenly frustrated, pp. 465–467. Have the prospective emotions, like others, their own impulses and ends? pp. 467–468.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS OF DESIRE.

We cannot observe the process by which the prospective emotions have been developed. Hope not joy, and without its essential tendency;

yet with a conservative tendency of its own. It does not seem to be developed from joy, rather to be a definite form of one of the changes to which impulses are subject, pp. 468–471.—Anxiety a development of our later fears. As we are apt to fear lest the end desired may not be accomplished,—when the desire is sufficiently important,—so from this fear interacting with hope, anxiety may be developed. Despondency, disappointment, and despair probably differentiations of sorrow, pp. 472–476.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE (I).

1. *Of the Laws of Hope and Despondency.*

Hope strengthens desire, but, making the future appear better than the present, is often deceptive; still indispensable. Despondency weakens desire; but has this counterbalancing advantage that, by impelling us to desist from the line of action which has led to failure, it leaves us free to attempt some other, to which when hope revives we turn. Hope restores the courage of which despondency deprived us, pp. 477–481.

2. *Of the Tendencies of Anxiety.*

Anxiety, of great service to desire by preventing our yielding to extravagant hopes; by making us cautious and watchful in pursuit of its end; by stimulating desire to further exertions, pp. 481–482.

3. *The Tendencies of Confidence.*

When the end is certain we no longer need caution and watchfulness, and confidence tends to relax them. Self-confidence a valuable support to desire, so long as it inspires us with courage to attempt difficult ends, and is balanced by doubt and anxiety, pp. 482–487.

4. *The Tendencies of Disappointment.*

Disappointment, of service to desire by correcting deceitful hopes and rash confidence; but when excessive and not balanced by opposite emotions, it discourages desire, and excludes hope, pp. 487–490.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE (II).

Despair.

Is despair of any service to desire? It evokes courage, energy and resolution even in cowards, and these necessary in desperate situations, pp. 491–495.—The suicidal impulse, which it evokes in certain cases, shown to be instrumental to its end,—as union in death, or escape from suffering, pp. 496–497.—The study of our less important desires shows that they are not strengthened by despair, but extinguished by it, pp. 497–500.—A contrary law, that despair tends

to weaken desire ; but some desires so strong that they triumph over this influence, thence becoming stronger than they were before, pp. 500-502.—The advantage which these opposite effects of despair have for the sentiment to which the desire belongs, pp. 502-504.

CHAPTER VI.

OF SOME OF THE LAWS OF INTERACTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

That the specific emotions of desire have certain intimate relations among themselves, so that a change which one undergoes involves change in another, pp. 504–508.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE LIMITATIONS OF DESIRE AND THE ANTAGONISM OF DESIRE AND JOY.

1. *Of Joy as interrupting Desire or Ensuing on its Fulfilment.*

The joy of anticipation, which often follows confidence in an end, interrupts desire for it ; so also the joy of retrospect ; the joy of attainment arises when desire is at an end, pp. 509–512.

2. *Of the Joys of Activity and their Relation to Desire.*

The joys of anticipation, retrospect and attainment, joys of rest in comparison with the joys of activity exhibited in playing at games. That this joy, which appears both to imply and to be compatible with desire, is in reality not compatible with it, pp. 512–517.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUSION.

Desires are never independent systems. They spring originally from our emotions and impulses, and have a second and prolific source in our sentiments. They subserve the end of one or other of these forces, and never acquire an end of their own. They cannot therefore serve as the base of a scientific study of character, pp. 518–521.

INDEX.

THE
FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER

INTRODUCTION

I

WHOEVER will consider the treatises on the science of Mind that have appeared up to recent times, will be able to judge how much or how little they have accomplished toward the foundation of a science of Character. The processes of perception and thought, of feeling and will, have been detached from the forces of character at their base. We have what purports to be a science of these processes; while that which alone directs and organises them is left out of account as if it had no importance. Yet we find in the text-books a small and subordinate place allotted to the emotions which, rightly conceived, are among these forces; but too often, as William James complained in his time, they are treated in such a way as to deprive them of the living interest which they have in the drama and the novel.

If we are to have a complete science of the mind, this will include a science of character as the most important part of it; and if we are to make any approach to such a science, it would seem that we must begin by a study of the fundamental emotions and of the instincts connected with them. But we have to conceive of the problem as essentially dynamical. The emotions are forces, and we have to study them as such. Our analysis must not be preoccupied by their constituent feelings and sensations,—and it is here that they

are little capable of scientific treatment, because these constituents are so elusive and variable,—but must be directed to show what are their main tendencies, what biological value they have at first, and what value for the higher ends of character afterwards. Once we grasp this problem clearly, the other problems of their varying sensations, the degree of bodily disturbance accompanying them, their description and classification, will fall into a proper and subordinate place.

As the study of the emotions should be directed in the first place to the discovery and analysis of their tendencies, so this seems to be the only way of advance to the more complicated problems of character; for we cannot attain to any clear conception of how the whole works before we understand how the parts work. The common problems of character—the problems of the growth and decline of nations; the ennobling and degradation of individuals; the changes through which character passes from childhood to youth, from youth to manhood and old-age,—these are so complicated that they confuse the mind, and we abandon all attempts to solve them, except such as are popular and unscientific. We have then first to investigate the forces at the base of character, and the part they play in the general economy of the mind.

The solution of this problem presupposes that we can profitably study the emotions dynamically, and that for this purpose we can sufficiently isolate them from one another and from the character as a whole. It is well for us to understand some of the difficulties of this first and indispensable task. In a strict sense we can never isolate the emotions. Each is bound up with others. Each subsists and works in a mental environment in which it is liable to be interfered with by the rest. Nor do these forces keep themselves, like human beings in the social environment, always distinct. On the contrary, they frequently become blended together, and often what we feel is a confused emotion which we cannot identify.

In consequence of this confusion and interference, we are liable to attribute to one emotion tendencies that belong to

another ; yet we can and do, in many cases, reach probable conclusions. The literary observer has to meet a corresponding difficulty. The conduct which he is observing may be variously interpreted ; but if he is able to observe the living man he may reach a definite conclusion. He believes that each emotion has its characteristic expression and gestures. He passes from the expression to the emotion often with the utmost confidence. What he sees he calls anger or fear or joy or sorrow. And, besides, a man's speech betrays his thoughts, and these his motives. And finally, when he surveys the man's action as a whole, and the ends to which it appears to be directed, he can often judge what are his dominant sentiments. And thus from a man's expression and gestures, from his speech and conduct, we may be able to refer results to motives, the ends accomplished to their determining emotions and sentiments.

What bearing on this conception of the problem has the famous James-Lange theory? The authors of it rejected the common belief that the emotions have definite and persistent characters. The truth is, says Lange, that they present "an infinity of imperceptible transitions," [1] and James says, that "they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things." [2] For if it is true that the peculiar character of their feeling is conditioned by vaso-motor and other bodily changes, and that these being variable (since "one and the same cause may act differently on the vaso-motor nerves of different individuals" [3]), the feeling of the emotion is itself variable in different persons and in the same person at different times ; yet this conclusion only verifies the fact, clear to introspection, that the same emotion may at different times include different bodily sensations. But setting aside those cases already referred to, in which one emotion so blends with others as to produce an emotional state that we cannot name or identify, still, fear, anger and other emotions, though their bodily sensations undergo some change, preserve their identity. We are not at present concerned with the feeling

[1] 'Les Emotions,' 'Conclusions.'
[2] 'Prin. of Psy.,' vol. ii. ch. xxv.
[3] Lange, *ibid.*

of these emotions, but with the bearing of this physiological theory on the conception of them as forces organised to achieve certain ends, which stamps their behaviour with the features recognised as characteristic of them.

It is a remarkable fact that two writers so original and independent could only discern this physiological problem, that James looked upon it as the one way he knew of to lift the study of the subject out of barren classifications and descriptions, while there was the familiar and far more important problem before them, with which practical men are in some measure conversant, of the parts which these emotions play in human life. If these primary emotions belong to our mental constitution, they would presumably not belong to it unless they had some biological value. And looked at in a broad way the value for the preservation of animal life of fear, anger, disgust, and curiosity is sufficiently obvious. Yet Lange confusing the control of emotions,—which so often strengthens them, as far as their depth or persistence is concerned,—with their suppression, looks forward to the day when through "the results of education and the intellectual life," we may end by realising the ideal of Kant of man as a pure intelligence for whom "all of the emotions" if he is still subject to them, will be looked upon as "mental troubles little worthy of him." [1]

The biological conception of the emotions now carries us but a little way. Man does not merely, like the animals, live that he may preserve his life and that of the species. As we rise above the primitive forms of emotion, a number of ends come into prominence that are concerned with the welfare and happiness of life rather than with its preservation. Emotions come to be organised round all those objects that we regard as the good things of life; and without these emotions we should not pursue them; but remain indifferent and apathetic to their appeal.

As James and Lange did not envisage this problem, so they did not consider the bearing of their physiological theory on the conception of the emotions as forces uncon-

[1] *Op. cit.*, 'Conclusions.'

sciously or consciously pursuing ends. We have only to define them, to include feeling and perception and to exclude their conative aspect, and we are no longer troubled with questions of their tendencies. And it has been a custom in English psychology so to conceive of them. Hence, according to this theory, they are naturally regarded as the subjective expression of certain bodily changes,—in the words of James, "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact," and "our feeling of the same changes *is* the emotion."[1]

While functional changes may give to emotions their peculiar sensations, they do not presumably confer on them their characteristic tendencies. The instinctive tendencies of fear to flight and concealment are not also the expression of the paralysis of the voluntary muscles which is asserted to take place, and which does take place in certain forms of the emotion. What then is the bearing of these functional changes on the tendencies of the emotion? When these are most marked are the tendencies strongest? Are they most efficient? When least, are they absent? The functional changes which condition emotions must either render them more or less efficient. The most intense emotions are usually the least efficient, and some, like hope, which are the least intense, are the most persistent and serviceable. The value of an emotion as feeling and sensation, reflecting the bodily changes, is to be estimated by its influence on the tendencies of that emotion. And we must estimate the value of emotions in this way because they are not merely forces, but also systems of character; so that everything that enters into them, their thoughts and feeling, no less than their conation, should support their end, and in proportion as they are efficient, does support it.

This seems to be the chief significance of the James-Lange theory for the problem of the emotions with which we are concerned. A later and more fruitful point of view is opened up by the study of the connection between the emotions and the principal instincts. We have, in contrast with the former theory, one which represents a primary emotion as "the

[1] *Op. cit.*, ch. xxv.

affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts."[1] This theory has the merit of again bringing into prominence the active side of emotions on which their biological value so much depends. But if the James-Lange theory failed to show in what way the bodily changes that conditioned the sensations and feeling were of service to, or even were connected with, the instincts of the same emotion, Dr. McDougall's theory has not shown that the stimuli that arouse these instincts are always and necessarily connected with the excitement of an emotion.

By the recognition of the active side of the primary emotions we are once more able to regard them as among the fundamental forces at the base of character, and the study of them on their dynamical side as affording, through the comparatively simple problems they present, the most hopeful line of advance to the more involved problems of the science.

II

While the value of a knowledge of character is often recognised it is the one subject which is never systematically taught, because there is little or no systematic knowledge about it.

Such knowledge of character as we possess is unsystematic, and has grown up in ways that we neither understand nor control. We did not set ourselves to master it as we set ourselves to master other kinds of knowledge. It has been derived from our own experience, from the opinion of those with whom we associate, and from literature. But this knowledge is never organised like that of science. Unlike science, it is also inexact, and mingled with prejudice and error. If it were science, it would be organised, and the error would be removed ; and, even if we could not make an exact science, we might find some method by which the degree of inexactness and error could be progressively diminished.

A noteworthy part of the old and traditional knowlege of character is stored in the Fables, Proverbs and Maxims of

[1] W. McDougall, 'Social Psychology, sect. i. ch. iii.

mankind; and here too each part of their wisdom, being merely the fruit of observation, is disconnected from other parts. Each proverb or maxim has only more or less truth. The great Bacon made a collection of sophisms and proverbs with their antitheses[1]; for "this matter," he says, "whatever may be thought of it, seems to me of no small value." Yet the antitheses, if they modify the truth to which they are opposed, do not often contradict it: as where on one side we read, "Love of his country begins in a man's own house"; and on the other, "He that has wife and children has given hostages to fortune."[2] These seem to be rather empirical laws that in some way counteract one another, and which are enunciated without any of the conditions that circumscribe their truth. And so is it with other proverbs and maxims: as that "Nothing that is moderate is liked by the common people"; "Deformed persons seek to rescue themselves from scorn by malice"; and others in constant use, like "Love is blind," or "Forbidden fruit is sweetest." If these express laws of character, they are not scientific laws; being detached from one another, inexact, and the truth in them mingled with error in unknown proportions.

Yet even this ancient knowledge which has been tested afresh by one age after another, and has survived for our use, is not officially taught. The young are not required to know by heart the celebrated proverbs, fables and maxims of mankind, as Chinese youths are taught the ancient wisdom of Confucius and his disciples, so that when experience of life is ripe, those great truths may come home to them which they might otherwise miss altogether. For the generalisations of great observers themselves direct and aid observation. But such things are now forgotten, and wits dismiss them as commonplaces no longer worthy of notice by an age so complex and progressive as ours. No one attempts to sound the depth of meaning underlying these thoughts, and to make it the base of new observations, that correct what is erroneous, and supplement what has been overlooked in the old. But if there were a science of character its provisional laws would

[1] 'De Augmentis Scientiarum,' B. vi. ch. iii. (Spedding and Ellis).
[2] *Ibid.*

progress from one age to another, and grow into a body of truth increasing in magnitude, variety and coherence, beside which the knowledge possessed by the wisest man of the past would seem one-sided and narrow.

In what other respects would the situation be changed if we possessed a science of character? Its truths, being organically connected together, could be systematically taught. The young man could be placed, so far as the general knowledge of the subject was concerned, not merely in a position which is now only possible to men of mature and varied experience, but in a superior position, because his knowledge would be more accurate, extensive and coherent. In one respect only would the comparison be against him: his knowledge would be mainly derived from books, and without the experience which alone gives the realisation of its truths. Yet the young are naturally observant, and often make experiments to test one another and their teachers; and men when they grow up often cease to observe character through too much learning or absorption in physical science. If the abstract laws of character were taught in permanent connexion with old and new observations which illustrate them, the knowledge obtainable in youth would not be merely abstract, and would sometimes approximate to the vividness of experience. Great dramatists and novelists impress the experiences of their characters so vividly upon us as almost to seem like our own experiences; and through the power of imagination, even in youth, we may have lived many lives. The knowledge of the young if it lacked experience, would still have the advantage that it had not come too late to be of service to them.

Finally a disastrous consequence of our present ignorance of the subject might be remedied. It is often remarked that the wisdom which a nation learns in one age it loses in another. Its experience changes with its altered situation. The lessons of the past are despised and forgotten. In the name of 'Progress' it abolishes the customs of its ancestors, as sons throw over the rules of their parents, but without understanding their meaning or their uses. It adopts the ruling Ideas of the present unquestioningly, without insight

into the laws of character which they exemplify and the sentiments to which they belong. It proceeds on its path of 'progress,' as if these laws had no existence, until bitter experience reminds it of their truth ; but often with the nation as with the individual, wisdom comes too late to retrieve disaster. These evils will always recur from time to time, and there is no safeguard against them, except the inclusion of all the truths of character in a system of science where they will be so organised in the general plan that no one of them can decay and be forgotten.

BOOK I

THE CONCEPTION OF CHARACTER

CHAPTER I

MILL'S CONCEPTION OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

THERE is one great writer to whose work we shall first refer because it has been the source of all subsequent attempts to found a science of character. It is more than sixty years since J. S. Mill wrote the famous chapter in his logic which he entitled "Ethology," in which the plan and method of the new science were for the first time clearly laid down. Notwithstanding many works that have appeared since, inspired by him, this single chapter is still, in my opinion, the most important contribution to the proposed science. Yet Mill accomplished nothing further, though he appears, at one time, to have purposed writing a treatise on the subject:—a failure which we may perhaps account for by the state of psychology in his time, and the dominance of the Laws of Association as explanatory principles.

Mill conceived that the science of Character should be "founded on the laws of Psychology,"[1] and should connect the many popular generalisations about character with these laws. He speaks of these generalisations as "the common wisdom of common life,"[2] and calls them "empirical,"[3] because they are based on experience, and distinguishes them from the scientific or "causal laws,"[4] because they are not universally true. They hold, he tells us, within certain limits, but we do not know what those limits are. The proverbs, "When your fortune increases the columns of your house appear to you crooked,"[5] and "Love is blind," would be

[1] 'A System of Logic,' B. vi. ch. v.
[2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*
[5] 'Armenian Proverbs,' trans. G. Bayan. (Venice, 1889).

empirical laws in Mill's sense. They are true of a great number of cases, but not of all. And of any new case we could not predict whether this would be an exemplification of the law, or an exception to it. But if we can discover why it is that Love is so often blind, or why it is that as a man's fortune increases he notices the defects in his property or imagines such as do not exist, then "in the propositions which assign those causes will be found the explanation of the empirical laws, and the limiting principle of our reliance on them."[1] But "if we have not yet accounted for the empirical law—if it rest only on observation—there is no safety in applying it far beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations were made."[2]

Thus admirably does Mill suggest how the empirical laws may be raised from approximate to scientific truth by connecting them with the causal laws on which they depend.

As regards the causal laws themselves, they are none other, Mill thinks, than "the general laws of mind";[3] and from their application there will arise the principles of the science of character, which will therefore be, in Bacon's sense, "axiomata media," or middle principles, because they will occupy an intermediate position between the generalisations of popular opinion and the supreme laws of mind.[4] Thus the science of character will be concerned with secondary and more concrete laws than is general psychology; but it will be essentially a psychological science.

This relation between the general laws of mind and the secondary laws which result from their application indicates the method which Mill regards as prescribed to the new science. It will be "altogether deductive."[5] For we cannot discover laws of the changes of character by experiment, since we can give neither an accurate nor a complete account of the character before and after it, and from observation alone we can only derive approximate generalisations. Still while this account would probably be true of the strictly scientific laws, it is not true of the empirical laws of character.

[1] *Op. cit.*, B. vi. ch. v. 2.
[2] *Ibid.*, i.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Op. cit.*

These, on the contrary, are based on observation, or introspection, and the method by which we reach them is inductive. Hence the progress of the science will depend on the alternative employment of both methods, even if the completion of any part of it can only be accomplished through deduction. And this seems to have been substantially Mill's own opinion. "The progress of this important but most imperfect science," he says, "will depend on a double process: first, that of deducing theoretically the ethological consequences of particular circumstances of position, and comparing them with the recognised results of common experience; and, secondly, the reverse operation; increased study of the various types of human nature that are to be found in the world; conducted by persons not only capable of analysing and recording the circumstances in which these types severally prevail, but also sufficiently acquainted with psychological laws. . . ." [1]

Having dealt with Mill's conception of the science and the method he prescribed for it, we come next to the question of its practicability. It will be evident, from what has been already said, that this practicability will principally depend on two conditions, (1) the existence of a sufficient number of "empirical laws" to serve as the inductive base of the science, and (2) the knowledge of a sufficient number of the "laws of mind" to serve as principles of deduction. Concerning the first condition, in Mill's opinion, it was sufficiently fulfilled at the time at which he wrote. "The empirical laws," he says, "have been formed in abundance by every successive age of humanity . . ." [2] Literature is full of them; and the original mind of Goethe, reflecting on this common wisdom of life, is compelled to admit that "Everything that is wise has been thought already; we can only try to think it over again." Yet it is strange to reflect that nothing has yet been done by psychologists towards forming a collection of these laws and classifying them on some useful system, and this notwithstanding the great influence that Mill exercised on his own and subsequent generations, and although many works have appeared since his time

[1] *Ibid.*, 6. [2] *Ibid.*, 6.

professedly dealing with ethological problems. Yet numbers of books of quotations have been published and selections of the "wit and wisdom" or "favourite passages" of various authors, wherein we might expect to find a collection of the empirical laws of character ready to hand if not classified on any scientific basis; but they have been compiled without psychological interest, and present a confused mass of prudential maxims, witticisms, moral exhortations, consolations in misfortune, platitudes, with only here and there one of those laws of character of which we are in search.

This preparatory work, then, has still to be accomplished; but the empirical laws exist however much labour may be involved in extracting them from the mass of alien matter in which they are embedded; and so far the hopes which Mill entertained of the constitution of the science seem to have been not unreasonable.

It is when we turn to the second condition of the practicability of the science, the knowledge of the laws of mind that are capable of serving as bases for its deductions, that we may well doubt whether it was sufficiently fulfilled in his time. Yet on the surface all appeared favourable enough. Mill was able to write on "the laws of Mind" one of those admirably persuasive chapters, the art of which he so well understood. Examined closely, these laws are found to be none other than the familiar laws of Association and the law of Retentiveness on which they are based, coupled with the admission of "mental chemistry"; a principle that was then coming into vogue to account for those transformations that arise in mental developments which the laws of Association so signally fail to interpret.

Now of what service are these laws of Association for deducing laws of character, and for determining the "limiting principle of our reliance" on the "empirical laws" of popular opinion? Is the familiar blindness of sexual love due to association by contiguity or to association by similarity? Does any principle of association raise the empirical law to a scientific truth by revealing the limits of its application? Does it enable us even to interpret what seems to be an opposite law enunciated by Shakespeare, that "love

gives to every power a double power," and "adds a precious seeing to the eye"? How can it? The law of association by contiguity assures us that when two sensations or ideas have been experienced together, the recurrence of one of them tends to arouse an idea of the other. If then we are to explain the common blindness of love by this law we must assume that there is in the first instance a casual conjunction between an emotion of love and inattention to defects of its object. This being assumed there will arise, according to the law, a tendency for this inattentiveness to recur when the emotion of love recurs; and this tendency, according to the frequency of the conjunction between them, will grow stronger. But what is to assure us of any uniformity of conjunction between them in the first instance? Given innumerable human beings, most of whom at some period of their lives pass through this experience of love, why are not the cases in which a casual conjunction between love and blindness occurs balanced by others in which the casual conjunction is between an emotion of love and perception of defects? Or if there is a disproportion on the one side, how can that account for such a constantly recurring uniformity in different parts of the world and in different ages, so that the fable of the blindness of love has become one of the most familiar ideas, verified ever afresh by one person after another in his own experience. The law of association by contiguity does not interpret this uniformity. On the contrary it leads us to anticipate an opposite result. It cannot account for the empirical law; still less then can it furnish us with the limiting principle of its range, and enable us to foresee in what directions exceptions are likely to occur.

Shall we be more likely to deduce this uniformity of experience from the law of Association by Similarity? The law of association by similarity lays it down that where any sensation or idea has some point in common with a second idea, the one has a tendency to arouse the other. Now we need not concern ourselves with the theory that these two laws of association are reducible to a single law of Redintegration; we may take them as they were generally held by the

older psychologists, as independent laws, and we have only to consider whether any bond of similarity can account for the conjunction between love and inattention to defects of its object? Again how can it? What similarity is there between them, or what greater similarity than between love and attention to such defects? How then is it possible that the one should suggest the other, not only more frequently than other experiences, but with a uniformity so constant as to produce the impression of a law of our character?

It is then neither a casual conjunction in the first instance, reinforced and rendered stable afterwards by the law of association by contiguity, nor an original resemblance between them that accounts for the familiar connection between love and blindness to defects of its object, but some principle that determines an organic instead of a chance connection; and on this principle the laws of association by contiguity and similarity throw no light whatever.

There remains only the principle of mental chemistry; and those are cases of mental chemistry, according to Mill, wherein simple ideas are so associated in a complex idea as to lose their distinctive qualities, and are properly said to "generate" rather than to "compose" that complex idea[1]: as "when the seven prismatic colours are presented to the eye in rapid succession," and "the sensation produced is that of white."[2] But this principle is wholly inapplicable to the present case, which is one of a connection between a sentiment of love and a peculiar attitude of mind distinct from it.

It would be superfluous to examine in detail other empirical laws of character and show that the principles of association cannot account for them. No competent person, in the present day, would think of applying these laws to such purposes. The extravagant hopes which they once aroused have long since been dissipated. It remains for us only to draw the obvious conclusions: the "laws of mind" which were known to psychologists at the time at which Mill wrote did not suffice to interpret the "empirical laws" or "approximate generalisations" concerning character, to be found in literature and the common speech of mankind, or to lead to our

[1] *Op. cit.*, B. vi. ch. iv. 3. [2] *Ibid.*

discovery of "the limiting principle" of their truth. With the laws of Association and "mental chemistry" as his only guides, it was impossible that he should have succeeded in his bold enterprise of founding a science of character. We need seek for no other explanation of his failure. But the work which he accomplished in forming a clear conception of the science and of the methods applicable to it, his firm grasp of the importance of the empirical laws as the indispensable data for its construction, were in themselves a remarkable achievement. They will remain a chief stimulus and aid to those who attempt to follow him in the search for its solid foundations.

CHAPTER II

THE LAW OF ORGANISATION AS IT IS DISCLOSED IN MIND

THERE are in all of us two kinds of forces or activities, the one making for organisation, the other for disorganisation; the one making us free in the higher sense, or free from slavery to impulse, the other making us free in the lower sense, or free from disagreeable restraints. These forces are referred to in the popular distinction between Principle and Inclination. We shall also interpret them by the distinction, to be presently explained, between Sentiment and Emotion.

Notwithstanding the theoretic distinction between these two kinds of force, and the profound significance of their opposite effects on character, they are in one respect identical: both pursue ends, and select the means to them: both are systematic; but the systems of the one are relatively comprehensive and permanent, those of the other relatively restricted and temporary.

There would seem to be, then, a law of our nature transcending the distinction between these two kinds of forces, and embracing both, that works universally to establish some kind of organic connection, never to establish the casual conjunctions due to the laws of Association. This is the law of Organisation as it is disclosed in the mind. We can easily recognise it, because we have become familiar with the conceptions of system and organisation through the progress of the biological sciences: but it was overlooked by Mill and the English psychologists of his day. It has still no appropriate and

accepted name,[1] and we can only distinguish it by the phrase we have already employed.

We shall now attempt to show that the most simple and general fact concerning our conative activity, is that it tends in all its manifestations to form some degree of organisation. For, being directed to ends, neither the stream of ideas, nor the field of perception, wholly preserves that chance-order which, apart from this organising activity, it would exhibit, but approximates to a systematic order, as a condition of fulfilling the ends pursued. The organisation of the body and all its parts is reflected in the mind. If the mind did not also tend to organise itself, how would its development have helped in the struggle for life? The most perfect types of mind and character are the most highly organised. This seems to be the fundamental law underlying all other laws of character: (1) *Mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and to sustain system and organisation.* Let us then adopt this law provisionally as our working conception.

We can trace the presence of this law in the child and the man even where the degree of organisation is least. The child must be kept amused and occupied. When it is not occupied it is not amused. It grows tired of old toys on which it has so often exercised itself. It pushes them away, and begins to fret. It becomes restless, and the movements of its hands and eyes are disorganised. But give it a new toy, and, at once, hands and eyes begin to work in common accord for the understanding of it. It ceases to cry, because it has again found something to organise its activity. Its cry witnessed to the presence of an impulse directed to the organisation of its mental life. The man, having self-control, no longer weeps when

[1] M. Paulhan calls it the 'law of systematic association' ('L'Activité Mentale'). See also 'Les Caractères,' in which this author describes it as 'cette grande loi universelle qui fait passer tout ce qui se développe de la pluralité à l'unité, de l'incohérence à la systématisation, et du hasard à la finalité . . . .' (Preface). As this law has nothing in common with the old laws of Association, I think it better not to adopt this name, but to select one that emphasises the antagonism between them. Prof. Ribot thinks that it might be called the "Law of Feeling" ('Psy. of the Emotions,' pt. i. ch. xii.) See also Fouillée, "Psy. des Idées Forces," L. I.

he is in the same situation ; but there is still present the same impulse to escape from it. Why is it that most people find walking without an object so disagreeable? or waiting on a platform for a train that is late, or in an office for an appointment? It is not merely that a previous occupation has been suspended, but also because mind and body cannot, in such situations, readily find a new occupation to replace the former one. Aimless movements, random thoughts, turning over the pages of a magazine in which you are not interested, replace the preceding organised activity. But let a friend be met unexpectedly, and at once his presence excites the sentiment of friendship, and the mind finds a new occupation in all the fresh facts concerning it. What again is 'ennui' or boredom? It is the distaste which the mind feels when it is unoccupied. It is the painful fatigue of idleness, when we will not throw ourselves into the occupations we have, or have not those we want. And if we take the types of character which represent the lowest form of mental organisation,[1] the people who yield to the present inclination and seldom oppose it, we find still an organising activity which lasts for a little time, and when it is spent, must find fresh objects to renew it. Hence these persons, as Schopenhauer remarks, are more subject to boredom than any others, and so often experience the painful and restless state, which still reveals the innate disposition of the mind for organised activity.

The same fundamental law is present in the mental life of animals. When the domestic cat is not licking itself, when it is not curiously exploring the recesses of a new room, or watching the birds in the tree, or stalking them in the grass, when all its instinctive and organising activities are suspended, it curls itself up and falls asleep ; and it only does not feel ennui, like a man, because it sleeps. The dog, too, having nothing to do, sleeps at its master's feet, till it is aroused by his tyranny to follow him on his rounds, and accept his ends, finding an intermittent occupation for itself in exploring the odours by the road-side.

This fundamental law of character may be only a general

[1] 'Les Caractères,' Paulhan : 'Les Impulsifs.'

expression for the particular laws of its various forces, because every one of them organises the activity of the mind for some end : on the other hand, it seems to point to something deeper and more comprehensive, because we find it present in the intervals between their activities, in the feeling of ennui, which makes the state of disorganisation into which we may have fallen repugnant to us. Hence it is, as La Rochefoucauld observed, that "there is in the human heart a perpetual generation of passions ; in consequence of which the ruin of one leads almost always to the initiation of another."[1] The boy, as he throws aside one occupation after another, despising now what before so much delighted him, must find some new sentiment to replace the old ones now dead. And all of them that succeed each other in the course of his life bear witness to the inveterate tendency of the mind to organise its activity.

It is the organic laws of the different forces of our character—the particular exemplifications of this fundamental law—which, if we were able to discover them, would alone seem capable of interpreting those common generalisations about character to which Mill attached so much importance. The laws of Association on which he and the old writers founded extravagant expectations, so far from interpreting, frequently counteract the laws of Organisation, by substituting casual and unmeaning for serviceable connections. They only favour the laws of Organisation in so far as they strengthen the bonds which these laws first create, or weaken those which they attempt to sever. They interpret the law of habit, according to which any system which establishes itself is strengthened by the associations which it forms in accordance with the laws of contiguity and retentiveness.

[1] 'Maximes,' ix.

CHAPTER III

THE SYSTEMS OF THE EMOTIONS

1. *Of the Constitution of Character*

We have come to recognise that the Laws of Mind that we require for interpreting empirical generalisations concerning character must be organic and not mechanical laws, and that without such, and with merely the mechanical laws of Association to replace them, there can be no foundation for the science of Character. But these laws of Mind are not ready to hand, like the laws of Association ; we have to find them. Still if it is the essential nature of Mind, and the most general fact that we can assert about it, that it tends always to organise its process, then, wherever we examine mental process, we should find some organic law, whether the force present be that of the play-impulse, or one of the serious sentiments of our life, as that for our family or profession. These organic laws are in fact the laws of our instincts, emotions and sentiments. Men considering us from the outside, observe the manifestations of these same systems. They come to the same conclusion that there are forces in us which always pursue some end ; and the wisest of them, observing our conduct, formulate empirical laws of our character, as that "Love is blind," or that "Forbidden fruit is sweetest," or disguise these laws in Fables, as that of "the Fox and the sour grapes," or "the Dog in the manger,"—which are again and again applied to characterise the same kind of conduct, and to make men recognise in themselves what is so evident to those who watch them. Thus we have to seek for two kinds of law about the same kind of force or system : the one

derived from popular observation, liable to exceptions, unscientific, but recognised and formulated; the other, belonging to the inner nature of these systems, organic laws, not liable to exceptions, for the most part not formulated, either because they elude discovery, or because psychologists have never systematically studied them. Both kinds of laws are indispensable to a science of character, and the possibility of its foundation depends on the discovery of a sufficient number of them.

These forces which are also systems, these systems which are forces, with their laws and subsidiary components, constitute our character. For with them and in them everything else that belongs to it is organised: our thoughts and volitions, even the virtues and vices that distinguish us.

We may attempt to make this conception clearer by contrasting character with circumstances. We see on the one hand the circumstances in which a man is placed, and a stream of experiences in the mind corresponding to them; on the other hand, character and its forces. How much of this stream is attended to and gives rise to clear perceptions depends, in great part, on these forces or systems of the character. They control and direct attention. Hence it is pointed out that the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, and the soldier, notice different kinds of fact, because their interests are divergent.

Beside this stream of perceptual experiences, often very sluggish or relatively fixed, there is another and more mobile stream of ideas. And here too we notice the same thing; those of our ideas which are attended to, arrested, recalled, are largely under the control of these same forces or systems of our character, whose organic laws organise and direct them. But interwoven with them, counteracting and sometimes neutralising their influence, are those other and mechanical laws of association. Both streams are thus subject to two opposite kinds of influence; and so far as their composition and order is determined by the laws of association, and is not modified by these organic laws, it cannot be said to belong to character. It does not form part of any system. Its order is casual and unmeaning. But it

still forms part of the mind. It belongs to those mental processes which are the ever-changing material from which the systems of character select what they need, by which they are brought into touch with changes of the environment, and warned to adjust themselves to them. But character is centred in this organising activity itself, and is manifested in every one of its systems.

In contrast with this conception it is curious to observe to what a poor collection of detached qualities we often reduce the living characters of men. Such a man we judge, has a strong will, is energetic, is industrious; but reserved, disobliging, and unsociable. Another is complaisant and sociable; but weak and insincere. These summaries of men's natures are chiefly of use for practice. For as with those whom we are asked to employ, we want to know first whether they are honest, sober, industrious, and understand the work they profess to do; so we expect to be helped by knowing something of those with whom we are likely to be brought into contact. But such lists of qualities do not tell us anything of their inner connection, and to what limitations they are subject, and what are the chief systems of the mind which elicit, develop, and organise them, whilst allowing other qualities to perish.

Abstract and disconnected qualities of character are then subordinated to its unified systems, and we have first of all to understand these systems and their laws.

We shall in the remainder of this chapter describe one of the principal orders of these systems, but without giving evidence for our conclusions, which we reserve for the second book. For we have first of all to form a conception of character in order to know what the science is at which we are to aim. And we shall find, step by step, as we add to our initial conception of character, that the problems of the new science will unfold themselves, and become progressively defined. And thus the future science may be regarded from this point of view as dependent on the progressive definition of an initially vague and abstract conception, and its transformation into conceptions that become ever more adequate to the wonderful and intricate object represented by

them. And this will be an essential feature of our method: this working conception that grows with and adapts itself to the knowledge of the facts. For here no one could formulate a true and adequate conception all at once.

2. *Of the Nature of an Emotional System, and of the different Primary Emotions.*

Now as there are in the body certain greater systems and certain lesser systems, so there are such also in the character. And as in the body the greater systems include certain subsidiary organs or systems,—as the nutritive system, its various organs, and the nervous systems, other systems, as the sympathetic, the peripheral, and the central nervous system,—so in the character also there are certain principal systems which organise others subsidiary to them. Now among these lesser systems that are, or may be, organised in greater, are the primary emotions with their connected instincts. And here we may refer to the fact, which is well recognised, that the systems of the mind, as mental systems, cannot be separated from certain bodily systems. Every system of the mind is incomplete, and has part of its system in the body, and every system of the body, which is not merely reflex, is also incomplete, and has part of its system in the mind. Whatever stimulus may be given to an instinctive system by an emotion of the mind, the executive part of it is in the body, and there also is another or receptive part which arouses the emotion. Thus the instincts of flight and concealment, involving so many co-ordinated movements for the fulfilment of their ends, are a part, and at first the largest and principal part, of the emotional system of fear, as imposing the end at which the system aims. And that part of the system which is in the mind includes not only the feeling and impulse of fear, but all the thoughts that subserve escape from danger. As we advance in life these acquired constituents, which modify the inherited structure of fear, become ever more numerous and important in correspondence with the growth of our experience.

The same is also true of anger and disgust, two emotions whose systems also include instincts. But while disgust is included among the recognised emotions—although in origin, and in respect of its most prominent side, it is the negative instinct which leads to the rejection by the organism of substances that are unsuitable or dangerous—yet the positive and complementary instinct is not held to belong to an emotion. The feeling and impulse which accompanies and controls the search for and absorption of food is known as the appetite, not as the emotion of hunger. An appetite is aroused by internal rather than by external stimulation, has a greater regularity of recurrence than an emotion, and becomes more urgent the longer it remains unsatisfied; but in other respects the psychological difference between them is unimportant. Both are psycho-physical systems, both include instincts and emotional impulses.

We must place therefore in these lesser mental systems not only certain emotions, but also the appetites of hunger and sex. There are other systems which we call neither emotions nor appetites, but loosely refer to as impulses, needs, or wants. Among them are the impulses connected with exercise and repose. Whether these include instincts may be more open to question. But the mode in which an animal takes the exercise characteristic of its species is recognised to be an instinct—as the flight of birds, the swimming of ducks, or the sinuous movement of snakes. And this instinct is connected with the impulse for exercise, and cooperates sometimes with hunger, sometimes with anger or fear, sometimes with the play-impulse.

The impulse for repose or sleep seems also to include an instinct. Different groups of animals have different ways of pursuing rest and sleep. Some make lairs, some perch on boughs, and bury their heads under their wings; some, like snakes, coil up. And the impulse is no mere impulse, but includes its own feeling. The longing for rest when we are forced to work, and the body feels tired, the longing for exercise when it feels fresh, and we are pent up in the house, reaches a high degree of emotional intensity. It was, we may surmise, for this reason that the old writers included Desire

among the primary emotions[1]; a custom which the moderns have reversed, under the influence, perhaps, of the abstract psychologising that was inclined to discern in an emotion only feeling, in an impulse only conation, and in other states only cognition.

The appetites and primary impulses, some of which we have noticed, we shall provisionally class with the primary emotions. Their feelings have not often the individual distinctness of fear and anger; and there are other differences which the course of our enquiry will elicit; but they belong to those lesser systems of the mind with which we are here concerned. They contain instincts, or, at least, innate tendencies. They are primary, or underived from any other existing impulse or emotion. They, therefore, belong to those fundamental forces of character, without a knowledge of which it were in vain to attempt to understand its later and more complex developments.

Of the primary emotions we have as yet noticed only fear, anger, and disgust; we must now briefly refer to those which remain; premising only that the attempt to furnish an exhaustive list must be provisional, and that we may come to include in the end many impulses or emotions that we overlooked in the beginning. Among those which we have been able to recognise, Curiosity is one of the most important. It presents more the character of an impulse than of an emotion as generally understood; but it is none the less a primary system, and the basis of the intellectual life. It appears to include a well-formed instinct, and to be susceptible of some degree of emotional excitement. This instinct induces animals to make such movements as are necessary for a fuller acquaintance with an object, as to approach it closely, to sniff at it, to regard it with attentive scrutiny.[2]

The next two systems, Joy and Sorrow, in contrast with Curiosity, present rather the character of emotions than that

[1] Or 'Passions' as they were then called. See Descartes, 'Les Passions de l'Ame,' Deuxième partie, Art. 69. Also Locke, 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' B. ii. ch. 20, § 6.

[2] Dr. McDougall has well described the behaviour of this instinct See his 'Social Psychology,' ch. iii.

of impulses or wants. They have been commonly regarded as primary, and it is improbable that any one will succeed in deriving them from other existing emotions. They are manifested very early in child-life. They include, if not instincts, at least innate tendencies. The general innate tendency of all joy is directed to maintain some process already existing. We attend to some stimulus perhaps accidentally, or because of its unusual intensity, but if it gives us joy or delight, we continue to attend to it. One of the earliest joys common to both men and the higher animals is that of satisfying hunger; as one of the earliest sorrows is that caused by the lack of food. Through hunger the young animal seeks the teat, and sucks at it when found: that is the instinct of its hunger. The enjoyment which it feels leads it to suck as long as the enjoyment is felt; that is the innate tendency of the emotion. And this enjoyment sometimes outlasts the satisfaction of appetite, and some men continue eating through gluttonous enjoyment.

The impulse of joy is thus often consequent on some other impulse, and accompanies its satisfaction, and continues as long as the enjoyment is felt. But after this enjoyment there frequently succeeds to it an opposite impulse. For soon monotony or satiety provokes aversion. Thus we withdraw from many things that at first give us a lively enjoyment, to return to them after an interval, but generally with diminished enjoyment. This withdrawal is due to Repugnance or Aversion, like Joy a primary system, but having an impulse and end opposite to that emotion. For when things are repugnant to us we behave in an opposite way to that in which we behave when we have joy in them, namely by withdrawing attention from them, and the accommodation of the organs, and often the body itself from their neighbourhood.

There are other kinds of joy and repugnance which, in distinction from those we have examined, do not seem to be consequent on the activity of any impulse that we feel. Thus there are some things which are an enjoyment to look at from the first, and others which are as immediately repugnant to us. The eyes, we suppose, are as much exercised by the examination of an ugly as of a beautiful object; but in the

former case we feel repugnance, in the latter, joy; in that, an impulse to withdraw the attention, in this, to maintain it.

Thus the child continues gazing at the light because he enjoys it, and cries to get back to it when he is turned away, because the gloom in front of him is distasteful; the cat who has lain curled up on the rug after a little time climbs up on a piece of furniture to look out of the window, where, if not warmth, is compensating cheerfulness. And we too avoid 'gloomy' people and 'gloomy' parties where the guests sit lost in their own reflections, and we use the term 'gloomy' to describe these things because they are immediately repugnant to us.

But often our repugnance is obstructed. We have to stay in places repugnant to us, or to live with people repugnant to us, or to do work repugnant to us. The little child cries to get back to the light, but he cannot turn his body round. This obstruction of an innate impulse tends to arouse in him either anger or sorrow, according to circumstances. For as the stimuli of curiosity and fear often differ only in degree,—a slighter degree of strangeness arousing the former, and a greater, the latter,—so the obstruction of an impulse may arouse either anger or sorrow according to the degree of its strength. When we make no headway against opposition, when it does not yield to our efforts, but remains immovably fixed, the anger which, perhaps, it first awakened, tends to be replaced by sorrow. We feel ourselves engaging in a hopeless contest against an invincible opponent. This the child cannot understand; but he feels its effects, and it is the cause of his earliest sorrows. Thus Descartes observes: "Quelque fois . . . . il est arrivé que le corps a eu faute de nourriture, et c'est ce qui doit faire à l'âme sa première tristesse."[1] The sorrow of children appears to be connected with a peculiar cry, different from that of fear or anger, and one which mothers can distinguish—the dumb expression of weakness and failure, and of the appeal for help. This appeal is the essential impulse of sorrow.

There are two other impulses of great importance which

[1] 'Les Passions de l'âme,' 2^{me} partie, art. 110.

Prof. Ribot[1] and Dr. McDougall have the merit of distinguishing as among the primary forces of character. The one is the impulse of self-display, the other the impulse of self-abasement. They have been excellently described by Dr. McDougall.[2] The former "is manifested by many of the higher social or gregarious animals, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the time of mating. Perhaps among mammals the horse displays it most clearly. The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated, the creature holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions become superfluously vigorous and extensive, he lifts his hoofs high in air as he parades before the eyes of his fellows. Many animals, especially the birds, but also some of the monkeys, are provided with organs of display that are specially disposed on these occasions. Such are the tail of the peacock and the beautiful breast of the pigeon. The instinct is essentially a social one, and is only brought into play by the presence of spectators."[3] Of the impulse of self-abasement, Dr. McDougall writes that it "expresses itself in a slinking, crestfallen behaviour, a general diminution of muscular tone, slow restricted movements, a hanging down of the head, and sidelong glances. In the dog the picture is completed by the sinking of the tail between the legs."[4] At the approach of a larger, older dog, a young dog under the influence of this impulse, "crouches or crawls with legs so bent that his belly scrapes the ground, his back hollowed, his tail tucked away, his head sunk and turned a little on one side, and so approaches the imposing stranger with every mark of submission."[5]

We have called these primary systems impulses rather than emotions. They are at least primary impulses; but they are probably not the emotions with which they are apt to be identified. The impulse of display cannot be at once both of the emotions of pride and vanity; nor can the impulse of self-abasement be both of the emotions of humiliation and shame. They seem to belong to an earlier and more

[1] 'Psy. of the Emotions,' part ii. ch. v. i.
[2] 'Social Psychology,' ch. iii.
[3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*

undifferentiated stage from which one or other of these later and more definite emotions developed. In respect of this later stage we notice that vanity only, not pride, can possess the instinct of self-display. And with respect to the impulse of self-abasement, do we find it present in either humiliation or shame? Humiliation is painful. A sullen anger accompanies the degrading situation; but it has no impulse of self-abasement. Other of our later emotions have this impulse in some cases, notably awe, admiration, and reverence; and we notice that in all three the emotion is pleasant. But pride and humiliation resist subjection to the last. And if shame feels abasement, being derived from fear, it possesses an instinct of concealment, and has not the impulse shown by the young dog to make the subject of it approach superiors and express submission.

We have now shortly reviewed the most conspicuous of the primary forces of character belonging to its lower and simpler systems. All of them seem to be innate. On their receptive side the connection with the earliest stimuli which arouse them is innate and not acquired; on their executive side, whether their systems contain instincts, or only innate tendencies, they are, in either case, innately organised to pursue certain ends, which alone satisfy them; in this respect contrasting strikingly with many of the impulses which we acquire in later life, the ends of which we call 'artificial,' as the craving to smoke tobacco.

Whether these primary forces, in addition to being innately organised for the pursuit of certain ends, are also similarly organised for the production of certain definite and rigid types of behaviour, which we call instinctive, for the attainment of these ends, is a subsidiary question. That many of them are so we have already seen. In the case of other emotions, as those of joy, sorrow, and repugnance, while the end may be defined, the behaviour requisite to attain it may not be sufficiently definite or complex to be entitled 'instinctive.' But the indefinite modes of behaviour, which distinguish the young child from the young of animals, enable it to experiment, to discover a variety of means, to adapt itself, as no animal can do, and at last to achieve

its ends more certainly in a greater variety of situations.

This question whether the systems of the primary emotions contain instincts, or merely innate tendencies, is then secondary for us. Our aim is to discover all the fundamental forces of character. All emotions and impulses belong to that class so far as their ends are innately determined, so far as their systems are not due to the coalescence of other existing emotions or impulses, whether or not they issue in 'instinctive' forms of behaviour. In a broader sense of the term 'instinctive," they are instinctively organised both to respond to certain stimuli and to pursue certain ends.

We have now advanced to a further stage our initial conception of character by the inclusion of these primary systems; and at once certain problems of the new science are suggested to us. We have to trace the laws of the action and interaction of these primary systems in the pursuit of their pre-determined ends.

CHAPTER IV

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (I)

1. *Of the Innate Bond Connecting the Primary Emotions.*

As in the foregoing chapter the lesser primary systems were summarised, we shall now give a similar and brief review of those greater systems of the character which organise and direct them. And here also we shall have little opportunity to furnish evidence in support of our several conclusions; our aim throughout this first book being to carry forward continually to fresh stages of fullness and definiteness the vague and inadequate conception of character from which we started.

The most conspicuous of these greater systems is Love; and in all Love there is an organisation of the lesser systems of many emotions,—as those of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow, besides others. In the presence of anything we love we are disposed to feel joy, and in prolonged absence from it, sorrow, and at the suggestion of danger to feel the fear of losing it, and when it is attacked to feel anger against the assailant. And with regard to the question whether there is any innate basis for such higher organisation, it seems undeniable that all the primary emotions and impulses are innately connected with the emotion of anger.[1] Interference with any one of them tends to evoke a display of anger; and this is how the earliest anger of the child is manifested, as when it is taken away from its toys, or interfered with in other occupations. Nor would it be a reasonable assumption that this anger is at first fortuitously aroused by obstruction to

[1] W. McDougall, *op. cit.*, sect. i. chap. vi. Note.

some instinct or impulse, and only gradually bound to it by association. The process is too sure and general from the beginning for such an explanation to be plausible. In the second place, the satisfaction of all instincts and impulses tends to be accompanied by some degree of joy or enjoyment, and especially if their satisfaction has been somewhat delayed or obstructed. The occurrence of this enjoyment is no more a fortuitous event on its first happening than was the anger, but seems to be innately connected with the satisfaction of the tendency which preceded it. In the third place, the failure to satisfy any strong primary impulse—not merely the obstruction which arouses anger, but that failure which amounts to frustration—this we have found to be at least one of the primitive causes of sorrow. And it is therefore reasonable to assume that the higher animals, as well as the young child, are susceptible to this primitive sorrow. Anger itself when it is beaten out of an animal, a child, or a man, tends to be replaced by sorrow. The dog, instead of barking, growling, and showing his teeth, yelps; the child bursts into a flood of tears; the schoolboy cries out that he "gives in"; and man himself, his pride broken, appeals for mercy to his enemy, or prostrated by disease and suffering, cries out to an invisible power, "Oh, help me! Have mercy on me!" These are the cries of sorrow, the motor response of the living system in the situation which has evoked it; and in this situation it is the only emotion which is serviceable, and the one therefore which is normally aroused.

Here, then, we must assume that there is some innate connection between the frustrated impulse and sorrow, just as there is between the satisfied impulse and joy.

If we take any other primary impulse or emotion we shall find the same result, as, for instance, hunger, disgust, or the impulses for exercise or repose. According as this impulse or emotion is obstructed, or satisfied, or frustrated, it will elicit anger, joy, or sorrow,—supposing always that it has sufficient strength; for an impulse may be so rapidly superseded that it will have no time to evoke any other emotion.

If, then, any primary emotion will from the outset elicit anger, joy, or sorrow according to the situation in which it

operates, the connection between it and them must be innate. For if the conjunction of one with the other were fortuitous in the beginning, and the connection between them only established by association, then in the beginning also we should find uncertainty, and divergent results in different cases, with only at most a progress toward uniformity, instead of uniformity from the beginning.

And, further, any impulse that is strongly working in us may not only arouse anger when obstructed, and sorrow when frustrated, but also, when we anticipate its frustration, fear. If we anticipate that hunger will not be satisfied, then in addition to the pangs of hunger we suffer from the fear of starvation. Nor do we only feel this fear because the satisfaction of hunger is a matter of life or death. Any other impulse that is strong enough to persist in the face of opposition may have the same effect. We desire sleep, and people who have had experience of sleeplessness often come to fear it. Only this fear is dependent on ideas, and the ideas on a previous experience, and, therefore, unlike primitive fears, seems to be acquired. Yet once we have formed these ideas of coming disasters, the fear—and not sometimes another, unsuitable emotion—falls into its right place uniformly, as if it were from the beginning fitted for this place. Still such animals as cannot anticipate evils cannot be subject to these fears, but only to those that arise from sensations.

The connection between this fear and the anticipated frustration of some impulse is partly acquired, because this anticipation is due to our previous experience ; but it appears also to be partly innate, because once the anticipation is formed and connected with an impulse sufficiently strong and important, the fear will tend to arise from the first with sureness and uniformity.

These four emotional systems of anger, fear, joy, and sorrow seem to have not only an innate connection with every other primary system, but also with one another. The frustration of anger provokes a bitter sorrow, its satisfaction a peculiar joy of elation, obstruction to it, increase of anger, and the threatened loss of the sweets of revenge, when anger is deliberate and develops hate, may even excite fear. Joy

itself, which, superficially regarded, seems to be without an impulse, yet when it is opposed, provokes anger, and when it is lost, sorrow; and when a great joy comes to us there arises the fear of losing it. Sorrow, too, when its outbursts or its self-absorption and solitary habits are opposed, evokes anger; and when its impulses are frustrated redoubled sorrow; but with relief comes joy. And if extreme sorrow seldom evokes fear—for when our situation cannot be worse, what more have we to fear?—yet when its impulses for help and restoration persist, these may also elicit the fear that they will not prevail. Even fear itself, when its impulse is opposed, may arouse anger, and the coward fleeing from danger will fight one who arrests him; and fear when it is frustrated, and no escape is possible, is combined with sorrow; but when it achieves escape, there is a joyful relief.

There is then evidence of some innate connection between the systems of these four emotions; the precise conditions under which one elicits another are complex and difficult to determine without a prolonged inquiry, but we shall assume that when these conditions are operative the emotion is evoked uniformly, and inevitably from the beginning, and this would not be possible were there not an innate connection between them.

Let us then assume that this law is operative at the base of the higher organisations of character: (2) *Every primary impulse, whether it is independent or belongs to a primary emotion, is innately connected with the systems of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow, in such a way that, when opposed, it tends to arouse anger; when satisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow; and when it anticipates frustration, fear; these systems being similarly connected together.* This law must also be understood to imply that there is in the very structure of the nervous system an innate base for the organisation of the dispositions of these primary emotions with one another and with the disposition of any other primary impulse.

2. *Of the Sentiment of Parental Love.*

We have next to study a system which is generally assumed to be innate, the so-called 'parental' instinct. But when

we come to examine this instinct, or more strictly the behaviour in which it is manifested, we find that its behaviour cannot be attributed to a single instinct, however complex, because it consists of different kinds of behaviour manifested at different times and in different situations.

The instinctive behaviour of the parent as manifested on behalf of the offspring is directed to the end of their preservation; and this end includes two chief features—their sustenance and their protection. If we take certain familiar examples we shall see that this behaviour involves several instincts even among some of the lower animals, among whom there is little care of offspring. Thus there are fish that make some sort of nest for their eggs, and defend this place against intruders.[1] The instinct which is involved in making this nest is quite different from that which is required for its defence. Yet both of these instincts belong to what is called the 'parental instinct.' When we reach those animals that not only make nests but also both feed their young, and protect them, the number of instincts is increased. If there are certain instincts involved in the animal feeding itself, and in the pursuit and killing of prey, these instincts will also be involved in a modified form in feeding and protecting the young. Again there are many animals who play with their young, like the apes and monkeys, and the *Fælidæ*, and this also involves other instincts in the form of play. All of these instincts, nutritive, offensive, defensive, sportive, are organised in the so-called 'parental instinct,' making it in fact what it is,—a system of instincts. It is only a single instinct in another and more general sense as being a system innately directed to the preservation of offspring.

In the latter sense we speak of the two 'instincts' at the base of life: the "instinct of self-preservation," and the "instinct of the preservation of the race," meaning that the one is innately or 'instinctively' organised for the end of self-preservation, and the other for the end of the preservation of the race. But from this point of view we can claim that every primary emotion is an instinct, because innately organised to pursue a

[1] Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' ch. viii.

certain end, whether or not the behaviour in which it is expressed has that stereotyped and definite character to which we usually restrict the term 'instinctive.'

The parental or maternal instinct is, then, only a single instinct in this very general sense. In the more usual and restricted sense of the term it is a system of instincts; and it is a system, and not merely a group, because all these instincts are inter-organised for the preservation of the offspring. And therefore the disinterested character of this system is not merely acquired, but is also an innate characteristic. For each instinct by its own peculiar behaviour promotes the same disinterested end which is common to all of them.

We may next consider this system from the point of view of the emotions implicated in it; and here we reach a corresponding conclusion. The system is not formed by a single emotion, but by a number of emotions. We find present in it the same group of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow, to which we referred at the beginning of the chapter. The mother animal shows fear on behalf of her offspring. The bird utters her danger-signal. The chicks run to their mother and she conceals them under her wings. The mother-ape takes the young ones on her back and escapes up a tree. The anger of these animals is as disinterested as their fear, and the cowardly Fælidæ defend their cubs at the peril of their lives. As we approach the higher groups of animals we find evidence also of a disinterested joy and sorrow. The joy of the mother is shown not merely in the presence of her young, but in the nurture and care of them, and in the satisfaction of a variety of instincts. In company with them she exercises her play-insincts, and enters into their games, not merely suffering them, but sometimes enjoying them also. And if this joy is hardly shown by the lower animals, it is a most significant fact in the human mother. The good mother delights in the presence of her child, in gazing at it, fondling it, playing with it, and satisfying all its needs. And this joy is not always an unmixed delight. Painful ingredients enter into it, and sorrowful or fearful thoughts that give it a composite character.

This mother's joy, like all joy, entails its own sorrow. In proportion to her delight in the presence, health and beauty of her child will be her sorrow in separation from it, and at the signs of its sickness or suffering. And this causal relation in which the two emotions stand to one another points, as we have tried to show, to there being an innate connection between their dispositions[1] and systems. Given one, the other tends to follow inevitably in certain situations. No casual conjunction in the first instance with after associations that become more regular and stable, can explain their union; it appears to be part of the innate constitution of the mind. For this sorrow which arises from a past experience of joy, in its turn, when the cause of sorrow is removed, leads to a renewal of joy. And these two emotions follow one another in their revolutions so frequently that they become an epitome not merely of the mother's love, but of human life itself. And the experiences of the object become so infused with the memory of this succession that one can hardly be present without in some measure exciting the system of the other. The joys of love are blended with its sorrows, and its sorrows with its joys; and a tear and a sigh come very near to its purest delights. This may afford a ground for explaining the unique character of all tender emotions which, in all their manifestations, point to an interplay of these opposite emotional dispositions. All tender emotions incline either to joy or sorrow. Gratitude is a tender joy, pity a tender sorrow.[2]

We have now formed some conception, in this study of the 'maternal instinct,' of one of those greater systems to which we have referred: the peculiarity of which is that they organise in themselves certain of the lesser systems of the primary emotions with their connected instincts, as well as other instincts with which no specific emotions are connected. The system which we have taken as an example is that familiar

[1] In the sense which we have given to the phrase 'system of an emotion' (see p. 67), the 'disposition' of the emotion is a part of it, being included in that part which is not present in consciousness.

[2] See 'Groundwork of Psychology,' by Prof. G. F. Stout, ch. xvi., by A. F. Shand, 'The Sources of Tender Emotion.'

one which is exercised in relation to and on behalf of the offspring. We have referred only to a few of its most prominent constituents; but these are sufficient to enable us to identify its character. For if an animal or a human mother takes delight in the presence of her offspring, feels sorrow in separation from them, sorrow also at the signs of their injury and suffering, anger in their defence, and fear when danger threatens them, and—with, or independently of, these disinterested emotions—exercises on their behalf a number of disinterested instincts connected with their protection and nurture, then such a system is at once recognised as that of maternal love. We have noticed that the portion of it to which we have referred—for there are many other emotions and other constituents comprised in it—is hereditary and not acquired, in respect not only of its instincts, but also of the bond connecting its primary emotions, and of the end which the whole system pursues, namely the preservation of the offspring.

There remains the question of the stimulus of maternal love. The primary emotions we found were at first aroused by stimuli innately connected with their excitement. Is it different here? While the end of this love is innate, as well as the connection between its fundamental emotions, is the connection with its object slowly acquired through experience, as we by slow degrees acquire love for our friends? It is the general opinion that in the normal case, and however much it may be enriched afterwards, the mother's love becomes active with the first perception of her offspring, and in the human mother often before birth, because there is an innate connection between it and the appropriate stimulus. And it seems to be partly for this reason that this most complex system is spoken of as an instinct, because it both instinctively responds to its stimulus and instinctively pursues its disinterested end.

This general opinion we are also inclined to adopt after considering the bond connecting the primary emotions. For they are fitted by nature to function in mutual support in relation to some object or end, and only require the presence and stimulus of the right object to complete their systems.

We inherit an innate disposition not only to feel fear, anger, curiosity, joy, and sorrow, as isolated emotions, in relation to certain objects which are innately connected with their excitement, but also an innate disposition to Love which organises all of them. But there is no maternal love in the animal mind until there is offspring to love. There is only the innate capacity to feel love, and to behave in any one of the complex and instinctive ways characteristic of love, when the appropriate stimulus is applied. As soon as offspring are perceived, this system tends to become active in response to it, and to manifest just that instinctive behaviour and that particular emotion which in the given situation is appropriate. That is to say, if the young are sucking at her teats, or sporting in front of her in health and enjoyment, that is a situation which innately tends to elicit such joy as she is capable of feeling in her maternal love. If, on the other hand, she perceives the signs of danger, the approach of some bird of prey or some dangerous animal, at the sight of whom her own species shows signs of fear on their own behalf, then in this situation she feels disinterested fear on behalf of her offspring, and utters cries of warning. If she perceives the approach of an enemy at the sight of whom her own species responds with the emotion of anger, and with instinctive aggressive behaviour to destroy it or warn it off, then in such a situation, and with her young near by, she feels disinterested anger on behalf of her offspring, and attacks or threatens to attack the enemy more in defence of them than of herself. If, lastly, she has lost her young, then she tends to feel such sorrow as her kind are capable of feeling, and utters cries of distress, and wanders disconsolate in search of them.

This system of maternal love, then, appears to be also disinterested in respect of its emotions and its instincts.

3. *Of the Source of Disinterested Action.*

All actions, we may suppose, are 'disinterested' that are directed to the preservation or well-being of some other life than our own, and in proportion as this end is not subordinated to our own preservation or well-being.

Psychologists have often enquired into the source of such actions. Biologists have shown that there are a number of disinterested instincts, and that the preservation of the species depends on the inheritance of such instincts by the offspring. But the former have rather singled out some one emotion, or some order of emotions, to which to refer all essentially disinterested tendencies. The theory which they have most generally advanced is that all disinterested actions have their source in sympathy. A second theory which was often confused with this one, has become more distinct in recent times,—namely that all disinterested actions have their source in tender emotion. For at first we should naturally assume that sympathy was tender, and that tender emotion was sympathetic. Nor should we be likely to form any clear distinction between either of them and love. Thus Bain speaks of "The warm, tender emotion, the reality of love and affection."[1] For love is the principle of disinterestedness; and the source of its disinterestedness is assumed to be sympathy or tender emotion. And thus we make one or other or both the epitome and essence of love.

This theory, inadequate as it is, is narrowed still further after we have come to recognise that there are many instances of sympathetic emotion which are neither disinterested nor tender;[2] and that whether sympathetic emotion is disinterested or not depends on whether it is combined with tender emotion. And thus we are left with tender emotion as the source of all disinterestedness. Yet it seems to be an obvious disadvantage to assume that however low down in animal life we find disinterested instincts, there tender emotion must also be developed in union with them. To feel tender emotion for another being whom we cannot see, who has not yet come into existence, and whose development we cannot foresee, seems to be an improbable experience. Yet the moth works for its offspring whom it has never seen, nor can ever see, and deposits its eggs where the larvæ can find protection and suitable food. And as

[1] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. vii.

[2] See T. H. Ribot, 'Psychology of the Emotions,' part ii, ch. iv; also W. McDougall, 'Social Psy.,' sect. I. ch. iv.

there are disinterested instincts that either precede, or are independent of sympathy, as well as of tender emotion, so some of the latest sentiments of the human mind are disinterested, without their disinterested character attaching to either sympathy or tender emotion, such as the love of knowledge or the love of beauty.

This question of the source, or rather of the interpretation of disinterested action, assumes a particular form when we conceive of love as one of those greater systems or sentiments which organise the lesser systems of the emotions. And in treating of love in its simplest and basic state, as constituted of the dispositions of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger, with their connected instincts, we have found that it is quite naturally disinterested, although we have as yet included in it neither the sympathetic nor the tender emotions. Yet we know from our own experience that in all human affections, whether for wife or child or friend, the sympathetic and the tender emotions are conspicuous and of frequent occurrence. But if we assume a stage of development in which these lofty emotions were not present, we can still interpret the disinterestedness of love without them.

The form which the problem assumes for us is this, how such emotions as fear and anger—commonly regarded as egoistic, or at least as bearing on the preservation of the individual,—or such uncertain emotions as joy and sorrow—how these can possess, both individually and collectively, a disinterestedness apparently foreign to their nature. And the solution of this problem appears to be that, not the nature of the emotion, but the cause which excites it, or the system in which it is organised, makes it disinterested. The error of preceding theories has been due to the assumption that disinterested action is the consequence of the particular nature of some emotion.

There are two broadly contrasted types of system to which the common emotions of fear and anger, of joy and sorrow, may respectively belong: First, the 'instinct of self-preservation.' If an animal cannot develop self-love, except in those cases in which it can form a conception of itself, as the common object to which so many of its actions relate, yet

in its mind the same emotional dispositions as we find in ourselves are innately organised for the same end. When danger threatens, it responds, like man, with fear, because there is an innate connection between that emotion and certain stimuli which for it are the signs of danger; when it perceives a hostile action directed against itself, it responds, like man, with anger, because here also there is an innate connection between the stimulus and the emotion; when it satisfies after difficulty or struggle its appetites and instincts, it feels such joy as it is capable of, and when it fails to satisfy them, a corresponding sorrow. All of these primary emotions are aroused by stimuli to which they are innately adapted, and, over and above the particular results they accomplish, subserve the common end of the preservation of the animal's life. The animal apparently knows nothing of this common end; but the primary emotions are innately organised to promote it. Each has its proper place and function in the animal economy. They may therefore be regarded as constituting a system: a system which is innate,—inherited not acquired,—in respect of (1) its adaptation to the stimuli which arouse it; (2) the bond connecting its principal emotions; (3) the common end which these are destined to secure.

The other system is that of parental love, called sometimes the 'parental instinct,' sometimes the 'instinct of the preservation of the race.' And we may now contrast the way in which these same emotions function in it with the way in which they function in what Shaftesbury named the "self-system."[1]

Disinterested fear is aroused in the mother-animal at the sight of danger that threatens her offspring, not at the sight of danger that threatens herself. Often the two causes are combined, and the danger which threatens the offspring threatens herself also. The emotion in that case will have two different lines of direction, which may be sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict; yet even in the latter event how often will she expose herself in order to conceal them, or to give them time to effect their escape! Disinterested anger

[1] 'Characteristics,' 'An Enquiry concerning Virtue,' B. ii. pt. i. sec. i.

is aroused in the mother animal by an act of aggression directed not against herself, but against her offspring. Here also the enemy that attacks one may attack the other also. Yet, in defence of them, she will often sacrifice herself, when she might abandon them to their fate, and seek her own safety. Disinterested joy is aroused in the mother-animal by the satisfaction of their impulses, not merely of her own, or by the sight of them at play. And here, too, the two causes of emotion are frequently conjoined. For the mother has an impulse to feed the young with her milk, or to procure them other food, and in satisfying their impulse she satisfies her own also. But her own impulse is itself disinterested: it belongs to a disinterested instinct. Its end is the nourishment of the young; and therefore its satisfaction may give rise to a disinterested joy. All of these emotions, then, form one system, because over and above the particular result which each one fulfils, there is the common end which all subserve; and this common end is the preservation of the offspring and the race.

The disinterested sorrow of the mother-animal is aroused not by the feeling of her own sickness or pain, but by the perception of the sick or injured state of her offspring, or of their absence or loss. Is it any more strange in this case that her cries of distress, and her impulse, however ineffectual, to restore their state of health and vigour, or their union with herself, should be disinterested, than that her fear, anger, and joy are disinterested, as organised in the system of maternal love? Yet it is precisely here that the current theory intervenes, and assumes the presence of another primary emotion, Pity, to account for the fact of disinterestedness; and then regards that as the sole source of disinterested action. Yet pity is only a particular kind of sorrow that has become 'tender.' But this theory supposes that sorrow cannot become disinterested until it is first differentiated as pity, connecting, as we have alleged, the source of disinterested action with the particular nature of the emotion, and not with the cause which arouses it and the system to which it belongs.

Nothing shows more clearly the error of this conception

than a study of the fate which has overtaken Sympathy. For long regarded as the special disinterested emotion, still so regarded by popular opinion, it has been clearly pointed out that there are sympathetic emotions that are not disinterested. The way in which a sympathetic emotion is produced, namely, by perceiving the expression of emotion of another mind, does not make it disinterested. Whether it is disinterested or not depends on the system which it excites. For instance, the signs of fear expressed by one bird in a flock induce a sympathetic fear in other birds, which fly away, and secure their own safety ; and the depression that we see so marked on some faces induces a sympathetic depression in us, so that we turn away from them. Where, on the other hand, the cries of the young induce a sympathetic fear in the mother-animal, which excites one or other of her maternal instincts, there sympathy is disinterested, because she seeks their safety rather than her own. This sympathy may or may not be combined with pity ; what is more to the purpose is that it excites a disinterested instinct.

Now pity seems to be an essentially disinterested emotion. For pity is the name of a sorrow that we feel on behalf of another person ; but its disinterestedness is not dependent on the tenderness of this sorrow. There are many aching sorrows felt on behalf of another which are neither sweet nor tender. They are all suffering without joy. They are disinterested, but often ineffectual and hopeless. They express the awful calamities to which love is subject from the discovery of the baseness of its object : the anguish of a father at the degradation of his son ; of a husband at the dishonour of his wife. The sorrows that are tender are those from which we suffer the least ; for the sweetness of joy past blends with them or the hope of a joy to come. And as there are disinterested sorrows which are not tender, so there are tender sorrows which are not disinterested. However unusual it is to find pity organised in the self-system, yet it sometimes occurs. There are men who enjoy pitying themselves. It therefore follows that it is not the nature of this emotion which makes it either interested or disinterested, but only the system which it excites and subserves.

All of the emotions are the same in this respect, and obey the same law; and this law we shall now attempt to formulate: (3) *Every emotion has a potential disinterestedness, so far as among the stimuli which excite it are some which excite it on behalf of another individual instead of on behalf of oneself.*

The conclusion to which we are now brought is that all of the emotions of the mother's love are disinterested, not because some of them are tender, but because of the peculiar cause which arouses them and the common end to which they are instinctively directed. Some perception of the presence or absence of the offspring, and in the higher developments of love, some conception of them, enters as a constituent of this cause. Thus the signs of danger may arouse fear in the mother animal, but not disinterested fear, unless together with these signs she perceives her offspring. She perceives this danger as having a relation to and bearing on them, and her instinctive response is this disinterested fear which provides for their concealment or flight, not primarily for her own. Thus her emotion of fear is innately organised for a disinterested end; but as it is also at other times innately organised for her own preservation, there must, in these two cases, be something different in the cause that accounts for its being connected with the one end rather than with the other, and which determines the difference of the subsequent behaviour. For the behaviour of an animal is not the same in securing its own safety as in securing its offspring's. And so it is with the other emotions. From the biological point of view we reach a corresponding conclusion. Ignoring the fact of emotion, we assume that there are two orders of instincts, those which bear on the preservation of the mother animal herself, and those which bear on the preservation of her offspring; and whether the one or the other shall be aroused in a given case will depend on the nature of the exciting cause.

We have studied in outline in this chapter two of those greater systems of the character the function of which is to organise certain of the lesser systems of emotions by imposing on them a common end and subjecting them to a common cause. These are the self-system and the system

of parental love. These higher systems we shall call "sentiments"[1] to distinguish them from the lesser systems of the emotions. All varieties of Love belong to the former class.

[1] Since 1896 when this theory was first put forward (see 'Mind,' N. S. vol. v. art. 'Character and the Emotions') those who have adopted it have agreed that this term with all its defects is on the whole better than the term 'passion' or any other that could be used to replace it (see 'Manual of Psy.,' by G. F. Stout, bk. iv. ch. ix. 5. Also E. Westermarck, 'Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,' vol. i. ch. v. p. 110, Note. Also W. McDougall, 'Social Psycho.' ch. v. I have only come across one exception. Prof. Boyce Gibson in his account of the theory adopts the term 'passion.' See his 'God with Us,' ch. viii, 'The Passion of Love,' in which a sympathetic and very penetrating study of the theory is given. For the arguments in favour of the term 'sentiment' see 'Mind,' N. S. vol. xvi. 'M. Ribot's Theory of the Passions,' by A. F. Shand.

CHAPTER V

THE SYSTEMS OF THE SENTIMENTS (II)

1. *Of the Theory that Love and Hate are Emotions*

WHILE in the last chapter we considered the biological theory that maternal love was a single instinct, in this chapter we shall have to notice, on the psychological side, a complementary theory that Love is a single emotion. This theory which has been generally held by psychologists as well as philosophers, regards Love and Hate as belonging to the same class of feelings as joy, sorrow, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust. Love and hate were included in Descartes' list of the primary emotions, or "passions," as they were then named. And even when not regarded as primary—as with Spinoza—they were still classed among the emotions. And, in fact, as long as the method of psychology was introspective, and so far as other methods were excluded, it was difficult to reach any other conclusion: for all that we can observe love to be in any single state of consciousness, is some emotion. The complex system to which any one of its emotions belongs is not an observable fact. But as soon as psychology becomes objective, and studies human nature from the outside, only using the indispensable material of introspection for purposes of interpretation or hypothesis, we are more likely to gain a true insight into the nature of love and hate. We judge of men's characters by what we know their conduct to be as a whole; and in the same way we judge of their love for one person and their hate of another, not merely by what its effects are observed to be on a single occasion, but what they are found to be at different times and in different situations.

Hence it is that the great dramatic poets, who are always great psychologists in this sense, lend no support to the theory of the philosophers that love and hate are single emotions. They are not indeed concerned to formulate theories of love themselves; they merely describe its manifestations. But from their descriptions alone we can infer that love includes at different times a great variety of emotions, as well as many other constituents that we have not yet been able to notice. And although it is most frequently sexual love which dramatists refer to, yet all kinds of love are, in the variety of their emotional constituents, the same. Scattered through the dramas of Shakespeare are descriptions of love which, if they had been taken into account by psychologists, would alone have pointed the way to a truer theory. Thus in "As You Like It" Phoebe says, "Good shepherd, tell this youth what 'tis to love," and Sylvius answers:

> "It is to be made of sighs and tears;—
> . . . . . .
> It is to be made of faith and service;—
> . . . . . .
> It is to be all made of fantasy,
> All made of passion, and all made of wishes;
> All adoration, duty, and observance,
> All humbleness, all patience, and impatience,[1]
> All purity, all trial, all observance;—
> . . . . . ."

Here, not only various emotions, but qualities of character and conduct, are assigned to love. Even fear has a prominent place:

> "Where Love is great, the littlest doubts are fears,
> Where little fears grow great, great love is there."

The position of sorrow and melancholy is indicated in these verses:

> "She never told her love,
> But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek: she pined in thought;
> And, with a green and yellow melancholy,
> She sat like patience on a monument,
> Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?'[2]

[1] A . sc. ii.

[2] 'Twelfth Night,' a. ii. sc. iv.

Chaucer in "The Romaunt of the Rose" has a long description and analysis of love:

"The life of love is full contrarie,
. . . . . .
For now the lover is joious,
Now can he plain, now makin mone;"[1]
. . . . . .

And again, and more fully; showing the frequent confusion of its opposite states:

'Love it is an hatefull pees,
A free acquitaunce without relees,
A truthe frette full of falsheede;
A silkernesse all sette in drede,
In hertis a dispeiryng hope,
And full of hope it is wan hope;
Wise woodnesse, and wode resoun,
A swete perell in to drowne,
. . . . . .
Also a swete helle it is,
And a soroufull paradys; . . ."[2]

Swift denies that love can be a single emotion; and specially includes in it the four emotions of joy, sorrow, hope, and fear:

"Love why do we one passion call
When 'tis a compound of them all?
Where hot and cold, where sharp and sweet,
In all their equipages meet;
Where pleasures mix'd with Pains appear,
Sorrow with Joy, and Hope with Fear."

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[1] Line 2297 *et seq.*

[2] Line 4703 *et. seq.*

"Love it is a wrathful peace,
A free acquittance, without release,
And truth with falsehood all afret,
And fear within secureness set;
In heart it is despairing hope;
And full of hope it is vain hope.
Wise madness and wild reasonne,
And sweet danger wherein to drowne.
. . . . . .
Also a sweet Hell it is,
And a sorrowful Paradise;
. . . . . ."

See J. Ruskin, 'Fors Clavigera,' V. ii. xxxiv.

To Coleridge love appears to organise the entire mind and heart:

> 'All thoughts, all passions, all delight
> Whatever stirs this mortal frame
> All are but ministers of love
> And feed his sacred flame."[1]

A corrective of this too inclusive conception is found in St. Paul's description of love, where some of the emotions which it excludes are indicated. "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, . . ."[2]

Now contrast this conception of the poets with the theoretical opinions of the philosophers. "Love," says Descartes, "is an emotion of the soul . . . which urges it willingly to unite with objects that appear suitable."[3] "Love," says Spinoza, "is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause."[4] "'Tis altogether impossible," says Hume, "to give any definition of love and hatred; because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition."[5] And lastly we have Bain's identification of love with tender emotion.[6]

We could hardly have a stronger contrast than between the insight of the poets into the complex nature of love,—in which they find so many emotions and desires, as well as other constituents, that the difficulty is to define it on account of its complexity,—and the lack of insight of the philosophers,

[1] 'Miscellaneous Poems,' 'Love.'

[2] First Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. xiii. (Quoted also by Prof. B. Gibson, 'God with Us,' ch. viii.) Among the divines Robert South thus describes Love. 'The leading Affection of all the Passions is Love. . . . Love is such an affection, as cannot so properly be said to be in the Soul, as the Soul to be in that. It is the whole man wrapt up in one Desire; all the Powers, Vigours and Faculties of the Soul abridged into one Inclination. . . . The Soul may sooner leave off to subsist, than to Love; and like the vine, it withers and dies, if it has nothing to embrace.' ('Maxims and Sayings, etc., from Dr. South.' Edit. 1717, p. 3.)

[3] 'Les Passions de l'Ame,' Deuxième Partie, art. 79.

[4] 'Ethics,' Part iii, Prop. xiii. Note.

[5] 'Treatise of Human Nature,' B. ii. pt. ii. sec. i.

[6] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. vii.

who reduce this complexity to a single emotion, which, in the view of Hume, cannot even be defined because it produces "merely a simple impression."

Spencer, alone, approximates to a true theory. His analysis of sexual love has been justly praised.[1] Love, he observed, "is habitually spoken of as though it were a simple feeling; whereas it is the most compound, and therefore the most powerful, of all the feelings."[2] Among its constituents, he enumerates the sexual instinct, affection, "admiration, respect, or reverence,"[3] self-approbation and self-esteem, "the pleasure of possession," the sense of freedom, and, finally, an "exaltation of the sympathies."[4] But, while he discerns so well the constituents, he conceives of them, not as combining into a system, but as being compounded into a single feeling. Now there is all the difference between these two conceptions. The compound feeling, so far as its composition remains unchanged, acts in all times, places, and situations in the same way. However greatly the situation may change, it can only respond to this situation with the same behaviour evoked by its compound emotion. Such a theory cannot account for the great diversity of the behaviour of love in different situations, as well as the corresponding diversity of its emotions. Several of these emotions may indeed blend into one where the situation is such as to evoke them together; but how often do different situations evoke different emotions? For the situation of presence contrasts with that of absence, and prosperity with adversity, and love responds to the one with joy, and with sorrow and longing to the other. The anticipation of the future changes; and, in correspondence with it, love is sometimes full of hope and sometimes sunk in despondency. The remembrance of the past changes; and, responding to it, love is sometimes filled with thankfulness, and sometimes with remorse. The situation of danger contrasts with the situation of security; and, responding to the first, love feels anxiety, and to the second, confidence. The plots of enemies contrast with the help of

[1] See 'The Psychology of the Emotions,' by T. H. Ribot, part ii. ch. vi.
[2] 'Prin. of Psy.,' vol. i. part iv. ch. viii. p. 487.
[3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*

friends; and love responds in the one case, with suspicion and anger, and in the other with trust and gratitude. The situation in which Love is placed may be any one of those referred to; and, in the course of its history, it may pass successively through all of them. Love, therefore, cannot be reduced to a single compound feeling; it must organise a number of different emotional dispositions capable of evoking in different situations the appropriate behaviour.

Adopting, then, this conception of love as our working theory, and the theory of the sentiment of which it is a part, we shall, in the next section, apply it to the interpretation of the different sentiments of human character.

2. *Of the Sentiments that are most commonly found among Men.*

While we can enumerate with some approach to accuracy the primary emotions and impulses which are universal constituents of all normal characters, when we come to treat of those greater systems of the higher level of character, we find that they vary much more from one man to another than do these lesser systems. For while there are one or two stimuli which appear to be innately connected with the excitement of love—as the presence of offspring, and, after puberty, of some individuals of the opposite sex—with these exceptions, our love for all other individuals appears to be acquired. And therefore the sentiments of one man differ from those of another; for the love has not only different objects, but itself varies with the varying nature of these objects. And although there is an innate system at the base of all varieties of love, so that we may even speak of the disposition of love as being as much inherited as the disposition to the primary emotions, yet love is only fully constituted when it has found its objects, and is rendered active on behalf of them. Yet sooner or later everyone develops some sentiments of this kind. There is this innate system within him which impels him to form them, and not to remain subject to the passing impulses. His "cool self-love," as well as his "better self," is an effort of his nature to rise into one of these self-controlled systems, and greatly as

the characters of men differ in degree of organisation, there are probably none among even the most impulsive who do not sometimes control the present emotion with a view at least to their own advantage.

In all normal individuals, then, there is a love of something to give some order and unity to their lives ; and the system which is found generally pre-eminent is the great principle of self-love or the self-regarding sentiment, analogous to the chief bodily systems in respect of the number of subsidiary systems which it is capable of containing—not merely emotions but even sentiments—as pride and vanity, avarice or the love of riches, sensuality or the love of sensual pleasures ; of these the self-love of any particular man probably contains several. And joined to this self-love in subtle and intimate ways which we cannot here attempt to understand, are a variety of disinterested sentiments : as conjugal and parental love, filial affection, friendship, the sentiment for some game or sport, and in the higher characters one or other of the great impersonal sentiments, patriotism and the love for some science or art.

There is finally a system of unique importance,—very imperfectly developed in most men, and seldom attaining to the warmth and intimacy of love,—which is known as 'respect for conscience.' It is ever contesting both the supremacy of self-love and the attractiveness of the present inclination ; and in most men it is combined with the religious sentiment. Of the peculiar character of its organisation, and of the secondary and derived emotions which make their appearance in it, we can here give no account ; we can only indicate the presence of the same four fundamental emotions as in all varieties of love. That there is a calm joy in fulfilling the dictates of conscience, and a peculiar sorrow in our failure to fulfil them, is familiar to everyone. When we rebel against it, and persist in our evil courses, this sorrow becomes remorse. Its fear is that apprehension of punishment which follows the violation of its laws ; and its anger is known as 'righteous indignation.'

Two other sentiments closely connected with one another belong to this same class : self-respect, and respect for others.

Among these greater systems must also be classed the opposite of love, hate. Sometimes love develops a complementary hate; as the love of knowledge, the hatred of ignorance, the love of beauty, the hatred of ugliness, the love of goodness, the hatred of evil, the love of country, the hatred of foreign nations. Whether hate is actually developed depends on the circumstances of the case; but some antagonistic attitude to ignorance, ugliness, baseness, always accompanies the love of their opposites.

3. *Analysis of Hatred.*

It has seemed to some that, with the progress of civilisation, hatred is becoming rarer. Tolerance, or indifference, has diminished religious hatred; the knowledge of foreign countries and their abandonment of aggressive policies, have diminished the hatred of foreigners; just laws, and a firm and impartial administration, have diminished the frequency of personal hatreds. But new forms of social hate have sprung up in their place: the hatred of the capitalist and the professional classes by the manual labourers in place of the old respect felt for them.

That hatred is a system that, however much it may be held in check by other forces of character, works for the destruction of the hated thing, as anger does only in its extreme forms, and in human beings works with a deliberate and self-controlled activity as one of its distinctive marks, is generally recognised. Shylock says, "Hates any man the thing he would not kill?"[1] Destruction then becomes the prominent end of hatred. All means may be adopted for this end, even that of prayer:

> "Cancel his bond of life, dear God, I pray,
> That I may live to say the dog is dead."[2]

Hate is not anger; and anger is not hate, though it may develop into hate. And fear is not hate, though it may develop into hate. Hate has, indeed, its bursts of anger; but resists them unless the occasion be suitable. And anger

[1] 'Merchant of Venice,' a. iv. sc. i.
[2] 'Richard III,' a. iv. sc. iv.

sometimes kills, and yet is not hate, unless that reflecting system be behind it.

The same four emotional dispositions of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow which are essential to the system of love are present also in the system of hate. But just as their disinterested forms were found to be aroused by different causes in love from those which arouse them in self-love, so are they also aroused by different causes in the system of hate. The health and prosperity of the loved object is a cause of joy: in hatred, it is a cause of bitter sorrow. In place of the delight in being again with one we love, is a peculiar mixture of repugnance and anger when we find ourselves again in the presence of one we hate; the one impelling us to avoid the person, the other to attack him. Shylock could give no reason for insisting on his pound of flesh "more than a lodg'd hate and a certain loathing" for Antonio.[1] Thus the joy of hate is opposite to the joy of love, being caused by the suffering, loss of power and reputation of the hated person; and the sorrow of hate is opposite to the sorrow of love, and is caused by his power, reputation, and happiness. While, too, in love we fear those things that threaten suffering, injury, or destruction to the object, in hate we fear those events that threaten to preserve it from suffering and final destruction. In place, too, of the anger in defence of the object, there is anger against those who defend it.

Another of the characteristic oppositions between the systems of love and hate is due to their relation to the sympathetic emotions. We observe that where love is the sympathetic emotions are much more frequent than where there is no love; but in hate they are not merely absent in most cases, but replaced by opposite or antipathetic emotions.

If we were to ascribe the frequency of sympathetic emotions in love to the fact that we so much look at and attend to the loved person, and think about his life and the events which affect it, we should have to explain why sympathetic emotions are generally absent from hate, seeing

[1] 'Merchant of Venice,' a. iv. sc. i.

that we attend also to the hated person, and think about the events which affect him. But whereas in love, when we see joy expressed on the face of one we love we feel at once a sympathetic joy, and a joy that becomes sweet and tender; and when we see sorrow expressed feel a sympathetic sorrow transformed to pity; and when we witness the ebullition of his anger against others, feel a sympathetic anger, unless counteracted by our disapproval; and when he expresses fear or anxiety about the future, feel a sympathetic fear,—though in all these cases we may react on the first sympathetic emotion and say that the joy and sorrow are excessive, and the fear unreasonable, and the anger unjustified. But in contrast to all this, the sight of joy expressed on the face of the hated one awakens anguish, and the sight of sorrow, a hideous joy; and the expression of his fear awakens no responsive fear, but the hope that what he fears will be accomplished; and the expression of his hope awakens no hope, but the fear that what he hopes will be accomplished. The expression of his anger alone arouses a responsive anger; but one which is aroused against him and not on his behalf.

Thus in hate the emotions which are directly due to the expression in speech or gesture of those which are felt by the man we hate, are in general antipathetic emotions; but in love, sympathetic. For love, which has as its end the well-being and preservation of the beloved, must render us sensitive to the sympathetic emotions that are capable of co-operating with his purposes; but hate, which has as its end the suffering and destruction of the hated one, must make us sensitive to all emotions which are antagonistic to his, and which will therefore tend to thwart his impulses and ends. Hence it is that hate must above all other sentiments make us insensitive to pity and gratitude in relation to the hated person, since these counteract all that it strives to accomplish.

Thus hate is indeed, like love, a sentiment and not a solitary emotion, which includes at least the four primary systems of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow,—though connected with different causes and ends,—as well as many other emotions, which are

in general the opposites of what love would feel in the same situations. There is therefore nothing in the particular tendencies of the four emotions referred to which prevents their being organised either for the preservation and welfare of self, or for the preservation and welfare of another, or for the suffering and destruction of another; but the peculiar tendencies of each emotion can be adapted to the end of the sentiment which organises them. When, however, we find the sympathetic and tender emotions, so frequent in love, generally absent from self-love, and replaced in hate by hard and antipathetic emotions, we can see that these great sentiments, working to their appointed ends, will assimilate or exclude any given emotion according as it can or cannot be utilised by them. This we shall assume to be a fundamental law of the organisation of all sentiments, and we shall presently attempt to define it.

We have now studied in outline the two chief systems of character, the lesser systems of the emotions and the greater systems of the sentiments. Together they constitute its most important forces: the one the fundamental forces at its base, the other the organisations and growth into higher forms of these same forces. We thus reach a definite stage in the conception of character as constituted of these two kinds of forces or systems.

It is only through this conception of character that we are able to define the initial problems of the science of character. For the problem depends on the nature of the constituents, and these being forces, the problem is to discover the laws of the action and inter-action, of the growth and decline, of these forces, both those of the emotions and those of the sentiments. And as the highest systems of character are those which are most subject to change, and its lowest the most constant, so the systems of the primary emotions will be relatively constant in comparison with the systems of the sentiments. We do not often speak of the growth and decline of fear and anger; but we frequently speak of the growth and decline of love and hate. Therefore a chief problem of the sentiments will be to understand the laws of their growth and decay. For some, like sexual love, which spring up suddenly, often

as suddenly come to an end. Others like friendship, which grow more slowly, are usually more lasting. Yet in both cases we reproach ourselves for inconstancy, and hold it as our ideal to be true and faithful.

We have therefore found in what direction we must first seek those "laws of mind" of which psychologists were ignorant in Mill's time, yet which are indispensable to a science of character. They are not to be found among the casual conjunctions due to the laws of association. They are to be found in the systems which pervade the mind and the body. The first, to which we referred in Chapter II, is the fundamental law that mental activity tends inherently to form system and organisation. Hence we can classify characters, as M. Paulhan has shown, according to the degree of their organisation.[1] The second is the fundamental law of the growth and decline of character, and is due to the constant interaction between its greater and its lesser systems. For as in the body there are certain "anabolic," and "katabolic" processes in constant operation, the one building up and the other breaking down its organic structure, so in the character there are certain tendencies working toward a higher form of organisation, and others working toward a lower form of organisation. Hence the common belief that we are never stationary, but always getting either worse or better. This law we shall now tentatively express as follows: (4) *In the growth of character, the sentiments tend with increasing success to control the emotions and impulses; in the decline of character the emotions and impulses tend with increasing power to achieve their freedom.* The third is the fundamental law of the sentiments: (5) *Every sentiment tends to include in its system all those emotions that are of service to its ends, and to exclude all those which are useless or antagonistic.*

With these three laws we shall proceed in the next chapter to investigate the further constituents of character, and to improve our conception of it, anticipating that each fresh stage of this conception will suggest to us new problems, and that these new problems will help us toward the

[1] 'Les Caractères,' livre i. ch. i.

discovery of new laws. We cannot indeed claim, as did Mill, that the "laws of mind" are already sufficiently understood for a science of character to be a possible achievement; but it is a principal aim of the present work to make a systematic attempt to discover, or re-discover them, and, thereby, to furnish the indispensable base of the future science.

CHAPTER VI

OF THE WILL AND INTELLIGENCE AS CONSTITUENTS OF CHARACTER

In attempting to understand the systems of the emotions and sentiments we have to isolate them. We have to abstract them at first from that mind, or self, to which they belong, or else our problem becomes too complicated to deal with. In isolating them in this way we shall, in a certain sense, personify them. As we have already noticed, we are so accustomed to regard the emotions as merely feelings, that in taking a comprehensive view of their systems we seem to be attributing to them qualities that only belong to the mind or self as a whole. For we shall assume that an emotion includes (1) a cognitive attitude—in the sense of a perception or a thought; (2) a conative attitude—in the sense of an impulse and end;[1] and (3) a feeling-attitude of a peculiar kind which we cannot fully analyse.[2] It has, therefore, the three essential attitudes of the mind as self; while, through the instinct or innate tendency connected with it, those bodily actions or behaviour are elicited which are necessary for the attainment of its end. An emotion is, then, a self, or microcosm, of the entire mind; and this, as we shall see hereafter, is still truer of a sentiment. Such a personification of emotions and sentiments does not falsify their nature, so long as we do not attribute to them qualities which they do

[1] 'Every special kind of emotion essentially involves a characteristic end or direction of activity, mental or bodily.' (G. F. Stout, 'Manual of Psy.,' bk. iii. ch. v., 3.)

[2] 'It is a unique kind of feeling-attitude towards an object.' (G. F. Stout, *ibid.*)

not possess,—so long as we do not confuse them with the total self to which they belong. At least, this is the conception which we shall provisionally adopt and attempt to justify in the same way as other leading conceptions, by applying it to the facts and judging how far it interprets them.

In the account given in the preceding chapters, of the principal forces of character as exemplifying the fundamental law of Organisation which pervades mental life, we made no mention of the Will and the Intelligence as among the most important of such forces. The varieties of strong and of weak wills—the difference between those who seem born to rule and those who are as naturally submissive; between those who exercise great self-control and those who are impulsive, which distinguishes not only individuals but nations; between those who pursue the same object from day to day, from year to year, and sometimes through the greater portion of a lifetime, and those who can never be long constant in anything;—all these varieties may spring as much from innate dispositions as do the varieties of primary emotion. But it may be reasonably urged that the will is not an independent force—at least, in the beginning, or before it develops the power of real choice; that it is an expression of the tendencies of emotions and sentiments; that in them its innate qualities are manifested, and its acquired qualities developed. And thus we find that the will of emotions is always impulsive, that of sentiments more reflective and self-controlled. In the sentiments alone are resolutions formed, and choice manifested between their sometimes conflicting ends; they only give the will to control emotion, and to be steadfast unto the end. Strength or weakness of will, other things equal, varies with the strength or weakness of the emotion or sentiment to which it belongs; and hence it is that we find the same man strong in some directions and weak in others. Yet there are some men who bring an innate power of will to the pursuit of everything they love, and others whose weak wills bring their strongest sentiments to inconstancy and failure. Such innate differences may be ineradicable; but every strong sentiment has a tendency to develop a strong will in its support. The

weakness of so many minds is either that they cannot love anything strongly and exclusively enough to pursue it steadfastly, or that they are innately predisposed to some discouraging emotion, as fear, or despondency, or sorrow, which they never learn to control. And thus the strength or weakness of the will is largely due to the sentiment in which it is organised, or to the direct influence of some emotion.

Yet if the conclusion were stated absolutely, that there is no will but that which belongs to some emotion or sentiment, we might be charged with overlooking the fact that, when sentiments conflict, we sometimes reflect on those with which we habitually identify ourselves and which ordinarily rule us without question. Thus respect for conscience often conflicts with ambition or sexual love, so that we are forced to reflect on both, and ask ourselves which we shall decide for. Now a decision does not always mean that one of these systems has at length triumphed over the other. We seem able sometimes to distinguish those cases in which we follow the will of a sentiment because we are absorbed in it, from those cases in which we suspend its activity, and regard it from the outside, doubting whether we shall follow it or some opposite system which we have tried in vain to reconcile with it. Then, if in the end we choose between them, and once more become identified with the first system, and with its will which pursues no other end but its own, this identification has been produced by a will which belonged essentially to neither system.

Now supposing that such volitions occur in fact, even if rarely, from what do they proceed? What higher systems are there than self-love, on the one side, and love of others, or respect for conscience, on the other? What other system can estimate theirs, and choose between their alternatives? Yet our personality does not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments. These are our many selves; but there is also our one self. This enigmatical self which reflects on their systems, estimates them, and, however loath to do it, sometimes chooses between their ends, seems to be the central fact of our personality.

If this be the fact, it is not the kind of fact which we can take into account. The science of character will be the science of our sentiments and emotions,—of these many selves, not of this one self. It will try to understand those forces with which our personality has to reckon; to trace the laws of their organisation, of their growth and decline, of their action and interaction; but it will leave out of account the mystery which lies behind them.

And the science of character will deal with the Intellect as with the Will. It will regard the one no more than the other as an independent existence; but as organised in and subserving the system of some impulse, emotion, or sentiment. The powers of the intellect, like those of the will, are partly innate, partly acquired; but they will only be elicited in one or other of these systems, and be dominated by its end. As under the influence of emotion our will is impulsive, so is our intellect precipitate, and incapable of calm deliberation. Only where emotions are organised in sentiments, and subordinated to their central control, are the higher powers of the intellect developed.

Yet if this conclusion were stated absolutely it might raise an objection like that we considered in relation to the Will. For is there not sometimes manifested in us a pure intelligence, free from all admixture of emotion or sentiment —the Reason which, ever since Plato wrote, has been opposed to Passion—and with which our highest will works in accord? But again, if this be the fact, a science of character cannot deal with it. For here we must assume that even where the intellect attains its highest development, and is most pure, disinterested, and independent, it still belongs to a sentiment, and draws from the noble love of Truth its purity and its disinterestedness.

Thus the working assumption of our science must be the acceptance of this law, even if it be contradicted by certain facts: (6) *All intellectual and voluntary processes are elicited by the system of some impulse, emotion, or sentiment, and subordinated to its end.*

CHAPTER VII

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER (I)

1. *Of the "Laws of Mind"*

We have now advanced sufficiently far in our study of the primary forces of human character to be able to consider with advantage the methods by which we may guide our future course, and whether among those open to us there is any one that will afford us a fair prospect of establishing a science of character. We shall first return to the method which Mill himself advocated in his chapter on the Logic of the Moral Sciences, and inquire how far it is fitted to promote this aim.

Two conceptions appear to have been prominent in his mind in the writing of this chapter: one that there is already to be found in literature a sufficient number of the "empirical laws" to serve as the inductive base of the science; the other, that a sufficient number of "laws of mind" are known to serve as principles of deduction, so as both to interpret these empirical laws, and to fix the limits of the reliance to be placed on them. With regard to the "laws of mind" we have already seen in what respect he was in error. There was neither a sufficient number of them discovered in his time, nor were those even which were discovered suitable for his purpose.

Mill appears also to have assumed that the laws of mind would not have the defect attaching to the empirical laws of being only "approximate generalisations." He regarded them as laws of "tendency": they would "not assert that something will always, or certainly, happen; but only that such and such will be the effect of a given cause, so far as it

operates uncounteracted."[1] In fact the laws of association, which he always had in mind, had not the defect of merely approximate truths. Properly expressed, as laws of tendency, they are universally true. Every idea does tend to revive any other idea with which it has been conjoined in experience, with a force, other things equal, proportionate to the strength of the preformed bond between them. We may also urge that the law of organisation, which is quite a distinct law, has also when properly expressed, as a law of tendency, a universal truth. The difficulty in both cases lies only in finding the proper expressions. It is difficult to throw them into a form in which criticism cannot demonstrate them to be only approximate generalisations. Thus if we were to formulate the law of organisation in this way: Every mental constituent tends inherently to connect itself with other such constituents experienced along with it, so far as the latter can combine with it in a system, and to exclude those which cannot—such a law would be merely an "approximate generalisation." For it is not true that every mental constituent has this tendency. Sensations do not reveal it, nor do images, apart from the systems which use them. In fact we might say—if it were our object to attempt to give a final expression to this law—that only constituents which already form a system, and pursue a common end, have this tendency to incorporate other constituents which are of service to them, and to exclude those which are not. Thus the instincts have this tendency, and in the changes they undergo in the life of individuals they tend to "learn by experience," and to incorporate the results of useful experience. Again, both the emotions and sentiments manifest this tendency persistently, because they too are already systems. Indeed we seem to have no evidence of anything growing into a system in the course of mental development which was not a system at the outset.

These examples will serve to show how very difficult it is to formulate laws of mind so that they can withstand criticism, and be shown to be really scientific laws, and not merely "approximate generalisations."

If we consider next the reciprocal relation of the laws of

[1] 'System of Logic,' vol. ii. B. vi. ch. v. 4.

Association and the law of Organisation, it is certain that they frequently counteract one another, that through chance-associations constituents get incorporated into our systems which are of no use to them, and that the law of organisation is ever tending to exclude such constituents and to substitute its own intelligible combinations for them; but one indispensable advantage which this law derives from the laws of association, is that combinations formed on account of their utility grow stronger from habit. Let us then attempt to express this law of the reciprocal action of these two most comprehensive tendencies of the mind: (7) *The laws of association tend to disorganise all systems of the character so far as they introduce into them constituents which are useless or harmful, and lead to the formation of bad habits; but they also subserve them by strengthening serviceable connections, which lead to the formation of good habits. The law of organisation, on its side, tends to exclude from these systems all constituents that owe their presence there to the action of association alone.*

When we attempt to pass from the general law of organisation to the particular laws of the emotions which exemplify it, what method are we to follow for their discovery? We seem reduced to the observation of their normal behaviour, and in this way again we obtain only empirical laws. For instance, if we ask what is the law of the system of fear, we may answer that it is the tendency of that system to faciliate an animal's escape from danger. But if this is the primitive law of the emotion it does not hold of many of our developed fears. We fear loss of money, power, reputation, and many other things besides life; and it would be difficult so to reconstruct the law that it would hold of all such cases. Again if it is a law of primitive disgust that it tends to make an animal expel from its body substances which are harmful to it, this law does not hold of the later developed forms of disgust among human beings, which have acquired ends quite distinct from the preservation of the body. These examples show that the systems of the different instincts, the most rigid systems of character, have yet a certain plasticity, and can be deflected to ends foreign to their original organisations.

In conclusion, we cannot anticipate that the laws of mind which we seem capable of discovering in the domain of the emotions or sentiments will be anything better than provisional or "approximate" laws in the first instance, and perhaps for a long time. They will be liable to exceptions, and we shall not know, as Mill remarks, just when or where the exceptions will occur. How then can we use such laws to explain the empirical generalisations about character, and to raise these to the level of scientific laws? We must again answer that Mill's opinion was too sanguine, and that we cannot at once, or perhaps for long, transform either into strictly scientific laws.

Now it is probably in the sentiments that the innate systems of the primary emotions undergo most alteration, and we may perhaps in the end be able to interpret these changes. But when we turn to the sentiments themselves, and inquire into the laws of their constitution, we can hardly expect to be able to lay down laws of these more plastic systems of a higher scientific value than those of the primary emotions. Could anyone say at once to what end his love of another human being is directed? It would seem to be governed by different ends, in different situations, and some of them escape our notice. There is the preservation and health of the body; and the preservation and welfare of the mind also. And what does such a vague phrase as the welfare of the mind import? In its lowest interpretation it may be identified with enjoyment; in its highest with the supremacy of the moral nature. It does not always carry the same meaning for the same individual; and it varies among different individuals according to the difference of their character and training. The avarice, pride and ambition of a father are incorporated in his conception of his child's welfare; as are the mother's love, religion, and purity, in hers.

We see then that this plastic system of love may pursue a variety of ends, even where it seems nominally to be pursuing one, named the welfare of the beloved object. Nor is even this end the only one that may enter into our thought. There is the union between the two persons to be maintained or restored. Separation is grievous, and the most disinterested

mother's love feels a struggle at this point sometimes, and realises the manifold ends of love. And, lastly, do we not expect happiness for ourselves in the love of others? If not, why do we so often reproach them in thought, at least, and say 'what a miserable love mine has been?'

The laws of the constitution of love will then have to take into account the multiplicity of its ends, their vagueness, their plasticity, their incompatibility in certain situations, so that sometimes one may have to be sacrificed to another.

Thus the laws of mind on which we are to base the science of character can only be provisional and approximate in the first instance. Still, even as such, the discovery of them, their precise enunciation, their comparison one with another, the gradual accumulation of a great number of them, will be a useful achievement and an essential part of our task. Being precisely expressed, their errors will be sooner brought to light; they will be a guide to future research. When a sufficient number of them are brought together and compared, some may be found to throw light on others. They should help us to discern and interpret the "empirical laws" of character, and when both are in harmony the evidence for each will be strengthened. Such provisional laws, notwithstanding their defects, will be a necessary stage in the development of a science of character, and will constitute the working assumptions on which its future advance will be dependent. But the great and initial problem is to give them such a form that they can be adopted by others, and become the base of a progressive development.

2. *Of the "Empirical Laws," and the Difficulty of Discovering them.*

When we turn to the other side of Mill's method, to consider the popular or literary generalisations about character which he remarks have been formed in abundance by every successive age of mankind, we have to notice that he did not himself make a collection of these laws, and that no one else ever has. The making of such a collection is a much more difficult task than he seems to have anticipated. It is

not merely, or mainly, the labour involved in extracting the laws from the literatures of the world: though this would require the co-operation of many able men; for no index will inform us at what page in a given work we shall find them, and there is no work of literature in which they may not be found; and here, the books of quotation will be found of little service. But there is a difficulty which no mere labour can overcome. Literature is full of great thoughts; but these do not often enunciate laws of character: the "common wisdom of common life" to which Mill refers, is not primarily concerned with them.

We do, indeed, find in literature some such laws. There is the law, so often quoted, that prosperity enervates character and that adversity strengthens it; but no conditions are attached to this law, and the exceptions are numerous. There is the law that love is strengthened by obstacles. Rarely is a writer so impressed by one of these laws that he is moved to collect the evidence in its favour, as was Montaigne in respect of the law that difficulty gives all things their value.[1] There are the famous observations of Aristotle concerning the characters of youth and age, containing many generalisations with some conditions annexed to them which indicate the limits of their truth, as that the young "are fonder both of honour and victory than of money," because "they have never yet had experience of want;" that "they have high aspirations," because "they have never yet been humiliated by the experience of life," and "are unacquainted with the limiting force of circumstances."[2] There are also a few remarkable empirical laws in the Ethics of Spinoza, which, apart from their metaphysical deduction, are models of what such laws should be, of which we may take the following as an example: "If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love."[3]

[1] Essais, Livre ii. ch. xv.
[2] 'The Rhetoric,' ii. ch. xii. (Weldon's trans.).
[3] 'The Ethics,' Part iii. Prop. xxxviii.

There are also some laws current in the common intercourse of men, as that bullies are cowards, that public-schools discourage individuality, and that the actor's art destroys character. Laura, in *Gil Blas*,[1] gives as an excuse for her immoral conduct, that, being accustomed to act good and bad characters alike, she has lost her prejudice against vice. But Diderot puts the law differently: "It has been held that actors had no character, because in playing all they lost the one nature had given them. . . . I think that the cause has been mistaken for the effect, and that they are only capable of playing all because they have none themselves." [2]

While then we may be able to find a few such laws, the number will be disproportionate to our expectation or our pains. And if this were not the case, these laws—considering the great influence of Mill's writings and the number of able men who must have read the famous chapter in his Logic—would have been collected long ago. Mill himself in that chapter is able to refer to very few, and those none of the best. He remarks that there are laws of national character, as that among a given number of Frenchmen and Englishmen, there will be more of one character among the first, and more of another among the second; but he does not state what these characters are; and that there are laws of the characters of sex, but these also he omits to specify. He gives an example of one law which he can both interpret and also point to the limiting condition of its truth: the character of the young is "impetuous," that of the old "cautious"; [3] because, he says, the old have had great experience of life, and the young but little. Another, which he enunciates, is an example of a kind of generalisation which we ought carefully to avoid. The statement that "all men are liars," [4] unlike the proverb, "love is blind," is not capable of being expressed as a law of tendency. For, as Mill admits, it is not in the nature of man to lie. It is frequently one of the rash utterances to which persons are prone who generalise under the influence of anger or of some other emotion, and has the same

[1] 'Gil Blas.'

[2] 'Anecdotes et Pensées diverses,' xv. 'Sur les Comediens.'

[3] *Op. cit.*, B. vi. ch. v. §1.

[4] *Ibid.*

value for scientific purposes as the statement that "all women are false." Of such generalisations there are a great number; but a science of character, ignoring them, must confine itself to those which are the fruit of genuine observation.

3. *Of the Nature of the Wisdom of Life Contained in Fables, Proverbs, and Maxims.*

We shall now shortly review that "common wisdom of common life" preserved in literature, in which Mill expected to find those empirical laws of character that would be such valuable material for a science of character if we could obtain it. The works in which this wisdom is most concentrated are the celebrated fables, proverbs and maxims of mankind. Aesop's fables have received many interpretations; but they are not collections of laws of character. Most of them represent the modes of behaviour that are typical of men under the influence of some emotion or sentiment. In the fable of "A Fox and a Stork," the fox asks his friend to dinner, which, as it is served on plates, the stork cannot partake of. The latter in return asks the fox to a repast which is served in long glasses. Now if this represents a common type of behaviour of selfish persons who, when they wish to appear generous, offer their friends what these will not accept because they cannot use, still this is only one of the common modes of behaviour of self-love, not the only one. So with regard to the punishment meted out to it; it is sometimes, and most appropriately, 'repaid in its own coin.'

If we consider next the fable of "A Mountain in Labour,"[1] this seems to represent a typical behaviour of vain men, who raise at first great expectations, and then render themselves ridiculous by their performances; but it does not pretend to be true of all vain men. It is characteristic of those who carry the exaggeration of their qualities to an extreme. "A Daw and borrowed Feathers,"[2] represents foolish vanity assuming qualities which belong to others, and

[1] Fable 23. [2] Fable 33.

often not stopping short at imposture, in order to extort admiration; and here too we have the appropriate punishment meted out to it: the other birds take back what belongs to them, and the daw is left naked. So is it with the better-known fable, "An Ass in a Lion's skin,"[1] in which courage is the quality assumed. In "A Fly upon a Wheel,"[2] who thought what a dust he raised, and in "A Stag drinking,"[3] who fell to admiring his horns reflected in the water, and despised his legs, we have represented other effects of vanity; the one showing that, through self-admiration, we are prone to think that conspicuous actions which we merely accompany are our own performances; the other, that through admiring in ourselves the qualities that win admiration, and despising those that are solid but little noticed, we are often brought to destruction. These are all typical ways in which vain men often behave; but no one of them is the way in which all vain men behave. They do not therefore express laws of character; they do not assert universal laws of tendency, though these may be implied. For before such laws could be enunciated we should require to know under what conditions one type of behaviour is elicited from vanity rather than another.

In some cases there may seem to be a nearer approach to the expression of a law of character, as in the often-quoted fable of "The Fox and Grapes,"[4] or in that of "The Fox who lost his tail";[5] but we should find some difficulty in defining it.

In the form which La Fontaine gives to the old fables we find that he too is content to represent the typical conduct of human beings in familiar situations, and to ridicule with his particular charm their folly, hypocrisy, and vices. He is not troubled about laws of character, and if occasionally, like Aesop, he comes near to expressing one, it is inadvertently. The fable of "The Countryman and a Snake,"[6] represents it to be a law of some natures to return evil for good, and to hate their benefactors; but we come no nearer to understanding what those natures are, or what that is in our

[1] Fable 224.
[2] Fable 270.
[3] Fable 43
[4] Fable 129.
[5] Fable 101.
[6] Fable 116.

common nature that disposes us to ingratitude. "Il est bon d'être charitable ; Mais envers qui? c'est là le point."[1]

The function of the fable seems to be, then, not to express a law of character, but to represent typical behaviour of human beings in familiar situations, and so to impress this on the mind that we recognise it wherever it occurs. Thus we say to a disobliging man who will not part with what he cannot use himself, and is required by others: "Do not act like 'The dog in the manger.'" But though the fable lacks psychological curiosity, it is still valuable material for a science of character. Wherever typical conduct is represented in the appropriate situation, some law of character is implied which would explain the conduct, if we knew the law. The fable seldom, if ever, brings this law to the surface of thought; but if we have already discerned the law we may use the fable as evidence and illustration of it.

In the various collections of Proverbs that have come down to us we find another literary form in which different races have condensed such wisdom of life as they understood; but only a few proverbs enunciate laws of character. The Proverbs of Solomon are sometimes expressed in the form of laws: as "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"[2]; or "The fear of the Lord is to hate evil: pride and arrogancy"[3]: but, as in all literary statements, the meaning of the terms is undefined. Many of them express the usual consequences of vice or folly; but not the precise conditions under which these arise: as "When pride cometh, then cometh shame."[4]

Or they attempt to teach us what things have value, that we may pursue them: as "Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom"[5]; or "Better is a dinner of herbs where love is, than a stalled ox and hatred therewith."[6] Or they warn us against presumption: as "Boast not thyself of tomorrow; for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth."[7] Or they give us practical advice: as "Chasten thy son while

[1] *Ibid.* [2] Proverbs, ch ix. 10. [3] Ch. viii. 13.
[4] Ch. xi. 2. [5] Ch. iv. 7. [6] Ch. xv. 17.
[7] Ch. xxvii. 1.

there is hope."[1] And even in a proverb so easy to interpret as "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick,"[2] there is only the familiar law of the passage from hope to disappointment under the condition referred to.

It is the same with the proverbs of other races: they are matter of advice, of warning, of exhortation, of reproof, of consolation; but seldom enunciate laws of character. Yet here too a few of them approximate to what we need, as that one the truth of which so often comes home to those under authority: "Forbidden fruit is sweetest." In others there is a law implied that we might hope to elicit: as "Still waters run deep."

In the more modern thoughts of the great maxim-writers we might expect to find a greater degree of that psychological curiosity which is a condition of our discerning the laws of character. The Maxims of Gratian contain advice how to avoid mediocrity and contempt, and to become famous. Their interest lies in the fact that they spring chiefly from one system, being the reflections of self-love organised for one of its principal ends, reputation. Their wisdom consists in the rules laid down for compassing this end, and for counteracting the malevolence of men. In place of the trust of love they exemplify the suspicion of self-love. "Trust the friends of to-day, as if they will be enemies to-morrow, and that of the worst kind."[3] "Never have a companion who casts you in the shade. . . . If you get any consideration, it is only his leavings."[4] These are only particular forms of the familiar law that self-love sacrifices the ends of others so far as they conflict with its own. Every sentiment exemplifies its own fundamental law in a variety of ways in different situations.

The maxims of La Rochefoucauld are not maxims of self-love. Here self-love itself is studied; there it studies the world. Here a sentiment for knowledge is predominant, curious to explore the springs of human conduct; but still revealing, stripped of its disguises, the predominance of

[1] Ch. xix. 18. [2] Ch. xiii. 12.

[3] 'The Art of Worldly Wisdom'; trans. J. Jacobs, ccxvii.

[4] *Ibid.*, clii.

this same self-love. "Moderation is a fear of falling under the envy and contempt which those deserve who are intoxicated by their good fortune."[1] "Pride plays a larger part than good will in the remonstrances we address to those who have committed faults."[2] "There is no passion in which self-love reigns so powerfully as in sexual love."[3]

No one has defined with equal subtlety and profundity the self-regarding sentiment. "L'amour-propre est l'amour de soi-même et de toutes choses pour soi ; il rend les hommes idolâtres d'eux-mêmes, et les rendroit les tyrans des autres, si la fortune leur en donnoit les moyens . . . il ne se repose jamais hors de soi, et ne s'arrête dans les sujets étrangers que comme les abeilles sur les fleurs, pour en tirer ce qui lui est propre. . . . On ne peut sonder la profondeur ni percer les ténèbres de ses abîmes. . . . Là, il est souvent invisible à lui-même . . . mais cette obscurité épaisse qui le cache à lui-même, n'empêche pas qu'il ne voie parfaitement ce qui est hors de lui ; en quoi il est semblable à nos yeux, qui découvrent tout, et sont aveugles seulement pour eux-mêmes. . . . Il est tous les contraires, il est impérieux et obéissant, sincère et dissimulé, miséricordieux et cruel, timide et audacieux: il a de différentes inclinations, selon la diversité des tempéraments qui le tournent et le dévouent tantôt à la gloire, tantôt aux richesses, et tantôt aux plaisirs. Il en change selon le changement de nos âges, de nos fortunes et de nos expériences. . . . Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner s'il se joint quelquefois à la plus rude austérité, et s'il entre si hardiment en société avec elle pour se détruire, parce que, dans le même temps qu'il se ruine en un endroit, il se rétablit en un autre. . . . Voilà la peinture de l'amour propre, dont toute la vie n'est qu'une grande agitation."[4]

That, however, everything cannot be reduced to self-love, wide as is its diffusion, that it is in constant interaction with other and opposite systems in our character, is evident from its own self-deceptions, self-justifications, and frequent

[1] 'Reflexions, Sentences et Maximes Morales de La Rochefoucauld,' xviii.

[2] *Op. cit.* xxxvii.

[3] *Op. cit.* cclxii.

[4] *Op. cit.* i. (de l'édition de 1665).

assumptions of virtue, and from this disinterested curiosity about it. But the laws of this interaction, if implied, are not elicited. In some cases, however, La Rochefoucauld enunciates genuine, empirical laws of character:—"Weak characters cannot be sincere";[1] "Envy is destroyed by true friendship, and coquetry by true love."[2] Again he observes profoundly: "It is only those who have firmness (of will) who can possess true sweetness (of character); those who seem sweet are generally only weak, which is easily turned to sourness."[3]

The result of an examination of the other great writers of reflections and maxims would bring us to a conclusion not substantially different from that which we have already reached. While we may find in the works of Bacon, Pascal, La Bruyère, Vauvenargues, Joubert, Goethe, an occasional law of character expressed, and many more implied, the bulk of their wisdom is not concerned to formulate such laws.

We must then judge, with regard to the inductive base of the new science, that Mill did not form an accurate opinion of the nature of the material that we could extract from literature, and with no more particular direction than to collect those "empirical laws" that "have been formed in abundance by every successive age of humanity," we shall make little progress, and that the reward is likely to be so disproportioned to our pains that we shall abandon the search in disgust. On the other side, as we have seen, in common with other psychologists of his time, Mill was mistaken as to the functions that could be assigned to the laws of association; and therefore was without any of those "laws of mind" to serve as deductive and explanatory principles, which were indispensable to the working of his method.

Notwithstanding the fact that the generalised observations of the great writers who have understood human nature most profoundly are not couched in a form which we can at once assimilate, and include in a collection of empirical laws of character, they are not without a special value and significance for us. The material which they supply is indis-

[1] *Op. cit.* cccxvi. [2] *Op. cit.* ccclxxvi.
[3] *Op. cit.* cccclxxix.

pensable to the inductive basis of the science, and may both help us in discerning laws that are implied in them, and in testing or verifying the laws that we have already discovered.

We have now to inquire in what other directions we have to modify and supplement Mill's method, in order to fit it for our purpose.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THE METHOD OF A SCIENCE OF CHARACTER (II)

4. *Of certain Qualifications which the Method of a Science of Character should possess*

THE chief deficiency of Mill's method is the omission to make any sufficient analysis of character itself, the most difficult and complicated fact that we have anywhere to deal with. He does not appear to have appreciated how abstract and inadequate are the ordinary conceptions of it, or how this abstractness and inadequacy must infect the problems of the new science. Yet the attainment of all difficult ends, setting aside those of our instincts, is dependent on some pre-conception of them, and the clearness and adequacy of this pre-conception conditions the choice of the means, and, therefore, the chances of success. A confused conception has its inevitable consequence in confused actions, drawn continually from their course because we do not know what that course is. It is for this reason that we have judged it essential to inquire, in the first place, into the constitution of human character, in order that we may form a clear conception of it, and through this clear conception, be able to discern the problems and the goal of the new science.

The conception of character common to those who succeeded Mill in attempting to treat it scientifically, was formed under the influence of analytical psychology, and this influence fastened attention on the three abstract elements—feeling, conation, cognition—assumed to be united in every state of consciousness, so that the conception of character reached along these lines was much the same as that of mind in

general. The problem of a science of character suggested by this conception, will be, therefore, to understand how these three 'elements,' called also 'aspects,' and sometimes 'functions,' are related to one another in the different characters of men. Thus arises the conception of a predominance of one or other of them as furnishing a key to the classification of characters. If to this conception we add the account of the four temperaments that has come down to us from Hypocrates and Galen, a second problem is suggested of the innate character as constituted by the predominance of one or other of these temperaments, the nervous, the phlegmatic, the bilious, and the sanguine. And thus we become at length involved in a third and more intricate problem: how the predominance of one or other of these types of temperament is related to the predominance of one or other of the ultimate elements or functions in the same character. Several works[1] have been written along these lines; and as long as they are followed, and the methods of analytical psychology are adhered to, it does not seem possible greatly to vary the conception of character and its problems. We are inevitably committed to quantitative estimates of character—to conceptions of more and less, which cannot be treated scientifically, so long as we cannot measure them, and which leave us with indefinite conclusions. We are taken away from concrete and fruitful problems to follow others which are abstract and even artificial, such as is that of the 'predominance' of one of the fundamental aspects of mind over another from which it is inseparable;[2] and, meanwhile, pre-occupied with them, we lose sight of the concrete facts, and the power of handling them.

If, on the other hand, we start from a concrete and synthetic conception of character, we are in harmony with the point of view of all dramatists, historians, biographers, and novelists,

[1] 'Study of Character,' by Alexander Bain; A. Fouillée, 'Tempérament et Caractère.' P. Malapert, 'Les Eléments du Caractère.' A. Lévy, 'Psychologie du Caractère.' F. Queyrat, 'Les Caractères.'

[2] I have considered the meaning which must be attached to such a 'predominance' in a review of M. Fouillée's work, 'Tempérament et Caractère.' See 'Mind,' N. S. vol. v. p. 125 (1896).

and can utilise their material. We avoid breaking up the forces of character into their elements, and being driven to consider the abstract problem of their mutual relations.

Adopting this position we are brought face to face with the natural problems of the tendencies of these forces, of the constitution of these systems, and of the laws of their action and interaction. Now granting that there are laws of the action of every one of these forces or systems, we cannot discover those laws until we know what these systems are. We therefore had first to inquire into them and the principal differences of their constitution; and when, through this inquiry, we had attained to the conception of character as constituted of the lesser and greater systems of the emotions and sentiments, we were soon able to pass to the tentative formulation of general laws.

Now if we had to establish the truth of these initial conceptions in the first instance, we should not make any advance at all. Subtle questions would have to be considered, and different minds would furnish divergent answers to them. We have to adopt these conceptions in the first instance, as part of our working theory. Thus the conception of the Sentiments as constituting the highest systems of our character through the organisation of the systems of the lower levels, has first to be tested for its fruitfulness rather than established as true. Does it help us to deal with the facts of our emotional life; to discern any of those "empirical laws" of which we stand in need, and which are everywhere implied in literature, and in the common discourse of men? Will it help us to organise these laws so that we can make a science of them, wherein the truth of one supplements, supports, or throws light on the truth of others? If it can do any of these things it will justify our use of it as a hypothesis; if it can do all of them, it may establish its own truth; if it can do none, though it be still true, it is unfruitful, and we must find some other hypothesis.

As it is with these initial conceptions, so will it be with the laws which they first lead us to suspect, and afterwards to define and enunciate. We shall not attempt to prove them to be universally true any more than the initial conceptions

that have led up to them. Without believing that they have a certain measure of truth we should not provisionally adopt them; but so far from assuming them to be completely true, we shall rather assume that they are always partially false, like most of the conclusions reached in "the moral sciences."

These tentative laws we shall add to our working theory; and employ them like our initial conceptions, to aid us in interpreting, and organising the facts of character, and in discovering other and more particular laws. And here we shall justify the foresight of Mill in the prominent part which he assigned to deduction in the new science, though we cannot claim for it all that he did.[1]

We shall not, then, assume with Mill that the "laws of mind" have a higher validity than the "empirical laws." They will be more general; the others, more particular; and both will be "laws of mind," and both will be founded on experience. The one, as Mill suggested, will be couched in the form of laws of tendency, and will assert not that something "will always or certainly happen,"[2] but that it will tend to happen so far as it is not counteracted. The others, so far as we find them in literature, will be generally couched in the form that something always does happen: as the law that "weak characters cannot be sincere."

The study of character being so difficult on account of its exceeding complexity, the method we propose is that of a hypothesis or conception of character, which gradually unfolds and develops as we come to study new aspects of the subject. The conception that we have formed in preceding chapters, with the laws which it has suggested, is the beginning of our working theory. We adopt it provisionally. It is comparatively simple; it will become more complex. It is inadequate; but at each step forward in our work it will become more complete. In so developing, it will become a more efficient and flexible instrument, capable of interpreting a greater variety of facts. As a clear conception has an advantage over one that is obscure, so will the more adequate

[1] See P. Malapert, 'Les Éléments du Caractère,' pp. ix. x. 'Introduction.'

[2] *Op. cit.* B. vi. ch. v. 4.

conceptions we reach have an advantage over the less adequate conceptions that have preceded them. They will lead us to formulate new problems, to suspect the existence of new laws, and therefore will direct attention and research to their discovery. Every one of these laws so discovered will, in its turn, enrich our previous conception, and improve it as an instrument of discovery and interpretation. What is implicit in the generalised observations and great thoughts of men of genius about character—in the laws that almost rise to the surface, yet baffle our interpretation—can only become explicit for us so far as we have some clue to them. The development of our conception will give us these clues in increasing numbers. "Great thoughts spring from the heart," says Vauvenargues;[1]—and if we know the emotional systems from which they proceed, we shall be able to interpret them. "The heart has its reasons, which the reason does not understand," says Pascal;[2]—unless in the same individual, the reason is both its instrument and also independent of it. "The maxims of men disclose their hearts";[3]—but only to those who have in their own the key that fits them.

Now, from the nature of the case, we cannot expect the laws of character which we discover to have the same degree of novelty as those discovered in the physical sciences. For from the time when man first began to reflect, he has reflected on the nature of those forces within him which are driving him to good or evil. Hence their tendencies must be more or less known; and the laws to which we attempt to reduce them can be no more than refinements and corrections of the conclusions often inarticulate of popular knowledge. At least, the further we descend from general laws to particular ones, the more shall we be treading on ground that is familiar and even commonplace; only our method of dealing with it will be different.

The familiarity of these laws in a crude, unscientific form will carry with it a certain advantage. We shall not only

[1] 'Les grandes pensées viennent du cœur,' 'Réflexions et Maximes,' cxxiv.

[2] Pascal, 'Pensées Art,' xvi. 111. [3] Vauvenargues, *op. cit.* cvii.

be able to appeal to the observations of great writers, as a means of verifying the more precise conclusions at which we arrive, but also to the cruder conclusions of men in general. It seems then grandiose to describe our aim as being to discover and organise the laws of character, since it is rather to restate and to refine them ; but still we have to discover those limiting conditions which popular thought is too simple and hasty to discriminate.

These then are the special features of the method that we propose to follow, and the additions that we have to make to what is still valuable in the method which Mill recommended. It is in the first place a method of discovery rather than of proof;—a method reaching no further than a tentative formulation of laws ; for organising the more particular under the more general ; for interpreting the generalised observations which every great observer of human nature forms for himself, and by this interpretation making some advance toward their organisation. And this is a fitting aim in beginning a science of character, since every science consists of an organisation of knowledge, and by this we may hope to advance a stage in the process of raising the common knowledge of character to the level of science.

Our method, in the second place, is one of gradual and cumulative proof through a gradual and progressive elimination of error. We have by successive steps to raise the provisional laws of character to the level of scientific laws. We cannot do this at once. We cannot at once raise even one of these laws to the scientific standard, because we do not know where error is mixed with its truth. The first step is to express these laws with the utmost clearness and precision. What is erroneous in them can then be more readily detected. "L'obscurité est le royaume de l'erreur." [1] "There are no errors which would not perish of themselves were they clearly expressed." [2] Yet this is itself an ideal to which, with ordinary language as our instrument, we can only by degrees approximate.

We shall now take some examples of these tentative laws, that we may be able to judge of the methods by which their

[1] Vauvenargues, 'Réflexions et Maximes,' v. [2] *Ibid.* vi.

errors are to be gradually eliminated. We have already explained the function that we assign to these laws—that of organising and interpreting the facts of character to which they refer, and of giving the needful direction to our attention in order that we may be able to seek for, observe, and collect them. When a law is ambiguously expressed we cannot judge whether certain facts do or do not fall under it, whether they agree with or contradict it. But when it is precisely expressed it is an efficient guide to observation and research, and we more readily discern the facts that are opposed to it. Now it is precisely by the study of these facts that we have to correct the provisional form of a law, and to raise it to a higher level of truth : they are therefore the most important to collect. For in them will be implied some condition that had been overlooked, and which limits the validity of the empirical law. Every careful thinker makes a certain number of such preparatory steps himself. His theory makes progress in his own mind. He sees certain facts that conflict with it. But because he fails at a certain point to make any further advance, he infers that his theory is true, and that others have only to accept it. Whereas he should strive to give it such a form that other thinkers can take up its development at the point at which he left it.

Next to the ambiguity of the terms in which a theory or a law is defined, the most common fallacy is to state it too broadly. Thus Suard commenting on the rule of Vauvenargues, that there are no errors that would not perish of themselves were they clearly expressed, remarks that "the expression is too general," that the rule applies only to "errors of reasoning or of speculation," but not to "errors of fact."[1] But at least the clearness of the enunciation aids us in recollecting the cases that conflict with the law, and these aid us to discover the condition that limits its range, and to raise it a degree nearer to the scientific standard.

When, again, Bacon says that "Deformed persons and eunuchs, and old men and bastards, are envious,"[2] his statement is so clear that we can readily recollect many exceptions

[1] Vauvenargues, *op. cit.* 'Réflexions et Maximes,' vi. note.
[2] 'Essays,' 'Envy.'

to it. Nor is it so difficult to account for them. For the mere physical facts to which he refers cannot sum up all the conditions of envy. They can only have this effect so far as they excite a particular system of the mind. But what is that system? St. Augustine says, "Pride is the mother of envy, and cannot but generate it, and even coexist with it."[1] Is it then only so far as a man is proud that he is prone to envy, and is this the only condition that limits the extent and validity of the law? Now pride is a sentiment of self-valuation; why then should it elicit in us, in presence of our own defects and inferiorities, just this one of its emotions, envy, rather than another? For the case is not simple. The young man who is ambitious values himself highly, and resolves to achieve that power or position which he regards as his due. His present position is one of inferiority; yet the young are seldom envious. It is disappointed men who have reached middle age that are most subject to envy. But what makes the difference? The young man conceives that achievements are possible to him which the middle-aged and the old know to be no longer possible to them. Inferiority has a different effect on the one from that which it has on the other. But pride, which is set against inferiority, has only two ways of removing it. Either it must directly achieve that superiority to which it lays claim, or it must lower the superiority of others, until its own inferiority is lost in the comparison. Ambition is its emotion in the one case; envy in the other.

Impossibility of removing the inferiority which rankles in the mind of pride is, then, a second condition of envy. And therefore all such defects as deformity, bastardy, and old age generate envy, "except," says Bacon, "these defects light upon a very brave and heroical nature."[2] But this limitation is one that affects some other part of our nature, and does not conflict with the law of pride.

Pride then not being able to raise itself to the height which it regards as due to itself, uses envy to lower the value of others. But this method being only partially successful,—since if we lower one man's fortune or reputation there are

[1] 'Hom. on Ps.' 101 [2] *Op. cit.* 'Envy.'

generally others to take his place,—envy remains unappeased and is apt to become a fixed emotion. Hence the observation of La Rochefoucauld that "Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred."[1]

Let us now notice how in this case, as we apply our method, an empirical law is carried through successive stages of development, in each of which it approximates nearer to the precision and universality of a scientific law. For first we have the law in its crude form, that certain persons subject to various defects and inferiorities are envious. We find facts that contradict it. We examine these facts; and in them, we will assume, we find pride subdued by the opposite sentiment of love,—love with its natural humility. We now restate the law, and subject it to this condition: That it is only so far as pride is present and is not counteracted, that defects and inferiorities of the self arouse its envy. Secondly, even in this form we still find facts that contradict the generalisation. For there are situations in which pride is so confident of its superiority, or, as in youth, is so confident of its power to remove in the future all inferiorities from which it suffers in the present, that it is raised above envy. We then examine these cases and compare them with those in which envy is present; and we find in the latter the presence of some inferiority which is irremediable,—as failure in middle life, following upon a high self-valuation in youth; the stigma of bastardy, or of mixed black and white descent, from which we can never escape; in the former we find the absence of any inferiority that causes humiliation, or of such only as a man may be confident of removing. We then restate the law a second time, and incorporate this condition in it.

And now we have to apply other features of the method. In the enunciation of the law, we should employ no terms which are obscure or ambiguous. But this is a condition that we find it impossible to fulfil in our present situation. For 'pride' is itself a term the meaning of which is full of ambiguity, as in a less degree is envy; and we cannot deal with either scientifically until we have first studied in detail the

[1] 'Maximes.'

constitution both of the sentiment and of the emotion. In the second place we have to avoid all indefinite and quantitative terms, and to find a form for our law which, as a law of tendency, will render it independent of variations in the strength of the tendency in different cases. Otherwise it would be impossible to find any scientific expression for it; and we should have to say, for instance, that men are made envious by their inferiorities when pride is *very* strong in them, or is not counteracted, as Bacon says, by "a very brave and heroical nature." Assuming that we have made that necessary and preparatory study of pride and its emotions, we can then restate the law as follows: Defects and inferiorities which both arouse the sentiment of pride and are felt to be irremediable tend to make us envious of those who do not suffer from them.

Thus as we collect the facts to which any empirical law of character clearly and unambiguously expressed directs our attention, we discover some condition on which its truth depends, and which had been overlooked in the first enunciation of it. But we can never be sure that we have discovered all the conditions that limit its truth, and therefore all our laws remain tentative and hypothetical.

We find the same recurring difficulties in treating of all the generalisations that we find in literature. When, for instance, Bacon says that "Love of his country begins in a man's own house,"[1] his statement is clear as far as it goes, but it goes a very little way. It indicates only one condition of patriotism, but if this condition is not valid it enables us to seek for the facts that contradict it. Beyond this it is full of unexpressed ambiguities. The family is a condition of patriotism; but unpatriotic persons are also brought up in a family, and may themselves have one; why then are they unpatriotic? Other writers have stated laws that distinguish other and more important conditions. It is a fundamental principle of the teaching of Confucius and his disciples that Filial Piety is the basis both of loyalty and of patriotism. "The duty of children to their parents is the fountain whence all other duties spring";[2] and this duty is centred in that reverential love of

[1] De Aug. Scien., Ed. Spedding, B. vi. ch. III. 'Antitheses.'

[2] 'The Book of Filial Piety,' ch. i. (trans. Ivan Chên).

parents whence this piety proceeds. And we can connect this ancient teaching which has overspread China and Japan with the modern teaching of Darwin. In his "Descent of Man," he says, "The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental and filial affections, since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents; and this extension may be attributed in part to habit, but chiefly to natural selection."[1]

Thus when laws are expressed clearly and without ambiguity we can more easily detect the facts that conflict with them and the conditions that have been overlooked, and are in a position to carry them a degree nearer to the truth. If we are ever to have a science of character it seems only possible through such a progress as we have attempted to describe in the tentative formulation of its laws.

Such a progress presupposes that the new science, however humble in its commencement, will not be for ever driven back to its starting-point to commence everything afresh. This has been so much the common fate of "the moral sciences" that we have become inured to it, and seek for nothing better, and are disposed to think that at every new departure in theory there is progress, since what is false in the previous theory has been destroyed, although there is no surety that what is true in it has been preserved. Tentative or hypothetical conceptions, with which the sciences have familiarised us, which are true up to a point and useful, and interpret a certain group of facts, though at first, and especially in the intricacies of human character, overlooking other and essential conditions,—these conceptions, if well chosen, ought to provide a basis on which a progressive science can be built. The successive formulations of a law must all be developments of the first crude form in which it is expressed. Each fresh formulation in response to new facts should be an advance on the preceding one, achieving progress by provisionally accepting the earlier form of the law. Even if—what is indeed probable—the most general hypotheses and laws of the science should at some future

[1] 'Descent of Man,' part i. ch. iv.

time undergo modification, yet so far as what was true in the earlier conceptions is recognised and preserved in the later, the progress of the science is not frustrated. There is still continuity. There is no revolution ; no interval of anarchy. All proceeds in an orderly development. For our conceptions and our laws grow with our knowledge of the facts. But we must no longer attempt to make them, what in such an intricate subject they can never be, perfect from the commencement.

The most pressing need of a science of character at the present time is, in our opinion, to accumulate a sufficient number of provisional laws, covering the variety of material with which we have to deal ; because these alone give the requisite direction to observation and research. The further progress of the science will depend on the accumulation of fresh facts bearing on the provisional laws, and especially of those that conflict with them, and which lead to the discovery of the concealed conditions that limit their range. But this subsequent stage can only be accomplished when a number of able men become interested in the problems of the new science, and co-operate for their solution by working on the same foundation. To transform a few of the provisional laws of character into scientific laws not liable to exceptions may be the work of a life-time. Each one of them requires a prolonged and patient investigation.

In the remaining chapters of this book we shall be able to watch the growth of our first conception or theory of character, to test its fruitfulness in suggesting the initial problems of the science, in directing attention to the formulation of its hypothetical laws, which we hope to discern, and in interpreting the generalised observations that we find in literature and in the current intercourse of mankind, and thus to judge of the value of the method as a whole. For a method cannot be established by argument ; but only by trial.

CHAPTER IX

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER

1. *The Qualities of Conduct.*

It is a more easy as well as a more accurate method to characterise a man by what he does than by what he is—by his outward conduct rather than by his thoughts, feelings, and desires. If we know how a man has acted in the main situations of life—as a son, a brother, a husband, a father, as a citizen, as a friend and foe, as an inferior, an equal and superior, in business and recreation, in company and solitude, in prosperity and adversity, through youth, manhood, and old age—we shall have almost a complete expression of his character, so far as it is possible for one life to test it; and we seem also to have a complete knowledge of the man; and this is the method we naturally apply whenever our powers of observation are stronger than are our insight and introspection, as is usually the case. Hence most of the terms we use to describe character are based on observation, and denote modes of conduct.

What are meanness, generosity, gentleness, sincerity, treachery, truthfulness, loyalty, cowardice, injustice, chastity, kindliness, honour and dishonour, but modes of conduct, in the first instance, and based, in our knowledge of them, on observation, though afterwards transferred to character itself, as among its most important qualities? And how much more important does it seem to us, for a knowledge of another person's character, to know that he is honourable, sincere and brave, incapable of treachery or meanness, than to have an account of what he loves or hates, or of his susceptibility to

anger or fear. If these are important, those seem to take us right into the heart of character, and some of them to be the principles which regulate everything else.

Yet the defects of the method of observation as applied to the knowledge of character are plainly apparent. For all that strictly we can know of a man whom we know only by observation is that his character is that from which his conduct proceeds—his conduct that seems so fully to characterise him. His character is the sum of unknown forces or tendencies which are the source of his conduct. But what these are in themselves, how they operate, how they are related together, and how they develop and decay, of all this we know nothing.

In practice we escape from this difficulty. The same qualities that are derived from observation of a man's conduct are afterwards attributed to his character, and this process seems to transform our ignorance of it into knowledge. What, for instance, is 'meanness'? We may consider it first in relation to the employment of money. A man is thought to be mean who underpays the services which he hires. If he engages someone to do business which has no fixed remuneration he makes a payment for it which is no proper equivalent. His meanness is shown in relation to those richer as well as to those poorer than himself. From the former he gets all he can without making a suitable return. If he is with a friend who offers to pay the expenses of some entertainment, for decency he offers some show of resistance; but when the time comes to settle the account he allows his friend to bear the cost of both. His is the remark, made in a moment of expansion, that the dinner we enjoy most is one that another pays for. And it is not poverty that accounts for such meanness; the rich may show it when they have some obligation to fulfil and reduce it to the least proportions.

Meanness, then, is a kind of conduct that we observe in certain men as characteristic of them, something not exceptional, but which repeats itself again and again in similar situations. From this uniformity of conduct we infer that there is a cause as uniform in the character to account for it,

and we call this cause also 'meanness.' The same quality that we have observed in conduct we attribute to character, as a quality belonging to it also. We may agree that this procedure does not increase our knowledge of a cause, the effect of which we can alone observe. But it is resorted to in other directions. It was made a reproach to the Faculty-psychologists that they interpreted the processes of the mind, such as remembering, reasoning, willing, and the like, as due to a faculty of the mind to perform them. Thus, remembering was supposed to be due to a faculty of memory, reasoning to a faculty of reason, willing to a faculty of will. Similarly, the meanness or generosity we observe as a quality of some men's conduct is explained by the meanness or generosity we attribute as a quality to their characters.

While there are a number of other qualities which are first observed in conduct and afterwards referred to character in order to account for them, they could not be attributed to it without some addition drawn not from external observation, but from introspection or observation of our own minds. For, although we say that a man is mean or generous in his actions because his character has the quality of meanness or generosity, yet the will is assumed to be implicated. The man is inferred to will the several actions which have the given quality. But all we know about these different qualities in the first instance,—the content which distinguishes one from another,—is drawn from observation of conduct. Thus 'kindliness' is a particular quality of some men's conduct by which they are shown, not occasionally but habitually, to be willing helpers of their fellows 'Treachery' is another quality, by which actions are first made to appear hospitable or kindly as a cloak to remove suspicion whilst they conceal another kind of actions which betrays the unsuspecting man to his ruin.

This filling out of character with a number of qualities drawn from conduct makes our conception of it much richer and more varied than it would otherwise be; and, if we have little introspection of our own minds and less insight into other men's, it chiefly makes up our conception of their characters,—with the addition of a reference to their wills as

implicated with these qualities and in some way responsible for them. Others acquire greater insight into the more obvious of the emotions and sentiments, and sometimes attempt to explain a particular quality, as when one asks, in witnessing some degrading action of a man, whether he can have self-respect. But most people are content to attribute these qualities of conduct to character without further inquiry, condemning one man for his treachery or meanness and praising another for his truthfulness or generosity.

What we have now to notice, and before we attempt to give any better explanation of these qualities, is that they are exceedingly numerous in comparison with our emotions and sentiments, and that if we analyse even famous descriptions of character we shall find that they are principally composed of them.

The celebrated "Characters" of Theophrastus are most of them personifications of one or other of these qualities of conduct. He tells us that having lived to the age of ninety-nine years, he had seen all sorts of persons, and had had time enough to know them. His method is to take some kind of conduct which he has observed, to distinguish the quality of it, to separate that from all other qualities belonging to the same man, and to form a character of it by itself, thereby obtaining both clearness and simplicity for his portrait, and making it life-like by representing its behaviour in a variety of situations. Of its secret springs, he tells us almost nothing. Among his characters are the Boor, the Dissimulator, the Flatterer, the Impertinent, the Complaisant man, the Rascal, the great Talker, the Newsmonger. Here and there we have one in which the quality of conduct is connected with its cause in the character, as "Effrontery caused by avarice," defined as a "contempt of honour" through a vile interest in money. After this momentary glimpse into the mind, he returns to describe its ordinary behaviour. The man's meanness is equal to his effrontery: "The very day that he has sacrificed to the gods, instead of eating religiously at home a part of the consecrated food, he has it salted in order that it may serve for several meals, and goes to sup with one of his friends; and there, at table in sight of every one, he calls his

valet, whom he wishes also to be fed at the expense of his host; and cutting for him some meat which he puts on a hunch of bread: There, my friend, says he, make good cheer." "Another time with the money that he has received from some strangers to get them places at the theatre, he finds a means of obtaining his own place free, and of sending the next day his children and their tutor." "If he is in a strange house, he manages to borrow even the barley and straw, and, what is more, he who has lent them has to bear the expense of having them carried to his house."[1]

Impressed by this quality of impudence, he has other characters in which it predominates. He defines the Rascal[2] as "one to whom it costs nothing to say or to do the most shameful things." Other characters are the Complaisant man, the Importunate man,[3] the Forward man,[4] the Dullard, the Brute; and mixed with these characters drawn from qualities of conduct are some of another kind, personifications of an emotion or sentiment: as Vanity, Avarice, Pride, Fear, or "Defect of Courage," and the temper that makes us displeased with everyone: "L'esprit chagrin fait que l'on n'est jamais content de personne, et qu'on fait aux autres mille plaintes sans fondement."[5]

Thus a quality of conduct, a sentiment, an emotion, a temper, may be variously drawn upon to form one of his characters, as if there were no significant differences between them.

La Bruyère, who translated the characters of Theophrastus, followed him in depicting the "manners" of his time. But the qualities which he distinguishes in them are more difficult to seize. Sometimes he gives varieties of the same quality, as, in Theognis and Pamphile, the affectation of the great: "gens nourris dans le faux, et qui ne haissent rien tant que d'être naturels."[6] Sometimes he represents varieties of the same sentiment, as of self-love in Gnathon and in Cliton. Of

[1] La Bruyère: 'Les Caractères de Théophraste: "De l'Effronterie causée par l'Avarice."'

[2] *Op. cit.*, 'De l'Image d'un Coquin.' 'De l'Air Empressé.'

[3] 'Du Contre-Temps.'

[4] 'L'Esprit Chagrin.'

[5] 'Les Caractères ou les Mœurs de ce Siècle,' 'Des Grands

the former he says: "Il embarrasse tout le monde, ne se contraint pour personne, ne plaint personne, ne connoît de maux que les siens"; of the latter: "C'est un personnage illustre dans son genre, et qui a porté le talent de se bien nourrir jusqu'où il pouvoit aller. . . . Quelque part où il soit il mange, et s'il revient au monde, c'est pour manger."[1] Of his more complex characters we may take his description of a hero, supposed to be in part a portrait of the great Condé. He "was born what other great men only become by force of rules, of meditation and practice . . . great in prosperity, greater still when fortune was contrary: the raising of a siege, or a retreat, has more ennobled him than his triumphs; . . . he has been heard to say: I took to flight, with the same grace with which he said: We beat them." And we have the summing up, in which the principal sentiments of the great man, and one or another of his characteristic emotions, are touched on in conjunction with others of his qualities: "a man devoted to the State, to his family, to the head of his family; sincere before God and before men; so great an admirer of merit that we should have supposed it to have been less a property of himself and less familiar to him; a man true, simple, magnanimous, not lacking in the least virtues."[2]

We may compare this noble portrait in which we seem to grasp the essence of the man, with one by another great delineator of character. Clarendon's portrait of the Duke of Buckingham is more complex, enters more into the details of his action, but represents a similar combination of qualities of conduct, sentiments, and emotions to form a single conception. The qualities of this statesman are first mentioned: "This great man was a Person of a Noble nature, and generous disposition." "He was of a most flowing Courtesy and Affability to all men who made any address to him. . . . He was of a Courage not to be daunted, which was manifested in all of his actions. . . ." Of his sentiments of love and hate, he says: "His Kindness and Affection to his friends was so vehement, that they were as so many marriages for better and

[1] *Op. cit.*, 'De l'Homme.'
[2] *Op. cit.*, 'Du Mérite Personnel.'

worse. . . . And it cannot be denied that he was an Enemy in the same excess . . . ; and was not easily induced to reconciliation." After a history of some incidents of his life, other qualities are enumerated: "He was in his Nature just and candid, liberal, generous, and bountiful." And these qualities are referred to his lack of Avarice: "nor was it ever known, that the temptation of Money sway'd him to do an unjust, or unkind thing." In conclusion, his ruling sentiment is noticed and excused: "If he had an immoderate Ambition with which he was charged, and is a Weed (if it be a weed) apt to grow in the best Soils; it doth not appear . . . that he brought it with him to the Court, but rather found it there, and was a Garment necessary for that Air." [1]

We have now given sufficient examples to show something of the variety of constituents that may enter into the conception of character, and that these constituents, notwithstanding the profound differences that subsist between them, are thrown together without method, or one is abstracted from the rest: any course being justifiable that produces a clear conception of the character we have to describe. Thus the qualities of a man's conduct are no sooner clearly identified than they are transferred to character, and placed alongside of other constituents that are not conduct, nor qualities of conduct.

We have now to consider how these same qualities of conduct are related to the impulses, emotions, and sentiments, and to the varieties of will and intelligence organised with them.

2. *The Conception of Conduct*

We combine, distinguish, and oppose the conceptions of character and conduct. We think of the one as within, and of the other as without us. We think of conduct as the expression of character, and of character as the source of conduct. We think we can observe other men's conduct, but not their character; and that they cannot observe ours; but that we can to some extent observe our own by introspection. The distinction is not however so clear as it seems. Conduct is the expression of character;

[1] 'Hist. of the Rebellion,' book i.

but not every action of the body is conduct. Reflex actions are not conduct; instinctive actions are. For conduct does not always imply a preceding thought of it, still less an intention to fulfil it. Our strong emotions seize us of a sudden; their impulses hurry us into action; their behaviour is sometimes instinctive, and their ends unforeseen. Sometimes we do not foresee a behaviour of our emotions which is acquired, when the habit of it has been long established. In anger, words often escape from a man, which he afterwards denies that he ever meant, or even said. And yet such actions are a test of character, because they are a test of temper. There are some natures so noble that even in anger they cannot degrade themselves. Thus not only the actions that we foresee and intend, but those also which we do not foresee, so far as they spring from our acquired habits or our innate temper belong to our conduct; and they are also the expression of our character, because they are the expression of some one of its instincts, emotions, or sentiments.

If we then have to conceive of conduct as the expression of character, we can understand how we come to transfer to it the qualities of conduct. For, as we have already noticed, the systems of character are not wholly contained in the mind; only a small part of them rises into consciousness; and the achievement of their ends is found in conduct. Our primary emotions have an instinctive or innate behaviour, and in this behaviour are the qualities which distinguish them. But this behaviour is part of the system of the emotion, and therefore belongs to our character; and hence the qualities of the one are those of the other also. For instance, under the influence of anger an animal fights; in fighting it manifests that instinctive behaviour for overcoming an enemy which is characteristic of its species; in this instinctive behaviour is found its quality of courage, which is therefore part of its innate character. The quality is in the system as a whole though it is only at first manifested in the conduct or behaviour of the system. Soon in the higher animals, and especially in man, this quality of courage comes to be acquired by the highest part of the system, that which is in the mind. For man, after his actions, acquires representations

of them; these representations give him foresight, and through this foresight the qualities of his conduct come to be acquired by his will so far as it acts in consequence of these representations. And thus courage, at first a quality of instinctive actions, is acquired by the higher systems of character, in the higher form peculiar to them, and becomes a quality of their conation. And this conation when it acts with foresight is called 'volition' or 'will.' Thus anger when it both foresees dangerous actions and braves them may be said to have a courageous will. All the qualities of conduct, then, innate or acquired may be acquired in this way by the emotions and sentiments to which the conduct belongs. This is the higher sense in which the qualities of conduct come to be acquired by the character.

As our conduct is the effect and expression of our character, so it includes not only positive actions, but also a certain group of negative actions or omissions. Negligence and culpable forgetfulness are modes of conduct, because to do what we have to do imperfectly, or to forget to do it altogether, must be due to some defect of our character, or of one of its systems. For we think that a person should have sufficient regard for others to insure him against such omissions. And therefore these qualities of negligence and forgetfulness attach as much to his character as to his conduct; an omission, in the one is an omission in the other also. If a man is negligent in the conduct of his business, he omits to think of all that he should do for its advancement, or does not think of it with sufficient concentration and effort of will; and his negligence therefore affects one of the systems of his character, even if it does not spread to the whole.

These qualities of negligence and culpable forgetfulness belong to a class which we have now to notice as being first in the character and afterwards in the conduct, and not like the former, first in the conduct and afterwards in the character. We hardly speak of animals as being negligent or forgetful. It is the business of their instincts to be efficient in their several directions. We do not require them to supplement the imperfections of their instincts by trains of thought that forecast particular lines of conduct: we attribute culpable

forgetfulness and negligence to those only who are capable of such trains of thought, and of the self-control to be guided by them. These qualities belong only to the higher side of our character; beginning there, they are attributed also to its effects in conduct.

There are many other qualities that are proper to character itself, or to one or other of its systems. There are the qualities of the emotions, the hardness of some and the tenderness of others, the impulsiveness and lack of self-control of all of them. There are their qualities of sensibility, intensity and duration, varying from one person to another according to innate and acquired tempers. There are the qualities of the sentiments which, as organising their several emotions, require self-control, and in some measure acquire it. Among the highest qualities of their self-control are patience, perseverance, constancy, fortitude, faithfulness; but one or other of their opposites also infect the sentiments, diminishing their efficiency. There are men who cannot learn to be patient, or persevering, or to acquire moral courage. These qualities, and their opposites, which start from the character, spread to and impregnate the conduct. A man's conduct has the patience, or the perseverance, or the fortitude of his character.

There are then two kinds of qualities of character; (1) those which are first in conduct, because they belong to the behaviour of our instincts, and are attributed to our innate character as the cause of it;—as the courage of certain animals and the cowardice of others; (2) those which are first in character, as the qualities of its emotions and sentiments, and thence come to qualify the conduct of these systems. Hence it happens that our conduct seems to be as much filled with qualities of character, as is our character with the original qualities of conduct. And this is at first a source of confusion to the mind. We can, then, by no means maintain that clear-cut distinction between character and conduct from which we started.

Character then is not constituted of the emotions and sentiments alone, with the will and intelligence as their instruments. It has other and very numerous and important

constituents. The qualities of character are neither emotions nor sentiments, though both of these involve them. But we cannot use the term 'quality' in that loose sense in which even love is sometimes spoken of as a quality of character. 'Quality' in its proper sense is not anything concrete and substantial in itself, but that which qualifies something else. It would therefore be improperly applied to denote the systems of the emotions and sentiments, and would tend to obliterate an important distinction.

CHAPTER X

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS

HAVING recognised two principal systems of the mind, the lesser systems of the impulses and emotions, and the greater systems of the sentiments, we shall assume in this chapter that all qualities of character belong exclusively to one or other of these systems, including in them, as heretofore, their appropriate conduct; and, if there are any such qualities in isolated acts, we shall treat them as waste-products of the mind, with which we have no concern; as lying outside of the forces of character and not properly to be regarded as among its qualities.

Every emotion or sentiment has a kind of conduct proper to it, and also its own characteristic thoughts and volitions: to its thoughts, volitions, and conduct many of its qualities belong. But do these qualities belong indifferently to all emotions and sentiments, or rather do not some belong to one, some to others, and some perhaps to all?

As we have anticipated, with every advance toward completeness in our conception of character, new problems of the science will come into view. That our conceptions of individual characters are much more largely composed of the qualities we have been considering than of either emotions or sentiments, and yet that the former are in some way connected with the latter, is the new feature that we have to add to our earlier conception. Therefore there is a new problem connected with it, namely, what particular qualities of character any given sentiment or emotion either possesses innately

or tends to acquire and foster. There must be a number of laws which it will be the business of a science of character to discover, of the qualities of character which are possessed and tend to be acquired by different sentiments and emotions.

We assumed in Chapter V. that there is one fundamental law which concerns the organisation of all sentiments in respect of the particular emotions contained in their systems, and in Chapter VI. that this law must be further extended to include the intellectual and voluntary processes characteristic of particular sentiments. We have now, therefore, to enlarge the law to include both these constituents as well as the qualities of character which were omitted from our first conception. This law will now read:

(8) *Every sentiment tends to include in its system all the emotions, thoughts, volitional processes and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are either superfluous or antagonistic.*

Now we do not assume that such an ideal form of organisation is ever in point of fact achieved, and least of all by the highest and most complex systems of the mind, the organisation of which is so much an acquisition and so difficult to achieve; but we do assume that every growing sentiment is unconsciously, at least, working toward its own more efficient organisation—that it tends to reject what it does not need and to acquire what it does need—and that it is by this hidden fundamental law that its advance is governed.

It is not our business here to enter into the detailed evidence in support of this law; what we have to do is to give sufficient illustration to enable us to grasp its import. First, then, we may consider the distinctive emotions of sentiments. While the tender emotions with their disinterested tendencies are continually brought into play in love toward other human beings, in other sentiments where they are not needed, they tend to be excluded. Why is it that all men who love themselves to excess grow 'hard-hearted,' except that the tender emotions have seldom any function to perform in self-love and atrophy for want of exercise? The same is also true of the sympathetic emotions. In all our affections they are in

constant demand, because they give us that insight into the minds of others which subserves the good we would do to them ; whereas in the sentiments we develop toward impersonal objects, such as the inorganic sciences, the accumulation of wealth, or the increase of our power, the tender emotions are absent, and the sympathetic are present only so far as our end requires us to deal with and to understand human beings. In hatred not only are the sympathetic and tender emotions absent, or only present if at all under exceptional conditions, but they are replaced by the antipathetic emotions. For if our end requires us to injure, to degrade, to give pain, or to destroy life, it is obvious that to rejoice when the hated object suffers, to suffer when he rejoices, hinders the incoming of those pitiful emotions that would relieve him in the first case and deter us from pursuing his destruction in the second. Shakespeare makes Richard III. say of himself: "Tear-falling pity dwells not in this eye." [1] Again, even the various forms of self-love have their distinctive emotional organisations. The pleasure-lover, though he may be as egoistic as the ambitious man, does not develop pride, and tends to lose what pride he has. Nothing more hinders the success of sociable entertainments than an arrogant spirit. Hence it is a law of all society which organises itself for pleasure that everyone must endeavour to be amiable ; but amiability and haughtiness are incompatible qualities. On the other hand, the proud man requires a firmer will than the pleasure-lover. The one has to sustain his power or superiority in the face of much opposition and enmity ; the other requires only the flexible will to seize the moment's pleasure, and to drop it when it is at an end. The vain man again must display himself because he delights in applause ; he must court it, and feel it sympathetically : but to court admiration would humiliate the proud man.

Thus do the different sentiments organise such emotions as they require ; and while there are some that are common to all, others are peculiar to each.

We have next to deal with the distinctive qualities developed by different sentiments, some of which have been already incidentally referred to. Is not 'meanness' as naturally

[1] Richard III., A. iv., Sc. ii.

developed with avarice as is 'generosity' with affection? Even the mean man is less mean toward one whom he loves. Yet though love develops generosity on behalf of its object, it does not follow that the quality spreads in other directions. For the sake of his family a poor man may be mean in his dealings with others, inhospitable to friends, and grasping with strangers. Yet meanness and generosity are not easily compatible, and the habit of one tends to spread at the expense of the other.

So also our affections tend to develop sincerity, gentleness, kindliness, loyalty, courage, and the forgiveness of injuries—all in the first instance on behalf of their objects. It is difficult not to be sincere with one we love, even if sincerity is not a natural quality of our character. And if there is no general kindliness of disposition we still tend to behave kindly to that one. There is another quality we expect from those who love us: loyalty; we expect that they will defend our reputation and not allow it to be questioned in our absence. There are some natures that have not the courage to fulfil this office of friendship—weak characters who cannot oppose any strong expression of opinion; who endeavour to prepossess in their own favour all those with whom they are brought into relation; who fear to offend anyone in position or power. Yet here even, and against the natural bent of their characters, love does what it can, and when it fails makes them ashamed of their cowardice. There are others in whom the intellectual sentiment stands in the way of their affections; who must take up in defence of their friends the same neutral and impartial attitude which others reserve for strangers. Thus the qualities which one sentiment tends to foster, another tends to destroy; and the innate qualities of character may be opposed to either.

That love tends to develop courage, and to overcome even innate timidity, may be seen in women who, loving their children, will brave every danger in defence of them. And when a great love rises in any one, how often and how familiarly, as though testing its powers of self-sacrifice and courage beforehand, does it arouse the same thought: "I would give my life for his."

How much sexual love tends to develop the quality of deception in the pursuit of its end, and even counteracts a naturally open and straightforward disposition, is evident to anyone who has observed its behaviour. Is there anywhere a story of true love struggling against opposition in which we do not read of parents being deceived by their children, and this either without any sense of wrong-doing on their part, or with at most the curious feeling that the action is at once both right and wrong, according as it is looked at from the point of view of the duty of children to their parents or from that of the duty of the girl to her lover. Hence the proverb that "All is fair in love and war." The true and gentle Desdemona deceives her father, as Iago reminds the simple Moor to make him doubt her fidelity to him.

Finally we may touch on the qualities of justice and injustice, and the influences that are favourable or hostile to them. La Rochefoucauld observes: "Les passions ont une injustice et un propre intérêt, qui fait qu'il est dangereux de les suivre, et qu'on s'en doit défier, lors même qu'elles paroissent les plus raisonnables."[1] And does not the love of individual persons tend always to make us unjust? For as our love concerns only them, when their claims and interests conflict with those of others whom we do not love, even where we have the same obligation to both, we tend to be partial to the one and unjust to the others. This is the chief source of injustice, that we love one more than others, or our self more than all. Stern men are more often just than loving-hearted women. For the face of Justice is severe, not tender; and in her hand she carries a sword.

It is a defect of Love that it cannot acquire justice, unless it can first love all men equally or according to their deserts; hence justice attaches itself more often to a different order of sentiments, and inspires respect rather than love.

We can then understand the meaning of the law, and adopt it as a working hypothesis, that every sentiment tends to have or to acquire the qualities of character which are necessary to its ends.

And since among these qualities are many that we name

[1] 'Maximes,' ix.

Virtues and Vices—and what is a virtue but a quality that has its place and function in some system, individual or social? —there is another and more particular law involved in the preceding one. (9) *Every sentiment tends to acquire the virtues and vices that are required by its system.* These virtues may either be peculiar to it, more or less, as kindness to affection, or like the courage of love, may be shared by it with many other sentiments. Then, too, every sentiment tends to acquire the vices that are serviceable to it, and to have as the French say "the defects of its qualities," and even sometimes to glory in them because of their manifest advantages. Of this one of the most striking examples is the injustice of our affections, in spite of the fact that they develop many of our noblest virtues. It is a significant fact that in Calvinistic theology this deep defect of human love is transferred to the Divine Love, which is not conceived as rewarding us according to our merits,—on which therefore we must not rely,—but according to His divine predestination, which has selected some for everlasting happiness by the preference and partiality of love: and so deeply is this injustice ingrained in love that the one does not seem a vice, but a virtue, when we are absorbed in the other. It is, we think, a proof of the noble generosity of Love, which lavishes on us so much more than we deserve, and calls forth in response from the human heart the most passionate gratitude. For this is its glory that it can accomplish what our cold Respects cannot, which measure out equal treatment by rule, even unequal treatment by the rule of precedency or of varying merit. Hence this injustice of love is approved of not only in theology sometimes, but in the noblest poetry:

> "Wish no word unspoken, want no look away!
> What if words were but mistake, and looks—too sudden, say!
> Be unjust for once, Love! Bear it—well I may!
> Do me justice always? Bid my heart—their shrine—
> Render back its store of gifts, old looks and words of thine
> —Oh, so all unjust—the less deserved, the more divine?"[1]

[1] Robert Browning, 'Ferishtah's Fancies,' 2.

CHAPTER XI

OF THE RELATIVE ETHICS OF THE SENTIMENTS

1. *Of the Virtues of Sentiments*

WE have found that among the qualities which a sentiment tends to develop are included certain virtues and vices which are natural to it. These virtues and vices are accounted such from two different points of view: first, from the point of view of society which, observing these qualities in our conduct, names them virtues or vices according as it approves of them or condemns them; secondly, from the point of view of the sentiment itself according to a standard which itself furnishes. And a sentiment will be indisposed to acknowledge those qualities to be vices which seem indispensable to it, whatever they are called by popular opinion; of which one of the most striking examples is that injustice of our affections noticed in the last chapter. Similarly it will be indisposed to account those qualities as virtues which are of no use to it. But its own virtues it will naturally tend to develop, because its system requires them; and when they arise spontaneously and without reflection, it will even be unaware of their existence. Hence the common reflection that we know when we do wrong, but that when we do right we are often unaware of it.

While in the first freshness of a sentiment its virtues often develop in this spontaneous way,—as, for instance, the qualities of generosity, gentleness, kindliness, and sincerity, in love and friendship; and in the sentiments for truth and art, the qualities of industry and perseverance,—yet a little later these qualities are often checked; and effort and reflection succeed to the first stage of spontaneous growth. For from the

earliest times virtue has been associated in our thought with what is difficult of attainment, vice, on the contrary, with a rapid decline, as something into which we 'fall' or 'slide.'

Now the difficulty of persevering in virtue is sometimes due to the fact that although when we love anything we desire the ends which love pursues in relation to it, yet the means thereto are often disagreeable and repugnant to us; as in the sentiments for art and knowledge, the kind of work which we call 'drudgery,' and in our affections, numberless little annoyances. But in the second place this difficulty is due to the competition of other sentiments and their emotions. Consider, for instance, how easy it would be for love to acquire and preserve generosity, were there neither avarice nor other forms of self-love; or gentleness were there no anger; or courage were there no fear; or constancy were there no new loves forming to displace the old; or intellectual impartiality in the love of knowledge, were we not indisposed to acknowledge the defects of our own theories.

Hence in all sentiments that continue to grow or even to maintain themselves, a second stage tends to occur in which we become conscious of their qualities, and reflect on them, and strive after them with effort; because we recognise that these qualities are in danger of not advancing with the growth and needs of the sentiment, or of even falling away. From this cause arise the Ideals of a sentiment.

2. *Of the Ideals of Sentiments*

When we have a great love of anything, it seems as if we could never do enough for it; and what we actually do seems to us too little. And thus from 'devotion,' which is the quality of love in general, as shown in its behaviour, we form the ideal of perfect devotion. And this ideal is not only or principally fostered by sex-love, which has such a strong, egoistic desire of possession, but conspicuously by the mother's love, and also by the way men 'devote' themselves to some science or art until their life seems absorbed in it, and other sentiments decay from insufficient exercise. And all the other qualities of sentiments tend to generate ideals of themselves, and thus we have ideals of constancy, courage, sincerity, perseverance,

patience, and loyalty. And we, who are engrossed in these sentiments, are induced to form these ideals for our own use, not only through experience of the defects of such qualities in ourselves, but also by observing the superior degree in which other men manifest them. For when we are not intent on distinguishing the vices of men, and are well-disposed toward them, we notice the qualities in which they excel ourselves.

For the pursuit of its ideals the sentiment requires certain special and secondary emotions, and which it therefore tends to develop or acquire. These special emotions which, in addition to the primary emotions, it tends to include in its system, are Aspiration, Admiration, and Remorse, Self-reproach or Shame. Thus the hero reads of the great deeds of the heroes of old, and thirsting for glory admires their indomitable courage, their perseverance and resourcefulness, and aspires after these virtues himself; the lover reads poems of love "faithful unto death," and thrilled with admiration aspires after inviolable constancy, truth, and purity; the friend reads stories of true friendship, and aspires after fidelity and companionship; the father, after wisdom, patience, and self-control; the lover of knowledge, after intellectual conscientiousness, impartiality, and exactitude; some pursuing a virtue common to the rest, others one peculiar to themselves; but all, where the love is great, urged to the pursuit of some Ideal. And as these emotions excite them to the pursuit, so for their neglect and backsliding are they punished by remorse, self-reproach, or shame.

3. *Of the Duties of Sentiments*

Besides the special emotions to which we have referred, there is another stimulus to the pursuit of their ideals by the different varieties of Love. The sentiment has its duties; and its duties are created by its ideals, as are its ideals by the imperfect degree in which it possesses the qualities which it regards as its virtues. It is clear that the sentiment requires for the steadfast pursuit of its ideals something steadier than its emotions; and this it naturally tends to develop. Everyone of those qualities which, possessed, are

its virtues, and aspired after are its ideals, when it commands their pursuit become its duties. Thus in sexual love and friendship there are the duties of constancy, faithfulness, and truth; in parental love the duties of patience, self-control, and wisdom; in the sentiment for knowledge, the duties of perseverance, truthfulness, and impartiality, and of attaching to our opinions no greater degree of assurance than that which the evidence warrants.

And these duties are familiarly recognised. But have they not been imposed upon us by the authority of parents and teachers, by the influence of books, and by our social environment generally? In great part they have; but have they not another source in ourselves, on account of which we are more ready to accept them from outside? Our 'heart' tells us they are right. For since each sentiment tends to develop certain qualities and not others, and to possess certain virtues and not others, and with this end to acquire special emotions whose function it is to maintain these qualities and virtues, or to pursue them as ideals, so also, as a different and additional stimulus to their attainment, will it tend to acquire the consciousness of duties.

It is because love develops its own duties, ideals, and virtues that we find them in the social atmosphere around us, whence they come back to us with a still stronger voice. If often they are first made known to us through our social environment, and being suggested to us on all sides, are naturally accepted, yet it is only when we have developed the sentiments to which they belong, that we feel and adequately realise their obligations. How often is it said that a man must have a family himself to realise fully the duties of the family-life. But he will not realise them any the more if he does not acquire the sentiment of the family. The man who loves his wife will feel more strongly the duties of being constant and faithful to her than will he who marries without love. If unfaithful, how much keener will be the remorse and sense of wrong-doing of the former than that of the latter. For the mother who loves her child to neglect it and to injure its health and welfare for the sake of her own enjoyment would be a crime, for which she could not forgive herself;

but to neglect another child of her own whom she does not love, or a step-child, would be natural, and carry fainter reproaches. The man who loves his country will be jealous of its interests and prepared to die in its defence; but where humanitarianism has displaced, and not been added to patriotism, the sense of these duties perishes.

If some duties are indeed impressed upon us by our social environment there are others which are not. That man only who loves knowledge or truth will feel the wrong of exaggeration, of loose thinking, of careless work, as well as the duty of precision of thought, of weighing evidence, of proportioning belief to it; and all these duties are summed up in that intellectual conscientiousness which the true thinker alone recognises. These duties are not generally found in our social environment, are seldom impressed upon us from outside; but our own sentiments create them for us. Each one of us, when he is tempted to do careless work, when indolence, or the desire of gain, or of popularity, restrains him from that unremitting perseverance and those pains and the ideal of perfect work, feels dissatisfied with himself and remorseful. But he will hardly be punished by the world for his neglect of such duties; because there are so few who love truth for itself, or the perfection of art, and so many who are indifferent or contemptuous toward both. But men in general love their families, and the duties of the family life are impressed on our social surroundings, and survive from age to age with those sentiments and that common human nature from which they spring.

As the sentiments create their own duties and punish us with self-reproach for neglect of them, so anyone who has fulfilled their duties under difficulties which have strained his endurance feels within himself, though all the world be ignorant of the fact, that secret and humble self-approval that is their reward of faithful service.

This self-approval and its complementary self-reproach belong to that same higher part of the sentiment which is connected with the pursuit and maintenance of its great qualities, its virtues, ideals, and duties. This inner system we shall call the Relative Ethics of the Sentiment. For it possesses an

ethical character throughout in respect of its special emotions, its virtues, ideals and duties, relative to the sentiment of which it is a part, and working at first exclusively on behalf of its object and ends.

So far we have referred to the great qualities necessary to a sentiment, its ideals and natural virtues, as constituting the object with which this relative ethics is concerned; and these become a very important proximate end of the sentiment, because its efficiency so largely depends upon them. And we may call this the end of its organisation as such, to distinguish it from its more familiar and final ends,—as the welfare and happiness of the person we love, the discovery and accumulation of knowledge in the intellectual sentiment, the possession and accumulation of wealth in avarice. Of the prominence of this subjective end of organisation we find evidence in many strong sentiments. Under its influence a man will often say, that he must make himself worthy of the person he loves, and if the object is impersonal, as truth, or art, or religion, that he must make himself worthy of his great vocation, so that his love may become stronger and better.

As this end of organisation is subordinate to the final ends of the sentiment, its relative ethics must indirectly or directly concern itself also with these ends; hence we reproach ourselves from time to time with the little we have done for those we love in comparison with what we might have done. The ethics of a sentiment has then two sets of duties, (1) those which concern the strength and organisation of its system, and (2) those which concern its final ends.

If a sentiment, over and above the ethics which are common to it and other sentiments, tends, as we have seen, to develop certain special virtues and ideals and to exclude others, so the ethics and conscience of its love will tend to have a certain originality and be more or less different from that of other sentiments. And thus the lives of men are apt to impress them more with the importance of some duties than others. Each sentiment has a type of virtue and perfection more or less its own which enriches the common conscience. And when any man develops its relative ethics in a higher degree,

and in a clearer form than that to which other men attain, because his love has reached a higher perfection, he becomes an ideal and a law to them so far as they possess the same sentiment. And thus the exalted love of truth and wisdom of a Plato or a Spinoza becomes the conscience of lesser men and teaches them the intellectual virtues; and the pure and constant love which women so often give to men, admonishes them of what is lower in their love, and evokes in it the ideal and the duty of purity.

We have now further to consider the function which these ideas of duty are fitted to perform in the sentiment. We are familiar with the conditions under which, with reference to our ordinary conduct, ideas of duty arise. As long as our actions do not conflict with them, and are such as they prescribe, because the right emotions, or established habits restrain us, ideas of duty do not usually arise, because they are not needed. When, on the other hand, the system does not elicit the requisite emotion, or at least not in sufficient strength, so that we come to doubt whether in our actual situation we shall remain true and constant, or loyal, or patient, or brave, then the consciousness of duty tends to arise because it is needed, sometimes taking the commanding form "I must do this," sometimes the weaker and more persuasive form "I ought to do it." And whichever form the ideas of duty assume they have not fulfilled their function unless they arouse the will to action. It is the same with the relative duties of sentiments. As long, for instance, as the first freshness of sexual love lasts, its emotions naturally lead us to be constant, faithful, and pure. It is to this stage of love that the maxim of St. Paul applies: "He that hath love needs not the law." But if, when this stage is past, love grows weak through the loss of novelty of its object, or the competition of some other system, and its emotions no longer have sufficient strength to maintain its virtues, and the issue is in doubt, then under these conditions the sentiment tends to elicit its ideas of duty. And the function of these ideas is not so much to awaken its languishing emotions as to arouse its will.

We have formerly noticed that there are two broadly

distinguishable kinds of will which are found in a sentiment; the impulsive will of its emotions, the reflective, deliberate will of the sentiment acting as a whole. Now the ideas of duty do not appeal to its impulsive will, shown by their presence to be inadequate to its task, but to this reflecting, deliberate will. It is this kind of will which we have spoken of as the self-control of the sentiment: a will which only ceases to be reflective and deliberate when it acts from a fixed habit of obedience to its special duties.

This then is the function of the relative ethics of the sentiment, first to awaken the ideals of its virtues, secondly to provide and elicit the special emotions required by these ideals,—aspiration, admiration or enthusiasm, self-reproach and self-approval,—thirdly in situations of doubt and conflict, to evoke the ideas of its duties, and through them to arouse the highest will of its system, that which acting after reflection and deliberation, has to guide it to its destined end.

We have found that certain characteristic types of love, both personal and impersonal, frequently develop a relative ethics characteristic of them. We must assume, as we have already done with regard to their emotions and qualities, that there is a general tendency of these sentiments to develop such a relative ethics, on account of its approved value for their systems. We have now to attempt to formulate this law: (10) *All varieties of love for an object other than oneself tend to develop a relative ethics, comprising the common emotions of self-approval and self-reproach, more or less special virtues and ideals with emotions of admiration and aspiration, and particular convictions of duty evoked in situations of doubt and conflict when the ends of the sentiment are in danger.*

As Love is the original source of a certain relative ethics,—and even builds up its own conscience in those who seem to be bereft of any other,—so Hate tends to destroy all restraints and duties that we have formerly acknowledged on behalf of its object, and any others which stand in the way of its ends. As soon as we begin to hate anyone the sense of these duties begins to decline, until one after another such protections against our enmity are abolished, and the man has no longer a right to his own life. And even in the restrained hatred of

some children for their parents we observe how quickly duties of obedience, respect, and gratitude are denied. Thus too when one nation hates another it feels itself justified in destroying even that noble part of the hostile nation which is ready to sacrifice life in its defence. And when workmen hate their employer they feel themselves justified in the wanton destruction of his property; and when the socialist hates, instead of merely opposing, governments that have a capitalist basis, revolution, calumny of those in authority, the appropriation of property without compensation, and the destruction of human life are no longer felt to be crimes. Let us then enunciate tentatively this law of hate: (11) *Hate, so far from developing, like love, a relative ethics of its own, tends to destroy all virtues, ideals, and duties that restrain it from its ends.*

4. *Of the Distinction between the Relative Ethics of Sentiments and the Conscience*

The relative ethics of a certain class of sentiments which we have been studying in this chapter must be distinguished from the general ethics of the Conscience. For while the former is inevitably partial to its particular object, the latter, unique among all sentiments in not possessing any private object, is not urged to partiality on that account. However narrow and unenlightened, however hardened by a man's vices, or rendered sensitive through his goodness and virtues, when it acts it acts, within its purview, without prejudice. And as it has no private object, so has it no private end; its end being to superintend and regulate other systems, to encourage some, to forbid others, to temper all, to approve or to disapprove of their actions.

Of the relation of this system of the conscience to the relative ethics of particular sentiments,—of the laws of their interaction, and how much conscience itself may be enriched and enlightened by the obligations which love obliges us to recognise,—we can here give no account. But were conscience destroyed in any one of us, as it is partially destroyed when we deliberately persist in a mode of living in contempt of its

laws, something analogous to it would tend to spring up spontaneously in every genuine sentiment of love when it had reached the stage at which its further progress was dependent on effort and deliberation. Hence we are now able to understand the profound reflection of Shakespeare: "Love is too young to know what conscience is; yet who knows not, conscience is born of love."[1]

The conscience, though so detached from the private interests of all other sentiments, has still its limitations. How much it depends on the ethics of a man's own age, country, and sex, with all their defects, is now recognised. Its "prickings" are largely confined to a man's dealings with members of his own tribe or nation; its rules are not extended to protect all men; and few of them are taken to include the lower animals. The relative ethics of the sentiments are at least valid for their objects, though they may have to give way before wider considerations; and the virtues of the Affections, their devotion, truth, faithfulness, courage, and self-sacrifice have won the common approval of mankind.

[1] 'Sonnets,' cli.

CHAPTER XII

THE SENTIMENTS AS THE SOURCE OF TYPES OF CHARACTER

In the last three chapters we have been considering the qualities of a sentiment, first as arising from its various conduct, secondly as constituting its virtues and vices, thirdly as connected with a Relative Ethics of its own.

These qualities of sentiments are also called qualities of character. We shall commence this chapter with the enunciation of a law which furnishes an additional reason for so regarding them. (12) *The qualities that a sentiment acquires for its own needs in becoming fixed, tend to qualify the character as a whole.*

This law appears to be a consequence of the law of Habit. For as the sentiment forms its characteristic thought and conduct, these, with their qualities, become fixed and habitual, and interfere with the acquisition of opposite qualities in other sentiments. Thus if a man has learnt to be open and candid through his early affections for others and trust in them, or as a secondary feature of his manliness and contempt of deceit, he tends to carry this quality into his dealing with men in general, and has an aversion to all duplicity. If a man has become a liar through vanity and desire for applause, the influence of the habit extends to other systems, and induces him to lie, not only to escape detection and punishment, but when no advantage is to be gained by it. Or when a man has developed meanness through self-love, and over-anxiety about the future, when being poor, he dreads falling into worse poverty, and saves to provide against it, this meanness, becoming fixed and habitual, begins to counteract the gener-

osity of his affections and restricts their development. And thus a quality appears to have a certain independence of the sentiment in which it first is developed, obtains generality, and becomes a quality of the man's character as a whole, modifying other sentiments.

We have then to enunciate a second law: (13) *The qualities of a man's character, whether innate or acquired, hinder the development of all sentiments that need opposite qualities, but aid those that need the same.*

Yet there are some men whose characters are so strangely balanced that they seem to be made up of what are called 'contradictions': extravagance and meanness, courage and timidity, sincerity and dissimulation, frankness and reserve. For in them no one sentiment is supreme, but the qualities which are formed in one are held in check, and kept within the limits of their own system, by the opposite qualities formed by other sentiments. Still in all such cases the qualities acquired by one sentiment tend, through the habit of their exercise, to become fixed in the character and to spread beyond their original limits.

The qualities which in this way become fixed in the character are, as we have noticed, far more numerous than the sentiments in which they have originated. For we have to consider the complexity of a sentiment,—the number of emotions that enter into it, the variety of situations that affect it, and the corresponding variety of its thought and conduct, and consequently the multiplicity of its qualities.

We can now see in a general way what are the dynamical relations in which a sentiment stands to the character as a whole. For, first, it consists in an organisation of a part of the character, which it exercises and strengthens. But, secondly, the rest of the character, which is outside of its system, does not remain unchanged. For in proportion as the sentiment becomes predominant, the emotional dispositions which it does not need, atrophy; and those which are hostile to it are suppressed; while the great multitude of its qualities, as we have just seen, tend to counteract the opposite qualities of other systems; and even its virtues and vices

have a similar influence. Thus although a sentiment is only an organisation of a part of the character, it is in a dynamical relation to the rest, and gives a peculiar orientation to the whole ; so that it becomes clear that there is a general law of the dynamical relation of every sentiment to the character in which it is developed. This law is: (14) *Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own.*

This law is clearly exemplified whenever a particular sentiment becomes so predominant that all the effects which it always tends to produce are actually manifested. It has been one of the great objects of literature to represent such clear-cut types of character. In the "l'Avare" of Molière, in Balzac's novel, "Eugénie Grandet," we have studies of the type of character formed by Avarice. While in the former work there appears to be no love in the miser for anything but his wealth, in the latter, Balzac provides old Grandet with a genuine affection for his only child, Eugénie. The other members of his household are his wife, for whom he has no love, and a hardworking and frugal servant, who believes in him and loves him, and has become an efficient instrument of his avarice. Starting from his dominant sentiment with its qualities of industry, parsimony, and meanness, we can watch how his other qualities are connected with it. His tyranny over all the members of his household is absolute, because for the attainment of his end, all of them have to be brought into the same system, and made instruments of its purpose. They too must save from morning till night, like him ; like him they must be ceaselessly industrious. Like him they must reject pleasures and entertainments. In reflecting on his influence over their characters and lives, do we not discern that a part of the system of every great sentiment must be a social effect outside of the individual in which it has developed? Although we shall be principally concerned with the organisation of such a system in the mind, body, and behaviour of the agent, yet this would be rendered ineffectual but for that contributory part which is organised in other human beings and in social institutions. For there is little that a man can do apart from others, and all his great ends require their co-operation. The ambition of a Napoleon obliges

Europe to become organised in his system, and there to accept the part which his tyranny imposes on it.

Thus the miser's tyranny over those subjected to him seconds his parsimony, his industry, his vigilance, his prudence, his secrecy, his cunning and unsociableness, which are the essential means of his avarice. He is secret, because he is suspicious. He is suspicious, because he pursues ends to which other men would be opposed, and because he has no counteracting trust of affection. He is cunning, because he both suspects and tries to outwit others. He makes a pretence of poverty, that no claims may be made on him, and that he may justify his economies. He is unsociable, because he is secret and suspicious, being engaged in pursuing an object of which others do not approve, and which alienates them from him.

The qualities to which we have referred appear to belong to avarice, in the sense that its thought, will, and conduct tend to acquire them because they are indispensable to the achievement of its ends.

We may next consider the dynamical relation of Avarice to the rest of the character, and try to discern the effects which it produces on other sentiments. In Grandet's affection for his daughter we observe the restricted manifestation of his generosity. Twice a year he gives her a rare gold coin which it was understood she would not part with: "Grandet liked to watch the money accumulating in her hands. He did not part with his money; he felt that it was only like taking it out of one box and putting it into another."[1] Other tendencies of affection are similarly restricted or destroyed. He cannot consider the happiness of his daughter from her point of view, and breaks her heart by refusing to allow her to marry the penniless cousin whom she loves. He is without pity for her distress; for pity would urge him to change his resolution. But by his bi-annual presents he thinks he is "fostering in his heiress a proper love of gold,"[2] which has given him the only happiness he understands. Thus the welfare and happiness which a parent conceives of for his child is determined by what he conceives

[1] P. 27 (trans. E. Marriage). [2] *Ibid.*

to be welfare and happiness for himself, and these by the nature of his own sentiments. For his servant Nanon whom he has fashioned in habits as penurious as his own, and who loves him, he has a certain affection. From time to time he pities her, and exclaims "poor Nanon," but "this pity in the miser's soul, which gave a thrill of pleasure to the lonely woman," was cold blooded; "it was a luxury that cost him nothing."[1]

In the emotional constitution of Grandet's sentiment we find a certain poverty of elements. His joy in his growing wealth, his absorbing desire continually to add to it, the hopes and anxieties with which his different ventures fill him, his suspicion of those with whom he has dealings, all these we are able to distinguish; although the last is not developed to the same degree as in other examples of the same type, because all the members of his household have been fashioned by him to complete obedience; but the symbol of the miser's suspicion, the bunch of keys, is always in his immediate control; everything is kept locked, and into his strong room no member of his household is ever allowed to enter.

The simplicity of his sentiment in respect of emotions, is due to the fact that he has been uniformly successful. He is never tried by failure and loss, but grows wealthier continually. Balzac has furnished him with an astute and penetrating intellect, and this in conjunction with the tenacity of his will accounts for his success. This quality of the will is a feature of all misers: without it avarice could never become a master-sentiment; but the degree and quality of the intellect is so much a matter of native endowment that it varies greatly in different examples of the type. In the portrait of the miser by the Russian novelist, Gogol, we see how deficiency of intelligence may render him ridiculous—which Grandet never becomes—and counteract his ends. For he grew poorer, not richer, because he accumulated, not money alone but everything, and expended nothing. His property fell into decay; the corn and hay rotted in his barns, but he "rambled about the streets of his village, peering beneath the bridges, and the planks thrown across the gutters,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 25.

and everything he came across, whether it was the old sole of a shoe, a woman's discarded rag, an iron nail, or a piece of a broken earthenware pot, he carried it all home with him, and threw it upon the heap . . . in the corner of the room." [1]

Balzac has added nothing essential to the type of the miser as it was drawn by Molière, but he has made it more complex and human in providing it with a few stunted affections. In Molière's "L'Avare" the miser has no love even for his children; in other respects his features are the same. His suspicion is increased, because he has less control of his household than Grandet. He suspects his children of robbing him—"Je crois qu'ils se font signe l'un à l'autre de me voler ma bourse." [2] But he undergoes misfortune. He loses for a time his money; and we observe his grief and distraction. In his apostrophe at his loss, he personifies his wealth, and for the moment, and through this artifice, he feels pity on behalf of it: yet even at this moment his sorrow is almost entirely for himself. "Hélas! mon pauvre argent! mon pauvre argent! mon cher ami! on m'a privé de toi; et puisque tu m'est enlevé, j'ai perdu mon support, ma consolation, ma joie: tout est fini pour moi, et je n'ai plus que faire au monde." [3]

We have now furnished sufficient illustration to show that Avarice is not merely a sentiment, but that it is an instance of the law to which we referred, and therefore tends to form a complete type of character of its own, constituted of the emotions, thoughts, and volitions which its end requires, and also of a number of qualities which, becoming fixed in the character, counteract the qualities of other sentiments that conflict with them. It is in dynamic relation with all other sentiments in the character, restricting some, destroying others. It exercises only a few emotional dispositions, and allows the rest to perish through disuse; and thus in the growth of avarice tender and sympathetic emotions are eliminated, until with their loss the character acquires the negative quality of inhumanity.

[1] 'Les Armes Mortes,' ch. vi. [2] A. i., S. v.
[3] A. iv., S. vii.

With this conception of the all-pervasive influence of the sentiment in character, there is naturally connected the problem of tracing the different types of character which different sentiments tend to develop, and this directs observation and research to the discovery of the laws connecting each sentiment with the rest of the character.

CHAPTER XIII

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE TEMPERAMENT ON THE CHARACTER

1. *Of the Distinction between Temper and Temperament.*

THE additions that we have made in the preceding chapters to our working conception of character have enabled us to define certain problems of the science that will hereafter, as we hope, direct our research to the discovery of important laws. In this chapter we have to study another side of character, to form a conception of it and of the problems which it suggests. Besides those qualities which a sentiment acquires for its own needs, there are other qualities to which we have not referred that are innate in character, and which are the foundation of the variety of its natural tempers and temperaments. Besides the problem of the influence of a sentiment on the character as a whole, there is the corresponding problem of the influence of the character on the formation of sentiments.

'Temperament' and 'character'! Two ideas that we so often combine, distinguish, and sometimes oppose, as we combine, distinguish, and oppose 'character' and 'intellect,' 'character' and 'conduct,' 'character' and 'circumstances.' Yet there is no character apart from the intellectual processes that subserve it; no character that does not tend to manifest itself in conduct; no character manifested without circumstances that arouse it to activity, that supply it with the material on which it reacts;—so also there is no character without temperament.

We vaguely surmise that our character develops as we grow up, and that at a certain age it is set and its chief

features defined, but that our temperament is defined from the beginning, and that it persists through life, or through a considerable portion of it.

Our temperament is then our innate character, or some part of it. Yet the dispositions of the primary emotions are inherited; but we do not call them our 'temperament,' but part of the original constitution of our minds. We confine the term 'temperament' to the particular mode in which these emotions are felt in different minds, or the particular mode in which they are manifested by them, so far as this is innate and not acquired. Some men are by nature 'irascible,' and tend to feel anger quickly and to express it hastily: that belongs to their temperament. Thus by 'temperament' we mean that part of the innate constitution of the mind which is different in different men, so far as this refers to their feelings and perhaps also to their wills; but that part of their constitution which is the same in all of them we do not call their temperament.

Sometimes we call the mode in which a man feels some emotion and behaves under it his 'temper.' And we use this term without clearly distinguishing between its meaning and that of 'temperament,' but incline to employ it in a more restricted sense, as something affecting a particular emotion, especially anger, and 'temperament' in a more comprehensive sense, as something affecting the emotional nature in general. Thus we speak of calm, excitable, and violent temperaments,—these qualities being referred to the emotions in general,—but of an irascible temper.

We shall follow this popular distinction in the use of the two terms, and attempt to apply it consistently, because it is important to have one term to refer to particular emotional dispositions, and another, to refer to the emotional nature in general. From this point of view a man's temperament is the sum of the innate tempers of his different emotions.

Thus for each emotion there should be certain natural or innate tempers that distinguish it in different men. With anger there may be an 'irascible,' or a 'sullen,' or a 'violent,' or a 'peevish' temper. We notice that in certain families there are more instances of the one temper than of the

other, and that they appear to be inherited. Farther than this we cannot go at present. For though some parents have learnt in recent times to observe the precise ages at which anger is first manifested in their children, they have not yet been urged to observe the peculiar sensibility to anger, and the mode in which it is manifested, and the age at which the temper is clearly defined.

It is the same with the other emotions. With fear there may be a relatively 'timorous' or a 'fearless' temper; with joy, when the susceptibility to it is very marked, a 'joyful' temper, or when less noticeable a 'joyless' temper; with sorrow, a 'sorrowful' or 'melancholic' temper, or one that is relatively insensible to feel sorrow. With other primary emotions—as surprise, wonder and disgust,—it is more difficult to judge how far the natural temper is different in different children. For the unexpected occurrences and novelties surrounding them, offer so many occasions of surprise and wonder, that did they not feel these emotions we should suspect them of being deficient in intelligence. But in later life men seem to be different in respect of their susceptibility to these emotions, whether this difference of temper be innate or acquired; and men of genius have sometimes been supposed to retain through life a sublime capacity to feel wonder at common things, like children.

It has been often observed that a man's natural temper may be greatly changed in the course of his life, and that from having a 'sweet' temper, gentle, tender, and little disposed to anger, he may become soured or embittered through disappointments and misfortunes, through ill-health or old age. Speaking of such changes, La Bruyère lets us see that the original temper is not altogether displaced, but still survives as a repressed disposition that might be manifested again in changed situations, or which still perhaps is shown to some loved individual:—"tel a vécu pendant toute sa vie chagrin, emporté, avare, rampant, soumis, laborieux, intéressé, qui étoit né gai, paisible, paresseux, magnifique, d'un courage fier et éloigné de toute bassesse: les besoins de la vie, la situation où l'on se trouve, la loi de nécessité, forcent la nature et y causent ces grands changements. Ainsi tel

homme au fond et en lui-même ne se peut définir ; trop de choses qui sont hors de lui l'altèrent, le changent, le bouleversent ; il n'est point précisément ce qu'il est ou ce qu'il paroît être."[1]

While the tempers of men are thus subject to great changes in the course of life, the temperaments are supposed to be constant. Emerson has even represented them as an inner destiny against which it is vain to contend. This view appears to be an exaggeration of the truth. Nothing that is concrete is exempt from change, and even our instincts are modified through our experience.

There is a doctrine of the temperaments that regards them as consisting in certain uniform and persistent qualities that pervade all the emotions alike—a doctrine which is very ancient and yet has persisted to modern times—which we must first consider, even if it brings us to only a negative conclusion.

2. *The Doctrine of the Temperaments.*

Recent attempts to reconstitute the classical doctrine of the Temperaments, notwithstanding the eminence of their authors, have not succeeded in transforming a doctrine which at least on its psychological side has always remained vague and popular. From the times of Hippocrates and Galen to the present day the principal aim has been to find a physiological explanation of the temperaments. But if these physiological theories, in place of their discrepancies, had showed some approach to agreement, we should still have to remark that the time has not arrived to seek for any physiological explanation, because we do not yet know with sufficient definiteness what that is that we have to explain. How much the psychological side of the temperaments has been neglected has been clearly recognised by certain modern authors ;[2] but whether it is capable of becoming, through the improvements that have been introduced into it, the base of a modern, scientific theory we shall now have to consider.

[1] 'Les Caractères,' 'De l'Homme.'

[2] See P. Malapert, 'Les Éléments du Caractère,' ch. i. p. 10, *et seq.* Also A. Stewart, 'Our Temperaments,' ch. i.

The doctrine of each temperament is constituted of three parts: first of certain observed characteristics of the external appearance, as the colour of the hair, the colour of the eyes, the shape of the face, the length of neck, and build of body; secondly of certain qualities of character, which have been sometimes found to co-exist with the external characteristics referred to, but treated in a popular manner, and without any attempt to discover the psychological base of their connection; and thirdly of the supposed predominance of some bodily organ or system to account for those qualities. The opinion that there is some connection between the qualities of character and bodily traits has been strengthened by Galton's "History of Twins" in which he showed that when the twins were alike in appearance they were in general alike in character, and when dissimilar in appearance, dissimilar in character;[1] but no attempt was made to trace a connection between the qualities of a given temperament and a definite external appearance.

Setting aside both the external appearance and the physiological theories of the temperaments, we shall confine ourselves to their psychology.

Of all the temperaments, those that were known as the Sanguine and the Bilious are the most clearly conceived, the most concrete and full of detail, and the most apt to call up in the mind familiar types of character. Various writers emphasise the general superficiality of the feelings in the sanguine type, referring to the qualities of inconstancy, of lack of perseverance, of impulsiveness. Richerand writes that "Inconstancy and levity are, in fact, the chief attributes of men of this temperament";[2] Cortes that "their anger is easily kindled, but it as speedily vanishes; all their passions are lively, inconstant";[3] Stewart, that they are "impulsive," "excitable," "not enduring in work."[4] It is their quickness of feeling joined to "insufficient intensity" which, M. Fouillée thinks, accounts for

[1] 'Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development,' 'History of Twins.'

[2] 'Elements of Physiology,' 1829.

[3] Quoted by A. Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv., appendix.

[4] 'Our Temperaments,' ch. iv. p. 77.

this "superficiality."[1] M. Malapert also regards their feelings as lively, mobile, and superficial.[2] When we follow out the particular forms in which this defect of superficiality is supposed to be manifested the type becomes life-like. The sanguine, says Kant, repent vehemently, but their repentance "will be soon forgotten,"[3] being (as M. Fouillée adds) more a matter of emotion than of will.[4] They readily make promises, but do not fulfil them. They are therefore, Kant also remarks, bad debtors, "and always require delays."[5] And we may follow out these applications in other directions. They are, we may say, inconstant in love, unfaithful in friendship, without assiduity and perseverance in business. How naturally, says M. Fouillée, they glide over everything, and everything glides over them; for the seriousness of life eludes them.[6] In fact we have only to assume that this quality of superficiality is universal, and attaches to all systems of the character, for these statements to be generally true of all those who possess this temperament, and in whom it is not counteracted. It is a characteristic part of the doctrine of the temperaments to make such an assumption, to assume that because a certain quality is manifested on one side of the character therefore it will be manifested on all the other sides.

All the qualities that we have so far noticed of the sanguine temperament have a logical connection. They either involve, or are particular forms of, the more general quality of superficiality; for the superficial man, feeling as it has no "depth" so it has no stability. But there are other qualities attributed to this type. The sanguine, says M. Fouillée, are optimists by instinct.[7] They have a fund of playful humour, like the child whom they resemble. They are, says M. Malapert, "tournés vers le plaisir, de bonne humeur, enjoués, expansifs, bons vivants, généralement bienveillants précisément parce qu'ils sont naturellement optimistes."[8] "They are benevolent and

[1] 'Tempérament et Caractère,' ch. iii.
[2] 'Les Éléments du Caractère,' ch. iii. vii.
[3] Quoted by A. Fouillée, *op. cit.* ch. iii. p. 35.
[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.* [8] *Op. cit.* ch. iii. viii.

happy," says Cortes.[1] Thus the "sanguine" has come to mean the "cheerful" temperament.

Let us next contrast this type with the opposite type, the Bilious. Richerand has given this description of it: "If sensibility, which is vivid and easily excited, can dwell long upon one object; . . . the passions will be violent, the movements of the soul often abrupt and impetuous, the character firm and inflexible. Bold in conception of a project, constant and indefatigable in its execution, it is among men of this temperament we find those who in different ages have governed the destinies of the world: full of courage, boldness, and activity, all have signalised themselves by great virtues or great crimes, and have been the terror or admiration of the universe."[2] He adds an interesting reflection on the kind of sentiments which prevail in sanguine and bilious men in consequence of their respective temperaments: "As love is in the sanguine, so ambition is in the bilious the governing passion."[3] Cortes, too, remarks that they "usually devote themselves to the accomplishment of a single object, have great constancy of purpose, a powerfu imagination, and are apt to ride hobbies";[4] also that they are "zealous, passionate, and revengeful."[5] Stewart adds that they are "not impulsive," that their conclusions are "thoughtfully arrived at," but still they are "passionate, jealous, revengeful, unscrupulous."[6]

The Bilious temperament is then opposite to the Sanguine, because of its opposite quality of depth or stability of feeling which enables it to "dwell long upon one object."

We shall now consider the sanguine and bilious temperaments from the point of view of the superficiality and depth of their emotions respectively. And by these metaphorical terms we shall mean only that the emotions of the one soon cease, while those of the other are relatively stable. It is assumed, as we have already remarked, that all the emotions of the sanguine are unstable, and that all the emotions of the bilious

[1] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix.
[2] Richerand, *op. cit.* (quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix).
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Op. cit.* ch. iv.

are the reverse. Between such extremes, such logically consistent types, there must occur many temperaments which are unnamed because they are indefinite. Among them there will be some that incline more to the bilious, others to the sanguine type—some deeper in their feelings, others shallower, and there will be all gradations of degree. These intermediate types will be likely to show a depth in some of their feelings and a shallowness in others; and in fact, in respect of them, the original assumption of the doctrine of an all-pervading, innate quality breaks down altogether.

The extreme types of the sanguine and the bilious are probably exaggerations of the real temperaments of men, and to this the descriptions of them owe a great deal of their vividness. We feel that they are more or less true. We can remember many persons who have shown some approximation to them. That they are completely true of anyone is doubtful. But if one person realises the sanguine type in all particulars, there must be innumerable others who do not. And to some extent this objection has been recognised by the apologist of the classical doctrine in the admission that it is difficult to class individuals under any one of the four types, because so many belong to "mixed" temperaments.[1]

"The Sanguine," says Laycock, "are easily moved emotionally. . . . But the emotion, though prompt and violent, soon ceases. He tells you that his temper is soon up and soon over."[2] That the irascible temper is innate there can be little doubt; but is it the sign of a temperament? That is to say, if a man shows a hasty and superficial temper, can we infer that all his other feelings will be correspondingly hasty and superficial? By no means. The same man who has a hasty temper may be constant in his affections; or he may show stability in some other direction. Admitting this, can we infer that where this discrepancy exists it is due to some counteracting cause? But what is the nature of this counteracting cause, unless it be that the irascible man, in respect of some other emotion or some sentiment, may manifest an opposite innate disposition? But we want to know whether

[1] Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. v. [2] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. ii.

in inheriting an irascible temper, a man also tends to inherit a disposition to feel other emotions with corresponding quickness and superficiality.

The child is frequently referred to as a striking example of the sanguine temperament, and certainly a healthy and active child closely approximates to it. But if we allow that his curiosity is soon satisfied, and craves new objects, that his anger and sorrow if acute, are soon forgotten, does this superficiality also extend to his fears? It is more dangerous for the child than for an adult to undergo an experience of extreme fear, because it is more difficult for the child to throw off the effects; and even where the experience appears to be forgotten, it often subsists as a suppressed disposition, which is connected in later life with some "phobia" or other disorder of the nervous system.

If next we examine the characteristics of the Bilious, now generally called the Ardent, sometimes the Passionate, temperament, we shall see that the conception of it has similar defects. It is obvious that the "depth" ascribed to the Ardent, their "inflexible" character, their "constancy of purpose," does not import that all their feelings are deep and lasting. And here we may remark that while our emotions last longer or shorter times according to the depth to which their dispositions have been stirred, yet such qualities as 'constancy' and 'perseverance' are more fittingly applied to the sentiments than to them. An emotion does not, and, if it fulfils its function, should not last beyond a very limited time; but our sentiments often carry with them an ideal of everlastingness. Our love cut short on earth lays claim to the heavens. But love, "stronger than death," and insatiable ambition, inevitably involve superficial sentiments in other directions? If a man has the genius of an originator he possesses an organisation which fits him for one kind of work, and sometimes for no other. In that he concentrates his life, and withdraws it from other directions. A strong love, or an absorbing friendship for one person weakens the appeal which others are capable of making upon us. We find men who in their youth seem open to all impressions, who take up successively a number of things, love each for a little time,

and then cast it aside. Their temperament appears to be superficial; but at length they meet with some object which stirs an unsuspected depth in them, and thenceforth they devote their lives to it. We cannot then infer that because a man is found to be superficial in one direction he will be superficial in others, and, still less, that where he is proved to be deep in one this indicates the presence of an innate quality that must be manifested on all sides of his character. The assumption underlying the doctrine of the sanguine and bilious temperaments conflicts with familiar facts which show that human nature is 'contradictory,' and that the qualities that we have too hastily assumed to pervade it are confined within narrower limits.

The descriptions of the Sanguine and Bilious temperaments have the merit of calling up at least clear conceptions of character, about the qualities of which the different authorities are in general agreement; the descriptions of the Nervous and Phlegmatic temperaments have not this merit. They either confine themselves to allocating one or two abstract qualities to the types, or if they attempt to make their descriptions more concrete, and to evoke conceptions of character, the different accounts reveal disagreements and contradictions. In general they agree in attributing a marked rapidity of the mental processes to the nervous temperament and a relative slowness to the phlegmatic. Even this agreement is not complete. M. Fouillée has substituted for these characteristics the two qualities of intensity and duration:[1] and the only types to which he attributes a quick reaction are the two we have already noticed, the Sanguine and the Bilious.[2] Thus with him the nervous temperament is excluded from the very category to which most authorities confine it. M. Malapert also emphasises the intensity and duration of emotion as characteristic of this type, and identifies it with the Emotional temperament.[3]

"Rapidity of mental action," says Stewart, "is one of the most striking characteristics of the nervous temperament."[4] "Rapidity of muscular movement," he says, "is equally

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iv. [2] *Op. cit.*, ch. iii. and ch. v.
[3] *Op. cit.* ch. iii. sections iv. and viii. [4] *Op. cit.* ch. vi.

characteristic."[1] This temperament, according to Cortes, has "a strong inclination to mental labour, great vivacity of feeling, an active imagination, and a rapid succession of ideas."[2] Richerand observes that the sensitivity to impressions which is "weak in the lymphatic, . . . moderate in the sanguine, rather quick in the bilious, constitutes by its excess the nervous temperament. Hence in his opinion this temperament is "commonly acquired," and it "is not so much a natural constitution of the body as the first stage of a disease."[3] Mill has given a striking description of it: "It is the character of the nervous temperament to be capable of sustained excitement, holding out through long-continued effort. It is what is meant by spirit. It is what makes the high-bred racehorse run without slackening till he drops down dead. People of this temperament are the material of great orators, great preachers, impressive diffusers of moral influences."[4] According to Stewart the temperament of Nelson was nervous. In one of his letters he thus describes himself: "While I serve I will do it actively and to the best of my abilities. I require nursing like a child: my mind carries me beyond my strength, and will do me up; but it is my nature."[5] Dryden's portrait of Shaftesbury emphasises the same quality:

> "A fiery soul, which working out its way,
> Fretted the pygmy-body to decay
> And o'er-informed the tenement of clay."[6]

Stewart also remarks of this type that it is both "rapid" and "enduring in work; will never give in."[7]

The account of the nervous temperament to which we previously referred gives a very different interpretation. According to M. Fouillée it is a "sensitive" not an "active" temperament. Intensity and prolongation of emotion are what distinguish it: "De là des sentiments qui vont se multipliant et s'exaltant, pour ne se calmer qu'avec peine. Enfin

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. vi. [2] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix.
[3] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix.
[4] Quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. vi. [5] *Ibid.*
[6] Works: Absalom and Achitophel, i. 156. [7] *Op. cit.* ch. vi.

ces sentiments, ne se dépensant point d'ordinaire par la voie de l'action, sauf dans les moments de surexitation et d'activité spasmodique, se dépensant, . . . à réveiller des idées ou à ébranler les organes internes, qui vibrent tous à l'unisson."[1] Hence the tendency of this temperament to become melancholic.[2] M. Malapert remarks : "Ce sont les natures franchement émotionelles qui sont ainsi les natures douloureuses."[3] Bain also conceives it as divorced from action. It is, he says, "essentially inactive, given to emotional displays, as measured by mere continuance and repetition."[4] But far from thinking it inclined to melancholy, he defines it as supposing a "full response to pleasurable or positive emotions, as Tenderness and Power ; and a superiority to painful or negative emotions as Fear."[5]

These accounts of the Nervous temperament are inconsistent with one another. Mill's account destroys any clear conception we had formed of the Bilious or Ardent temperament. For the nervous temperament when conceived of as "enduring in work," and as prosecuting it with such zeal that it is liable to exhaust the nervous system, is nothing less than the "ardent." For those only who have steadfast sentiments are capable of working with such persistency.

Returning to the more general descriptions of the nervous and phlegmatic temperaments as the quick and the slow, we notice that there is an assumption here which corresponds with that which vitiated the doctrine of the sanguine and bilious temperaments, namely, that the "quickness" of the nervous, or the "slowness" of the phlegmatic pervades all the intellectual processes of each, as well as their emotions and sentiments. But in point of fact we find that a man may be quick in some respects and slow in others, as he may have a good memory for certain subjects but not for others. He may learn quickly, provided that what he has to learn is suited to his abilities, but he will be inevitably slow in respect of subjects which are unsuited to them. Again, he may express himself quickly upon those which he understands and has ready information, but not upon those which he has

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iv. p. 39. [2] *Ibid.* p. 47. [3] *Op. cit.* ch. iii. v.
[4] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. i. 31. [5] *Op. cit.* ch. v. 6.

not. Passing next to the primary emotions, does it follow such a person will feel them quickly, and also quickly form sentiments of love and hate? Now, according to Bain, those who have a "very powerful intellect" are likely to be deficient in emotion.[1] This opinion may be too general, but at least there are many men of powerful and quick intelligence whose temperament is cold. So far from quickly feeling emotion on slight occasion, they seem to be divested of it, and to be the embodiment of pure intellect. There is a moving force of ideas in them which resists the incoming of emotion as a disturbance. Provoke them to anger you may, but they seem proof against other and ordinary emotional appeals. The force of their intellect renders them phlegmatic to most emotions.

With regard to the phlegmatic temperament: in any given case slowness usually pervades certain processes, but not all. There are men who walk slowly whose minds are quick and active; and when their thoughts are most active and concentrated, their movements are slowest or stop altogether, when not agitated by emotion. There are men who are slow to form resolutions because their minds are quick to foresee consequences that escape other men; or who are slow of speech because they think before they speak; or who appear slow of thought because they discern difficulties and contradictions, and exercise self-control to avoid precipitate judgments. All self-control delays action, and, apart from other influences, those are quickest who are the most impulsive.

Still we meet with individuals low in the scale of intelligence, with minds singularly inert, who are generally slow in carrying out all mental processes requiring thought; who, if questions are addressed to them, take an unusually long time in understanding and replying to them; who are naturally silent because they find it difficult to sustain conversation; who are sometimes slow in walking, and in carrying out tasks involving muscular exertion. But the slowness of their mental processes seems to depend on the low grade of their intelligence; their slowness of bodily movements results either from deficient energy or

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. v. 6.

from lack of emotion. These different causes are by no means always combined. When, for instance, it is remarked that persons of this type "have in general an insurmountable inclination to sloth,"[1] are "lazy,"[2] it is deficiency in the amount of available energy, not in the quality of intelligence, which is referred to. Now where the quality of intelligence is low, mental activity involving the higher intellectual processes will be sluggish, because such men are unfitted to exercise them ; but it does not follow that the lower mental processes of perception and recollection will be sluggish, and still less that bodily movements will be also slow.

With regard to the secondary characteristics of these temperaments there is no general agreement. Stewart remarks that the phlegmatic are "persistent" and "enduring in work,"[3] which is not consistent with the "inclination to sloth," also ascribed to them.

We should indeed expect that among different observers of this type some would attribute indolence to it while others would not, since there is no necessary connection between a certain deficiency of energy and deficiency of intelligence. But indolence may be also accounted for by lack of interest or apathy. Accordingly we find that the phlegmatic type is often regarded as apathetic, as by M. Malapert.[4] "They are well-nigh passionless," says Cortes.[5] In most cases apathy does not affect all sides of the character. A strong love, and still more a great sorrow, renders us apathetic in many directions. But extreme and general apathy, except in some idiots, is not an innate temperament, but the consequence of disease. It is found among those suffering from Dementia Praecox. "In the very earliest stages apathy is evidenced by a certain degree of listlessness, lack of interest in their surroundings," until at last they may lead a "purely vegitative existence."[6] But the phlegmatic only appear apathetic, because they cannot react with sufficient quickness to momentary stimuli, and

[1] Richerand, *op. cit.* quoted by Stewart, *op. cit.* ch. iv. appendix.
[2] Cortes, quoted *loc. cit.*
[3] *Op. cit.* ch. iv.
[4] *Op. cit.* ch. iii. viii.
[5] Quoted by Stewart, ch. iv. appendix.
[6] Stewart Paton, 'Psychiatry,' ch. xiv.

therefore remain indifferent when others are affected by them. But where a stimulus is sufficiently strong and persistent, the slowness of their reaction does not prevent them from feeling strong emotions. M. Malapert remarks, "La lenteur ici produit l'apathie extérieure et commune, mais si l'échauffement est lent, il peut aboutir à une conflagration violente."[1] Here too we find, as we expect, opposite opinions.

There is then no general connection between the slowness due to a low grade of intelligence and an incapacity to feel strong emotions, where the stimuli are sufficiently prolonged and such as can be readily understood. The connection between slowness due to this cause and a relative apathy arises from the fact that our primary emotions may be aroused by ideas as well as by their primitive sensational stimuli. If a deficient and sluggish intelligence can only feel fear when danger is obviously present, it will escape from many fears to which quicker and more imaginative minds are subject.

The attribution of a universal slowness and apathy to the phlegmatic is another of those uncritical assumptions that pervade the doctrine of the Temperaments. An extreme slowness which is due to temperament and not to disease has its limits. In most cases the slowness may be found to exist; but the connection between the primary emotions and the primitive causes that arouse them may be unaffected by it. Such persons often respond quickly to certain kinds of fear or anger. Under the influence of a strong emotion to which they still remain subject, their appearance is transformed. The apathetic or placid expression gives place to another that shows how deeply they are stirred. Their mental processes and bodily movements are quickened. They are able to converse with animation. They cease for a time to be phlegmatic.

3. *Of the Chief Defects of the Classical Doctrine of the Temperaments*

There are certain inherent defects of the classical doctrine we have been considering that seem to render fruitless all

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iii. vi.

attempts to use it as the base of a scientific theory of the Temperaments. The first, to which we have already referred, is the assumption that one or other of such qualities as 'superficiality' or 'depth,' or 'quickness' or 'slowness' may be safely inferred to be present in all the mental processes, emotions, and sentiments of any individual who inherits one or other of the four temperaments in question. This assumption we have seen reason to reject.

The second defect of these types is that they are based on conceptions of quantities that are indefinable in amount. One type has superficial feelings; but what degree of this quality constitutes the sanguine temperament? We have no means of judging. The sanguine man, it is said, is "very" superficial. Now we have throughout this book avoided all problems which require quantitative solutions, because assertions that an individual has "much" or "little," "more" or "less" of a certain quality, when we have no means of measuring the degree, do not lend themselves to scientific treatment. But these assertions are essential to the classical doctrine of the temperaments.

The third defect is that these types are artificial and exaggerated, and do not represent the real temperaments of men. This is so far recognised that it is admitted that most persons have "mixed" temperaments. M. Fouillée remarks: "Loin de soutenir avec Kant qu'il n'y a point de tempéraments composés, nous soutenons qu'il n'y a point de tempérament simple. Ce qui est introuvable, c'est un pur sanguin, un pur nerveux, &c."[1]

If we try to understand what this "mixture" which constitutes the real temperaments of men involves, we shall see how much farther it extends than is commonly recognised. Taking first the sanguine and ardent temperaments, and setting aside all their characteristics, except the opposite qualities of superficiality and depth which distinguish them, we notice first that these types are at opposite poles, and that somewhere in the intermediate stages between them all the existing temperaments of men must be found. Thus every real sanguine temperament will be stable in some direction

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. vi.

and in some degree, and every real, ardent temperament will be unstable in some degree, in some direction. But the same is true also of the nervous and phlegmatic. These, too, are at opposite poles, and somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. It follows that every sanguine temperament must also be either nervous or phlegmatic, or belong to some intermediate and more indefinite variety; and this must be also true of every ardent temperament. And every nervous temperament must be either sanguine or ardent, or belong to some intermediate and more indefinite variety; and this must be also true of every phlegmatic temperament. It follows, therefore, since each of the pure types is an exaggeration resulting from the assumption that all the mental processes possess that high degree of a certain quality which has been observed in some of them, that all existing temperaments combine in varying proportions all the four so-called pure temperaments. Thus the most unstable temperament we can find, will have—after eliminating the greater degree of instability which has been due to insufficient discipline in childhood and youth or has been acquired by an unregulated life—some qualities in which it is less unstable and approximates nearer to an ardent type, and if it is also quick and nervous, there will be some qualities in which it is not so quick, and approaches nearer to the phlegmatic type. Thus whatever approach to clearness and precision the different temperaments may seem to possess in their artificial exclusion of one another will be lost in the confusion of their real combinations.

There are other defects of the classical doctrine. It does not lay down any tentative laws such as might be available to us in a scientific treatment of character. It is a barren classification, like those classifications of the emotions that were till recently so prevalent. It does not justify our inferring anything of the temperament of a given individual beyond what we have observed it to be; and it induces us to make erroneous inferences, and is therefore an impediment to a scientific interpretation of character. These several assertions we must now examine.

In the ordinary descriptions of men's characters we do not

lay claim to exactitude. We say that a man is silent, reserved and unsociable, or that he has little capacity for affection, is ungrateful and an infliction to those who love him. Such statements are not scientific; but they have a certain practical value. They teach us to anticipate some of the actions of the same individual in the future. To classify a man under one of the four temperaments may be supposed to have the same sort of practical value. After some observation of a given individual we conclude that he is superficial in certain directions; if we class him as sanguine, does that give us grounds for inferring anything about him that we did not know before? It encourages us, indeed, to believe that he will be superficial in all other directions because that is the character of the type. But before making such an inference we ought to have a very wide knowledge of the man. The doctrine of the temperaments, however, does not justify our anticipating or abridging this knowledge, not only because its assumptions are unscientific, but because the temperaments of men are "mixed." The doctrine of the temperaments does not then give us grounds for extending our inferences beyond those limits which our observation of the individual in question justifies. And barren of good results, it encourages us to make those rash inferences to which the human mind is already too prone.

If we consider another quality of the sanguine temperament, it will reinforce the same conclusion. When we class a man as sanguine we not only infer that he is generally superficial, but that he has a natural fund of good spirits, that he is indisposed to the depressing emotions, and is, as it is said, a "born optimist." That some empirical connection has been found to exist between these characteristics may be admitted, and it is here, if anywhere, that the classification should help us by extending our knowledge of the man, and furnishing us at least with some tentative laws of character. But we are here in the same difficulty as we were formerly with regard to the man's superficiality. If we have already inferred from our own observation that his disposition is cheerful, we do not require the doctrine of the temperaments to inform us of that which we knew already

But if we have not made this inference, because we have not extended our observations in that direction, this doctrine does not justify our making it, because the temperaments of men are "mixed." A man may have one of these characteristics without the other.

In the remarkable analysis which Hume gave[1] of his own character when he felt his death approaching, he states that he was "naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper," "ever more disposed to see the favourable than the unfavourable side of things," of which he furnishes several eminent instances: first that when his great Treatise on Human Nature "fell dead-born from the press," he "soon recovered from the blow"; secondly, that his temper was never soured notwithstanding his "frequent disappointments"; but thirdly and most significantly that when he was overtaken by disease, and knew that his end was approaching, he "never suffered a moment's abatement" of his spirits, so much so, he says, that "were I to name a period of my life which I should choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same ardour as ever in study, and the same gaiety in company." Here then we have a striking instance of a sanguine temperament proof against what is reckoned the greatest misfortune: here, if anywhere, we ought to be able to infer that the individual in question possessed also the other principal quality of this temperament—superficiality of character. But what are the facts? He declares that he had one "ruling passion," the "love of literary fame," which he pursued with ardour through the greater part of his life, and up to its closing scene. If this great writer had then a sanguine temperament, he had also the essential quality of the opposite or ardent temperament. His most recent biographer describes him as "A man of placid and even phlegmatic temperament."[2]

The doctrine of the temperaments seems then to afford us no valid grounds for extending our inferences concerning a given individual beyond those limits which our particular knowledge of him justifies. It does not lay down any

[1] 'My own Life.'

[2] 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' xi. ed. vol. 13, Art., 'Hume.

provisional laws of the conjunction of qualities in a type that that we can rely on. Its classification of individuals is barren of good results; and its doctrine throughout is pervaded by rash and unscientific inferences.

The examination of this classical doctrine, though it has brought us only to negative results, has seemed necessary, because almost all recent works which have attempted to treat of a science of character have been based upon it; and a doctrine which has lasted more than 2,000 years, and been praised by eminent philosophers, physiologists, and physicians, may well seem deserving of careful examination. But this doctrine though so many modern writers have essayed to give it a scientific form, has never been lifted out of that loose and popular status to which its original defects condemned it, and seems to be incapable of fruitful development. In the next chapter we shall return to the consideration of the natural or innate tempers with which we commenced this chapter, though with the knowledge available at present we cannot do more than indicate what has to be accomplished.

CHAPTER XIV

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL TEMPERS ON THE STABILITY OF SENTIMENTS (I)

1. *How far the Temper of one Emotion involves a corresponding Temper in other Emotions*

THE study of the 'tempers,' in the sense given to the term in the last chapter, seems to be the only base on which we can hope to found a scientific theory of the temperaments, because here we are confined at first to a single emotion, and need not assume that the quality of its temper attaches to other emotions in the same individual. And our task will be to call in question such an assumption, and to ask how far and in what directions the quality of one emotional temper can be inferred to attach to other emotions. For instance, there are those who are very sensible to fear; and women are held to be more timorous than men. But does this natural or innate sensibility to fear carry with it a corresponding sensibility to anger? We should not suppose that it does, but rather that it restricts the sensibility to such an opposite emotion. Men, on the other hand, are supposed to be more sensible to anger than to fear. The males among many animals have to fight in their own defence, for the possession of the females, in defence of them and of the young, and to procure food. Thus the sensibility to fear is probably not the same as the sensibility to anger in either sex; and the natural temper of the one emotion cannot be inferred to attach to the other.

The sensibility to an emotion we shall take to mean the

degree and the manner in which it responds to its appropriate stimuli. But here we must distinguish different qualities which this sensibility may have. There is, first, the range of sensibility to fear. In any given individual this range has certain limitations. Among the variety of 'causes' that may arouse fear, there is some one or a certain number to which he is peculiarly sensible, and others to which he is relatively insensible. Thus in the different "phobias" the sensibility to fear becomes specially connected with a particular cause. A man fears open spaces or confined spaces, or falling from heights, or drowning, or burning; but because he is very sensible to fear from one of these causes he need not be equally sensible to fear from others. On the contrary, as the sensibility is increased in one direction it may be diminished in another. So also with regard to anger, there are men so irascible that any kind of opposition arouses this emotion. Others have their sensitive points: their political or religious opinions must not be questioned.

The sensibility to one emotion then does not involve an equal sensibility to others; nor does the sensibility to one involve an equal sensibility to all the causes by which it may be aroused. The range of emotional sensibility varies from one person to another. Some have a very wide, others a narrow sensibility. The 'emotional,' as they are called, have a wide sensibility to many emotions, to joy and sorrow, to anger and fear, to hope and despondency, alternating between states of excitement and depression. Others are emotional in a particular direction: the irascible in respect of anger, the timorous, of fear.

In proportion as we are more insensible to a particular emotion we become slower or more phlegmatic in responding to the stimuli which arouse it; and to provoke it these stimuli have to be stronger or more persistent; but in proportion as we are sensible to an emotion our quickness of reaction to it is increased, and the stimuli require to be less strong and less persistent. Thus people who possess a natural sweetness of temper are 'slow to anger,' but the irascible are quick to anger. The 'hard-hearted' are very insensible to pity, gratitude and other tender emotions, and being insensible are

slow to feel them; so that it requires a very strong or persistent appeal to move them.

Besides the varying range of sensibility, there are then the qualities of quickness or slowness involved in it, so that when sensibility is increased, quickness of response to the stimulus appears to be also increased within the range of sensibility to the emotion; and when insensibility is increased, slowness of response is increased with it. And besides this, with increase of sensibility delicacy is also increased, so that the emotion responds to a stimulus that is less strong and less persistent. Two other qualities are also involved in sensibility to an emotion: 'intensity' and 'duration.'

In studying the natural or innate temper of an emotion, all of these qualities have then to be distinguished: (1) the range of its sensibility to the various stimuli which may arouse the emotion; (2) the quickness of the emotional response to them; (3) the delicacy or the degree in which there is response to the weaker stimuli of the emotion; (4) the intensity of the emotion evoked, (5) and the duration of this emotion; and in estimating the temper we have to judge how far increase or decrease of one of these qualities involves that of others.

While the particular temper of one emotion cannot in general be inferred to attach to others in the same individual, whether in respect of range or delicacy of sensibility, or quickness, intensity, or duration of the emotional response, but each must be observed by itself, yet there may be affinities between the members of a certain group of emotions, so that the marked sensibility to one involves a similar sensibility to others also.

Let us consider some of the natural tempers connected with the emotion of Joy. Just as some people are peculiarly timorous by nature, and liable to feel fear from all sorts of trivial causes, and others timorous in a more restricted way, so we find that there are corresponding, and apparently innate tempers as regards joy. There are some whose range of sensibility to it is very great, so that they are disposed to it from all sorts of trivial causes; others are disposed to feel it in a more restricted way, and chiefly along the lines of their

peculiar endowments,—as artists to the delight of visible beauty, musicians to the delight of beautiful tones, and natures endowed with great muscular energy to the delight of physical exercises and games of skill. But when we speak of the joyous temper, we mean that this temper has such a wide sensibility that those who possess it feel joy almost whenever there is a possible cause of joy present, and even when other people would only feel indifference, or contempt. Thus involved with this wide sensibility there must be a delicate sensibility, so that a very weak stimulus is sufficient to arouse the emotion; and in this case also, it would seem, they must be quicker in responding to the specific emotional stimuli. For whereas we find that able men congregate together, and lawyers and doctors seek each other's society, because the joy to which they are sensible is to be found along certain lines of activity, joyous natures feel joy in all company that is not disobliging; even with dull people they can feel joy because, being so sensitive, they can extract it from almost anything.

This joyous temper, so far from its peculiar sensibility attaching to the emotional dispositions in general, entails a corresponding insensibility to the opposite emotions of repugnance and sorrow. This is what Hume means when he says that he was "ever more disposed to see the favourable than the unfavourable side of things."[1] For everything that we look at being complex, according as our attention is directed, we observe its good qualities or its defects. But the joyous temper directs attention to the pleasing or favourable side of things, so that it may find an object suited to its emotion, and at the same time withdraws attention from that displeasing side which would arouse repugnance; and resisting the presence of any cause of repugnance is slow to respond to it.

Our emotional moods are like tempers, being only less fixed and permanent. Now there is one familiar characteristic of our moods. When we are in an irascible mood we are disposed to get angry on the smallest pretexts, and to find justifications for our anger on all sides. Our sensibility to anger is increased both in range and in delicacy. Things and persons seem contrary. We are ready to blame them

[1] *Supra*, p. 146.

and to exaggerate their defects. Our judgment becomes warped and valueless. This diffusiveness of the angry mood is accounted for by the fact that the anger to which it disposes us is not aroused in the ordinary way by some external event, but is inwardly excited. It has therefore no object already formed, but has to form one for itself. As this object is more or less artificial, and is not in any case the cause, but only a specious justification of the emotion, it has little stability; and having fulfilled its function, after a little time gives place to some new object. Thus in an ill-tempered mood a man complains of his dinner, of the lack of attention he receives, of violations of his orders, of disagreeable people he has met, passing from one of these objects, when its insufficiency is exposed, to some other. For while the mood persists, if it can find no single object to justify it, a succession of objects must replace that one.

In the joyous mood there is a similar diffusiveness. There is sunshine over everything, and the shadows fall unnoticed. Common things are transformed. And here again the mood has to discover or to make its object; and if no single one is adequate, and a sufficient justification for what it feels, it spreads itself over a great many, or takes them up in succession. But at every step it excludes those aspects of things from its attention which afford no justification for what it feels, still more such aspects as would tend to arouse the opposite emotions of repugnance and sorrow. For our emotional moods work like instincts in the sure yet unconscious way in which they find and attach themselves to their objects, by controlling the attention.

If there is something stupid in our moods, because their objects cannot justify them, and they so much warp our judgment, we might expect that any reflective man who discerned them in himself would try to escape from their influence. Yet who tries to escape from a joyful mood? and did not Hume estimate his sanguine temper as worth more than thousands a year?

But the joyous mood, if it diminishes our sensibility to certain emotions, increases our sensibility to others. The mind cannot long remain fixed on the present, however

enjoyable, but anticipates the future, and colours that also with its emotions; and so far as the possible events of the future are desired and yet felt to be uncertain, they cannot become objects of joy, even though, were they realised, they would become such. They become objects of hope, which is also a pleasant emotion; and when the uncertainty of their accomplishment is reduced to a minimum, they become objects of confidence. The mood of joy which disposes us to rejoice in the present, or in memories of the past, disposes us to hope and confidence in respect of the future.

At the same time that the mood of joy extends our range of sensibility in this direction, it restricts it in another. Despondency and despair are other emotions that may colour the future, but they are opposites of hope and confidence, as joy itself is opposite to repugnance and sorrow. Hence the mood of joy, allying itself with hope or confidence, renders us correspondingly insensible to despondency and despair. For joy has the field, because it is based on the present mood, and being in a position of superiority is better able to exclude its competitors.

Carrying over these conclusions from the mood to the temper, we shall now attempt to formulate the laws of the extension and restriction of emotional sensibility connected with the joyful temper: (15) *The joyful temper, in proportion as it is stronger than the ordinary disposition to joy, weakens sensibility to the opposite emotions of repugnance and sorrow, and by strengthening hope and confidence in the future, weakens the opposite emotions of despondency and despair.*

We have already noticed that in proportion as our sensibility to an emotion is increased, we tend to feel it more quickly in response to its stimuli; and in proportion as our sensibility is diminished, more slowly. The joyful temper therefore renders us quick to feel joy, hope and confidence, and slow and phlegmatic to feel sorrow, despondency and despair; for being strongly disposed to the former group, we respond readily to their stimuli; but being correspondingly indisposed to the latter group, we respond to their stimuli slowly, and only after our resistance to these emotions has been overcome. And, further, the joyful temper has not only a very wide

sensibility responding to a great variety of stimuli, but is also peculiarly sensitive to them, so that a very weak stimulus is sufficient to arouse joy; because this joyful disposition is only waiting for an opportunity to discharge itself. It therefore renders us correspondingly insensitive to the stimuli of sorrow and despondency, so that we require a very strong stimulus before we can feel these emotions.

We can therefore enunciate the following additional laws: (16) *The joyful temper tends to make us nervous or quick in our response to stimuli of joy, hope and confidence, but phlegmatic or slow in our response to stimuli of sorrow, despondency and despair.* And secondly: (17) *The joyful temper lowers the threshold of sensibility for joy, hope and confidence, but raises it for sorrow, despondency and despair.*

If the joyful temper has affinity with certain emotions and hostility to others, and extends the qualities of its sensibility to the former but not to the latter, so also the sorrowful temper has affinity with certain emotions to which also it extends its sensibility. There will then be complementary laws of the sorrowful temper. The first is: (18) *The sorrowful temper, in proportion as it is stronger than the normal or mean disposition, diminishes sensibility to the opposite emotion of joy, and by increasing sensibility to despondency and despair, in respect of the future, weakens the opposite emotions of hope and confidence.* The second is: (19) *The sorrowful temper tends to make us quick in responding to stimuli of sorrow, despondency and despair, but slow or phlegmatic in responding to stimuli of joy, hope and confidence.* The third is: (20) *The sorrowful temper lowers the threshold of sensibility for sorrow, despondency and despair, but raises it for joy, hope and confidence.*

There are many other innate sensibilities to joy falling short of the breadth and impartiality of the joyous temper, which is ready to welcome anything that will yield it satisfaction. There are tempers that still have a wide sensibility to joy from a given class of objects, while they remain relatively insensible to it from other classes; and of these, too, the preceding laws hold, though repugnance and sorrow are not driven out to the same extent.

In any given class of objects—whether things seen or heard, whether persons, or places, or scenes in nature—there are always a certain number that tend to arouse joy in any particular individual. We cannot say what these objects are, since they vary from one person to another. Here and there we find a man for whom a large proportion of a given class arouses joy, yet for whom another class yields more repugnance than enjoyment. There are persons who are solitary in their habits, and inclined to misanthropy, to whom their fellow-creatures, with few exceptions, are repugnant. Thoreau was a solitary person ; but he had the compensating joy and love of nature. And here his sensibility was as broad and sensitive as it was narrow and restricted in relation to men. When he first took to his solitary life he found himself, he says, "in the midst of a gentle rain," "sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sight and sound around my house an infinite and unaccountable friendliness," which "made the fancied advantages of human neighbourhood insignificant."[1] He felt a similar delight and friendliness in the presence of the wild animals. "He pulled the woodchuck out of its hole by the tail: the hunted fox came to him for protection ; wild squirrels have been seen to nestle in his waistcoat ; he would thrust his arm into a pool and bring forth a bright, panting fish, lying undismayed in the palm of his hand."[2]

Now in proportion as the sensibility to joy is broad in respect of a given class of objects, so that a great many objects in this class arouse joy, in that proportion must the sensibility to repugnance and sorrow be there restricted.

But the relation of joy to sorrow is more complex than its relation to repugnance. Repugnance is the true opposite of joy: they are naturally antagonistic. But there are no two emotions that more frequently and harmoniously blend together than do joy and sorrow. However broad is the musician's sensibility to delight from music, and fitted to receive it from all varieties of style and composition, other

[1] Walden, 'Solitude.'

[2] R. L. Stevenson. Familiar Studies of Men and Books, 'Henry David Thoreau.'

emotions blend with this æsthetic joy, and among them most frequently sorrow. And this holds of the enjoyment of all art, sorrow is not excluded by joy, but its painful effect is mitigated when both are blended into one complex emotion. But the broader the sensibility to joy in respect of a given class of objects, the more is sorrow excluded as a pure, unblended emotion.

It would be difficult or impossible to find anyone capable of experiencing in the presence of human beings a joy as broad and impartial as that which some derive from nature, and some poets and artists from their respective arts. For trees and mountains do not frown at us and treat us as enemies; and however wide a man's enjoyment of society, it is inhibited by countenances that express an ill disposition toward him. Toward them, naturally, there tends to be evoked repugnance or anger. Still, we find that some individuals and nations are by nature so sociable, that they are inclined to feel enjoyment in the presence of most persons, and this temper in proportion to the breadth of its sensibility, does tend to efface the sorrow that may be occasioned by absence of any one, and to exclude the repugnance that is so marked in morose and misanthropical natures.

There are then cases where the sensibility to joy is very much confined to a particular class of objects, as with musicians to that belonging to their art; with sociable natures to the presence of other persons; with æsthetic natures to having beautiful things around them in their daily life; and with natures endowed with great physical energy to the exercises of games and sports. In such cases, while their breadth of sensibility within the class there protects them, outside it, and in proportion as sensibility to joy is confined to this class, it exposes them the more to repugnance and sorrow.

We shall now formulate tentatively this law: (21) *In proportion as the sensibility to joy is broad in respect of a given class of objects is the sensibility to repugnance there narrowed, and sorrow either excluded or transmuted into tender emotion; and in proportion as the sensibility to joy is broad in respect of all classes are repugnance and sorrow as separate emotions excluded altogether.*

We have attempted to find in this section some provisional solution of the problem—how far the temper of one emotion tends to be accompanied by a similar temper in respect of others. We have not found any ground for inferring that there is a general identity between the temper of different emotions, but we have found that where one bears a strong resemblance to some other—as joy to hope, and sorrow to despondency—the temper of the one probably attaches to the other also. We shall now proceed to consider the second problem of the influence of certain tempers on the stability of sentiments.

2. *Of the Influence on the Stability of Sentiments of Tempers that have a Broad Sensibility to Joy*

The kind of joy to which a man is peculiarly sensible is a very important fact in his character, because it indicates the probable direction along which his principal sentiments will be formed. It is not an isolated fact; it indicates the presence of certain bodily organs, or instincts, or talents that require to be exercised, and which respond with some degree of enjoyment when they have found appropriate objects. But over and above the different sentiments that are formed along these lines,—as sexual love, the love of physical exercises and sports, as well as a variety of æsthetic and intellectual sentiments,—the breadth of sensibility to joy which we have been considering has a decisive influence on the relative stability of sentiments. We shall first consider the broadest sensibility which we identified with the joyous temper.

Suppose, for instance, that a man were so peculiarly constituted that the society of his fellow-creatures gave him no delight whatever; and beauty of all kinds left him indifferent and unmoved; that having little surplus physical energy he felt no enjoyment in games and sports; and that knowledge alone moved him to wonder and delight; then such a person would be endowed by nature to love knowledge, but to love no other object whatever. And this delight would indicate the existence in him of a natural ability that needed

exercise, and that would be ready to respond with enjoyment when it had found an appropriate object; and it would indicate the lines along which, and the limits within which, his sentiment would be formed; where resting on a natural ability, and having no competitors, this sentiment would endure with the ability and energy required for its exercise. But if instead of this intellectual temper, confining joy to a particular class of objects, there was that widest sensibility which we have identified with the joyful temper, then there would be no limits to confine the growth of sentiments to any single class of objects, but they would be free to attach themselves to all classes, and to all the individuals of these classes, excepting those that instead of joy aroused the opposite emotion of repugnance. But in this case the sentiments that might be formed would have so many competitors that we should not expect them to have stability. This we shall now consider in more detail.

Starting from the conclusion reached in a previous chapter, that there is at the base of all love that we acquire for an individual thing or person some innate organisation of emotional dispositions in which the primary systems of joy, repugnance, sorrow, fear, and anger are included, the problem of the growth of a given sentiment is, first, to understand how this innate system at the base of love comes to be attached to a particular object. In a great many cases the emotion of joy is instrumental in effecting this connection in the first instance, because joy directs or holds attention to the object. This is especially clear in such sentiments as those of maternal and of sexual love. The delight of the mother in the presence of her child, of the lover at the sight of his mistress, not only rouses a wave of emotion which is diffused through the whole system and awakens it to activity, but connects or begins to connect it with a particular object. But joy alone can never form a durable bond, so as to render us 'attached' to this person rather than to another. For this the opposite emotions of sorrow and repugnance are essential, which ensue, if at all, when the object of joy is absent, or destroyed or injured. "Absence," says La Rochefoucauld, "weakens ordinary passions, and strengthens great ones as

the wind blows out a candle and spreads a conflagration."[1] And hence many maxims of the poets, as that "The course of true love never did run smooth."[2]

If, then, sorrow in absence or disaster is essential to the formation of a durable connection between the innate system at the base of love and a particular object, what stability of sentiments is possible when the innate temper is that which we call the joyful temper, with its resistance to sorrow and repugnance; when almost anything or anyone can replace that which has gone before, and prolong the joy of which it was the mere occasion? Sorrow in absence being eliminated, the momentary connection formed with an object is quickly obliterated, and nothing is loved because nothing is "missed." In one of his "Characters" La Bruyère represents this joyful temper and its effects. "*Ruffin* commence à grisonner, mais il est sain, il a un visage frais et un œil vif qui lui promettent encore vingt années de vie: il est gai, *jovial*, familier, indifférent; il rit de tout son cœur, et il rit tout seul et sans sujet: il est content de soi, des siens, de sa petite fortune, il dit qu'il est heureux: il perd son fils unique, jeune homme d'une grande espérance, et qui pouvoit être un jour l'honneur de sa famille; il dit: *Mon fils est mort, cela fera mourir sa mère*, et il est consolé; il n'a point de passions, il n'a ni amis ni ennemis, personne ne l'embarrasse, tout le monde lui convient. tout lui est propre; . . . on l'aborde, on le quitte sans qu'il y fasse attention; et le même conte qu'il a commencé de faire à quelqu'un, il' l'achève à celui qui prend sa place."[3]

If this joyful temper with that widest range of sensibility which we have attached to it is hardly present in real life, without some other temper that mitigates its effects, it none the less indicates a law of the relative stability of sentiments This law we shall now attempt to formulate. (22) *In proportion as the innate sensibility to joy approaches the widest range of the joyful temper, in that proportion it increases the instability of all sentiments of love to which it gives rise.*

There is one limiting condition of the preceding law

[1] 'Maximes,' cclxxvi.

[2] Shakespeare. 'A Midsummer Night's Dream,' act i, sc. i.

[3] 'Les Caractères,' 'De l'Homme.'

which we have hitherto abstained from taking into account. However wide the sensibility to joy, the intensity and persistence of the emotion for one class of objects may be different from what they are for others. Suppose that it is much greater, then the sentiments formed in that direction will tend to be more stable. When, for instance, Hume describes himself as a man "of a cheerful and sanguine temper,"[1] he does not mean to imply that he brought the same degree of cheerfulness and enjoyment into all kinds of occupations. He was endowed by nature to do certain kinds of work, and in doing them he would be apt to feel a greater degree of enjoyment. He informs us that his studious disposition had led his parents to conclude that the law was his proper vocation, but that for himself he found "an unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning."[2] This was again impressed on him when he was induced later to take up the business of a merchant at Bristol. In a few months he found this also "totally unsuitable."[3]

Thus a special ability to do some kind of work not only affords a peculiar enjoyment in successfully doing it, but also arouses repugnancy for other kinds of work that hinder it. However naturally cheerful the temper of Hume, his genius restricted the range of his cheerfulness. He could not enjoy all kinds of work. Unlike common natures that may have little preference for anything, he was thrown into an opposite state to that which his cheerful temper disposed him to, and experienced a strong repugnancy when the work which he had to do kept him from that for which he was specially fitted. Without this special ability he might have become a lawyer or a merchant without loss of cheerfulness.

There is a corresponding law to that which we have formulated of the joyous temper that appears to hold of those tempers that have a wide sensibility to joy in respect of a particular class of objects. If, for instance, all knowledge affords joy and the same degree of it, how can one kind of knowledge be loved and pursued in preference to all others? There will not be that strong repugnance which Hume refers

[1] 'My own Life.' [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*

to when one is substituted for another, but a similar enjoyment; and this will destroy all stability of sentiment. With such a temper there will arise the 'dilettante,' the 'jack of all trades and master of none.' It must be for some such reason that Aristotle laid it down that all men of genius are of a melancholy or ardent temperament. And thus, too, Borrow exclaims: "Thou wouldst be joyous, wouldst thou? then be a fool! What great work was ever the fruit of joy, the puny one?"[1]

We see many men in whom this temper is manifested in relation to another class of objects. There is the amorousness of some men, and frequently of poets. Each pretty face delights them, and they cannot resist its attraction, forgetting loyalty to the one before it. Thus Stevenson remarks of Burns that "His affections were often touched, but never perhaps engaged."[2] He "was formed for love," but "so greedy after every shadow of the true divinity," that he had perhaps "lost the power of self-devotion before an opportunity occurred."[3] Yet if the poet's sensibility to joy is broad in one direction, it is often as narrow in another. One kind of work alone appeals to him, and affords him a constant joy. Though inconstant in sexual love, he may be ardent in the love of his art; and even the defects of the one may furnish the experiences on which the other chiefly relies.

There are other familiar examples. There are sociable persons who derive an equal enjoyment from the society of many acquaintances; who day after day seem open to receive this same enjoyment, and go forward to meet it; who number their friends by hundreds, and find them all 'charming'; but for the same reason have no particular attachment to any one; who, if they are rich, live for society so that it becomes their chief delight, and to be separated from it their chief affliction; while yet to be separated from any one person involves no appreciable repugnance or affliction. And thus with them the love of individuals is as superficial as the love of society is lasting.

[1] 'Lavengro,' ch. xviii.

[2] 'Familiar Studies of Men and Books,' 'Some Aspects of Robert Burns.'

[3] *Ibid.*

Let us then tentatively enunciate this law: (23) *In proportion as our sensibility to enjoyment from a given class of objects is wide and equable—so that we are open to receive a similar enjoyment from a great many members of the class—the sentiment of love that we are capable of forming for any one becomes superficial and unstable.*

These natural tempers that we have been considering which tend to give rise to only superficial sentiments for members of a class, do not on that account tend to the formation of superficial sentiments outside of their respective classes, and the assumption that they do so was one of the principal errors of the old doctrine of the sanguine temperament.

We shall in the next chapter consider some of the opposite tempers that have not a broad but a restricted sensibility to joy.

CHAPTER XV

OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL TEMPERS ON THE STABILITY OF SENTIMENTS (II)

1. *Of the Influence on the Stability of Sentiments of Tempers that have a Narrow or Restricted Sensibility to Joy*

If there is no quality of character more important than 'stability' or 'steadfastness,' and none that produces more disastrous consequences to individuals and nations than 'instability,' we might suppose that the first manifestations in children of these qualities would have been carefully observed and recorded, and that they would have been traced to the natural tempers that either favour or thwart them. But the facts have not been systematically observed, and if some of them have been recorded in literature, as is certainly the case, they have not been extracted from it. In the absence of this indispensable material it is only possible to define our problem precisely, not to solve it ; though we may offer some tentative generalisations that may serve to guide our further research.

Stability of character is a quality which is not so much needed by the emotions as by the sentiments, and by the will which is organised in their service. The sentiments therefore tend to acquire it, and do acquire it, other things equal, in proportion to their own strength. But there are natural or innate tempers that either tend to further or to thwart this development.

There are those whose natural or acquired tempers are as narrow and restricted in their sensibility to joy as those that we considered in the last chapter were broad and sensitive ; or

rather,—lest we be supposed to assume that this sensibility pervades the character as a whole,—there are those who in respect of a given class of objects are not open, like those last considered, to receive impressions of joy from a great many members of the class, but, stubborn to such impressions, only respond to them under rare conditions. In respect of this class they are 'difficult to please.' Our natural endowments and even our training may occasion this difficulty. The good artist or musician is more difficult to please than the ordinary man in the works of his special art. The literary man is sensitive to bad style and to commonplace thought. He who delights in good conversation, and, like Madame de Sevigné, thinks that there is no joy equal to it, cannot experience it in ordinary company, or with those who lack animation, wit, and amiability. And as our special endowments and training here restrict our sensibility to joy, so they render us more sensitive to repugnance from the common members of the class. Thus we notice how the marked repugnance of the artist and literary man for bad work restricts the range of his enjoyment. For with regard to every class of things there will be some that tend to arouse joy, some to arouse repugnance, and some that leave us indifferent; and as the number of the first is diminished so is that of one of the others increased.

Beside these special endowments that narrow our sensibility to joy and broaden our sensibility to repugnance in one direction or another, there appears to be a veritable temper of repugnance, sometimes perhaps natural, but more often acquired through the disappointments of life, which is the opposite of that joyous temper that we have already noticed. This temper renders us stubborn or phlegmatic to impressions of joy from almost any kind of object. The character of Alceste in "Le Misanthrope" is an example of this general sensibility.

If with such a temper, and a sensibility to joy so narrow and obstructed, we tend to develop misanthropy, losing proportionally the very capacity for love, yet the other tempers to which we have referred, that feel repugnance, or indifference, for most members of a given class, and joy for a

very few of them—these are the most favourable soil from which strong and exclusive sentiments of love are developed.

There are those whose natural temper is the reverse of the amorous; who are not open to receive the sudden, sexual delight from a great number of persons, nor prone to seek for it; who when occasions are presented, remain phlegmatic to the incitement. This sexual temper makes them feel indifferent to most people, and, when this indifference is combated, repugnance. But if at length its joy is aroused, how ardently does it burn! How the law of contrast intensifies and strengthens it! On all sides indifferent or disagreeable objects, with one exception. How can that one be forgotten? What sorrow ensues from a joy so circumstanced when presence is succeeded by a long absence! How eager and engrossing is the desire for the return of the unique event! What hopes and anxieties alternate with this desire! What sudden fears and prolonged despondencies! How in lonely thought and imagination will Love, which organises all these emotions, and repeats them again and again till they are stamped in its memory,—spring up in a night! Love suddenly formed; yet so deep and constant! This is the 'Ardent' temper, and this the love which naturally grows from it. But is the explanation of such a constant love so simple? Probably not. The innate basis of love differs from one person to another in other respects than in its sensibility to joy, as in capacity for self-control, courage, and endurance; but this we seem able to infer, that wherever there is this narrow and obstructed sensibility to joy, there, when the proper object has been found, and this obstruction has been overcome, will tend to follow lasting sorrow, repugnancy to other things that distract us from it, and with these emotions an enduring love. And thus Balzac writes to the woman he loved and waited for through so many years: "Vous ne savez pas avec quelle force un homme qui n'a rencontré que travaux sans récompense, et douleurs sans joie, s'attache à un cœur où, pour la première fois, il trouve des consolations."[1]

In Lucy Ashton, "the Bride of Lammermoor," Scott has

[1] 'Lettres à l'Étrangère,' vi., 'A Madame Hanska.'

given us a portrait of an ardent temper in which the base of the character is drawn with the ease and clearness of the great masters. Three tempers exist in her together. The first which is mentioned refers specially to the will. She is at an opposite extreme to those who are innately predisposed to resist suggestion, advice, and influence ; she is pliable, and in this direction, therefore, weak. "Every reader," says Scott, "must have observed in some family of his acquaintance, some individual of a temper soft and yielding, who, mixed with stronger and more ardent minds, is borne along by the will of others, with as little opposition as the flower which is flung into a running stream. It usually happens that such a compliant and easy disposition, which resigns itself without murmur to the guidance of others, becomes the darling of those to whose inclinations its own seem to be offered. . ."[1] But why was the will of Lucy Ashton so compliant? Was there not another temper in her that increased its weakness? For even the strong may comply with the wishes of others where not opposed to their own, and accept their guidance for a time where they have no opinion of their own by which to guide themselves. Now Scott remarks that with regard to Lucy Ashton "the alternative was, in general, too indifferent to her to render resistance desirable," and that "she willingly found a motive for decision in the opinion of her friends, which perhaps she might have sought for in vain in her own choice."[2] The weakness of her will was in this respect derived, and not inherent in it, being due to her indifference to so many things. Yet even strong love, though it tends to develop a strong will in its support, does not always imply a habit of resistance to the will of others : far from it. A loving nature is strong in pursuit of the ends of love,—strong in the extent of its self-sacrifice ; but its end being the happiness or welfare of another, it often develops that weakness we call 'pliability.' Of two mothers who equally love their children, one may be foolish, the other wise. One endeavours to please the child, and gratify its desires, because her end is its enjoyment ; the other frequently thwarts its desires, and is then firm in her resistance, because her end is the child's welfare. But, as a

[1] 'The Bride of Lammermoor.' ch. iii. [2] *Ibid.*

rule, whenever we love, we are disposed to do what the loved object requires of us, unless we believe that this would be for his or her disadvantage. Lucy Ashton's pliability was due partly to her affections, partly to her indifference to the alternative course, but, probably, in part also to an innate weakness of will. For when she has acknowledged her love, and resistance in its defence is forced on her, she does not, like a strong character, act with alacrity and courage, but, shrinking to the last, and suffering acutely through this enforced resistance, she adopts it with patient endurance. Her natural weakness is accentuated by the strength of the characters by whom she is surrounded; her proud and imperious mother; her brother so much like his parent; and the sullen and revengeful character of the man she loves, embittered by his wrongs, by his poverty and high rank.

To this pliable temper which was partly innate and partly acquired, was joined a second temper which increased her general weakness: she was peculiarly timorous. A clap of thunder, the threatening approach of wild cattle, brought her near to fainting; while the presence and the threats of her despotic mother so terrified her that she was sometimes speechless. We might suppose that with such a double source of weakness there was no possibility of her nature being capable of the strong and concentrated sentiments of an ardent temper; and Scott finely suggests that this was the conclusion to which her mother had come: "She was mistaken in estimating the feelings of her daughter, who, under a semblance of extreme indifference, nourished the germ of those passions which sometimes spring up in one night. . . . and astonish the observer by their ardour and intensity": her "sentiments seemed chill, because nothing had occurred to interest or awaken them."[1]

Now how was this third and ardent temper manifested in her case? It was not shown apparently by any predisposition to sadness or melancholy, which often accompanies it: it was masked in this general "indifference" which misled her mother and accounted in many cases for her pliability. But indifference to things in general does not

[1] Ch. iii.

by itself constitute an ardent temper, or the apathetic would be ardent. To it there must be united a marked sensibility to feel joy from a particular kind of object,—an object that seems rare and unusual in comparison with the common things of its class. Such joy as this, from the very fact of the rarity and strangeness of the object is naturally combined with wonder or with admiration. And we have instances of it,—independently of sexual love,—even in the cold intellectual temper itself, of men who, like Malebranche, have been entranced with delight and wonder in first looking into the pages of some book, the subject and treatment of which were in harmony with their peculiar genius: signs of the sudden birth in them of a sentiment that endured through their subsequent life, and organised their chief energies in subordination to it. But these had the strength of will to support this strength of sentiment: how will it be with her so weak, pliable, and timorous; who will be thrown into situations of danger through a forbidden love, and have to find the courage to meet them; who will have to struggle alone and unsupported with such masterful wills around her; who will have to resist those whom custom and religion have taught her implicitly to obey? If her temper had not been ardent, it might have been more in harmony with the other tempers of her nature. If she could have loved this man lightly, she could have sacrificed him to her weakness and her fears. Loving him ardently, exclusively, steadfastly, she must force from her nature what was hardest for it to yield,—resistance to fear, resistance to her compliant temper, and to the habit of obedience to her parents. It is one of the miracles of love how largely it can surmount the defects of the tempers which it has to control; but the struggle forced on this nature, so gentle, sweet and steadfast, is greater than it can bear. Terrified at the consequences of her own resistance, awed by the commands of her parents and of the minister of her religion, perplexed by base deceptions employed to convince her of her lover's desertion, she still finds courage to resist for long, and to substitute for her natural compliancy an obstinate refusal; until at length broken in health and spirits, and so confused by her weakness

and her fears that she scarcely knows the meaning of her actions, she signs the deed that binds her to another. Thus, the ardent temper, which above all requires to be supplemented by a natural courage and firmness of will, is liable without their aid to be counteracted by the other tempers that may be combined with it.

We shall now attempt to formulate the law of the influence of an ardent temper on the stability of sentiments: (24) *In proportion as our sensibility to joy in respect of any given class of objects is narrow, so that we feel joy in the presence of very few members of it, and indifference or repugnance to most, in that proportion does the love formed for any one member tend to be constant.* Thus the strength of a sentiment, other things equal, varies inversely with the range of our sensibility to joy from the members of the class to which its object belongs.

There is a question which this law suggests, but to which it affords no answer. Why is it that a temper that renders us so insensible to joy in the presence of most of the members of a class, notwithstanding surprise at their novelty, should yet be sensible in a high degree to joy in the presence of some particular member of it: a joy not dependent on novelty, and to which it remains sensible when the freshness has worn off? In other words, what is the secret of the attraction which the favoured individual possesses over the rest of the class? Now in certain directions we can sometimes answer this question. Where there is an ardent love for some form of art or some branch of science, it often happens that there is an affinity between the talents of the man and the quality of work which the science or art requires for its successful cultivation. A man loves it because he enjoys it, and because it is adapted to his talents; he will love it the more steadfastly the less he is fitted to do other kinds of work. For—vanity apart—he will find no compensating enjoyment when he is forced to occupy his mind elsewhere. These other things, because he is unfitted to deal with them, or because they are beneath his abilities, will leave him indifferent; and if he is forced to attend to them will arouse repugnance. And this will prevent him forgetting

the delight which his favourite subject afforded him, will make him long to return to it, and render the dejection that he feels in working in uncongenial fields prolonged and unappeasable. All this we meet with frequently in the lives of men of genius. But what in sexual love is the explanation of the exclusive attraction which the favoured individual possesses for those of an ardent temper? There are those who could love almost any woman who had some degree of youthfulness and charm, as Hawthorne confesses of himself; there are others that remain insensible to the most beautiful. What is it that overcomes this insensibility? The favoured individual is raised above the members of the class to which he belongs; but what gives this pre-eminence to him? Is there here too some affinity, but a secret one, that we cannot penetrate, or is it due to accident or circumstances?

Scott, in the case we have been considering, traces the selection of the favoured individual to a variety of conditions, among which the timorous temper of the woman itself plays a part. Terrified by the near approach of a wild bull, a stranger killed the animal at the critical moment. In the sudden relief from such a painful emotion, surprise and joy were mingled with her feelings of gratitude toward her deliverer. Nor was this all: Lucy Ashton was of a romantic temper, inclined to wonder and admiration. "Her secret delight was in the old legendary tales of ardent devotion and unalterable affection, chequered as they so often are with strange adventures and supernatural horrors."[1] In the noble appearance, in the career and misfortunes of the Master of Ravenswood there was an air of romance. Thus wonder and curiosity were connected with joy and gratitude; and as the scene of their meeting was recalled again and again in her solitary reflections, the same emotions were renewed and the connection between them and her thought of him established: he was "linked to her heart by the strong association of remembered danger and escape, of gratitude, wonder, and curiosity"; and in her admiration for him, "no cavalier appeared to rival, to obscure the ideal picture of

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iii.

chivalrous excellence"[1] she had formed of him. All these emotions co-operated in her case, and perhaps others, before the general insensibility which guarded the approaches to sexual love could be overcome.

We may see in the preceding examples—in such tempers of narrow and obstructed sensibility to joy from the members of a given class of objects, how the one object that at length stirs them is taken out of the common things of the class to which it belongs, and raised into pre-eminence over them. The joy which it excites, containing or contained in admiration and wonder, becomes much more intense and lasting than those common joys of a broader sensibility that have scarcely anything to distinguish them, and are effaced by one another. We may then formulate this second law of the ardent tempers: (25) *In proportion as our tempers have a narrow sensibility to joy, the joy to which they are sensible is the more intense and lasting, and establishes a more durable connection with their objects.*

There are other laws which the study of the tempers will lead us to distinguish, such as the laws of their interaction, where several of them, as in the case of Lucy Ashton, combine together to form one complex temperament. Thus it seems to be clear that the compliant temper counteracts the ardent temper, and the ardent the compliant; and that the timorous temper also generally counteracts the ardent; for those who love greatly must greatly dare. Still there are many varieties of fear, and it often happens that the man who is peculiarly sensible to one is correspondingly insensible to another; as are those who have physical courage combined with moral cowardice, or those who can stake their happiness or glory on a chance, and work toward it through their lives undaunted, yet have some physical fear that might make cowards of them. The Apostle Peter had an ardent love of his Master, and the vehemence of this love made him protest that though all deserted him, he would remain faithful, yet when the hour came he disowned him through sudden fear.

The examples we have now adduced will be sufficient to

[1] *Ibid.* ch. iv.

show how many observations require to be made, and how much material collected, before the laws of the influence of the tempers on one another and on the sentiments could be raised to the scientific standard. But at the same time these examples open before us a future of great promise; for once the problems are clearly understood, and we have formulated tentative laws for their solution, we know what are the facts that we have to observe in child-life, and to search for in the characters of individuals and of nations; and as these facts are gradually accumulated, so will the laws be gradually discovered and perfected, and the growth of the science be assured in respect to this fundamental side of it.

The conception of character that we have gradually unfolded in this first and introductory book, inadequate as it is, has suggested some of the initial problems of a science of character, has furnished us with some tentative laws for our guidance, and has indicated many lines along which further observation and research may be directed. The conclusion that we provisionally adopt is, that there are three principal stages in the development of character. Its foundations are those primary emotional systems, in which the instincts play at first a more important part than the emotions; in them, and as instrumental to their ends, are found the powers of intelligence and will to which the animal attains. But even in animals there is found some inter-organisation of these systems, or, at least, some balance of their instincts, by which these are fitted to work together as a system for the preservation of their offspring and of themselves. This inter-organisation is the basis of those higher and more complex systems which, if not peculiar to man, chiefly characterise him, and which we have called the sentiments; and this is the second stage. But character, if more or less rigid in the animals, is plastic in man: and thus the sentiments come to develop, for their own more perfect organisation, systems of self-control, in which the intellect and will rise to a higher level than is possible at the emotional stage, and give rise to those great qualities of character that we name 'fortitude,' 'patience' 'steadfastness,' 'loyalty,' and many others, and a relative ethics that is in constant interaction with the

ethics of the conscience, which is chiefly imposed upon us through social influences. And this is the third and highest stage in the development of character, and the most plastic, so that it is in constant flux in each of us; and the worth that we ascribe to men in a review of their lives, deeper than their outward success or failure, is determined by what they have here accomplished.

BOOK II

THE TENDENCIES OF THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS

CHAPTER I

INSTINCT AND EMOTION

1. *The meaning to be assigned to the terms 'Emotion' and 'Instinct'*

In any attempt to estimate the part which the emotions play as factors of human character, it is important first to distinguish those which are primary, which reappear in the same or in modified forms in the higher systems of the sentiments, and are the source of a number of more complex emotions that we class as 'derivative.' This principal aim determines for us the problems that directly concern us. We have first to analyse the systems of the emotions; to distinguish their impulses and tendencies; to observe the results which they normally accomplish, and which they seem organised to achieve; and finally to judge from these several considerations whether they are primary or derivative. The results which emotions are fitted to produce can be traced (1) by observation of their behaviour; when foresight of these results is present, (2) by introspection, and in general, (3) by an analysis of their systems.

Following upon this problem we have, as everywhere in this work, to attempt to trace some of the laws of these primary forces—as those of their action and interaction; for one emotion may either strengthen another or weaken it, may either blend with it into one complex emotion or hold itself distinct.

Now, among the root forces of character we must include some of the instincts: for such instincts as 'seizing' and 'walking' would not be called forces of character, although

they may be constituents of such forces. With the various instincts of 'flight,' of 'concealment,' of 'fighting' and 'killing,' and many others connected with the emotions, it is different; and animal character is mainly constituted of them. For behind the anger or fear that we feel there are the instincts of anger and fear hidden in the organism, and the force which the one has may be, in part or whole, the effect of the force which the other has. The problem of the relation between these forces, the one operating in consciousness and the other beneath it, cannot be set aside, even if we can only obtain a partial solution of it.

The words 'instinct' and 'emotion' have been used in a great variety of meanings. 'Emotion' is frequently used to signify intense feelings, involving wide diffusion of nervous excitement and marked modification of the organic functions. Such a use excludes all the fainter degrees of anger and fear, joy and sorrow, which are still the same forces of character, though working at a lower degree of intensity or strength. "Emotion" is also used in a very abstract sense to include the passive feelings of the mind, but to exclude both the impulses combined with them, and the cognitive element which is also an inseparable part of the same mental fact. 'Emotion,' finally, may be used to denote all those forces that are alternating in our minds with so little respite, as joy and sorrow, anger and fear, disgust and curiosity, hope and despondency, anxiety and disappointment, at all degrees of intensity at which they can be felt and recognised; for it is these that are collectively known as 'the Emotions.'

Our purpose determines the choice we have to make, and we select the third use of the term. We require the term to denote concrete facts, not abstract elements, facts which are at the same time forces of character, such as everyone discerns fear and anger to be. 'Emotion' for us will connote not feeling abstracted from impulse, but feeling with its impulse, and feeling which has essentially a cognitive attitude, however vague, and frequently definite thoughts about its object. The thoughts of anger and fear are quite familiar to us: we have only to hear someone express them in order to know that he is angry or afraid.

This entire concrete fact, which we shall call the emotion, susceptible of varying degrees of intensity and strength, is a system ; because it is penetrated throughout by an impulse that organises it, which accepts certain thoughts and rejects others, and directs them to its pre-determined end. Thus anger excludes 'reasonable' thoughts and 'kindly' thoughts about its object, and possesses its feeling in support of its impulse, which is innately organised to work toward a certain result or end, the injury or destruction of its object. This result which at first probably is not foreseen, human beings come to foresee after they have had sufficient experience of the emotion.

The emotions then are forces : they work in certain ways, and in certain directions. They are within us to perform certain functions ; though they often exceed their functions, and are very imperfect instruments. They need, and in man they acquire, higher systems to control them ; but they are essentially organised forces, and as such we shall define them. And if in the course of our inquiry we come upon any so-called 'emotion' which is not such a force, which has neither impulse nor end—as we shall do in at least one case—we shall not enter upon any subtle inquiry as to how this contradiction to our theory may be met ; we shall for our purpose refuse to accept it as emotion, because it lacks the fundamental character of that class of facts to which we here restrict the term. So much it has seemed necessary to say, in order to obviate, as far as possible, disputes and misunderstandings as to the meaning of the term.

We have now to add something further as to the nature of the emotions, and to distinguish between them and the entire systems to which they belong—between, for instance, anger or fear as we feel it, and the entire system of anger or of fear. And this distinction is forced on us, not because anger or fear, as we feel it, is not a system, but because it is not the entire system of the emotion. The emotion is only a part of that system. It is, in fact, that part which is present in consciousness ; but there is another part which is not in consciousness : namely, the executive part which

carries out the impulse of anger or fear, and the receptive part which evokes that impulse. It is clear that the system of the fear or anger that we feel would fail if it did not extend into the body, and there excite certain nervous and muscular processes not only having a connection with one another, but forming one system with the emotion of the mind, because directed to the same end. Yet this is not all. If the emotion has no external effects, its system remains abortive and incomplete. But the angry man becomes erect; he clenches his fists, he sets his teeth, he shouts or fights. The frightened man turns pale and trembles, and hides or runs away. This part of the system of fear or anger which we call its expression and behaviour is that which is accessible to external observation; the first part, the emotion that we feel, is accessible to internal observation; and the intermediate part has to be approached by indirect methods, and the nature of its living action inferred from them.

Thus the three distinguishable parts of the system of the emotion, the emotion itself, the processes connected with it in the organism, and its outward expression and modes of behaviour, all belong together, and form one system.

Now, where we are dealing with a primary emotion there is often, if not always, an instinct connected with it, and the next problem which we have to consider is the meaning to be given to the term 'instinct,' and the relation which such instinct bears to that complex system of the emotion to which we have referred.

The term 'instinctive' is applied by biologists to certain complex actions or behaviours characteristic of a group of animals, the capacity to perform which is inherited;[1] as the way in which some animal attacks and kills its prey, the mode of locomotion characteristic of it, as the swimming of ducks, the flight of birds. Such modes of behaviour are

[1] "In recent scientific literature," says Prof. Lloyd Morgan, "the term is more frequently used in its adjectival than in its substantival form; and the term 'instinctive' is generally applied to certain hereditary modes of behaviour Investigation thus becomes more objective, and this is a distinct advantage from the biological point of view."—Art, 'Instinct. Encyclo. Britannica,' Eleventh Edition.

observed to arise before the young animal can have learnt to perform them through experience. But we find that the specific behaviour which in this sense of the term we entitle 'instinctive' is liable to be modified in the course of an animal's life through its experience. 'Instinctive' behaviour is then of two kinds, that which is purely instinctive and that in which some traits of the behaviour have been acquired by practice.

There is another common use of the term "instinctive" in which it is applied to the emotion itself when excited by a stimulus which innately tends to arouse it. Thus Darwin says: "Fear of any particular enemy is certainly an instinctive quality, as may be seen in nesting birds, though it is strengthened by experience."[1] Hudson who contests this conclusion of Darwin, and considers that "fear of particular enemies is in nearly all cases"[2] acquired, also uses the term "instinctive" in this additional sense. In his chapter on "Strange Instincts of Cattle," he refers among other cases to "the excitement caused by the smell of blood, noticeable in horses and cattle, among our domestic animals, and varying greatly in degree, from an emotion so slight as to be scarcely perceptible to the greatest extremes of rage and terror."[3] All our primary emotions may in this sense be instinctively felt, because among their stimuli there are some that are innately connected with their excitement.[4]

These two uses of the term 'instinctive' are quite consistent with one another. The same conception penetrates both: that that which is instinctive is not acquired through experience, but is due to inherited endowment.

[1] 'Origin of Species,' ch. viii. 'Instinct.'

[2] 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. v. [3] *Op. cit.* ch. xxii.

[4] Since this work was prepared for the press, Prof. Stout has given in the 3rd Edition of his manual an excellent account of Instinct. He justifies the application of the term 'instinctive' to emotion in certain cases: "where we find an animal showing emotional excitement in the presence of a certain special object and fixing attention on this, though it has not been actually harmed or benefited by it in the past and is not being actually harmed or benefited by it in the present, such interest and attention may be properly called instinctive." 'Manual of Psy.' B. iii. ch. i, 6.

Turning next to the meaning to be given to the term 'instinct' we must in correspondence with the meaning assigned to the adjectival form, define it to be an inherited disposition both to be excited by certain stimuli and to respond with a specific kind of behaviour or expression to such stimuli.

There is another meaning of 'instinct' and 'instinctive' that we ought to notice. Just as fear and other emotions, and even imitation and sympathy, are spoken of as instinctive when it is meant that the emotion, or the impulse to imitate, has been due in the particular case to a stimulus which is innately connected with the excitement of that emotion or impulse; so also when the end aimed at, and not merely the behaviour by which it is accomplished, has not been acquired through experience but is due to hereditary endowment, the pursuit of such an end may be called instinctive, and the disposition to pursue it may be called an instinct. It is in this sense that we speak of the 'Instinct of Self-preservation' and the 'Instinct of the Preservation of the Race.' But from this point of view all the primary emotions are instincts in so far as they direct action to ends that are not acquired through experience, and at first without knowledge of what these ends are.

If we were to take this third meaning of instinct independently of the others, we should have to say, that even where the means to an end are acquired through experience, yet so far as the ends are not so acquired, our actions are in this respect instinctive, and that from which they proceed is an instinct. Thus, if we were to analyse the most complex and recently developed behaviour of civilised man, as manifested in the building of battleships or aeroplanes, we should have to conclude that it is still instinctive so far as directed to the end of self-preservation or to the preservation of the race.

We have tried to show in Book I,[1] that the Instinct of Self-preservation is in reality the name of a number of different instincts which would not be so named, unless in addition to their predetermined end they also gave rise to definite and hereditary forms of behaviour. We have also seen[2] that the

[1] Ch. iv. 2, 3. [2] *Ibid.*

parental instinct is such a group of distinct instincts. It may seem to introduce confusion into our conception of instinctive behaviour to name it instinctive when its end alone is innately determined, and it is more in agreement with ordinary usage to allow it to be such only when, in addition to the end, the behaviour itself is in great part not acquired, and when it has that typical form that makes it characteristic of the species, or of the sex of the animal, or of some narrower group.

We can combine together these three uses of the term 'instinct,' and say that every instinct is such because it is (1) capable of being instinctively aroused, (2) of evoking an instinctive mode of behaviour, and (3) of being instinctively directed to the end of self-preservation or to the preservation of the race.

There are some instincts that seem to be nearly perfect at birth, and to evoke actions which are complete in themselves, and others that produce only fragments of more complex actions, apart from which they are useless. Among the former are the wonderful instincts of moths and other insects which are only brought into activity once in a lifetime, and which oblige the insect to wander about until it has found a suitable place in which to deposit its eggs, and where the larvæ when they are developed will find the food suited to them. The young of many mammals are able not only to suck when the nipple is in their mouth, but at birth, or soon after, to walk and find their way to the teats of the mother-animal. But the child has to be assisted by its mother, because it can only suck when the nipple is in its mouth, and only this part of the complex action is instinctive.

The instincts of human beings in general produce only such fragmentary actions and, where they are not assisted, require other actions to be learnt and combined with them. The instincts of "sitting, standing, creeping, running, walking, jumping, climbing, throwing,"[1] are only fitted to become parts of more complex and acquired dispositions through which alone are they of any advantage to us, and fitted for the service of our emotions and sentiments. They therefore cannot be regarded as connected with any particular emotion, nor as

[1] Preyer, 'The Mind of the Child,' pt. i. ch. i.

giving rise to any particular emotion rather than to another; they are at the common service of all, and belong to none.

When the child is not able to attain its ends by such incomplete instincts as still survive in it, then, so far as it is unassisted, it has to fall back on two other and more general methods for attaining them: imitation or experimentation. In the first it shows itself capable of profiting by the experience of others; in the second, of profiting by its own experience. But how does it come to adopt these methods? It does not acquire them through experience. When therefore these methods are spoken of as 'instinctive,' and the dispositions from which they proceed as 'instincts,' what is meant is that they are hereditary: that the child begins to imitate because the sight of what others are doing is an innate stimulus to its innate and imitative disposition; that it begins to experiment because failure to attain its ends acts innately as a stimulus to vary its means, and to continue to vary them until it achieves success. Thus Preyer remarks that the utilising of experience "may be conceived of as an inherited logical process—*i.e.*, as instinctive."[1]

Now we may object to class these hereditary dispositions as instincts, because they do not produce like other instincts a definite behaviour which is substantially the same on different occasions, but, on the contrary, a behaviour that varies with the situation, according to the kind of action that the child has to imitate, or the end which it has to achieve by its experimentation; yet in all this varying behaviour there is still something that stamps it as imitation or experimentation. There is something abstractly the same, though in its particular nature different, which impels us to call it "instinctive." But what we have specially to notice is that these so-called instincts to imitate and to experiment, like those fragmentary instincts to which we last referred, are not connected exclusively with any particular emotion[2]; but so far as they are serviceable, may belong to all emotions.

[1] 'The Mind of the Child,' pt. i. ch. i. Thus Prof. Stout speaks of "the instinctive appreciation of relative success and failure as shown in persistency with varied effort." ('Manual of Psy.,' B. III, ch. I, 5, 3rd ed.)

[2] See 'Social Psychology,' sect. i. ch. iv.

Besides the hereditary dispositions to which we have referred there are others: there is the constitution of the mind; and besides this constitution common to all persons, there are the special, innate tempers and abilities belonging to different persons. The term 'instinct' may be used in the most general sense to include all innate dispositions; but following the narrower use of the term advocated in recent works,[1] we shall exclude all such as are too general, and which like the capacity to feel emotion, to retain what we have learnt, to believe, to compare our ideas, and to make inferences, are not connected with a sufficiently definite mode of behaviour; and on the other side we shall exclude all innate tempers and dispositions that distinguish individuals, and which are so marked in men of original character and genius.

2. *The Relation of Instinct to Emotion*

The problem we have now to consider is not the speculative question how instincts have been developed; whether they are purely biological facts as some have contended, "no-wise guided by conscious experience,"[2] or whether from the beginning, as others maintain, intelligence and will have influenced their development.[3] We have to start from the fact that we inherit them. It is admitted that in each one of us they are modifiable through our experience; and that even among animals there are few if any instincts that do not become more perfect with practice. Our problem is confined to the question how they are related to the primary emotions.

We have distinguished three parts in the system of an emotion: (1) that part which is in consciousness and is alone the felt emotion; (2) that part which is organised in the body; (3) and that part which is present in our behaviour and accessible to external observation. Now assuming that there is some instinct present in the system of an emotion, this instinct will include so much of the second or bodily part of the system as is inherited, and is innately excited by certain

[1] See 'Instinct and Experience,' by Prof. C. L. Morgan, ch. iv., also W. McDougall, 'Social Psychology,' sect. i. ch. ii.

[2] C. L. Morgan, *op. cit.* ch. iv.

[3] G. F. Stout, see 'British Journal of Psychology,' vol. v. 1912.

stimuli, and innately evokes a specific kind of behaviour in response. Whether that part of the system which is in consciousness is also part of the instinct, and no more than the subjective expression of its activity, we shall presently have to consider.

A second and delicate question is: what degree of definiteness must be present in the behaviour of a primary emotion before the physical disposition from which it proceeds can be accounted an instinct? This question more particularly concerns us where we are dealing with human rather than with animal instincts. But turning on differences of degree which cannot be measured, the question itself is not susceptible of a definite answer. The instinct and the innate disposition will here shade into one another. For instance, it is generally held that the appetites and such primary emotions as anger and fear are, or contain, instincts. But the hungry infant cannot find its way to the breast. Its movements are at first undefined, or only to be defined by the result or end to which it is persistently groping. These movements are not generally regarded as instinctive, but only the definite action of sucking when the nipple is in the mouth. Again the young child, while very early susceptible of fear and anger, can accomplish very little of the behaviour which is characteristic of these emotions. It cannot at first, under the influence of fear, run away or hide itself, as the young chick runs to and hides under its mother. Under the influence of anger it cannot at first injure anything or inflict pain, the two most familiar manifestations of the emotion. It must first learn to grasp things before it can dash them on the ground or throw them about in anger. It must first learn to balance its body and to walk before it can run away in fear. At first it can only clasp things with its fingers. "The contraposition of the thumb, . . . is very slowly learned by the young child."[1] It falls down many times before it learns to walk securely. Yet all of these movements of grasping, standing upright, and walking are regarded as "predominantly or exclusively instinctive."[2] More or less fragmentary and uncertain at first, they grow

[1] Preyer, *op. cit.* second part xi., 'Instinctive Movements.'

[2] *Ibid.*

more definite and coherent as the organs become developed and after practice. But they only become definite because there are dispositions that innately determine the ends to which they are directed, as well as the employment of experiment or imitation to achieve them. And hence the delight of the child when it has at length accomplished the simplest of these movements after repeated failures.

The so-called instincts—or, as we prefer to call them—the emotional systems of fear and anger in the child then contain other and simpler instincts—as those of walking, running, creeping, and throwing things about,—which, in the human child, are incomplete and fragmentary compared with the corresponding instincts of animals ; and, organised with them, and assisting their deficiencies, there must be also the instinctive tendencies to experiment and imitate.

The early imperfection of human instincts enables a superior intelligence to profit more by his experience than is possible to other animals held in check by their more complete, and therefore more rigid instincts. He can vary his methods by experimentation and imitation ; they are more confined to those which are hereditary. The animal with the more rigid instincts has the advantage at birth over one so much dependent on experience, if both are left to their own resources ; the other has an incalculable advantage afterwards.

Human instincts, though so much more fragmentary than those of animals, at least persist as constituents of the more complicated dispositions that are slowly acquired. But if we adopt James' definition, that Instinct is "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance,"[1] then, since we sooner or later acquire foresight of the ends, we are brought to his conclusion of "the transitoriness of instincts,"[2] most of which are "implanted in us for the sake of giving rise to habits," and then "fade away."[3] But this conclusion is simply a consequence of his definition of the term.

Now the chief objection to this definition is that it obscures the recognition of an important fact, namely, that the inherited

[1] 'Prin. of Psy.,' vol. ii. ch. xxiv [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*

dispositions, among which are included the instincts, are not superseded, but only modified by habits, and by the acquired foresight of the ends to which they are directed.

We come next to a definition that has the merit of attempting to connect instinct with the psychological fact of emotion, as well as of recognising the permanence of instincts. We have attempted to show that some instincts are parts of the systems of primary emotions. The theory we are now to consider in contrast with this regards the primary emotions as parts of the systems of instincts.

"We may then define an instinct," says Dr. McDougall, "as an inherited psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." [1] Thus a primary emotion is "the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts," [2] and each one of them conditions "some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it." [3]

Now in attaching an instinct so rigidly to a primary emotion, and a primary emotion to a particular instinct, three important facts seem to be obscured: (1) that an instinct may be excited, and even evoke the behaviour which is characteristic of it, without exciting a particular emotion; (2) that in the system of a primary emotion there may be not only one but several instincts; (3) that sometimes the same instinct may be found organised in the systems of different emotions.

(1) We have already seen that those fragmentary instincts that are involved in 'standing,' 'sitting,' 'walking,' 'running,' 'sucking,' 'licking' are not connected exclusively with any particular emotion, nor when they are excited must they also excite emotion; and that this is also true of the instincts or innate tendencies to imitate and to experiment. But even when we take the more complex instincts of primary emotions, into which one or other of the former enter as constituents,

[1] 'Social Psychology,' sect. i. ch. ii.
[2] *Op. cit.* sect. i. ch. iii. [3] *Ibid.*

as the various instincts of fighting of different animals, which we connect with anger, and those of flight which we connect with fear—there is some evidence that these instincts may sometimes be excited and evoke their characteristic behaviour without arousing the particular emotions. Not only do experiments on animals appear to enforce this conclusion;[1] but we have familiar experiences of our own. We are face to face with sudden danger; with calmness and rapidity we make the requisite movements, and find that we have escaped from the dangerous situation without feeling the emotion; but we often feel it retrospectively, if we reflect on the situation. We may also fight without feeling the emotion of anger. With calmness we may watch the movements that our opponent is about to make, and guard against them. At times there may be a rush of angry emotion; at others, the behaviour of the instinct and the acquired skill proceed without it. In many such cases we can see, just as in those fragmentary instincts of grasping or sitting or standing, that the movements are accomplished so rapidly that there is not time for the emotion to be felt. And it is precisely under the opposite conditions that we are most likely to feel intense emotion: where the action is not accomplished rapidly, but delayed. There are no fears so intense as those which arise in situations from which we cannot escape, where we are forced to remain in contemplation of the threatening events. There is no anger so intense as when the blood boils and all the sudden energy that comes to us cannot vent itself on our antagonist. The arrest of an instinct is that which most frequently excites the emotion connected with it; and therefore we feel the emotion so often before the instinctive behaviour takes place, rather than along with it. What appears to be invariably present when an instinct is aroused is not emotion but a feeling of impulse. Without impulse it would be no more than a compound, reflex action.

[1] As those of Dr. Goltz on a dog from which the hemispheres had been removed; also others of Prof. Sherrington recorded in his work on 'The Integrative Action of the Nervous System.' See also Prof. Lloyd Morgan's 'Instinct and Experience,' ch. iii.

Preyer, in the observations of his child, remarks that the first clasping of a finger, when it is placed in the hand of the child, is not an instinctive movement involving a felt impulse, but a simple reflex. For he observes the reflex action on the fifth day, but the instinctive clasping not until the seventeenth week. The absence of the clasping in sleep, which he noticed, is "to be ascribed to the insufficient excitement of the nerves of the skin, and the diminution of reflex excitability in sleep."[1] For when, he says, instead of putting a finger in the hollow of the child's hand, "I move my finger with a gentle rubbing movement back and forth upon the flat of his hand, he often clasps it quickly, almost convulsively, with his fingers, without waking."[2]

If we cannot suppose that the excitement of an instinct is invariably accompanied by an emotion, still less by one of a particular quality, we may at least distinguish between those reflex actions that are preceded by a psychical impulse to perform them and those that are not, and confine the term "instinct" to the former. But still we cannot be sure that such simple actions as "clasping" what is placed in the hand may not sometimes be accompanied by an impulse that we feel and at other times respond so rapidly to the stimulus of a sensation as to exclude it.

(2) If an instinct may be excited without involving an emotion, an emotion may be incapable of being excited without involving the excitement of some instinct or other innate tendency. But the same emotion may include a variety of instincts in its system. A few examples will make this point clear. In the chapters on the primary emotions we shall consider in detail the variety of instincts or innate tendencies that are organised in these particular systems. We shall here confine ourselves to fear. In the system of that emotion as it exists in man and in many animals, there are included at least two instincts of flight and concealment. Sometimes these instincts are excited together or in close succession, sometimes one and not the other. An animal—and especially man with his greater plasticity and power of adaptation—may, under the influence of this emotion, either take to flight,

[1] *Op. cit.* 'The Senses and the Will,' pt. ii. ch. xi. [2] *Ibid.*

and afterwards conceal himself, or, on the other hand, he may conceal himself without flight by creeping into cover, like a crab that buries itself in the sand, or withdraws into the crevice of a rock, or like a child that hides under the bed-clothes ; or, on the other hand, he may take to flight and, like birds, when at a sufficient distance, feel secure without further protection. According to the theory we are considering, each one of these instincts ought to have a different primary emotion as its affective aspect ; but we feel only the one emotion of fear in both cases. We do not deny that this fear has different sensations connected with it when we are running away or lying still ; but it is in both cases the same primary emotion.

(3) In the third place, the same instinct may be connected with the systems of different emotions. That an instinct is organised in one does not prevent it being also organised in another. The same habits may be useful in different systems, so also the same instincts ; just as the same emotions function over and over again in a variety of sentiments. The simple instincts of sitting, or standing, or grasping objects with the hand, the instincts of locomotion, evoking the peculiar instinctive movements by which an animal propels itself, whether by walking or flying, or swimming, or by sinuous movements—are indispensable to the systems of many emotions, and may be excited through fear, anger and the appetites. Thus the instinct of flight in birds may be roused to activity through the emotions of fear, and of anger, and through the appetites of hunger and of sex. The combative instincts connected with the emotion of anger are found also in a modified form in connection with the enjoyment of play ; as we see when dogs play at biting one another, and alternately give chase and take to flight. What instincts may not enter the system of this wonderful emotion of play ?

If then an emotion is not the affective aspect of the excitement of an instinct, what is that which corresponds most closely to an instinct in consciousness ? An impulse ; and, consequent on it, the sensations that accompany the subsidiary motor response. But an emotion with its system is a more comprehensive fact than an instinct with its impulse, because in the former system there may be organised a

variety of instincts with their impulses, all of which subserve in different situations the same end of the emotion. There may be also included in an emotional system a number of acquired tendencies which increase the variety of methods at its disposal. Corresponding with these innate and acquired tendencies in the system of an emotion there will then be felt and included a variety of impulses. In the system of fear there are the impulses of flight and of concealment, and others, as we shall see, connected with different innate or acquired dispositions,—felt in different situations; but felt with one and the same primary emotion of fear.

Not only is the system of a primary emotion a more comprehensive fact than the system of an instinct, but in man it becomes also a much more important fact. An instinct has only one kind of behaviour connected with it, and, when the appropriate stimulus excites it, must tend to respond with this one kind of behaviour. The same emotion in man has a variety of different kinds of behaviour connected with it, both instinctive and acquired, and when an appropriate stimulus excites it, is not compelled to respond with the same kind of behaviour, but may select that one which in the situation is the most appropriate. We shall therefore conclude with the enunciation of the following tentative law: (26) *Every primary emotion tends to organise in its system all instincts that are serviceable to its innately determined end, and to acquire many serviceable tendencies which modify such instincts.*

3. *Of the Significance of the Physiological Theory of Emotion for the Science of Character*

As the science of character must conceive of the primary emotional systems as forces innately determined to pursue certain ends, and possessing certain hereditary and acquired methods for achieving them; and as moreover its principal problem in respect of these systems is to understand the laws of their action and interaction, so from the point of view of this science we have to judge of the bearing on it of the physiological theory of emotion. This physiological theory holds that the organic sensations, which are so conspicuous in intense emotions, are due to the alteration of the function of

different organs, and that these alterations of function have two contrasted effects, are either stimulating or depressing.

Now since the emotions are forces organised to achieve certain results or ends, then it is clear that these functional modifications connected with them will either further the attainment of these ends or impede them, and that in a given case they may have partly the one effect and partly the other; either by affording the emotional system the increase of strength which it needs, or by favouring it in some other way; or, on the other hand, by unduly weakening it, or by rendering it in some other way less fitted to attain its ends. Sometimes these opposite effects will be manifested by the same emotion under different conditions, or at different degrees of its intensity or prolongation. Fear, for instance, may be so depressing as to paralyse us, or so stimulating as to make us run as "if the devil was behind us." Prolonged fear is held to be always depressing, yet it may be so sustaining to man's inconstant will that he gives henceforth all his days to "working out his salvation with fear and trembling."

If an animal has to escape by instant flight, and is so paralysed by fear as to be unable to move, then these functional changes are unfavourable to the efficiency of the emotional system. In other cases where a creature has to lie still, and escape detection, the depressing effect of fear may be advantageous to it. Again the influence of these functional changes may be mixed. The great increase of muscular strength that accompanies anger is favourable to a system which is essentially aggressive, but the trembling which is often a feature of violent anger, unfits a man for delicate movements of attack and defence. Thus such functional changes belonging to the system of an emotion may be beneficial to it in one direction and detrimental in another; but we may expect that, as they are innate features of it, they are on the whole beneficial, and that natural selection has favoured their development.

The two significant features of the systems of the primary emotions on their physiological side are, then, the instincts which belong to them, and those functional changes which we have been considering. The one furnishes the proximate

end of the system, and some systematic behaviour adapted to it ; the other includes those changes of circulation, respiration, glandular secretion, increase or diminution of muscular activity, which, notwithstanding their sometimes contradictory influence, appear, on the whole, and when not too violent, serviceable to the end.

It is principally in man that the higher and psychological side of these systems undergoes important modifications. Man, through his greater intelligence and plasticity, acquires innumerable new methods of attaining his ends. In the system of his anger he learns the ways in which pain can be inflicted and resistance overcome. In the system of his fear he learns methods of escape beyond the range of animal intelligence. He constructs machines ; he invents disguises ; he learns to repress the expression of his emotions, and attains his ends by putting his enemy off his guard. In yet another way he modifies the structures of his instincts. He multiplies the causes which arouse and sustain emotions. The flow of his forecasting and reflecting mind introduces the new stimulus of ideas. The emotions of animals are aroused by sensations or perceptions, chiefly, if not exclusively. Certain things arouse fear in young birds before they have learnt by experience what things are signs of danger,—as loud noises, a sudden, rapid or near approach, or things that seem strange or large to them. These stimuli appear to be innately connected with the excitement of the instinct. Yet their fear is not so rigidly organised as to be incapable of modification. They may acquire it for some objects and lose it for others ; in large towns, where they cease to be molested, they allow human beings to approach close to them. In man, loud noises and sudden or rapid movements still arouse fear, but innumerable ideas may also excite and indefinitely sustain it. Hence the emotion may become an independent system, unrelated to the welfare of the organism ; as in mental disease we see fear become morbidly persistent through the influence of ideas. Each may react on the other, and the ideas both sustain fear, and be themselves sustained by it. But with animals, when the perceptual experience is removed, the fear subsides.

As it is with fear so is it with certain other emotions: men fall a prey to sorrow, anger, despondency and despair, and become unable or unwilling to control them. In unstable or neurotic tempers, emotions with their impulses become relatively independent. In melancholia, sorrow as well as fear may become morbidly persistent. In acute mania, anger may acquire a similar persistency. There is a feature common to all such cases,—the acquired influence of ideas in arousing and sustaining emotions. So long as the emotional systems are under the exclusive control of the sensational stimuli which are innately connected with their excitement, the balance of the instincts is not lost. Each has its own place: no one usurps the place of the others. But when the emotions become connected with compulsive ideas one group of instinctive tendencies gains at the expense of the rest. While the inherited connexion between the original stimuli and the emotion is evidence of its biological utility; the acquired connexion between ideas and emotions is only of approved value so far as it is under the higher control of the sentiments. But in the decay of character the power of these higher systems is undermined by the growth of the emotions as independent forces.

The result of the modification which the systems of the emotions undergo in man, and especially the multiplication of the causes which excite and sustain them, is (1) to make man the most emotional of animals, and (2) to render possible the debasement of his character. For that which is a condition of his progress is also a condition of his decline,—the acquired power of ideas over emotions, and the subsequent power of each indefinitely to sustain the other. Hence the existence of the emotions constitutes a serious danger for him though not for the animals, and the balance which is lost when the emotions are no longer exclusively under the control of those causes which originally excite them can only be replaced by the higher control of the sentiments. There are then three stages in the evolution of emotional systems; the first and primitive, in which they are under the control of the stimuli innately connected with their excitement, undergoing a certain change through individual

experience, but not radically altered; the second, in which they become dangerous and independent systems; the third, in which they are organised under the control of the new systems which they are instrumental in developing. For it is with them as so often with children, who at first have to obey a rule imposed on them which they cannot understand, and afterwards, when they grow up, break from its control, but only to fall under their own unregulated impulses, until, at length, their disasters teach them to make a new law to replace the old one they derided.

CHAPTER II

FEAR

1. *Of the Meanings to be Given to the Terms "End," "Object," and "Cause" of Emotion*

THE systems of the emotions are forces that enable us to perform the actions constituting the expression and behaviour characteristic of them. These actions, partly through heredity and partly through individual experience, have become organised to effect a certain result. It is because the emotional forces are so organised that they constitute systems, and the results to which their actions are instrumental we shall call their 'ends.' In this sense the discovery of the 'end' of an emotion or of an instinct is that which alone enables us to interpret its system. It is the same with the organs of the body. Their activities are coordinated to effect certain results. Their tendencies to effect them are called 'functions,' and these functions prevail when their systems are not interfered with or deranged. We cannot understand the organs of the body without a knowledge of their functions, nor the emotions without a knowledge of their ends.

The emotions have also ends in a higher sense. We may not feel the impulse of the bodily organs to fulfil their functions; but we usually feel the impulse of the emotions to accomplish their ends. In the striving of anger or fear even in a young child there is surely present an impulse which the child feels.

There is also a still higher sense in which the emotions may have ends. The young child at first knows nothing of

the particular results to which its anger and fear are directed. These systems lack a fore-knowledge of their ends, and have apparently been organised without it. But as the child comes to experience the effects of his emotions, he acquires this fore-knowledge. Is this fore-knowledge superfluous? As long as we are under the influence of emotion must we be governed by its pre-determined end? In the system of an emotion in man several instincts may co-exist which, in an animal, are often separated; and the man who foresees the different results to which they impel him may sometimes be able to choose between them. Thus while some animals capable of rapid movement will take to flight under the influence of fear, others, who can move but slowly, will under the same influence remain immobile, or, like the hedgehog or a caterpillar, curl up. But man, where a too urgent fear does not deprive him of his power of forecasting different results, or of judging between them, may choose either to take to flight, or to conceal himself where he is, or to adopt some other means of safety.

It is then of the first importance, if we are to succeed in interpreting the primary emotions as root-forces of character, to study the types of each emotion from the point of view of the different instincts and other tendencies which are expressed in their behaviour, directing them to different proximate results or ends, although the final end of the emotion may be the same in all.

It is usual to distinguish the varieties of fear by the different kinds of object to which they are referred,—as the fear of darkness, the fear of falling from heights, the fear of lonely places. It is also possible to distinguish them by their 'causes,' which often comes to the same thing; for the edge of the precipice both causes our fear and is that to which we refer it. But while the different causes or objects of an emotion may excite different instincts of its system, it is the latter which are of principal importance for us and by them that our types must be distinguished.

By the term 'object' we shall understand that to which the person who feels the emotion refers it, and by the term 'cause,' some condition, often merely the most conspicuous

condition, which has been instrumental in arousing the emotion, and these are perhaps the most usual meanings of these terms. There are emotions that in this sense are said to be sometimes objectless. We feel fear, and know not why we feel, nor to what to refer it. It is often caused by some pathological state. Borrow describes how he was afflicted by it after illness. "Oh, how dare I mention," says he, "the dark feeling of mysterious dread which comes over the mind, and which the lamp of reason, though burning bright the while, is unable to dispel!"[1]

The moods of emotion to which at times we are subject are caused by bodily states; and it is in these cases that the cause to which they are due is so different from the object to which they come to be referred. For while the cause is some state of the body, the object is something we invent to complete and justify the emotion. For it does not satisfy us to feel an emotion, and not be able to refer it to anything in particular; and when a man is in an angry mood, there is scarcely anything, however unreasonable, to which he may not attribute it. Again, where it is a belief of some impending disaster that causes fear, the object of it is never this belief, but the possible event in the future which it represents.

Taking the term 'object' in this sense, which sometimes coincides, and in other cases does not, with that condition of the occurrence of the emotion which we single out as its 'cause,' we find that this object is either something in the environment which we perceive, as the person or place we fear, or something we represent, as some possible event in the future or something fictitious that we invent to justify our mood.

2. *The Primitive Varieties of Fear*

The system of Fear, like that of every other emotion, normally becomes more perfect through the action upon it of the developing mind and organism, and the skill acquired through experience. The child is taught early what things are dangerous, and how to avoid them. But while the means at the disposal of its emotions are partly acquired their proximate ends, in many, if not all cases, are predetermined

[1] 'Lavengro,' ch. xviii.

by the instincts contained in their systems ; so that, whether we foresee them or not, we still pursue them when we are under their influence.

When the proximate result or end to which fear is directed in one animal is different from that to which it is directed in another, the systems of fear in the two animals will be themselves partially different because they have to be adapted to different ends, though the cause of fear may be the same. Thus the same cause—the approach of an enemy—will lead one animal to take to flight, another to remain motionless, a third to creep into concealment, and a fourth to keep close to its dam. The instincts of fear which have to achieve these different results must be themselves different. They must involve the activity of different nerves and muscles. The sensations must consequently be different, and the thoughts so far as there is any pre-cognition of the result, must be also different. Where, on the other hand, the cause is different, or the object is different, the systems may be closely similar. Thus whatever be the cause of fear, young apes will generally cling to their mother for protection, and young chicks hide under the hen's wings.

The two most familiar varieties of fear—(1) that which directs escape by rapid movements, and (2) that which directs escape by hiding—are sometimes combined and sometimes manifested separately, as we noticed in the last chapter. For an animal may either take to flight and, when at a sufficient distance, take no other precaution, or it may creep into a hole in the ground, or conceal itself in some other way, and this either with or without a precedent flight.

(3) The third variety is characterised by silence. Its instinct inhibits all sounds coming from the animal itself. When young birds are being fed, if the parent "emits the warning note, they instantly cease their hunger-cries, close their gaping mouths, and crouch down frightened in the nest."[1] Hudson observed that with certain species this suppression of all noise may be noticed before the young are hatched. "When the little prisoner is hammering at its shell, and uttering its feeble *peep*, as if begging to be let out, if the warn-

[1] 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. v. p. 90.

ing note is uttered, even at a considerable distance, the strokes and complaining instantly cease, and the chick will then remain quiescent in the shell for a long time." [1]

(4) The fourth variety of fear which is also instinctive in its behaviour, is characterised by clinging to someone or something, or keeping close to it for protection,—as when the child clings to its mother, or the young animal keeps close to its dam, or the drowning man to anything within reach, or the frightened dog cowers at its master's feet. Hudson shows how, under the influence of fear, the doe and fawn in La Plata behave in an exceptional manner. When a horseman approaches them, the fawn, apparently at some signal, runs away, and the doe also a little later, but "in a direction as nearly opposite to that taken by the fawn as possible": and thus the fawn "instead of being affected like the young in other mammals, and sticking close to its mother, acts in a contrary way, and runs from her." [2]

(5) The fifth variety, which, like the third, is manifested in early life, is expressed by a shrinking or starting back from fear. This behaviour is noticed in young birds, who, through fear, "simply shrink down in the nest or squat close to the ground." [3] Hudson also observes that "animals old and young, shrink with instinctive fear from any strange object approaching them," [4] even a piece of newspaper blown by the wind. Thus we shrink from the edge of the precipice, or from the sight of something horrible, and the child from unfamiliar faces, or we start back from ground which is giving way under us.

(6) The sixth variety, characterised by paralysis or immobility, is sometimes interpreted as a failure of fear to serve any useful purpose when aroused with too great intensity. Yet immobility may often enable an animal to escape detection; and a prostrate man may disarm the anger of his enemy, or the pretence of death deceive him. Yet if we admit that the most intense forms of an emotion are those in which they are most likely to defeat their ends, it does not follow that when immobility or a pretence of death is adopted by

[1] *Ibid.* [2] *Ibid.* ch. vi. pp. 110, 111.
[3] *Op. cit.* ch. v. p. 89. [4] *Ibid.*

some animal, this is due to "excessive" fear. The behaviour of this type of fear may have different instinctive forms in different animals. "The green spider's method of escape, when the bush is roughly shaken, is to drop itself down on the earth, where it lies simulating death. In falling, it drops just like a green leaf would drop, that is, not quite so rapidly as a round, solid body like a beetle or spider."[1]

(7) One of the most frequent manifestations of fear, but perhaps of fear in conjunction with sorrow, is the instinctive cry for help or protection. Some observers think they can distinguish between this cry of fear in the young child and that of sorrow or some other emotion. This variety directed to obtaining assistance, is frequently combined with some other: the child who cries for help will cling to someone for protection. But it is also an independent variety. Hudson noticed that when he had driven away a weasel from her young, that "the young continued piteously crying out in their shrill voices and moving about in circles, without making the slightest attempt to escape, or to conceal themselves, as young birds do."[2] Thus, in consternation of terror men cry out to Heaven to save them who never appealed to Heaven before.

(8) If the type just described is ambiguous, because its characteristic behaviour may be due to the conjunction of fear with sorrow,[3] the eighth variety is also ambiguous. It is defence by means of aggressive action, as the fighting of an animal at bay. Human beings act in a similar way: a man who will not face danger when he can escape from it will often fight bravely with one who restrains him from flight. "Does not the fear of death" says Seneca, "rouse up even arrant cowards to join battle?"[4]

We may interpret this type in one of two ways. We may suppose that this peculiar behaviour is not due to fear, but to anger suspending and replacing it. But we have to explain how one kind of behaviour suddenly ceases and another takes its place. There seems to be something innate, and not learnt from experience in the change from one to the other;

[1] Hudson *op. cit.* [2] 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. vi. p. 104.
[3] See B. ii. ch. ix. p. 3. [4] 'De Ira,' l. i. c. xiii.

for the situation in which the animal is placed at once evokes it. Must we not therefore assume that there is an innate connexion between the emotions of such a kind that, under the stimulus of this situation,—the perception that escape is barred,—the one emotion ceases and, in ceasing, determines the other to replace it? But does anger replace fear; or does the animal fight only so long as it cannot escape? For when men, inspired by terror for their lives, fight desperately with anyone who tries to detain them, or when two men on a sinking ship fight for the possession of a life-belt, the desperation of the attack seems to show that it is still inspired by fear, that anger has not replaced it, and that the moment they are free, or have obtained what they need, their headlong flight will be renewed?

The second way of interpreting the facts is to suppose, in accordance with what we have found to be the case in Chapter I of this book, namely, that different instincts may be contained in one and the same emotional system, and that and one the same instinct may be present in different emotional systems, that therefore under certain conditions, one of the instincts of anger may be organised with the system of fear. These conditions include the perception of a situation in which escape is barred. On this supposition fear still remains, and anger does not replace it, but fear so organises the attack that it is directed only to the same end of escape, so that when the man has wrenched himself free of his antagonist he resumes his flight. This would seem to be the true interpretation of the facts in some cases. Hudson gives a remarkable case which shows how a peculiar instinct of attack was perfectly organised in the fear of a frog. He was attempting to capture the animal. "Though it watched me attentively, the frog remained perfectly motionless, and this greatly surprised me. Before I was sufficiently near to make a grab, it sprang straight at my hand, and catching two of my fingers round with its forelegs, administered a hug so sudden and violent as to cause an acute sensation of pain; then at the very instant I experienced this feeling, which made me start back quickly, it released its hold and bounded out and away." When Hudson had caught the frog, he

noticed the " enormous muscular development of its forelegs, usually small in frogs ; " and after gradually exhausting it, he says " I experimented by letting it seize my hand again, and noticed that invariably after each squeeze it made a quick violent attempt to free itself." [1]

In other cases we may reasonably suppose that one form of the instinctive behaviour of anger, which must in any case have some tendency to arouse the emotion with which it is primarily connected, does arouse the emotion ; so that a man forgetting his fear, no longer subordinates to it his attack, but continues to fight bravely even when a plain opportunity of escape is presented to him.

In comparing these eight varieties of Fear, all of which seem to have a characteristic behaviour which is genuinely instinctive, at least in great part, it is clear that there must be a considerable difference between the systems of fear in different groups of animals which manifest one or other of them in exclusion of the rest. Thus a system of fear which is organised for rapid flight must be very different from one organised for immobility or slow and stealthy concealment ; and a fear organised to express shrill cries of terror must be very different from one organised for silence and secrecy. Such different proximate ends involve corresponding differences in the physiological processes that effect them. If fear were always a depressing emotion it might be adapted to prompt concealment, but not to sustain rapid flight.

It is a remarkable fact that, while certain of these types of fear belong only to certain animals, and not to others, man possesses all of them. His system of fear is both the most comprehensive and the most adaptable. It contains all of these eight instinctive varieties and at least another to which we shall presently refer ; so that when man is afraid, so far as he can escape from the exclusive domination of any one of these instincts, he can employ his superior judgment to choose between their several modes of behaviour and select that one which is the most suitable to his situation. This escape from the tyranny of any one instinct is rendered possible to him, though hardly to the animals, by the fact that

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iv.

his emotions are so largely excitable through ideas which are not exclusively connected with any one instinctive reaction, and therefore involve a certain delay in the response, enabling him often to adapt his conduct intelligently to the situation.

(9) There is lastly the instinctive and disinterested fear which is not only a human characteristic, but is exhibited conspicuously by the females of the higher mammals and birds on behalf of their young. How strange is the behaviour of this fear! Its first aim is to ensure the escape of the offspring, and this aim may endanger the mother herself. If she feel fear on her own account, this fear combats it. She exposes herself to danger on their account, which no other fear does. If she cannot escape with them she will often fight at bay in their defence.

It is usual to regard this fear as sympathetic, because it is disinterested; but it may not be determined by any sympathetic emotion.[1] According to Brehms, the female ape "at the least danger utters her sound of warning, inviting the little one to take refuge on her breast. If it is disobedient she slaps it . . ."[2] Only after she has secured it does she take to flight, seeking a refuge in the trees "as soon as the hunters approach, while the males at once make ready to fight."[3] Thus it is the mother who inspires a sympathetic fear in her young, and while they under its influence seek their own safety, she without sympathy seeks theirs at the risk of her own.

Even the Felidæ exhibit disinterested fear or anger on behalf of their young. The mother "at the approach of a foe . . . defends her offspring with utter disregard for her own life." Hudson describes the behaviour of a field-mouse divided between fear for herself and fear for her offspring. When he approached, she abandoned them, but waited at a certain distance. On his remaining motionless she returned with hesitation, "frequently pausing to start and tremble, and masking her approach with corn-stumps and little inequalities in the surface of the ground."[4] He watched her take one of

[1] See *supra*, B. I, ch. iv, 3.
[2] 'Life of Animals,' 1st order, Pitheci. [3] *Ibid.*
[4] 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. vi. pp. 105, 106.

the little ones in her mouth. She "ran rapidly away to a distance of eight or nine yards and concealed it in a tuft of dry grass." Then she returned and took another and carried it to the same place. A third she took, but to his surprise carried it away in an opposite direction. The fourth was deposited with the third. This process she repeated until all her young were deposited in pairs in different places. Though he had tried to distinguish these places, yet when he made the attempt to trace the scattered brood, he could not find one of them, so skilfully had her fear concealed them.

The distinctive character of this fear lies partly in the disinterestedness of its end. It may employ the instincts of flight, of concealment, of silence, of immobility, but the characteristic behaviour of each is modified, and adapted to secure the safety of the offspring. Thus for instance there is the warning cry, and the effort to secure the young ; and only after she has secured them, often at risk to herself, does her fear begin to resemble other kinds of fear in its action.

3. *The Varieties and Functions of Fear in the Sentiments*

The primitive varieties of Fear to which we have just referred, though having different proximate ends determined by their respective instincts, have yet an end common to all of them, that of saving the life of the individual or offspring from some danger that seems to threaten it. They are of so much importance for this biological end that an animal deprived of the instincts of its fear would have little chance of survival ; but in animal life they are scarcely employed for any other end. Man, however, as he evolves, invents other ends than the preservation of life, and develops also sentiments directed to them. Besides the love of life he has the love of power, the love of property, the love of reputation, the love of pleasure. Besides thinking of the existence of his offspring, he thinks also of their happiness and welfare. Besides loving them, he loves also his friends and country. In all these sentiments the system of fear is an essential constituent. He can fear on behalf of any one of their objects with a strength, which, if it is not equal to the fear of death, is adequate to the safeguarding of their

interests. What application then to these new objects and ends will the old instincts of his fear have which belong to his animal existence? These instincts of flight, of concealment, of silence, of clinging or keeping close to something, of shrinking or starting back, of immobility or simulation of death, of crying for help, all bear reference to the bodily life. Suppose that it is no longer the bodily life which is in question, but ambition, the love of power; and that the situation is so adverse that in this sentiment fear is excited for the threatened loss of that power which it values above everything else. Will the old instincts of fear help it in the present exigency, or will it have to invent new modes of behaviour adapted to the new end? When a man fears the loss of his power, does he run away? Does he hide? Does he cling to another? Does he start back? Does he simulate death? Does he cry for help? He probably does none of these things. A great minister might endeavour to regain the favour of his sovereign or of the electorate by flattery, promises, or bribes. An Italian of the fifteenth century might have poisoned his rival to secure his own position. These modes of behaviour are invented by man and foreign to the animal world. They are an acquired behaviour of fear, still pursuing security of some sort as its end; and this fear belongs to a great sentiment which brings to bear on it its own reflectiveness and self-control.

We shall then lay down tentatively this law of the acquired behaviour of fear and that of the emotions of man in general: (26) *The systems of the emotions, when they are organised in distinctively human sentiments, tend to develop in the pursuit of their new ends, new modes of behaviour more or less different from the instinctive modes of behaviour which they inherit.* It is these acquired varieties of fear organised in distinctively human sentiments which we have now to consider.

(10) There is a type of fear which arouses no impulse to run away nor to conceal oneself, nor to cling to someone, nor to cry for help, nor to simulate death, nor to fight at bay, but which bears a certain resemblance to the shrinking of the body from a horrible or terrifying object. This type, implying some mental conflict, depends on ideas;

and its essential character is inhibition. It is directed to prevent our doing something which there is a present motive in us to do. There may be a call upon us to pursue a dangerous course of action, and fear may produce inaction. There may be a duty to speak in defence of a friend, and fear may keep us silent. There may be a desire at a public meeting to rise to our feet, and fear may glue us to our seat. There may be an impulse to find out the truth, and fear of what the truth may be may keep us in ignorance. There may be an impulse to return to the right course, and fear of consequences may hold us to the wrong. In all these cases we feel something like a shrinking from doing that which we at the same time desire or have some motive to do. Yet the instinctive behaviour of shrinking or withdrawing the body is not, or need not be expressed. What is distinctive of this fear is not the drawing back of the body but the restraining of the mind from a certain course of action. Still there is a real resemblance felt between the two cases, and hence we often say metaphorically that we 'shrink' from some course of action of which we are afraid.

This fear depends on ideas and essentially belongs to a sentiment. For instance, in the self-regarding sentiment there are many possible ends. A vain man desires applause, but he may fear failure or ridicule. Both the desire and fear belong to the same system. Again, friendship may urge a man to defend an absent friend, but fear on his own account may oppose it; or patriotism may call upon him to offer his services to his country, but fear for his own life may restrain him. In these cases the opposing motives belong to different systems.

(11) There is another variety of fear which, in distinction from the last, is not a fear of something we may do ourselves, but of something that may happen in the future independently of us. It does not therefore produce inhibition and inaction, but urges us to invent methods to counteract the possible event. This is the most characteristic fear of our sentiments, ever watchful both of the existence and well-being of their objects, and therefore prone to anticipate or imagine a variety of dangers that may threaten them in the future.

Res est sollicite plena timoris amor: Love is a thing full of anxious fears, as hate is fearful of the escape of the hated object.

We can only define this variety of fear by the proximate end to which it is directed, namely, to prevent that which we fear in the future from being accomplished; but the behaviour which may be necessary to counteract this threatening event, depending in the particular case on the nature of it, as well as on the present situation, is of the utmost variety. In the history of the race these varieties of behaviour are gradually discovered and multiplied, and then handed on from one generation to another as part of the traditional wisdom of life.

For instance, in the love of property there is the fear of losing some part of it; but if we ask how this fear behaves we find that, although it belongs to the same system, it is capable of great variety. Its behaviour changes with the state of society, and with the progress of applied science. In primitive times, when wealth consisted in flocks and herds some organised defence of it was necessary. Men armed themselves not only to protect life, but also their property. In more modern times the fear of theft led to the invention of locks and safes. And when wealth takes the form of stocks and shares, a new danger arises of sudden falls of value; and man invents a new behaviour of fear corresponding with this danger—forced sales on a falling market. Here and there an old instinctive action can be adapted to the new situation, and before banks were common, money was concealed in mattresses, secret drawers, and cupboards.

As it is with the fear involved in the love of property, so is it with that of other sentiments: the fear which belongs to them has to be adapted to their ends and situations. In a man's love of his own existence and well-being, the fear of some disease, or of losing health or life has its own characteristic behaviour as manifested in consultations with doctors, in the swallowing of drugs, in changes of place, of diet, of habits of life. In other cases we see how the old instincts of concealment, though superseded, give rise to acquired methods of behaviour adapted to the same general end. The criminal sometimes hides his body: he hides his name under aliases; he hides his crime by deception and lies; he commits a new

murder to prevent a previous murder from being discovered. In the love of others there is a corresponding variety: parents in fear for their children, shield them not only from injury to their health, but also from injury to their character, by excluding dangerous companions and contaminating literature; and we fear to lose not only the companionship of those we love, but also their belief in us, and reciprocating love; and the last fear leads to a peculiar mode of behaviour: watchfulness over ourselves, correction of defects, appeals for forgiveness.

All this varied and constantly changing behaviour of the fear of sentiments in which the primitive instincts of the system, its clingings and shrinkings, and cries for help, and concealment and flight, and immobility or paralysis, and fighting at bay, play either no part at all, or only appear occasionally, is slowly invented or assimilated by the sentiments in whose service the intellect is organised. And this behaviour is so complex and variable that we cannot define it: we can only define the end to which it is directed. The unchanging law amidst all this complexity and change of behaviour is quite simple and familiar: (28) *The fears of both love and hate in respect of events that may happen to their objects in the future, are directed to prevent the occurrence of such events by methods of behaviour that are gradually invented by the individual or imitated by him from others, and thence handed down in an ever-growing tradition.*

We have now considered the chief varieties of fear as distinguished by the different proximate results or ends to which they are directed; first, those which are primitive and determined by instincts, and directed to the preservation of the bodily life of the individual or offspring; secondly, those which are acquired and determined by the system of sentiments. We have next to consider whether these varieties have any ulterior or final end common to all of them and yet distinctive of fear as such.

4. *The Common End of Fear*

By the common end of fear we do not mean an end as general as that of the preservation of the individual or

species, but an end distinctive of the system. For just as the functions of different bodily organs and systems are themselves different though they also subserve this end of preservation, so we should expect to find that the ends of the primary emotions would be correspondingly different.

There are several ways of judging of this end. First, by comparing the results achieved by the different varieties of an emotional system, and endeavouring to discern what common result they subserve. Secondly, by considering what satisfies the impulse of the emotion. For the instinctive behaviour of each variety is only a means; and if neither flight, nor concealment, nor cries for help have removed the apparent danger, the impulse of fear persists, because its end has not been attained. Thirdly, by introspection, wherever this end is disclosed in consciousness.

Now if we compare our first seven varieties, which are all primitive and widely diffused in animal life, these, however different in their methods, seem to be directed to the same biological end. For whether through fear an animal takes to flight, or conceals itself, or clings to its dam, or cries out, or is silent, or shrinks, or crouches down like a young bird in the nest, or simulates death, it is still endeavouring to escape from some apparent danger, and this end satisfies the impulse of its emotion. There may be in some cases no real danger. A child is afraid to sleep by itself in a dark room. Brave men are sometimes afraid of ghosts. If we say that the danger is at least an apparent one, then it is difficult to interpret the fact that animal fears probably, in many cases, act without any representation of their ends. Something acts as an instinctive stimulus of fear, a loud noise, or a sudden or rapid approach. The animal starts and takes to flight: at a certain distance it stops and fear subsides. The system has worked itself out to its end without requiring, as far as we can judge, any precedent conception of danger or, on its conclusion, any final conception that this danger is past. How then are we to formulate the common end of these primitive fears? We must assume that the organism is pursuing an end of which the animal mind knows nothing. This end is to escape from some event that may involve injury or

destruction of the organism. That it does not involve this in all cases only shows that emotional systems are not perfect. They are fitted to deal with common, but not with exceptional cases; the stimuli of fear are generally signs of danger, but not always.

If we consider next the end which the disinterested fear of an animal subserves, we have only to add that this enables the offspring to escape from a similar event. The common law of all primitive and animal fears appears then to be this: (29) *The instincts of fear further the escape of the animal itself, or other animals connected with it, from bodily injury or destruction.*

In the next place we have to consider the end of those late fears that are of purely human origin, and belong to sentiments. Their end will obviously be bound up with the ends of these sentiments. And whether it is the love of wealth, or power, or position, or pleasure, these objects can in a sense be also injured or destroyed; and the fears connected with them further their escape from such injury or destruction. Thus some event may threaten us in the future, some injury or disease of the body which will deprive the rest of our life of pleasure or afflict it with pain; and we, loving ourselves, fear this threatening event. Or this event may threaten to injure or destroy the position, or power, or reputation we possess among our fellow men; and we, loving position, or power for itself, or desiring to possess it for its advantages, fear this event. Again, if we take that variety which is characterised by inhibition, in which the proximate end of fear is to do nothing, the ulterior end is still to escape from some event that may, metaphorically speaking, injure or destroy something we love. For instance, if we fear to speak in public, that may be because we fear to injure or lower our self-valuation, and both pride and vanity recoil from that. If we fear sometimes to know the truth, that is because the ulterior result may be to injure the high value we attach to someone we love or, where it refers to our own case, to lower our own. Another case frequently occurs in illness. The sick man fears to know the truth lest he may learn that he is suffering from some fatal disease. He

fears the loss of hope to which he clings pathetically. He fears despair, and even fear itself, and last of all death. What object or end of a sentiment is injured or destroyed here? But man in the love of himself places his well-being high or highest among his ends, and what well-being is left to the dying man whose thoughts centre in himself in this life?

We shall now attempt to enunciate the common law of all varieties of the higher fears appertaining to sentiments: (30) *The fears of love are directed to the end of preventing the injury or destruction of the things we love, and are excited by those events that seem to threaten this injury or destruction.*

Will the law of Hate, like other manifestations of this sentiment, be opposite to the law of Love? When we hate a man, an institution, or a form of government, we do not, as in love, fear lest this object be injured or destroyed, for it is precisely this event we desire. What then is it that we fear in hate? The fears of animals all bear reference to the injury or destruction of their own lives or the lives of others associated with them; the fears appertaining to sentiments of love refer to the injury or destruction of their objects: but those of sentiments of hate to the escape of their objects from such injury or destruction. We fear lest the man we hate may escape our vengeance, lest the institution or government we hate may be proof against all our attacks.

We shall now express tentatively the law of the fears to which this sentiment is liable: (31) *The fears of hate are directed to the end of preventing the escape of the hated object from injury or destruction, and are excited by those events that seem to favour this escape.*

What then is the common law of fear in these opposite classes of sentiment. If there is such a law it must be more abstract and general than either of the preceding laws. It must leave out of account their opposite tendencies, and yet point to some tendency which unites them. Now the tendencies of both love and hate are directed to the ends of their respective sentiments. To these ends all of their emotions converge, so far as they are properly organised in the system, and do not break from its control. The fear of both love and hate—in so far as it is a fear appertaining

to sentiments, and not primitive fear—is determined by the ends of these sentiments, and has certain functions to perform in relation to them. Now whether, as in love, we pursue the preservation and well-being of the loved object, and our union with it, or, as in hate, pursue the destruction and evil state of the hated object, we tend to fear, through the action of the sentiment, those events that seem to render impossible the attainment of these supreme ends—as in hate, those events that will make the hated thing powerful, happy or prosperous, or that by separating us from it, will baulk our efforts to destroy it.

We shall then formulate the law of fear, common to both classes of sentiments, as follows: (32) *The common end of fear in both love and hate is to prevent such events occurring as seem to imperil the ends of these sentiments, and fear is therefore aroused by the prospect of such events.*

What finally is the universal end of fear? It must be highly abstract to combine so many and such different types: is it also vague and undefinable? Fear, from its primitive to its latest forms, has always to do with events which are taken to be 'threatening' or 'dangerous.' At first this danger refers to the body and threatens its life. Later on these events are conceived of as 'dangerous'; and as 'threatening' not merely the life of the body but, metaphorically speaking, the ends of our sentiments. In Love, we fear the destruction of the object loved, and in Hate, the escape of the hated object from destruction. Any event which is conceived of as threatening the one result or the other is 'dangerous.' The universal end and common function of fear can be nothing more than to prevent the occurrence of some 'dangerous' event, that is to say, of some event that 'threatens' one or other of these more particular results: certainly a very abstract and empty sort of end, but one which affords, in different stations, a great latitude of development.

As fear has always to deal with some threatening event, so in its emotion, there is always something to match this: a painful, prospective thought, which we call 'apprehensiveness.' And the significance of an animal's flight, or simula-

tion of death, or changes of colour, and of the locks and bolts invented by man, and his defensive forces, and of much of his lying and treachery, of his complaisance as well as his reserve, are always related to this threatening event and this apprehensive thought of it.

Let us then enunciate this law: (33) *The universal end of Fear is merely to prevent the occurrence of some threatening event whether the danger be 'real' or 'imaginary.'*

In finding an end common to all varieties of fear, it by no means follows that this end distinguishes the system of fear from all other emotional systems. Any law which embraces so many and such distinct varieties must be exceedingly abstract; and thus the end which they have in common may not also serve to distinguish them. For these varieties are manifested in the most opposite modes of behaviour, as in the greatest rapidity of movement of which an animal is capable, contrasting with a prostration and immobility that resembles death; as in giving vent to the most piercing cries for help, contrasting with the suppression of all noise. We find even that the emotion which we regard as the very root of cowardice, can yet be so modified as to evoke a high degree of courage; and—if the struggle of a desperate man for his life with even one stronger than himself, be not true courage,—we are reminded of that noble and disinterested fear that freely exposes self to danger for the salvation of another life.

The supposition into which we fall so naturally, that there must be some end distinctive of all varieties of fear, may not be justified; and there are reasons for holding that it is not. If fear is directed to prevent the happening of some dangerous event, are there not other systems which have the same ulterior end? Without the appetite of hunger, and the instincts connected with it, animals would die of starvation. Anger is often a reaction to the same set of external circumstances as is fear. The approach of an enemy is an event fraught with possible danger; one man reacts to it with anger, another with fear. Both systems, in different ways, tend to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous event. Thus, while all varieties of fear have a common end, there does not

appear to be one distinctive of its system as compared with others.

What then do we gain by having two or more systems directed to the same end, and what special advantage do we derive from fear? Fear subserves the preservation of life in its own way, and brings to the service of the sentiments its own original and acquired modes of behaviour. The system of fear in man is wonderfully complex and adaptive. It comprises, first, all the eight principal instincts of which there are corresponding varieties in different species of animals. It comprises, in the second place, the disposition to those modes of behaviour that are acquired, and are peculiar to man, which he invents or learns by imitation. Fear therefore, in man, has at its disposal a much greater number of alternative modes of behaviour than falls to the lot of any other animal. According to the situation it can, when its emotion is not too intense, select the behaviour appropriate to that situation. And the fears of the sentiments, aroused through ideas, and their forecasting thought of consequences, are seldom as intense as the primitive and instinctive types. The sentiments tend to control and subordinate them to their ends; and this control tends not only to mitigate their intensity, but to elicit from their systems the behaviour which the situation requires. Thus the instincts of fear rarely dominate the system in man as in animals. For they do not furnish the common end of fear, but only the proximate ends comprised in their peculiar types of behaviour. Besides these, there are the other acquired modes of behaviour which may not comprise instinctive constituents.

This therefore is what our sentiments, and human life generally, gain from the system of fear: a most complex and adaptive system of alternative types of behaviour, distinguishing fear from every other emotional system. It is this and not its common end which distinguishes it. Fear throughout its varieties, and with one possible exception, manifests in its behaviour one general characteristic: it avoids all aggressive action. And—to deal with the apparent exception—if the situation on rare occasions forces fear to resort to aggression, this is only as a momentary phase of its conduct, and as a

means to that other and pacific conduct that characterises it. It fights with an adversary, but only to escape from him; it struggles for the possession of lifebelt or wreckage, but only to cling to it for safety.

This distinctive behaviour of fear serves to interpret the utility of its system. There are situations of constant occurrence with which, and apart from all cowardice, an aggressive behaviour is unfitted to deal. We are too weak to attack them directly; or no mode of attack known to anger is adapted to them. Disease and death threaten us: we invent methods of prevention and delay. Our adversary is too strong: we invent methods of complaisance and deceit. It is difficult to keep a sufficient guard over our property: we hand it over to the protection of banks and depositories.

Thus fear, if it have no common and distinctive end, has a body of behaviour which distinguishes it, and through which it subserves a function in our sentiments which no other emotion can fulfil. It deals with situations of weakness in which, however strong we are, something else in the present or future seems stronger. The types of its behaviour are its methods of dealing with this power; and all its methods it puts at the service of the sentiments which organise it, for all of them have their experiences of weakness.

The law of the behaviour of Fear is, then, a very familiar one: (34) *Fear throughout its varieties strives to avoid aggressive behaviour.*

5. *Of the Growing Control of the Instincts of Fear by the Emotion*

As there are three parts in every emotional system, so we must distinguish in Fear, first, that part which is present in consciousness and accessible to internal observation—the emotion itself, its impulses, sensations and thoughts secondly, that part which is organised in the nervous system, comprising the instincts of fear and its acquired dispositions; thirdly, that part which comprises the characteristic behaviour of the system, and is accessible to external observation. We have distinguished the different varieties of fear not by the differences of their feelings and sensations,

nor by the different causes which arouse them, nor by the objects to which they refer; but according to the characteristic types of behaviour which they initiate; for this and nothing else is of the first importance in an inquiry into the nature of fear as one of the fundamental forces of character. It has become clear to us that no one of these types of behaviour furnishes the end of the emotion, and that they are but different methods, inherited or acquired by the system, for arriving at this end. For where any one of them does not attain it, the fear tends to persist. There is then in the system of fear an emotion—an impulse—which is not necessarily satisfied by the fulfilment of any one of the types of behaviour at its disposal. We feel it persist when neither flight, nor concealment, nor outcry, nor silence has availed us, with a force increased by our failure. It is this impulse that strives ever to fulfil its end of escape from danger, which learns, in man, to vary its methods, and to set aside those which are unsuccessful.

This central and emotional side of fear comes to be the supreme force of the system in man, subordinating the other forces that belong to it, its several instincts, and the dispositions to other and acquired modes of behaviour. The instincts of fear no longer dominate the system in man, because they only provide the instinctive, and not the acquired, forms of behaviour, and the biological, but not the common end. But so long as with animals and young children, fear is more or less exclusively under the influence of the stimuli which instinctively arouse it, and reacts to them by some one form of instinctive behaviour characteristic of the animal or the situation, so long may the emotion seem to be the mere accessory of this one, instinctive process. But the more developed fear is, and removed from this state—the more it is aroused by ideas and directed to ends foreseen—the more it comes to be organised in sentiments—the greater in relative importance becomes this central part of the system. For acquiring foresight of its particular end, the special danger which it has to avoid, it is no longer impelled blindly into this or that instinctive form of behaviour, but consciously adopts that or some other which

it has learnt, or invents on the occasion, after having reflected on the possible alternatives, and judged that best. Nor, again, does it persist blindly in the conduct which it has adopted, but, watchful of its effects, is ready to change it, when unsuccessful, for some other. This selectiveness, control and judgment, fear only attains to through the influence of the sentiments in which it comes to be organised; but once attained, the emotion is placed in supreme control over the instinctive and other forces of the system; and its abstract and general end to direct their particular and proximate ends.

We shall, therefore, enunciate the following law: (35) *The instincts which at first dominate the system of fear tend, in the mental development of man, to fall under the control of the emotional side of the system.*

Thus, having learnt subordination to the sentiment, the emotion brings all its own tendencies into subordination to itself. Through the course of this development, fear gains in flexibility, and power to adapt itself to the new forms of danger that arise; its end, too, being so abstract, and merely to escape from some threatening danger, admits of a variety of interpretations according to the situation. For what is not, or what may not be, a danger to such a creature as man, who loves and hates so many things!

6. *Of Fear as one of the Primary Emotions and Root-Forces of Character*

There are several tests we may apply to determine whether or not a given emotion is primary, and whether the force which it has belongs originally to its own system, or is derived from any other. (1) There is the time at which the expression and behaviour of the emotion is first observed in child-life; for although some emotions are primary which arise at a late period, as the appetite of sex; yet when an emotion is manifested in the first months of child-life, that is evidence of its primary nature. (2) The second test is the diffusion of an emotion in the animal-world; the more widely diffused, the more is the probability increased that it is a primary emotion. (3) The third test is whether we can, by analysis, reduce it to other emotions. (4) The fourth is, whether the emotion in its

earliest forms is manifested in genuinely instinctive behaviour, and is at first instinctively aroused by sensory stimuli. From all these points of view we must conclude that fear is one of the primary emotions and root-forces of character. It is the first, or one of the first emotions to manifest itself in child-life. It is very widely diffused in the animal-world. It is unlikely that we shall ever succeed in reducing it to more rudimentary emotions. And, lastly, it is both instinctively aroused, and manifests itself in a variety of instinctive forms of behaviour in different animals.

This opinion dates only from modern times; and one of the most remarkable differences between ancient and modern writers on the emotions is the denial by the former that fear and anger are primary emotions. They are found neither in the lists of the primary emotions of Descartes and of Spinoza, nor, to come to more modern times, in those of Hutcheson and Hume. But these writers except the last, make no careful attempt to trace fear to the primitive emotions at its source. A curious error runs through all of them. Too much influenced by introspection, they take into account only the later or ideational fears which spring from desire, and overlook the primitive forms aroused by sensations. Thus Spinoza defines Fear as an "inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future."[1] That he overlooks the earlier forms is clear from his conclusion that there is "no hope unmingled with fear and no fear unmingled with hope."[2] Descartes also treats these two emotions as if they were inseparable, and likewise connects them with desire. He defines Hope as "a disposition of the soul to be persuaded that what it desires will come to pass," and Fear as "another disposition of the soul" to be persuaded that what it desires "will not come to pass."[3] But while he offers an ingenious derivation of Hope as due to a mixture of "joy and desire," he makes no complementary attempt to resolve Fear. For Hope is a later emotion, dependent both on ideas and on desire, and therefore offers

[1] 'The Ethics,' part iii. 'The Definitions of the Emotions,' xiii.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] 'Les Passions de l'Ame,' 'Troisième Partie,' Art. 165.

some prospect of resolution. Still the inference is suggested by Descartes' account of Hope, that Fear must be some mixture of sorrow and desire. And this conclusion is expressly drawn by Hutcheson, and adopted with certain modifications by Hume. The former substitutes the term "aversion" for "desire" and defines Fear as "a mixture of sorrow and aversion."[1] But Hume alone attempts to furnish a conclusive proof of the derivative character of Fear, and one that might be regarded as scientific and experimental. Like his predecessors, he overlooks the primitive manifestations of fear, and couples it with hope, regarding both as arising "from the probability of any good or evil."[2] "Suppose then," he says, "that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either desire or aversion; it is evident that, according as the mind turns itself to one side or the other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow." And he proceeds with a fine psychological observation: "The imagination is extremely quick and agile; but the passions, in comparison, are slow and restive: For which reason, when any object is presented, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other, though the fancy may change its views with great celerity, each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of grief or joy predominates in the composition; and these passions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination produce by the union the passions of hope or fear."[3]

But this proof is not cogent enough for him; he endeavours to complete it by making joy and sorrow pass and re-pass into hope and fear in the laboratory of his imagination. "Throw in," he says, "a superior degree of probability to the side of

[1] 'The Nature and the Conduct of the Passions and Affections,' sect. iii

[2] 'Essays,' 'A Dissertation on the Passions,' sect. 1, 3. Compare also 'A Treatise of Human Nature,' book ii., 'Of the Passions,' part iii. sect. ix.

[3] *Ibid.*

grief, you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the complexion, and tincture it into fear. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails still more and more till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief. After you have brought it to this situation, diminish the grief, by a contrary operation to that, which increased it, to wit, by diminishing the probability on the melancholy side; and you will see the passion clear every moment, till it changes insensibly into hope; which again runs, by slow degrees, into joy, as you encrease that part of the composition, by the encrease of the probability. Are not these as plain proofs, that the passions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of the sun, passing through a prism, is a composition of two others, . . . "

Striking and original as is this attempt of Hume to apply an experimental method in psychology, it is not conclusive. According to this theory there is no possibility of fear arising until the imagination represents probable views of the future. Now hope and despondency are subject to some such conditions; fear is not. And paraphrasing his argument we may use it to enforce a different conclusion. 'Throw in,' we may say, 'a superior degree of probability on the side of grief, you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the complexion, and tincture it into despondency. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief, and the despondency prevails still more and more, till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief.'

Experiments in the imagination, however, necessary to the novelist and dramatist, are not conclusive evidence in psychology, nor would they carry any degree of conviction except in the hands of men of imaginative genius. Whether joy and sorrow when blended in the process of desire—if they ever be—produce even the contrary emotions of hope and despondency is doubtful, that they would originate fear is in the highest degree improbable. But these abortive attempts to account for an emotion that has been held to be the first to manifest itself in child-life, suggest one conclusion. Sorrow has been one of the emotions consistently employed

in these attempts, and sorrow seems to bear a greater resemblance and affinity to fear than to the other painful and primary emotion of anger. In melancholia, sorrowful dejection and fear are frequently found together, as if the pathological conditions of the one involved extreme susceptibility to the other. The prospect of death is apt to afflict us with both. But we are not here concerned with the relations between them. For us the conclusion of modern writers that fear is one of the primary emotions and root-forces of our nature must be held to be substantiated.

CHAPTER III

ANGER (I)

1. *The Primitive Varieties of Anger*

WE have here to study the emotional system which is the root of so many of the worst propensities of our character, which yet we cannot, as some of the Stoics recommended,[1] eradicate from our nature, but are compelled to accept it, and, if we are wise, to acknowledge its value for men as well as for animals, so long as it is at first balanced by the other instincts, and afterwards comes under the control of the right sentiments. For even the highest love has its anger; and it imparts a nobleness to the most brutal of the emotions.

Here, as in the case of fear, the new varieties which arise in human development are directed to new results or ends. Thus anger becomes more plastic, and is no longer restricted to the behaviour of its original instincts. Thus, too, we are able to distinguish between its primitive and derivative forms. For the causes which respectively arouse them are themselves different. For, whereas the causes of primitive anger are sensory stimuli innately connected with the excitement of instincts, the derivative forms, if sometimes also aroused by sensations, are only aroused by them so far as the connexion is acquired through individual experience and thought. Thus, for instance, among primitive causes of anger are overt and threatened attacks, painful blows, and with certain animals, even a near approach to them when they are

[1] Seneca and others. The value of Anger as a stimulus to action was recognised by Aristotle and Plato.

feeding or with their females. Among secondary causes are insults, deceptions, and thefts. And, just as we can gain an insight into, and so interpret, the primitive types of fear which are specially manifested in the animal world and in the young child, because these still subsist in ourselves—for we, like them, are made afraid by loud noises, by the sudden and rapid approach of strange objects, by the sensation of bodily insecurity when the ground beneath us sways, as in an earthquake, or when we take one step too few or too many on the staircase—so, too, and for the same reason, we can interpret the primitive types of anger.

(1) The first variety of anger is so frequently manifested that we may be apt to regard it as universal. Spencer calls anger the "destructive passion." Even in the infant this is partially disclosed. The angry child cries, and accompanies its cries by violent movements of its hands and feet, and by stiffening its back. But it is capable of so few co-ordinated movements that we cannot by observation discover the proximate end of its emotion. The anger is vague; its system undeveloped; we have to interpret it through what it afterwards becomes. Later we find the angry child biting an offender, or dashing what is in its hand to the ground. The latter tendency is so persistent that grown-up people often, when they are angry, feel an impulse to break things, to throw them violently about, to slam, or dash open, doors. Darwin's description of the emotion refers to this tendency: "The body," he says, "is commonly held erect for instant action, but sometimes it is bent forward towards the offending person, with the limbs more or less rigid. The mouth is generally closed with firmness, . . . and the teeth are clenched or ground together. Such gestures as the raising of the arms, with the fists clenched, as if to strike the offender, are common. . . . The desire, indeed, to strike often becomes so intolerably strong, that inanimate objects are struck or dashed to the ground."[1] . . . Among the Carnivoræ, anger is the useful ally of hunger, giving them the courage to attack and kill their prey. Those that do not live on carrion can only satisfy their appetites by the destruction of other animals; hence,

[1] 'The Expression of Emotions,' ch. x.

various instincts of pursuit, of attack, and of destruction are organised in their anger, and are manifested in different groups of animals, by some difference of instinctive behaviour, according to their mode of life and means of attack.

Thus, there is a primitive variety of anger of which the end appears to be to destroy life, and sometimes also to destroy other things; which is represented in different animals by different instincts of destruction, as well as by others of approach and attack. Even these instincts may have to be perfected by practice. Thus, among the Felidæ the mother trains her young, brings them "small animals," or those that are "half expiring."[1] "These she turns loose, and the little fellows practise on them. . . ." Finally the mother takes them with her in her hunts, when they learn all the tricks—the stealthy approach. . . . the hidden attacks."[2] It is interesting to note that among certain animals the instinct of concealment, which plays such a prominent part in primitive fears, appears also to be organised in this variety of anger, as among the Felidæ. It is dangerous to follow a wounded lion into the bush. It can completely conceal itself behind a slight covering of foliage, whence in rage it springs upon its unsuspecting enemy.[3]

(2) Destruction is not the end of all varieties of anger: another and familiar type is directed to the overcoming of opposition.[4] The two are sometimes combined, like the types of concealment and flight in fear; but not always. The cause of this variety of anger is always the same. It presupposes an existing impulse, and is only aroused by some interference with, or obstruction of, this impulse. Its end is therefore the overcoming of that obstruction. If death or destruction were taken to be the universal end of anger, it would be difficult to interpret those cases where the outburst of anger is satisfied by something short of this goal. For when the obstruction to an impulse is removed, what need is there of a further display of violence? There is an obvious distinction between

[1] Brehm, 'Thierleben,' Felidæ. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] F. C. Selous, 'A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa.'

[4] Thus Prof. Stout says, 'Anger involves a tendency to destroy and forcibly to break down opposition' ('Groundwork of Psychology,' ch. xv.).

the anger of a man who violently wrenches a door open, or savagely knocks down another man who bars his way, and the anger of one who fights his opponent to kill him. In the former, the anger is an incident in the course of another impulse that precedes and outlasts it: in the latter, the only impulse may be that of the sudden anger itself. In the one the preceding impulse controls the impulse of anger, and restricts it to the breaking down of opposition; and killing, if it arises, is incidental to this end: in the other, killing is the end, whether there is or is not resistance; as in so many instances of revenge.

Thus among bees, "If by any chance two queens are born at the same time, they at once engage in deadly combat. One queen must perish."[1] But with regard to the young queens, they are kept close prisoners "till after the departure of the mother queen with her swarm"; because "the mother queen would destroy all the younger ones could she get the chance, by stinging them. The workers . . . never allow the old queen to approach the prisons of the younger ones. They establish a guard all round these prisons cells, and beat off the old queen whenever she endeavours to approach"; but do not kill her. Thus we see the two types here in clear distinction from one another.

Since one of the most frequent causes of anger is opposition to a present impulse or desire, this variety of anger is frequently manifested, yet there are other causes which give rise to other varieties. The emotion may be aroused by the sharp and sudden pain of a blow, or by being insulted, scorned, mocked at, or even neglected, and it is then directed, not to overcoming opposition essentially—for there may be no opposition—but to destroy or punish the offending person, or inanimate objects.

(3) Another and familiar type of anger is directed to the prevention of attack, and is expressed in some form of instinctive behaviour of warning or of threats. Dogs often show their anger to one another by a threatening attitude, and growl but do not bite. Thus each dissuades the other from attack, and they part without injury on either

[1] Pettigrew, 'Design in Nature,' vol. ii. p. 915.

side. The roar of the lion and the hissing of the snake seem directed to inspire fear in possible enemies. "When two or three strange troops of lions approach a fountain to drink at the same time . . . every member of each troop sounds a bold roar of defiance at the opposite party."[1] Koppenfels has described the terrifying spectacle of the gorilla when he threatens attack. "If he is taken by surprise, he rises, utters a series of short, half-roaring, half-grunting noises that cannot be described; beats his gigantic chest with his huge fist and shows his teeth with an exceedingly ferocious expression on his face, while the hair on his head and on the nape of his neck stands vibratingly erect. . . . Yet if one does not irritate him and beats a cautious retreat, I do not think he would attack anybody."[2] Hudson observes that the skunk, through the efficacy of its threats, often does not need to employ his terrible defensive instinct: "When the irascible little enemy began to advance against us, going through the performances by means of which he generally puts his foes to flight without resorting to malodorous measures—stamping his little feet in rage, jumping up, spluttering and hissing and flourishing his brush like a warlike banner above his head—then hardly could I restrain my dog from turning tail and flying home in abject terror."[3] Sometimes we find this anger of threats manifested in co-operation by a flock of animals. Brehm describes a band of baboons he met as "beating the ground with their hands and barking rather than roaring." "Old and young, males and females, roared, screeched, snarled, and bellowed all together, so that one would have thought they were struggling with leopards or other dangerous beasts. I learned later that this was the monkey's battle cry: it was intended obviously to intimidate us and the dogs. . ."[4] Elephants under similar conditions emit a "succession of short, sharp, trumpeting screams" which are "very disconcerting."[5] Brehm remarks of love-combats that "among all

[1] Gordon Cumming, 'The Lion Hunter,' ch. ix.
[2] Quoted by Brehm, 'Life of Animals,' 1st order: Pitheci.
[3] *Op. cit.* ch. vii. p. 122.
[4] 'From North Pole to Equator,' 'Apes and Monkeys.'
[5] 'The Living Animals of the World,' Art. F. C. Selous.

birds with voices the combat is preceded by a definite challenge. Even the song of a singing bird is a weapon with which he may gain a bloodless victory." [1] It has been observed that the temper of wild buffalos is "morose and uncertain," and that it is not safe to disturb them in their pasture or repose: "On such occasions they hurry into line, draw up in defensive array, with a few of the oldest bulls in advance, and wheeling in circles, their horns clashing with a loud sound . . . they prepare for attack; but generally after a menacing display, they betake themselves to flight, then, forming again at a safer distance, they halt as before, elevating their nostrils, and throwing back their heads, to take a defiant survey of the intruders." [2]

Thus there is a variety of anger which is directed, not to destroying anything, not to overcoming any existing opposition, but merely to preventing a threatened attack. It is manifested in forms of instinctive behaviour that vary from one class of animals to another.

(4) Primitive anger is not always prospective and directed to ward off a possible attack, but is sometimes retrospective, and its end then is to inflict punishment for past injury. This is the anger which prompts to the behaviour called 'revenge.' Some animals exhibit it, as the ape, dog, camel, and elephant; but it may be doubted whether in them it ever approximates to the character of human revenge, which before its accomplishment is preceded by thoughts that often brood for a long time over the past injury or insult.[3] It is more probable that anything beyond a present attack or one anticipated in the near future escapes them, and that the revenge attributed to them is the behaviour of unappeased anger re-awakened by the same cause that before aroused it, and perhaps carrying images of the previous attack or

[1] *Op. cit.* 'Love and Courtship among Birds.'

[2] Pettigrew, 'Design in Nature,' p. 971.

[3] Thus Prof. Westermarck defines Revenge as anger 'more or less restrained by reason and calculation' ('The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,' vol. i. ch. ii. p. 22). In the text, I have used the term 'revenge' both to denote the behaviour of a certain variety of anger as well as to characterise the emotion itself.

injury. For if a man or other animal has attacked them, and escaped without punishment, the impulse of their anger remains unsatisfied, and it is natural to suppose that the sight of the same individual on a later occasion should re-excite this anger, so far as their memory is sufficiently tenacious, though in the interval there may have been no recollection of it.

The distinctive character of this primitive anger is, therefore, that it is directed, not to kill anything, but to inflict a punishment in return for an unavenged injury, little as the animal may be aware of this end; but with animals that stand high in the scale of intelligence, revenge tends to bear some proportion to the offence.

Romanes remarks that "retaliation and revenge are shown by all the higher monkeys when injury has been done to them, as anyone may find by offering an insult to a baboon."[1] The case given by Darwin is well known: Sir Andrew Smith, a zoologist whose unscrupulous accuracy was known to many persons, told me the following story of which he was an eye-witness. At the Cape of Good Hope, an officer had often plagued a certain baboon, and the animal, seeing him approach one Sunday for parade, poured water into a hole and hastily made some thick mud, which he skilfully dashed over the officer as he passed by, to the amusement of many bystanders. For long after the baboon rejoiced and triumphed whenever he saw his victim."[2] Many stories are told of the revenge of elephants. "Some years ago an elephant which had been wounded by a native, near Hambangothe, pursued the man into the town, followed him along the street, and trampled him to death in the bazaar. . ."[3] But the punishment inflicted is often less severe. In another case an elephant, Cluny, had been teased by "a thoughtless dandy" with repeated offers of lettuces "for which he was known to have an antipathy." The young man at last "presented him with an apple, but, at the moment of taking it, drove a large

[1] 'Animal Intelligence,' ch. xvii. p. 478.

[2] Quoted by Romanes, *ibid.* See 'Descent of Man,' p. 69.

[3] Sir E. Tennent, quoted by Pettigrew, 'Design in Nature,' vol. ii. p. 998.

pin into his trunk, and then got out of his reach. The keeper, seeing that the poor creature was getting angry, warned the silly fellow away. . . After half an hour, he returned to one of the cages opposite to the elephant's. By this time he had forgotten his pranks with Cluny, but Cluny had not forgotten him, and as he was standing with his back towards him, he threw his proboscis through the bars of the prison, took off the offender's hat, dragged it into him, tore it to shreds, and then threw it into his face, consummating his revenge with a loud guffaw of exultation." [1]

But the anger which inflicts punishment for previous offence is not confined to the highest order of animals. Many strange stories have been told by the Spaniards of the Puma of South America, and of its friendliness to man. Hudson relates "one of the very few authentic instances of this animal defending itself against a human being," which illustrates both human and animal revenge. A gaucho who was distinguished for his skill in killing jaguars, had on one occasion failed to sustain his reputation, and "knew that he would be mercilessly ridiculed by his associates." Of what happened to him on his homeward ride there were no witnesses; but his own account was as follows, and inasmuch as it told against his own prowess it was readily believed. "Before riding a league, and while his bosom was still burning with rage, a puma started up from the long grass in his path, but made no attempt to run away; it merely sat up, he said, and looked at him in a provokingly fearless manner. To slay this animal with his knife, and so revenge himself on it for the defeat which he had just suffered, was his first thought. He alighted and secured his horse . . . , then, drawing his long, heavy knife, rushed at the puma. Still it did not stir. Raising his weapon he struck with a force which would have split the animal's skull open if the blow had fallen where it was intended to fall, but with a quick movement the puma avoided it, and at the same time lifted a foot and with lightning rapidity dealt the aggressor a blow on the face, its unsheathed claws literally dragging down the flesh from his cheek, laying the bone bare.

[1] Pettigrew 'Design in Nature,' vol. ii. p. 1002.

After inflicting this terrible punishment and eyeing its fallen foe for a few seconds it trotted quietly away." [1]

From the cases we have considered, we infer that the nature of this variety of anger is different from all the preceding varieties, and that its end is not essentially to kill, nor to overcome opposition, nor to prevent a threatened attack, but to inflict a punishment for an offence just, or at some previous time, committed. The puma made no further attack upon his enemy, and did not attempt to kill him. Cats, in the same way, when teased by children will often strike them with a paw, doing no other harm to them than a slight scratch.

The animal behaviour evoked by this variety of anger appears to be at least partially instinctive, and to involve one or other of the modes of attack characteristic of the animal. It is distinguished from the first variety both by its end and by its behaviour, for different kinds and degrees of punishment may be inflicted that stop short of destruction; from the second, because there may be no longer any opposition; from the third, because no injury may there be necessary, warning and threats having an efficacy of their own.

It was from a too exclusive occupation with this type of anger, so characteristic of man in its higher developments, that Aristotle and the ancient philosophers drew their famous definitions of the emotion. Thus Aristotle defined anger as "an impulse attended with pain to a conspicuous revenge . . . ." [2] and Seneca as "the desire of avenging an injury," [3] and others as the "desire to punish one by whom you think that you have been unjustly injured;" [4] definitions that have no application to the preceding types. What it concerns us to notice is that this anger of revenge or punishment reaches its full development only in man, because only in him, as far as we can judge, is the reflective thought possible that can adequately proportion punishment to offence. Hence the principle of an "eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," and the conclusion of Bacon that Revenge

[1] 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. ii. pp. 46, 47.
[2] 'The Rhetoric' (Welldon's trans.), B. ii. ch. xi.
[3] 'De Ira,' l. i.
[4] *Ibid.*

is "a kind of wild justice."[1] In animals this adjustment is too impulsive, and too much determined by the degree and nature of the anger aroused to offer more than occasional approximations to justice.

(5) There is a fifth variety which is as clearly distinguishable from the anger of revenge as from that which, anticipating attack, often averts it by threats and warnings. This is the anger which is seen among organised bands of animals, and is directed to bringing into obedience or subordination those who dispute the domination of a single individual. Thus Brehm says: "All monkeys, with perhaps the exception of the so-called anthropoid apes, live in bands of considerable strength under the leadership of an old male . . . the monkey-leader is an absolute despot of the worst type, who compels his subjects to unconditional obedience. If anyone refuses submission, he is brought to a sense of his duty by bites, pinchings, and blows."[2] Of baboons, he writes, when the leader "becomes too weak and old, the younger growing males fight amongst themselves, and the strongest or eldest takes on the leadership."[3]

There is then a variety of anger shown by certain gregarious animals which is directed to effect and maintain social subordination. It is also seen in family life, where it has the similar function of producing and maintaining obedience to the head. The mother-ape requires her young to obey her warning-cry; if it is disobedient she slaps it."[4] In human development this variety is early shown by children. One tries to dominate others, and to become the leader of their games; if he is resisted quarrels ensue. So at school some boys show this overbearing spirit; and other boys have to fight for their freedom or accept their domination. Some persons exhibit this tendency throughout life, and are for ever striving to get power over others; peace with them is only possible through a willing subordination. They are the natural leaders of society when their courage and abilities are equal to their ambition. Their career is watched with sus-

[1] 'Essays,' 'Revenge.'

[2] 'From North Pole to Equator' (Lectures, trans.), 'Apes and Monkeys.'

[3] 'Thierleben,' b. i. p. 179.

[4] Brehm, *op. cit.* 1st Order, Pitheci.

picion by those who love freedom, because, whether brutal or benevolent, they begin by denying the liberty to resist their wills. From a peculiar disposition of anger there seems to arise this tyrannous ambition.

We need not assume that animals are capable of the sentiment of ambition; but some gregarious animals, as we have seen, are capable of the emotional disposition that precedes it. And it is clear that the experience of anger must be markedly different, according as its impulse is generally successful or the contrary. Success will induce an animal to be more ready to attack others, and to anticipate further success, so far as it preserves the traces of its past experience. But its success and triumph are connected with its enemies' failure and abasement. It is sometimes thought that an animal is without self-consciousness, and therefore cannot understand its own success, because it has not those conceptions of self, based on language, which we have. That in some way it understands success is evident from its cries of triumph—as the delight of the baboon who had covered the officer with mud, and which was renewed for "long after whenever he saw him."

If the minds of animals work more on the perceptual plane[1] than do ours, they may understand the situation of their own success or triumph through perception. If an animal perceives its enemy's defeat, it may perceive its own triumph in connection with that. The experience of the preceding struggle has not been entirely effaced. The last stage of achievement is not understood in isolation, but in relation to what has preceded it. There is thus reached a triumphant self-feeling, a peculiar joy, suffused still with anger, which is what we call the emotion of pride; and the elation of it is rendered more distinct by perception of the enemy's abasement. A gregarious animal that is generally successful in its fighting, must, it would seem, have this feeling strongly developed. How must it be elicited by the sight of those other animals of the flock who have undergone defeat? How must their feeling at sight of him tend to become one of fear rather than anger?

[1] See G. F. Stout, 'Manual of Psy.,' books iii. and iv.

The experiences of successful anger of a gregarious animal may enable the emotion to acquire a new end. Instead of destruction, prevention, or revenge, the bringing of other animals into a position of subjection. Such an end would tend to be acquired by the baboon who happened to be the strongest of his band; so that henceforth his former enemies, instead of their old defiance, move before him with caution and fear, ministering to his pride.

From the foregoing account we may be inclined to conclude that the anger directed to subject others is not an instinctive but an acquired variety; and that it depends on the following conditions: (1) The cumulative experiences of successful anger; (2) a capacity for self-feeling of at least the perceptual order; (3) a capacity to discriminate the triumph of self in connexion with the defeat of an enemy. Sometimes this anger with its new end must be combined with the anger that aims at destruction, for some will not accept defeat; sometimes with that which inflicts punishment for offence, for some will still break out into rebellion; sometimes with that which confines itself to threats; for some have to be reminded of their subjection: and always at first with that which has to overcome opposition; but these, which are ends of other varieties, and still operate under other conditions, are here subordinated to the end of this acquired variety of anger which aims at bringing the members of a flock or band into social subordination to their leader.

(6) While some varieties of the primary emotions conduce to our own preservation, there are others that subserve the preservation of other persons. There is an anger that we feel on behalf of others, as there is a fear corresponding to it; and as there is clear evidence of this disinterested fear being experienced by the higher animals, so there is similar evidence of their capacity to feel disinterested anger. Although the tiger is cowardly, and chiefly attacks animals of inferior strength to himself, and "if his first leap is unsuccessful generally renounces his prey," yet the tigress "defends her offspring with utter disregard for her own life."[1] And while the gorilla, whom we have seen is so

[1] Brehm, *op. cit.* 'Felidæ.'

terrible in threats, does not as a rule attack unless he is himself attacked, yet when he "is surrounded by his family, he attacks without being provoked." [1]

While this disinterested anger is chiefly manifested on behalf of offspring, or what appear to be such, yet this is not always the case. Animals that live in flocks or herds sometimes come to one another's assistance. A man shot a baboon and wounded another. "The baboon screamed, and instantly the others sat up, saw the malefactor, and charged straight for him." He escaped, and "the baboons contented themselves by barking defiance." [2] Brehm relates how his hunting dogs chased a troop of baboons; one young one was cut off and ran up a rock out of reach of the dogs. An old male baboon saw this, and came to the rescue; "showing his teeth, and backed by the furious barking of the rest of the baboons, he disconcerted and cowed these savage dogs," and saved the young one.[3]

This disinterested anger, like the disinterested fear we previously noticed, may employ any one of the instincts of ordinary anger. In the above case, it employs threats; in other cases, the anger that confines itself to breaking down opposition, or that which aims at destruction. Brehm describes how the wild horses of the steppes sometimes set free captive horses: "The inhabitants of the steppes who tame horses, fear the tarpans worse than the wolves, as they do them a great deal of harm, and that of a peculiar kind. As soon as a herd of wild horses see tame ones, they rush at and surround them, so that the latter through fear allow themselves to be carried off." [4] Ill luck to those who happen to be driving in a carriage. "In spite of the blows, cries, and threats of the drivers, the horses of the steppes, overcome with fury, break the carriage to pieces with their kicks and teeth; tear the harness off their comrades, and set them free, and at length, neighing joyously, carry them off in triumph." [5]

[1] Brehm, *op. cit.*
[2] 'Living Animals of the World,' vol. i.
[3] *Op. cit.*
[4] Brehm, 'Illustriertes Thierleben,' i. p. 528.
[5] *Ibid.*

Thus the anger which is aroused in many animals by being held fast or impeded in their free exercise of bodily movements, and which is directed to overcoming the obstructions, is here shown disinterestedly, and is directed to setting free other animals that belong to the same species. In another case the disinterested anger is directed to avenge an injury suffered by another animal. "A man in Hamburg kept a tame stork, and having caught another, thought to make it a companion to the one in his possession. But the two were no sooner brought together than the tame one fell upon the other, and beat him so severely that he made his escape from the place. About four months afterwards, however, the defeated stork returned with three others, who all made a combined attack upon the tame one and killed him."[1]

How far this disinterested variety of anger, as of the corresponding variety of fear, is instinctive, it is difficult to determine. Both of them may employ in their disinterested way the instincts of other varieties, and so far are themselves instinctive. But it may be questioned whether the disinterested behaviour which distinguishes them is itself such. For although this behaviour is chiefly shown at the age of parenthood, and on behalf of the young, when so many new instincts ripen, yet the animal has acquired considerable experience, and its emotions are aroused by somewhat different causes and are expressed by a modified behaviour.

Now there are two points of view from which an emotional system may be entitled instinctive, first in respect of its behaviour, so far as the definiteness of this has not been acquired through experience, or not been wholly so acquired; secondly, in respect of its emotion, so far as this is instinctively aroused, that is, so far as the causes which arouse it are innately connected with its excitation. Are there then any cases that innately arouse disinterested anger or fear? This question is involved in another and more general one: Is there a 'parental instinct'? It is generally assumed that there is. Darwin includes it among the "social

[1] Pettigrew, 'Design in Nature,' vol. ii. p. 947.

instincts."[1] Both Darwin and Spencer identify it with a sentiment of love,[2] Spencer as one not merely directed to our own offspring, but to be identified with the "love of the helpless."[3] Prof. Westermarck partly accepts Spencer's theory, but insists on distinguishing between maternal love and love of the helpless because the former will normally go to greater lengths of sacrifice than the latter. He therefore inquires what is the stimulus of maternal love. Now if the stimulus of the love of the helpless is in Spencer's words "smallness, joined usually with relative inactivity,"[4] the stimulus of the other must have some additional feature; and this is close and constant proximity: the mother "is in close proximity to her helpless young from their tenderest age; and she loves them because they are to her a cause of pleasure."[5]

In the last phrase, Prof. Westermarck indicates another and additional stimulus — the feeling of pleasure. Its importance is very great. It is a familiar experience that those mothers who do not take pleasure in the sight and touch of their children, and in nursing and tending them, are lacking in maternal love. They are regarded as unmotherly, and their children recognise that they are not loved.

But we shall approach closer to the facts if we substitute for this abstract term 'pleasure' the more concrete term 'joy.' For joy contains other elements besides pleasure, and what the mother feels is joy. Her joy is tender, if not with most animals, at least with the human mother; and the painful ingredient in it varies in different situations. The stimulus of maternal love is thus the perception by the mother of relatively small and weak creatures in close proximity to herself which arouse in her the emotion of joy; and this joy on the supposition of the maternal instinct is aroused instinctively. For it springs up suddenly at the sight of this weak, helpless creature, and does not seem derived merely from what the mother does on behalf of the child.

[1] 'Descent of Man,' ch. iv. [2] Darwin, *op. cit.* ch. iii. p. 100.
[3] 'Prin. of Psy.,' vol. ii. part viii. ch. viii. [4] *Op. cit.*, *ibid.*
[5] 'Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,' vol. ii. ch. xxxiv. p. 189.

We have already remarked on the ambiguity and vagueness of the phrase 'parental instinct'[1] employed by biologists, on the ground that love with which they identify it contains all the instincts of its component emotions. We inferred that the love of the maternal instinct is at least a combination or system of subsidiary instincts: and if we recall the conclusion to which we have come in the last few chapters, that even single emotional systems, as anger and fear, contain, not as has been supposed, only one instinct apiece, but a number of instincts, which enable the same emotion to respond differently, and to evoke a different behaviour, in different situations, then we shall recognise how many instincts must be included in love which, beside anger and fear, organises so many other emotions.

Now if the stimulus of maternal love is not only the perception by the mother of the small and weak creature in close proximity to herself, but also the joy infused into this perception, then we have to inquire how the disposition of this joy stands related to the other emotional dispositions of love. Let us confine ourselves to the two with which we have been occupied in the last two chapters, fear and anger. If without an innate susceptibility to this joy there can be no love, and if this love is instinctive, then our hypothesis will run as follows: there is an innate connexion between the disposition to joy and the dispositions to fear and anger, of such a kind that, given a susceptibility to the one on behalf of the child, there will arise a susceptibility to the other two on behalf of the same object; and these being the anger and fear of love will be the disinterested varieties of these emotions. Now if there be this innate connexion between these three dispositions, it follows that when, instead of the external causes which arouse joy, there are substituted the external causes which arouse fear or anger,—and these we may summarise as situations of either danger or aggression—then, because there is this susceptibility to joy on behalf of the child, there will arise in place of it either the emotion of fear or anger, according to the particular situation.

[1] Book i. ch. iv.

That maternal love is instinctive in normal mothers will therefore mean that at least any one of these three primary emotions is capable of being instinctively aroused by its appropriate stimuli on behalf of the offspring in the manner we have described.

Let us then attempt to express this law so far as it concerns fear and anger: (36) *So far as there is an instinctive susceptibility to feel joy in presence of an object, so far there is an instinctive susceptibility to feel disinterested fear and anger on behalf of the same object.*

We have so far dealt with the instinctive nature of the animal's disinterested fear and anger on that side of the nature of instinct which is referred to in the question: "Whether birds fear or have instinctive knowledge of their enemies."[1] But beside the connexion between the stimulus and the emotion, there is the connexion between the emotion and the behaviour; and if the first shows that the emotion is instinctively aroused, does the second show that the behaviour evoked is itself instinctive? If disinterested fear and anger employ one or other of the instincts of the ordinary egoistic varieties of these systems, they are so far instinctive in respect of their behaviour. But when an emotion is employed disinterestedly, its behaviour must be more or less different from the behaviour it manifests when an animal acts for itself. Sometimes this difference is considerable. If the hen feels fear on behalf of her chicks she tries to conceal them under her wings, though she remains exposed herself. If an animal feels anger on behalf of her young, in fighting to defend them she interposes her body between them and their enemy, or distracts him in some other way. Now this disinterested behaviour of different animals does not appear to be learnt through experience, but to be more or less adequate from the beginning. We shall therefore conclude provisionally, that the behaviour of both disinterested fear and anger among animals is not wholly acquired, but in part instinctive, and that it employs instincts which, even when they most closely resemble the egoistic instincts of these emotions, have some features which distinguish them.

[1] Hudson, 'The Naturalist in La Plata,' ch. v. p. 88.

If we have not been able to account for the development of disinterested fear through the influence of sympathetic emotion, it is not more likely that the same influence will account for disinterested anger. The young may play unconscious of the approach of an enemy, while the parent is aroused to disinterested anger on their behalf. With human beings it is the same. We are angry when we see one person ill-treating another: his feeling may be fear, ours is anger. Wrongs of individuals and classes arouse our moral indignation. And thus the end of this anger is different from that of other varieties, being to threaten, or to punish, or to break down opposition, or to destroy for the preservation or well-being of another life.

CHAPTER IV

ANGER (II)

1. *Of the Varieties of Anger that are acquired in the Sentiments*

THE variety of Anger which is directed to the infliction of pain, though sometimes regarded as instinctive, is probably acquired, and either peculiar to the human species or shared by them only with the apes and monkeys. It is probable that these animals alone can distinguish between inflicting bodily injury and causing pain ; and the variety of anger we are now considering seems to depend on this distinction. In other varieties of anger the infliction of pain is an incident, here alone it is the end.

It is commonly said that certain animals are cruel, and the play of the cat with the mouse is popularly supposed to indicate a purpose of causing pain. But it is more likely that this is a manifestation of their play-instinct, directed, not to causing pain, but to perfecting the animal in those modes of attack and destruction on which its livelihood depends.[1] Hudson observes that "some hawks do certainly take pleasure in pursuing and striking birds when not seeking prey."[2] But to take pleasure in the exercise of an instinct is one thing and even where it is an instinct of killing is what we should expect : to take pleasure in it because it produces pain in another animal is a different matter. If there is an instinct

[1] See Groos, 'The Play of Animals ch. iii. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.* ch. v. p. 96.

to inflict pain it must be shown that the instinctive behaviour in which it is manifested is directed to this end and no other.

This type is so highly developed in human beings that it has been taken by Bain to define all varieties of anger, just as formerly Aristotle selected revenge for a similar purpose. Tyrants have kept alive their victims to perpetuate their sufferings, and have regretted their deaths as depriving them of an exquisite enjoyment. But, in civilised life, it is sometimes through speech that the endeavour to cause pain effects its purpose. When two persons are venting their anger in words, each often endeavours to inflict pain on the other, and to discover his most sensitive spots.

The development of the anger which is directed to inflict pain seems, then, to be an acquired variety, and to depend on the discrimination of pain as one of the normal effects of anger, after which it is possible to pursue pain as an end. Yet many varieties of anger not only incidentally produce pain, but require to produce it as a means. The effectiveness of threats depends on their arousing fear; and where animals fight for leadership of their bands, the pain and fear which they inflict on those who oppose them are necessary as means to their end.

Seeing that the infliction of pain appears to be an incident or a means and not an end, in primitive types of anger, it must seem strange that Bain should be so much impressed by its wide diffusion in the human race as to define the entire emotion by it, as in his well-known declaration that, "Anger contains, as its essential peculiarity, an impulse knowingly to inflict suffering on another sentient being, and to derive a positive gratification therefrom."[1] Yet he at the same time recognises that among predatory animals, "the disposition to kill and destroy"[2] is sufficient for their preservation. Thus he recognises other tendencies in anger and yet, in treating of man, tries to confine his emotion to one.

Now supposing pain to have been distinguished as one of the normal effects of anger, what influences it consciously to pursue pain as its proximate end? If the anger which is preventative, or that which seeks to subordinate others or to

[1] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. ix. 4. [2] *Op. cit.* ch. ii. 24.

break down opposition, or to kill, employs pain at most as a means, what variety may pursue it as an end? Now revenge, in human beings, is frequently directed to inflict pain, because pain is a form of punishment. And while revenge at first seeks to injure or destroy, according to the nature of the offence or the degree of anger aroused, so, as mental development progresses, it comes to select degrees and varieties of pain. The pain is one kind of punishment that may be inflicted, and which also can be graded to the offence.

The study of the behaviour of this variety of anger, setting aside the ambiguous cases of animal cruelty, seems to show that it is gradually acquired through experience. Thus men invent instruments of torture which are not so much designed to produce injury as pain; and when the pain to be inflicted is mental, a knowledge of human nature is required: as to know what another most loves, and to defeat the end of his love; or what he most fears, and to bring this danger upon him. One general kind of behaviour is soon learnt. For as men value themselves highly, and have more pride than love, so anger seeks out this pride, and endeavours to humiliate them and to bring them into contempt. Hence insults are amongst the most frequent forms of this behaviour of anger. And hence, too, once pride is developed, anger nearly always elicits it both in the angry man himself and in his opponent; rising into elation in one and smarting under humiliation in the other. Thus both in respect of its end and its behaviour, this variety of anger seems to be acquired. Yet in the principle of 'an eye for an eye' and 'a tooth for a tooth,' there seems to be something instinctive, as if there were an innate compulsion on a man when he has been injured to cause injury in return; and the infliction of pain, as a variety of revenge, has therefore something of the instinctive character of that primitive type.

This variety of anger, where it belongs to a sentiment, is generally in the service of either pride or hatred. For hatred, which takes its end of destruction from anger, adopts also this end of inflicting pain. The other ends of anger it sets aside, except as its occasional means. It does not aim at overcoming opposition, nor at the prevention of an attack, nor to bring

others into subordination, nor to deter them from repeating an offence, but only at their destruction or suffering.

There are other acquired varieties of anger, and which are peculiar to sentiments of love. It would seem as if all kinds of love would only employ anger to break down opposition to their desires, or by threats to prevent opposition, or to enforce obedience ; but love has its acquired forms of punishment. In the love felt for children and for inferiors generally, punishment is never the end of anger as in revenge ; but becomes a means to the new and acquired end of reforming the offender, or of deterring him from repeating the offence. The reformation of character is wholly foreign to all primitive varieties of anger, and is only acquired through the organisation of anger in love.

Yet while this end is acquired it may adopt one of the primitive varieties of anger as its means, or some modification of them which still bears the same general character. Thus "righteous anger" threatens terrible punishments in the future if the work of reformation is not presently begun ; it breaks down rebellion, and does not allow the pity of love to restrain it.

There is one variety of punishment which is peculiar to our affections. It is a frequent fate of human love not to meet with the responsive affection it longs for. The young accept the love of the old as if it were part of the established order of things, as involving receptiveness on their part with little corresponding activity. Hence it seems strange to them to find this love not always the same, but sometimes chilled. In the heart of the old, which is hidden from them, there is a want of some answering love to their own, which need not go far, but must go a little way. Hence when the old find that love meets with forgetfulness, ingratitude, and neglect, they are apt to grow chilled and offended. The young feel that they are received differently, and it seems unreasonable to them ; for they have done nothing. This chilled or offended manner which surprises them is the calm anger of love, which is painful to it because directed against the loved object. It is an anger of ideas and reflection, and essentially belongs to the sentiment. Its function, in which it is seldom successful,

appears to be to recall the other to a sense of the duties of love. And the punishment which it inflicts is also peculiar to it, and at some time invented by it. It withdraws or conceals love for a time.

There is an anger which has a still more chilling effect. It is the anger of pride. Like the former it springs in a world of ideas, reflection, and self-control, and is dependent on a preformed sentiment,—the self-love which is pride. Its cause is a humiliation, a wound to pride which must be concealed, but revenged. Its persistency is proverbial: the offence under which it smarts is one which we are least able to forgive; its peculiar and bitter pain of humiliation, one that we are least able to forget. It is a most frequent cause of hatred. But its anger is reduced to such an unnatural coldness that to the man himself it often seems that he is not angry. He is not excited: his feeling is not an emotion in the popular sense of the word. The excitement of emotion betrays itself; but such a disclosure of anger would be a humiliation to pride. The man who offends our pride must detect neither anger nor humiliation. For a mark of the superiority which pride feels is superiority to what is meant by emotion. It must preserve always its calm and impassable demeanour. Hence the coldness of its anger, yet until its revenge is attained persistent and implacable. And its revenge must take a peculiar form determined by the sentiment: it must consist in the humiliation of the offender. For whatever injury it inflicts, and whatever other pains, these are subordinate to this end of depriving him of power, superiority and reputation so as to make him feel the pain of his degraded state. By his humiliation alone is the cold anger of pride appeased.

Thus anger has important functions to perform both in the systems of love, self-love and hate; and the nature of its end is determined by the respective nature of these sentiments. In all three cases, the self-control of the higher system masks its emotional character. It is neither excited, nor explosive, nor violent. It has lost the primitive character of the emotion; and those bodily changes which physiologists attribute to it are hardly appreciable. If it has no longer the same strength in one sense, in another it has a greater. In immediate

physical energy it is weaker: in power of persistence immeasurably stronger. In place of thoughtless impulse, and crude primitive methods of offence, it has the thoughtfulness, self-control, and adaptability of the sentiment.

2. *Of the Common End of Anger*

We cannot judge of the end of an impulse from the results that ensue on it in a given case; for the impulse may be counteracted, or only partially achieved. Thus in one case the actual results of anger may be death, in another injury, in another no injury at all, or an injury inflicted on an unoffending person, in another, words that do not even give pain, but excite contempt. When a man in his rage at bodily pain strikes himself, or dashes his head against a wall, the visible results cannot be the end of his angry impulse, but the end is the destruction of his pain. We judge of the end by what satisfies the impulse, and brings it to an end.[1] When a child cries and is restless, we may not know at first what it wants. But if we find that its crying ceases with food, and a look of contentment spreads over its face, we judge that food was the end of its impulse, and the impulse hunger. But if it continues to cry, and pushes aside the breast, but appears satisfied when something is given it to look at or to handle, and becomes engrossed in that, turning it over on all sides, then we conclude that its impulse was for some occupation adapted to its state.

While we may trace the ends of particular impulses in this way, even where they cannot be disclosed through introspection we cannot thus judge of the end common to many allied impulses, such as the common end of the different varieties of anger. Here we have to compare their particular and proximate ends, and consider whether they have anything in common which distinguishes all varieties of anger from the ends of other emotions. In attempting to make this comparison, we note how some of those we have distinguished have been held at one time or another to furnish a complete definition of the emotion. To a subtle mind, dealing with

[1] See 'Manual of Psy.,' G. F. Stout, B. i. ch. i. § 4.

general terms of loose and flexible meanings, it is easy to force a definition, designed to apply to certain cases, on others that at first had been overlooked. Thus if anger is defined as the "destructive passion," and destruction is assigned as its end, we can easily force the type of anger which is designed to give pain into harmony with it. For does not pain destroy the preceding pleasure, or, if no pleasure preceded it, does it not destroy peace of mind? Does it not also destroy a man's capacity to pursue his ordinary tasks or business? Similarly the anger which stops at threats we can allege is on its way to accomplish destruction, but is arrested by the retreat or conciliatory attitude of the enemy: for "A soft answer turneth away wrath." But while pain may be said metaphorically to destroy pleasure, or peace of mind, or efficiency for work, when the infliction of pain is the end of anger it is pursued for no one of these other results, but for itself because it is pain. And when anger is expressed in threats and warnings, it is so far directed, not to the destruction of an enemy, but to dissuade him from attack. But different varieties of anger may be combined in a given case. Iago may delight in inflicting the tortures of jealousy on Othello, as well as in destroying the trust and happiness of his love.

If, again, we take the breaking down of opposition to be the common end of anger, we can with a little ingenuity interpret the killing of an enemy as being directed to putting an end to opposition in the future, and revenge which stops short of this extremity as still directed to the same end. But the revengeful anger which inflicts punishment for past injury, sets itself to overcome the opposition of the enemy in order to inflict the punishment; it does not inflict the punishment to overcome the opposition. The impulse of revenge would not be satisfied by the most sincere promise not to offer further opposition, without first administering the requisite punishment.

Nor can we any more successfully define anger as Aristotle and Seneca defined it, and identify it with the impulse of revenge. Yet Seneca, who observed and recorded so many manifestations of anger, has the same verbal ingenuity for combating objections to his theory. He had noticed that

animals are sometimes angry when they have no injury to avenge. He had apparently not noticed the same fact in human beings. He had therefore to deny that animals were susceptible to anger. "Wild beasts become angry without being excited by injury, and without any idea of punishing others or requiting them with pain. . . . We must admit, however, that neither wild beasts nor any other creature except man is subject to anger: for while anger is the foe of reason, it nevertheless does not arise in any place where reason cannot dwell." [1]

Now whether our definition be broad or narrow, it should not be justified by verbal artifice. We must frame it differently according as our purpose is different. It is not wholly a question of truth. There is not one answer only that is true. There is not even one answer only that is serviceable or fruitful. But the answer that we give is our theory of the emotion. For instance, our aim is to investigate the forces at the root of character, which include these primary emotional systems. There may be some animals so low in the scale of life, so immersed in sensation, as to be insusceptible to emotion as we know it, as a feeling with its own impulse and end, and its own thoughts, vague or definite. Yet such an animal may possibly manifest an aggressive behaviour to other animals, and this behaviour may be the result of an instinctive disposition. We should say, because we think that a wide conception of the facts and a broad definition of the term is here serviceable, that such an animal—if such there be—is susceptible to anger. We should take this point of view because if there is present any one of the types of behaviour characteristic of a primary emotional system, it is important to class it with the other types of behaviour of the same system, as exemplifying the same force of character, working to the same or similar ends, though the emotional side of this system be either absent or at a rudimentary stage of development. So, also, with a narrower definition of anger, it might be objected that many of the examples we have taken in this and the preceding chapters do not certainly show the presence of anger. They

[1] 'De Ira,' L. I. C. V.

do not certainly show that the emotion of anger is present. But, from the behaviour exhibited we can infer that one of the instincts or acquired dispositions of anger is both present and active. Though one part only of the system of anger be active, while the rest is latent—as one instinct to the exclusion of others, or one instinct to the exclusion of the emotion,—this we shall still call by the same name—'anger.' It is the same force of character, whether this is aroused in part or in entirety, and this rule we shall apply to all other emotional systems.

Returning, now, to the question of the common end of anger, it may not be possible so to define the common end of all varieties of anger as to show this to be a definite and concrete end comparable to the ends of these particular varieties. It may be as in the case of fear, something attenuated and abstract. It may even be so general as not to suffice to distinguish the system of anger, in respect of its end, from other emotional systems. We cannot define it, as in all cases, organised either for 'destruction,' or for overcoming 'opposition,' or for inflicting 'punishment' or 'retribution' for past injury, or for inflicting 'pain,' or as a deterrent influence, or as a reformatory agent. It is organised sometimes for one, sometimes for another. What is common to all of them is an end more abstract and general than that which distinguishes any one. As all varieties of fear are directed to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous event by methods that are pacific and strive to avoid aggression,[1] so all varieties of anger are directed to the same end by an opposite and aggressive behaviour, using the term 'aggression' to include both a threatened as well as an actual attack. We can therefore enunciate the law of the behaviour of anger :—
(37) *All varieties of anger tend to accomplish their ends by some kind of aggressive behaviour.*

In the preceding attempt to find a distinctive, common end of anger, we seem to have been trying to interpret it from a mistaken point of view. Its system may not be organised on the lines we have supposed, and yet it may be serviceable. For why do we possess this force, Anger, and what advantage

[1] Ch. iii. laws ix. and x.

does it bring to us in the struggle for life, and for those higher ends that have since been evolved? It brings to us a force of a peculiar kind, carrying with it a sudden accession of energy, preventing us from succumbing to fear and cowardice, making us, at least, momentarily brave; useful for many kinds of aggressive action; useful even where threats are employed as a force ready at hand to carry them into effect: serviceable, too, because the system of anger has at its disposal a complex body of behaviour, containing many alternative types, some of them instinctive, for use on different occasions and in different situations. And this system contains several distinct ends, which may be applied either to our own advantage, or to the advantage of those we love; but it appears to possess no common as well as distinctive end of its own. And yet this is perhaps a third advantage, giving anger a great flexibility when it comes to be organised in the service of so many sentiments—for there is not one of them without it—and has there to be subordinated to such different purposes. Its function in them is to give us the sudden and additional force we require, and a choice between many different forms of behaviour, suitable for threatening, punishing, subordinating, overcoming, destroying, reforming enemies or comrades; suitable not only against material, but also against spiritual opponents, making us angry with our own weakness, indolence, despondency, lack of spirit and perseverance, and determined to destroy them, and giving us, for the time, the active spirit that we need. These are some of the advantages which our character and sentiments derive from the system of anger.

3. *The Relation of the System of Anger to the Emotion*

While primitive anger is aroused by some sensory experience, as a smarting pain, an attack on our person, obstruction to an impulse, the sight or threats of an enemy, and expresses itself in some form of instinctive behaviour which is connected with the sensory stimulus, or the degree of anger aroused,—in the later forms, with the growing importance of ideas as causes of the emotion, and of ideas as complicating, prolonging and directing the course of it, and

of the sentiment as moderating its intensity or restraining its irreflective, spontaneous outbursts, the emotion, as in the case of fear, comes to assume a position of predominant importance, linking together, as it does, a number of instincts and acquired tendencies.

This increasingly important part played by the emotion coincides frequently with a diminution of its original intensity, giving it greater power to foresee and select its course. Where, on the other hand, anger is sudden and primitive, and its action most immediate and unrestrained, much of the process on which the accomplishment of its impulse depends, excludes ideas, and escapes the control of consciousness. Hence it is that our sudden emotions are so apt to surprise us, when we realise all that we have done, and often that it has been foreign to our thoughts and purposes.

But while the emotion thus comes to take a leading place in selecting that behaviour of anger which is most suitable to the occasion, and to the fulfilment of the ends it has in view, having once acted as a stimulus to the action, it often becomes suppressed, while other parts of the emotional system are active. Though the feeling of anger may come back as a sudden throb when we recollect the injury, or when some new obstacle intervenes; yet while we are occupied in avenging it, as in a duel with swords or pistols, attention is concentrated on the difficult art of the struggle, and the purpose we have in view, and the emotion is frequently excluded.

Thus the executive side of the system even when initiated by the emotion is capable at times of working without the accompaniment of angry feeling, and an animal's instincts of destruction may be excited and discharged without it. For if the task before this system is one neither difficult nor dangerous—on account of the insignificance of an enemy and our own predominant power and skill—it seems as if the emotion disappears from beginning to end as not necessary to initiate or support the achievement. Thus we destroy a fly or a wasp on the window-pane without a trace of angry emotion.

CHAPTER V

OF THE LAWS OF THE INTERACTION OF FEAR AND ANGER

1. *Of the Complicated Relation of the Systems of Fear and Anger*

THERE are some laws of character so familiar that we ignore them, which yet ought to be the foundation of our science. We should endeavour to express them with precision, and to discover the limits of their truth; and the conditions on which they depend. The law that Fear and Anger tend to exclude one another is impressed on us by our own experience. It seems to be true of animals and men. The dog so brave when angry, seems at other times timid and under the influence of fear. He allows the cat who is so spoilt that she does almost what she pleases, to take the first taste of his food, and is afraid to thrust her aside, and whines and looks to his master for intervention. Yet the same dog will threaten or attack the cat when he is aroused to anger,—as when she attempts to get at his bowl when he is already feeding from it,—and will fearlessly attack other dogs bigger than himself, against whom he has no chance of victory. The cat does not show much trace of anger in her ordinary behaviour. She avoids encounters with the dog, and keeps to the neighbourhood of garden walls and trees, where, if threatened, she can quickly place herself in safety. Like others of her species she chiefly attacks animals of inferior strength to her own. Her instincts of pursuit and destruction are aroused by the sight or sound of a small bird or mouse; and at first her secret and stealthy movements, apart from the

expression of her eyes, seem to signify fear rather than anger. Even when she has seized her prey, and her instinct of destruction is active, is her struggle with so weak an opponent sufficient to arouse the emotion of anger? For she often plays with it, and manifests as little anger, as does Iago when he is compassing the destruction of Othello. But when at bay facing the dog with growls and hisses, she seems to feel anger. Dogs too seem to feel anger when they snarl at one another and show their teeth. It may be that their instinct of destruction too is excited in some degree, but their anger is at first confined to threats. Is it partially counteracted by fear? It bursts all restraints when one dog flies at the throat of the other. Boys at school before they enter on a fight, often feel some degree of fear, but as soon as they give and receive blows, hot anger excludes it. But a cowardly boy when he receives a painful blow, begins to cry, and sorrow and fear exclude anger. There are some men who can intimidate even brave men with whom they come into contact. A glance of their eyes cools anger and excites fear. Thus the first form of the law of the interaction of fear and anger is this: (38) *Fear and anger tend always to exclude one another, where both are referred to the same object;* being, as Bain expressed it, "opposite in all their outgoings."[1]

Let us next attempt to discover the cases which contradict this law.

There is one variety of fear which, though directed by the instinct of flight, may, under opposition, become violent and aggressive. Cowardly animals fight at bay. When a panic occurs in a crowd, men fight with and trample on one another in their efforts to escape. When a ship is sinking, the people of cowardly nations stab those who bar their way to the boats, and hurl back into the water those who attempt to get into them. And tyrants kill those whom they fear, and by those who live in dread of them are often murdered. Has anger or fear caused the greater number of homicides?

In a previous chapter, we found that there were two alternative explanations of this type. The more obvious explanation was that under sudden opposition to its impulse,

[1] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. ix.

fear may give place to anger. And in some cases this is probably the true one. But this does not easily interpret the strict subordination of the struggle to the end of fear in other cases. Where anger drives out fear, the end of fear is for the time forgotten, replaced by some end of anger. Anger may then carry a man far from his former end: having begun to fight, he may fight for the end of destruction or revenge. But when an animal struggles violently to escape, as soon as it is free, it betakes itself to flight. In such a case there is no essential incompatibility between the systems of fear and anger. Some instinct or tendency of anger is aroused with fear, but subordinated to its present end. This utilisation of part of one system by another, is not confined to fear. The system of anger may, in pursuit of its aggressive end, sometimes manifest the behaviour of fear. This is characteristic of certain animals, as the Felidæ. In their stealthy and silent approach, in the sudden spring upon their prey from behind, we see that the instinctive behaviour of their anger contains, by innate prearrangement, something of the behaviour of fear. The instincts of concealment and silence which distinguish one variety of fear, are innately organised in their system of anger. Both cases are instances of the law of the transference of instincts from one emotional system to another that we noticed in the first chapter of this book. For an instinct that is chiefly serviceable in one system, may also be occasionally serviceable in another. Man himself, who manifests the behaviour of such different types of animals, also sometimes discovers a similar secrecy and silence in his revenge, and springs from some hiding-place upon his unsuspecting enemy. And this behaviour is even characteristic of the revenge of certain races; whilst it is repudiated by others as cowardly and dishonourable.

These facts contradict the law of the mutual exclusion of fear and anger as we have previously stated it. It is not true, as Bain supposed, that these emotions are opposite "in all their outgoings." They are opposite in most; the law is true within certain limits, but what are these limits?

We fly from danger: we become angry with something else that impedes our escape. We are brave enough to fight with

a powerful enemy, but not brave enough, or too prudent, to fight him openly, and borrow the self-protecting instinct of fear. Yet although there is this much harmony between these antagonistic systems, the harmony does not seem to extend to their emotional feelings. The emotions of fear and anger may rapidly alternate, but each tends to exclude the other from simultaneous presence. When the wounded lion conceals itself from its pursuer behind some foliage, whence it springs suddenly upon him, the emotion of its rage excludes the emotion of fear, though including one of its instincts. Or when a man in terror of his life struggles with another who bars his way, his fear excludes the emotion of anger, though including one of its forms of behaviour. And if this is not true of all cases, if sometimes the emotion of anger is aroused by the struggle, then this, in its turn, suspends the emotion of fear.

There are then limiting conditions of the law of the mutual exclusion of fear and anger, and we must restate the law so as to take them into account. Fear and anger tend to exclude one another so far as they are antagonistic ; but their antagonism does not include all parts of their systems. It does not exclude some instinct of aggression from the one, nor some instincts of concealment and silence from the other ; but it does exclude their respective emotions. We shall therefore restrict the law to the emotion: (39) *The emotions of fear and anger tend to exclude one another from simultaneous presence in consciousness, and resist fusion into one complex emotion.*

2. *Of the Relation of Jealousy to Fear and Anger*

When we find that opposite emotions are so often blended together, we may well doubt whether the law as we have just restated it is true without further limitation? Joy and sorrow are fused in some, at least, of the tender emotions of love. The joy of meeting has remembrance in it of the sorrows of absence, and the sorrow of parting, of the joys of being together. The emotion of pathos is sorrowful ; but the joy of beauty is fused with it. In the emotion of reverence two emotions with antagonistic tendencies are blended together. One is the admiration of greatness, the other is fear or awe

The one impels us forward; the other would turn us back. The one holds us entranced in contemplation; the other precludes familiarity, and keeps us at a respectful distance. Is this also sometimes the case with fear and anger?

There is one complex and derivative emotion that if we closely study its behaviour shows clear traces of the action of both of these emotions. Jealousy manifests in certain situations the secretive behaviour of fear. Some Mahometan nations are peculiarly jealous of their women, and seclude them from the society of men. The women live a concealed life in their homes, protected from admiration and pursuit; if they go out they must be attended and closely veiled. This concealment points to the influence of fear in moulding the behaviour of jealousy. And if we consider how frequently jealousy commences in a state of doubt or suspicion concerning the action of the man of whom we are jealous, either because of his attention to the woman we love or possess, or of his rivalry with us for some position of power or reputation, then because we desire exclusive possession of the one or the other, we feel fear or anxiety, because we are in danger of losing it or of not attaining to it. Fear is then at the root of jealousy, is manifested in its behaviour, and sometimes may come to the surface of consciousness and be felt as the emotion. Hence the phrase "torturing jealousy."

If fear is one of the roots of jealousy, anger is another. The behaviour of jealousy is marked on different occasions by all degrees of aggressive anger, from rudeness, which is a threat, to insult, assault, and murder. As doubt and suspicion ripen into certitude, rage replaces fear.

In the behaviour of certain animals on account of which jealousy has been attributed to them, there is clear evidence of the influence of anger. A dog may fly at another because he witnesses his master caressing the stranger. Romanes relates that one of his correspondents had "seen the same rage manifested by a fine cockatoo at the sight of his mistress carrying on her wrist and stroking affectionately a little green parrot."[1] In the diary concerning a monkey kept by the

[1] He remarks that "such jealousy" seems to him a "very advanced emotion."—'Animal Intelligence,' ch. xvi. p. 443.

sister of the same writer a similar display of angry behaviour is also attributed to jealousy. "To-day," she writes, "he (the monkey) had been a long time playing with his toys, taking no notice of anyone. Suddenly my mother remembered that to-day was my birthday, and (for the first time since he came to the house) shook hands with me in congratulation. He immediately became very angry with me, screamed and chattered and threw things at me, being evidently jealous of the attention my mother was paying me."[1]

Yet if fear and anger are both at the root of jealousy, are they both simultaneously present and fused in its emotion? We might think that jealousy must be a unique emotion because it has received a distinctive name in many languages. But if the alternation in jealousy between the behaviour of anger and fear imported nothing more than an alternation between the corresponding emotions, we could hardly account for its being thus distinguished.

If we consider jealousy in human nature we find that there is always some preformed sentiment from which it springs. Thus sexual jealousy springs from sexual love: "La jalousie nâit toujours avec l'amour; mais elle ne meurt pas toujours avec lui."[2] But sexual love cannot be separated from self-love, with which it constantly interacts; and it is due to the desire of self-love to possess certain things exclusively for self, such as women, power, and reputation, that jealousy principally arises. Thus La Rochefoucauld observes: "Il y a dans la jalousie plus d'amour propre que d'amour."[3] Hence too he remarks: "La jalousie est le plus grand de tous les maux, et celui qui fait le moins de pitié aux personnes qui le causent;[4] for if love is pitiful, self-love is pitiless.

There is one other condition of jealousy, also connected with this sentiment of self-love. The loss of possession to which jealousy refers, or the failure to obtain it, is of such a nature as carries with it a lowering of a man's self-valuation. We need not then wonder that it is accompanied with humiliation, and that we conceal it from shame:—"jealousy, and

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. xvii. p. 493.
[2] La Rochefoucauld, 'Maximes,' cccIvi.
[3] 'Maximes,' cccxxiv.
[4] *Op. cit.* mdiii.

especially sexual jealousy, brings with it a sense of shame and humiliation."[1] And La Rochefoucauld observes: "Ce qui rend les douleurs de la honte et de la jalousie si aiguës, c'est que la vanité ne peut servir à les supporter"[2]: "on a honte d'avouer que l'on ait de la jalousie."[3]

The influence of self-love, and especially of its system of self-valuation evoking the emotions of shame and humiliation, with fear and anger, with the sorrow of love too at the loss of something precious—loss of trust in, or anticipated loss of the loved object—may account for the derivation of jealousy. We can only surmise how it may have been differentiated: we cannot observe the process itself. But from the study of its behaviour we can infer that at least three emotions, fear, anger, and shame, have left their mark upon it. This behaviour is only characteristic as a whole; its several parts present no originality. The old tendencies of these three emotions are operative as if there were no new emotion present. Thus jealousy seems to reveal no new force of character. It only combines in a peculiar way certain forces that are quite familiar to us.

When we pass from observation of its behaviour to introspection of the emotion itself, this seems to show that fear and anger are locked together in it, though one or other, according to the situation, is generally predominant; and that shame guards the secret of their humiliating thoughts.

Thus jealousy appears to be a new blend of old emotions, the proportions of which are never constant, but all of them throughout their changes are painful, and the union of them is the torturing emotion we know. Though the proportion of these emotions is variable, yet, from the blending of them, jealousy seems to acquire its unique quality of feeling: in this respect exemplifying a law of the development of other derivative emotions, such as shame and reverence. The painfulness of this emotion is increased by the fact that it has to be concealed. For there is nothing noble and disinterested about it. It seldom arouses respect or sympathy in other persons, but rather their contempt and ridicule.

[1] A. C. Bradley, 'Shakespearean Tragedy,' lec. v. 'Othello,' p. 178.
[2] La Rochefoucauld, *op. cit.* ccccxlvi. [3] *Ibid.*, ccccIxxii.

Our present interest centres in the blending of fear and anger which jealousy contains. If this is the fact, it contradicts our assumption that the two emotions essentially exclude one another. And there seem other cases where fear and anger are blended together. Children often do something that is forbidden because it is forbidden as well as dangerous, and their parents, seeing this, because they love them, feel both fear at what may happen to them and anger at their disobedience. To seize the child and to punish it for what it has done seem to be a single act. In the same way in the jealousy of sexual love or pride, fear of the loss of possession arouses anger against the person whose conduct makes this loss possible. Fear and anger, generally incompatible on account of their opposite tendencies, are in such cases not incompatible, because their tendencies are harmonised. In jealousy, anger with the woman is in harmony with the fear of losing her, so far as it makes her afraid of the consequences of her own action. The tendency of our fear has met an obstacle in her conduct; and the anger tends to remove this obstacle. So also when an animal fights at bay, its anger is subordinated to the end of fear.

The second formulation of the law of the interaction of fear and anger is, therefore, like the first, true only under certain conditions, and we have to define these conditions. When either the impulse of fear is not subordinated to the end of anger, or the impulse of anger is not subordinated to the end of fear, not only the two emotions, but the entire systems tend to exclude one another. It is only so far as the system of the one, or such part of it as is active, is subordinated to the system of the other, and that the situation is such that the one may be serviceable to the other, that fear and anger do not tend to exclude one another. Let us then attempt to embody this new conclusion in a restatement of the law: (40) *The systems of fear and anger tend universally to exclude one another from simultaneous activity, and therefore to prevent the fusion of their respective emotions, so far as the activity of one is not subordinated to the end of the other.* And as the law of the mutual exclusion of these systems is only valid under certain conditions, so there must

be a complementary law of their mutual inclusion, which so far as we have rightly interpreted these conditions, we can also formulate: (41) *When and so far as the system of either fear or anger, in a given situation, derives some advantage from exciting and subordinating to itself any part of the other system, the one will tend to excite the simultaneous activity of the other, and to fuse their respective emotions when these are elicited.* And thus it seems that the most opposite emotions may be fused together when their tendencies are reconciled; and Bain's enunciation of the law, that "Feelings, it opposed, or even if different, exclude one another,"[1] requires this corrective.

There is a subsidiary law that we have also implied: (42) *Fear tends to elicit anger in support of its end when its impulse is obstructed.* But there are certain limiting conditions of a quantitative character which we cannot define or measure. The fear must not be excessive, nor must the opposition be excessive. For under the paralysing influence of excessive fear we become incapable of vigorous resistance; and where an obstacle is too powerful, it tends to arouse sorrow or despair in place of anger. And the normal susceptibility to anger of the one sex is not the norm of the other. A woman, feeling her physical inferiority, fearing the strength of man, would be more likely, if seized by him, to appeal to his pity, to lure him by her arts from his purpose, or to be prostrated by her fear, than through anger to make a vigorous resistance, and to fight, like an animal at bay, to the last. But if the opposition came from one of her own sex, she would be more likely than in the former case to be aroused to anger and aggression. Yet what is or is not excessive for even the same sex is liable to constant fluctuations. It is not the same when a man is armed, as when he is unarmed, nor in the day-time as in the night, nor when he is in health as when he is sick, nor when he is young as when he is old.

Thus the tendency of fear to arouse anger when opposed depends on the degree of the fear and on the degree of the opposition; and this condition we cannot define so long as we are unable to measure it.

[1] The Emotions and the Will; "The Emotions," ch. i, 38.

The apparently simple case, studied in this chapter, of the interaction of two primary systems, will enable us to understand how difficult it is,—indeed with our present knowledge impossible,—to transform an empirical law of character, subject to exceptions, into a scientific law universally valid. But our experience should also teach us that a course of constant, if slow, progress toward this goal is still possible, so long as we hold fast to that stage of our knowledge and formulation of the law to which we have already attained, and apply steadily the right method for making a further advance: patiently observing and collecting the facts that seem to contradict this formulation of the law, comparing them together, so as to discern what they have in common. For therein lies the limiting condition of the truth of the empirical law of which we are in search.

CHAPTER VI

OF THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT WHICH HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN ANGER AND FEAR

1. *How far the Quality of Courage belongs to Anger*

As we purpose in the present work to study the relations of character and conduct, to trace character to its fruits in conduct, and conduct to its source in character, so, in our treatment of the emotions, we have to indicate the conduct or behaviour which is their natural effect, as well as to trace the qualities of character which they possess or acquire. The natural conduct of anger is courageous action, and the emotion of anger possesses this quality of courage. That is to say, if we see cowardice in an action ensuing on anger, or mixed in the behaviour appropriate to it, that must be due to the influence of some other principle, as that of fear, but never to the pure impulse of anger. And by saying that anger is courageous we mean that it is ready, when required, to risk the life of the organism to which it belongs, in order to compass its end—whether of destruction, or of breaking down opposition, or of offering threats and defiance, or of punishing wrongs or injuries done in the past.

Courage then in this sense, as a readiness to risk the life of the organism, is a quality inherent in the conduct of anger and in the emotion from which it proceeds, because this readiness or courage is so often required for the attainment of the end of anger. Hence it was that Aristotle declared that "courage does nothing grand in war without it, unless its flame be supplied from this source; this is the goad which stirs up

bold men, and sends them to encounter perils."[1] But he wisely adds: "It must . . . be made use of, not as a general, but as a soldier."[2] To which Seneca, who wishes to achieve the impossible, and to destroy a fundamental part of our constitution, replies by exposing the excesses of anger; how by being "over-hasty and frantic, like almost all desires, it hinders itself in the attainment of its object, and therefore has never been useful either in peace or war";[3] and that with regard to its courage, "no man becomes braver through anger, except one who without anger would not have been brave at all . . ."; [4] and how it is prone to rashness, and while trying to bring others into danger, does not guard itself against danger."[5]

The observations of Seneca indicate the nature and some of the defects of anger. Its courage, like the emotion from which it proceeds, and to which it belongs, is capricious and unstable, impulsive, and possessed of little foresight. It comes to us suddenly and leaves us when we still need it, and is often entirely absent when our need of it is greatest. The conduct of anger, though courageous, is a low form of courage like that produced by the stimulating effect of alcohol. True courage is not the quality of any emotion, but of a sentiment of love or hate.

Courage, as we noticed in the first Book, is one of those ambiguous qualities that we attach both to conduct and to character. We think of it as in the man himself, and not merely in his acts. It exists when it is latent and inactive, as a quality of his character. The etymological meaning of the term indicates that it was regarded as belonging to the heart. We still speak of a man of 'stout heart,' and we mean that such a one has the force which belongs to anger, or that he is little susceptible to fear, or that what fear he feels he controls. The absence of fear is then only one source of courage, as self-control is another; but anger still remains a primitive and original source of that quality without which we think that nothing great can be accomplished. We must then attempt to formulate this obvious law of character: (43) *Courage is an innate quality of the system of anger*,

[1] Quoted by Seneca, 'De Ira,' L. I. vii. [2] *Ibid.*, ix.
[3] *Ibid.*, xii. [4] *Ibid.*, xiii. [5] *Ibid.*, xi.

belonging both to its emotion and to its instincts and behaviour, in the sense that anger is prepared to endanger the life of the organism for the attainment of its ends.

2. *To what kinds of Fear the Quality of Cowardice belongs*

As one original source of courage in character, as well as in conduct, is found in anger, so an original source of cowardice, as well in character as in action, must be sought in Fear. For cowardice, like courage, is taken to qualify both character and conduct. And this cowardice means just the opposite of the disposition of courage, namely, a disposition not to risk the life of the organism to which it belongs for the attainment of ends, and fear implies this disposition in its general avoidance of aggressive actions. Cowardice of this impulsive kind belongs then inalienably to all the lower varieties of fear, namely, to those which bear on the preservation of the individual himself. But this primitive cowardice is not an inability or unwillingness to control the impulse of fear, but something proper to the fear itself, which subsists in it whether it be controlled or not. For as the highest courage is the quality of a sentiment, and not of an emotion, so the most degraded cowardice is likewise the quality of a sentiment, namely, of that self-love that places the preservation of our bodily life before honour, country, and all noble ends.

We must then attempt to state precisely this law of the cowardice of fear so familiar to us: (44) *Cowardice is an innate quality of the egoistic varieties of fear, of their emotion and of their instincts and behaviour, in this sense, that such fear tends always to avoid risking the life of the organism whatever the end may be.*

3. *Of Disinterested Fear as an innate source of both Courage and Caution*

When we have traced a certain kind of cowardice to fear, it is strange to find that a noble courage may be also due to it. The fear that we feel on behalf of others impels us, as we have previously noticed, to expose our own life to danger, where it

is required to save theirs, and this without even the support of anger. Thus, we may throw ourselves into water or fire, and risk suffering or disease for those whom we love. It is, however, no isolated emotion of fear that has this courage, but love acting through and transmuting it, that urges us persistently to unite ourselves to the loved object, and, thereby often to endanger our own life.

It may perhaps be doubted whether this courage of fear is only manifested by this emotion when organised in a preformed system of love; for it is manifested instinctively by many animals on behalf of their young. But the mother loves her young, and this courageous fear is only one of the disinterested emotions of her love.

In other cases the action of love is not clearly implied. Brave men often endanger their own lives for one whom they do not even know. It is sometimes pity which induces them to do this, and sometimes a disinterested fear. If we see another in a position of danger, as on the border of a precipice, or too near an approaching train, a sudden fear impels us to rush forward and to pull him back. How do we come to feel this disinterested fear? how do we likewise feel disinterested anger if he is wrongfully attacked? how do we come to feel pity for him in his distress? But if the same man who feels the disinterested fear for a stranger would also feel disinterested anger on his behalf (if instead of being in imminent danger, he were unjustifiably attacked), and pity if he saw him in bodily suffering, or overtaken by sudden misfortunes—acting in all cases disinterestedly on his behalf, according to the situation,—then there is already present in that man a system of emotional dispositions that, as inferred from its behaviour, cannot be distinguished from love,—a kind of love for our fellow-men as such, strangers though they be,—a natural humanity ready to be evoked under exceptional conditions, though remaining latent in the ordinary situations of life. This humanity has not indeed the peculiar characteristics of sex-love, family affection, and friendship, which all imply some familiarity with the loved object, and delight in his presence and companionship, and sadness or sorrow in separation from him, and which

are not only evoked under exceptional conditions; but it is a kind of love that is even more disinterested. In its later and more reflective development, it is called universal benevolence; because it shows no partiality for persons, is not dependent on acquaintanceship, and a reciprocating affection.

The disinterested fear of love also behaves sometimes in such a different way that it is called cowardly by those who observe its conduct. Prudence or caution bears a certain resemblance to cowardice. Fabius Maximus, who saved Rome from Hannibal, was called cowardly by his countrymen, because he refused to fight pitched battles with the enemy, and contented himself with keeping them in sight, and being prepared to take advantage of their occasional weakness and mistakes. But when his friends came and urged him to wipe out this reproach, and risk a battle with the enemy, he replied: "I should be of a more dastardly spirit than they represent me, if, through fear of insults and reproaches, I should depart from my own resolution. But to fear for my country is not a disagreeable fear."[1] This patriotic fear gave him courage to subdue the fear of loss of personal reputation; and it was thus determined by his love of country, in conjunction with the situation in which he found it placed. If we compare his generalship with that of Scipio Africanus, who, instead of defending Rome, attacked Carthage, we may infer with some probability not only that the wise caution of Fabius was due to this same fear, but that the boldness and brilliancy of Scipio was due to a temperament in which fear played less part, and a disinterested anger against the common enemy a greater. With the former, the advantages of the system of fear, and of its variable body of behaviour, were employed to the uttermost in the service of love: with the latter, those of anger. The action of the sentiment would tend to correct the excesses to which either temper was liable, restraining the one from excessive caution, and the other from rashness. But its conduct would still be stamped by the prevailing emotion, nor could it exchange at will the caution due to fear for the audacity of anger.

[1] 'Plutarch's Lives,' vol. ii. 'Fabius Maximus.'

Thus while the lower or egoistic fears are an original source of cowardice in action, the higher fears of the sentiments of love are, through their influence, the source of a noble courage, as well as of the virtue and quality of character that we name caution or prudence.

4. *Of the Derivation of Cruelty from certain kinds of Anger*

If anger is an original source of courage, so is it a source of the acquired quality of cruelty. The primitive forms of anger are only inadvertently cruel. What is meant by cruelty implies enjoyment in inflicting pain, and the intention or desire to inflict it; and the first presupposes that we can distinguish the signs of pain in others, and the second, that we can form the idea, or foresee the possibility of inflicting it. Hence cruelty, in its proper sense, is only possible at a comparatively high stage of mental development,—a stage which perhaps no other animals besides man, and the apes and monkeys, are able to reach. It is characteristic of that variety of anger which aims at inflicting pain as its end, and enjoys the sight of the pain it has caused. For the anger that is successful in attaining its end has the enjoyment of success, and, when this success coincides with the subjection of another, the enjoyment of pride.

It is sometimes remarked that the most deliberate forms of cruelty are not practised by brave men. A brave man may destroy his enemy, or even inflict pain as a punishment, but he will not degrade himself by unnecessarily prolonging it. But in those cases in which cowardice is a condition of cruelty, there must be some interaction between anger and fear to account for it. Fear by itself cannot account for cruelty in action. Fear manifests flight, or concealment, or a shrinking back, or a clinging to another for protection, or a crying out, or a keeping silent, or a pretence of death, but never aims at inflicting pain as such. But where fear restrains the impulse of anger, it tends to render anger at first more painful, and afterwards revengeful and cruel: as if there were a desire of inflicting suffering in revenge for the pains of fear. For the painfulness of anger

is soon forgotten if its initial stage passes at once into the excitement of the attack, and the attack into triumph. Men of a hasty temper are well known to bear little resentment. But when the initial and painful stage of anger is prolonged, when it is restrained by the most painful of all emotions, fear, so humiliating to pride, we can understand how the coward who dares not attack his enemy openly, or without superior advantages, broods over his revenge, and how his revenge becomes deliberate, implacable, and cruel. And thus it is that cowardly men are so often cruel, because the same circumstances that tend to arouse their anger tend also to arouse fear, so that there arises a constant interaction between these emotions. But there are other timorous natures that, in general, are not cruel. Women are more under the influence of fear than men are, and from the most trivial causes. In some, subjection or ill-treatment arouses fear or sorrow, but not anger. They remain gentle and inoffensive to the last, patient under their wrongs, because the disposition to anger, which is the original source of cruelty, is so much lacking in them, or aroused by different causes.

There is then implied in this interaction between fear and anger a law of character which we must attempt to formulate. (45) *Where fear restrains the impulse of anger, in a mind capable of reflection and foresight, it tends to render anger deliberately cruel; and in proportion as circumstances frequently evoke this experience, the character tends to acquire the qualities of deliberate cruelty and cowardice.* For a man's acts may be occasionally cruel, or cruelty may be a vice of his character. Cruelty of character is a settled disposition, from which cruel acts proceed with little to account for them in external circumstances; whereas others only become cruel under exceptional provocation.

We have seen how cruelty may be a quality of a certain emotion, or a resultant of two emotions that interact, or an occasional quality of a man's conduct, or an acquired and settled quality of his character: we have now to notice that cruelty may become the object of a sentiment. History impresses on us the belief that some men develop a love of cruelty for itself,—as Caligula, Nero, or Ivan the

Terrible of Russia. There are also ages in which the sports and games in vogue foster this sentiment. What is remarkable is that this sentiment of cruelty often shows no trace of the emotion from which it was probably derived. Seneca, who was a frequent witness of the cruelty of his times, has given many instances of it. He says of Gaius Caesar that he flogged and tortured people, "not to carry out any judicial sentence, but merely to amuse himself." "He beat senators with rods; he did it so often that men were able to say, 'It is the custom.' He tortured them with all the most dismal engines in the world, with the cord, the boots, the fire, and the sight of his own face."[1] And reflecting on this kind of cruelty, he inquires whether they who commit it feel anger, seeing that they do it to those "from whom they have received no injury, and who they themselves do not think have done them any injury."[2] And he concludes that "this evil takes its rise from anger; for anger, after it has by long use and indulgence made a man forget mercy, and driven all feelings of human fellowship from his mind, passes finally into cruelty. Such men therefore laugh, rejoice, enjoy themselves greatly, and are as unlike as possible in countenance to angry men, since cruelty is their relaxation."[3]

Thus through anger, and especially through the interaction of anger and fear, do men come to feel enjoyment in inflicting pain, from the frequent enjoyment of it they develop a love of cruelty for itself, and through this love they become capable of enjoying the spectacle of suffering, without any incitement of anger; for all love enjoys the presence of its object. Hate, however deliberately cruel, could not accomplish its vengeance with such ligh-hearted enjoyment.

[1] 'De Ira,' L. iii. C. xviii. xix.
[2] *Op. cit.* L. ii. C. v.
[3] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER VII

JOY

1. *Of the Distinction between Joy and Pleasure*

WE have now to treat of certain primary systems which, unlike those of Fear and Anger, do not seem to contain several instincts and acquired tendencies, with a variety of alternative types of behaviour resulting from them, but are comparatively simple and uniform. The systems of Joy, Repugnance, and Sorrow, we shall have occasion to think, not only include primary emotions, in the sense of these being underived from any others, but,—what is more important from our point of view,—are fundamental forces of character, having laws of action that constantly reappear in the higher and more complex systems into which they enter.

It may seem that we know what Joy and Sorrow are, as clearly as we know what Anger is, or Fear, and that no definitions can make them clearer to us, or even make us more consistent in the use of their terms. But fear and anger are more readily identified at low degrees of intensity than are joy and sorrow. We speak of 'being pleased' at things where if the feeling were stronger we should call it 'joy'; just as the weaker degree of sorrow is generally named 'sadness.' Thus men are sometimes 'pleased' at looking into shop-windows; but the child we think feels 'joy'; for we observe his rapt expression and eager exclamations, and find it so difficult to get him away. Yet the difference between the two cases is one of degree, not of kind: and where the system is the same, and manifests the same tendencies, we have decided

to call it by the same name. But there is a distinction between joy and pleasure, which, as it is often confused, we shall try to make clear.

Our general assumption and point of view, that all emotional systems are concrete facts and forces of the mind, and not abstract elements torn from their context, affords us a preliminary basis for distinguishing between pleasure and joy. Pleasure is an element that we abstract from the total fact to which it belongs: joy is one of the facts from which we abstract it. Joy is a system which indeed contains pleasure, and if there were no pleasure in it, it would not be joy. But joy has other things in its system. To consider first its emotional side, joy is an emotion, and, like all emotions, is an attitude of mind,[1]—a perception or a thought,—not merely sensation; and its perception or thought is pleasant to us. It is only afterwards, and through psychological analysis, that we discover that pleasant bodily sensation may be also comprised in it. Thus the joy of meeting a friend or of looking at some beautiful scene, includes the perception of the object, and the joy of success includes the thought of it.

Joy has often no defined object. We are then inclined to wonder why we feel it. We cannot find a sufficient explanation in a change of our environment. There is nothing specially that we rejoice at; but we feel more joy in everything than in our ordinary state. This is the character of our moods of joy. They often arise from some state of the body. All our sensations then are pleasant, and our thoughts take their colour and are also pleasant. At other times the mood arises from some great good fortune, so that even the days that succeed it inherit something that disposes us to adopt a joyful attitude to everything. Thus in these cases the attitude of mind indispensable to joy is at first without any steady and defined object, but is still in search of it, and, in the absence of one sufficiently stable and exclusive, spreads itself over several.

This law of joy is not peculiar to itself. It is common to all emotional moods: (46) *All moods of emotion arise at first without a defined object, but there is an inherent tendency in*

[1] 'Manual of Psy.,' G. F. Stout, B. I. Ch. I. 4.

them to search for one, because an object is necessary to organise and direct their impulses.

If the distinction between joy and pleasure involves the distinction between joy and bodily pleasure there are still other differences between them. A bodily pleasure or a bodily pain is one that we can localise more or less clearly in some part of the body or in the body as a whole. When this pleasure or pain is intense, it tends to become the object of our thought, because it engrosses attention on itself. But it does not tend merely to attract thought and attention, but to arouse an emotion which includes them. This is most clearly seen in the case of bodily pain. We cannot contemplate intense bodily pain indifferently; and we can only contemplate it calmly for a limited time. The Stoic philosophers treated it in theory as no evil, so impressed were they with the power of an attitude of mind to transform established values. But they could only carry out this theory into practice when pain was not too intense or prolonged. For our spontaneous attitude to intense pain is not an indifferent thought, but a concrete emotion. Pain always tends to excite our repugnance: it fills us at times with rage; when it has broken down our energies of resistance with grief; when we anticipate its continuance or return, with fear or horror; when we have lost all hope of its leaving us, with despair; and when we contemplate our life as subjected to it, with misery. It is because of the innate connexion between pain as a stimulus and one or other of these emotions as its effect, that we regard pain as intrinsically an evil; and it is such an evil because we cannot exclude these emotions, though we may diminish and control them.

Let us then express this law of bodily pain: (47) *Bodily pain, after it has reached a certain intensity, tends to absorb attention on itself, and to arouse and become the object of some antagonistic emotion.* Bodily pleasure also tends to become the object of some emotion when it exceeds a certain intensity; but so few of our pleasures reach this point, and where they do, quickly fall away from it. Still sometimes we do experience joy or enjoyment in the presence of bodily pleasure: a thing which would be impossible if they

were the same; but at other times something in us arouses disgust or shame at our acceptance of it.

Let us now contrast the law of the bodily pleasure or pain with that of the emotion: (48) *Bodily pleasure and pain, after they have exceeded a certain intensity, tend to attract attention to themselves; but pleasant and painful emotions tend to attract attention more to their objects than to themselves.* Thus joy is in this too distinguishable from bodily pleasure; it makes us think of the absent friend who has returned to us, or the good fortune that has at length arrived, rather than of the fact of joy itself; and even if the emotion have for a time no such object, it still makes us project our thought beyond itself, until we have found something to which it may be referred.

We have now to consider those degrees of the bodily pain and pleasure below the degree at which they begin to draw attention to themselves and have these effects. When we observe the mass of bodily sensation faintly pleasant or painful, that is or may be included in an actual emotion, we notice that this does not spontaneously attract attention to itself or become an object of thought, but gives greater fulness to the emotion. Not only is this the case, but we know that certain faint and diffused bodily pains are apt of themselves to arouse emotional moods, and to become part of their emotions. Physical depression and weakness set up the emotion of sadness or melancholy; another kind of faint and undistinguished pain, sometimes felt in the head or viscera, sets up a mood of irritability, which now and again breaks out into weak emotions of anger. Similarly the vague and diffused bodily pleasure that accompanies states of good health tends to arouse joy, and when we think of the future, hope or confidence, and when we think of ourselves, pride. Hence the joy, confidence, and pride, to which good health disposes us, make us value almost anything rather than itself, to which they pay no attention; because vague sensations of pleasure arouse emotion, but do not become an object of it.

There is then a complementary law that governs the weak or faint degrees of bodily pleasure and pain, which is opposite to the law that governs their intense or strong degrees:

(49) *Bodily pleasure or pain when it falls below a certain strength or intensity, tends to arouse some emotional mood, and to become part of this mood.*

Thus all varieties and degrees of bodily pleasure and pain tend to arouse some emotion, sometimes being merged in the attitude of this emotion, sometimes being constituted as its object.

While then the distinction between bodily pleasure and pain, on the one side, and joy and sorrow, on the other, should in principle be sufficiently clear, the distinction between what are called 'mental' pleasure, displeasure and pain, and emotions is that between a part or element and the whole to which it belongs. Mental pleasure and pain are always parts of some emotional attitude, although this emotional attitude may not reach the degree of intensity to which the term 'emotion' is usually confined. An emotional system may hardly be felt, or weak emotions may blend together, and the result be a confusion of feelings that we cannot analyse; but the same emotional forces, whether distinguished or not, whether alone or in combination, are still operative.

Now as we are interested in Joy because, however quiet it may appear, it is a force of character, and has important functions in our sentiments, so we have to take the term in a very broad sense to include all varieties, high or low, intense or faint, and weak or strong. All are substantially the same force operating in character with different degrees of strength, and the less prominent and intense varieties are frequently the stronger, and exercise a steadier, a better, and more important influence upon us.

Our chief problem, as in the case of fear and anger, is to study the innate tendencies of joy through a comparison of its varieties, and to judge how far these are modified by any tendencies that are acquired. We need hardly trouble to consider formal definitions of joy: according as we contract or extend the fluctuating denotation of the term, a number of such definitions are possible, and within their own domain may be sufficiently useful. Not subtlety, however, but a sound judgment is necessary to fix the denotation of the term, to discern the important differences that alone justify us in

marking off the group of facts that we are going to study, and conferring upon them a distinctive name. But the aim we set before ourselves will partly determine what are important differences for us.

Now as we shall adopt a very broad use of the term we cannot accept the old definitions of Descartes and Spinoza, because they make class-distinctions of differences that do not go to the root of the facts. Thus Descartes' definition restricts the emotion to certain of its later developments. "The consideration of present good," he tells us, "arouses in us joy; that of evil, sorrow; when it is a good or an evil which is represented to us as our own."[1] Hence it follows that we cannot feel joy before we have developed the abstract conception, "good," and of "self" as "owning" something good. But it is not our purpose so to restrict the meaning of the term that we have to deny that animals and young children are capable of experiencing joy. Spinoza's definition is that "Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope."[2] Hence it follows that the later emotion, Hope, dependent on desire and ideas of future events, must be held to precede the primitive emotion, Joy, which animals seem so conspicuously to feel in their play.

2. *The Common Varieties of Joy*

There are many different pleasant states of mind; and these determine different varieties of joy. Pleasure enters into work and into rest, into excitement and into peace. Hence there is a joy of work different from the joy of rest, and a joy of peace different from the joys of excitement. Thinking has its own pleasures of novelty, of unimpeded advance, and of achievement, when the mind is fresh and adapted to its work; and these determine the joys of the intellectual life. There is a different joy in physical activities, —in those activities which are predominantly muscular, not nervous. How well the average Englishman knows them,

[1] 'Les Passions de l'Ame,' 'Deuxième Partie,' Art, 61.
[2] 'The Ethics,' part iii. 'Definitions of the Emotions,' xvi.

who thinks they have no equal. But these are not merely due to the pleasures of muscular sensation. The activity must be systematised and have variety: its different actions must be directed to an end. The joy of it is not to be found in walking to and fro on a railway platform. It is cricket or golf, or hunting or shooting. The pleasure appertains to the thought of the game or sport as a whole, or there would be no joy in it.

So there is a joy in physical rest, when the body feels warm and at ease, and all its sensations are pleasant. How well the indolent know it; but there are restless natures that resist it, and render it difficult of attainment to those who live with them. But sensations, however pleasant, do not constitute joy, and are at most among its conditions or constituents. Here the joy is in the thought of rest or comfort. And how comes it that this thought is sometimes not a joy? We need not appeal to the ascetic tendencies in human nature for confirmation of this fact. It is sometimes sufficient that a man knows that he has not done his work, that he thinks himself idle, to transform the emotional character of his state. And the chief difference is in the feeling and tendencies of his thought, and not of the qualities of his sensations. It is an attitude no longer in harmony with, but in opposition to these pleasant sensations. It is penetrated with a sense of weakness, and the emotion is disgust, shame, or indignation. But how can a weak man tear himself from the sensuous enjoyment? The joy returns and masters him; but the reaction of disgust or shame follows, and excludes it. Two opposite emotions referring to the same bodily sensations as part of their objects, interpreted by the one as ease and comfort, by the other as idleness and luxury.

Besides these there are many other varieties, as the joys accompanying the satisfaction of the appetites, the aesthetic joys of beauty, and the joys of laughter, some being the mere outburst of health and good spirits, others having the intellectual element of wit or humour, all conditioned by their respective sensations. For as the sensations of hearing are different from the sensations of vision, so the joy of music is different from the joy of a landscape. Many of these joys are primary, in

the sense of being underived from one another or any other emotion ; others are late products of evolution. Thus, it is possible that man alone possesses a stream of thoughts in the mind, which he sometimes distinguishes as representing past occurrences, sometimes as representing possible events in the future. Hence the joys which depend on these new activities are themselves new varieties : the joy of remembering past joys, the joy of anticipating future achievement or happiness ; the one consoling the old, the other inspiring the young. Some of these later joys are secondary to our acquired sentiments, yet have a uniqueness of their own, as the 'cold' joys of self-love, the joy of meeting an old friend, the joy of reconciliation with one whom we love, and the joy of being at length at peace with our conscience.

There are, then, many distinct varieties of joy. But on comparing them we do not find that they have been distinguished by the same principle as we adopted in distinguishing the varieties of fear and anger. For no conspicuous differences of instinct or tendency stand out in our different joys, to engage us to make that the basis of our classification. We therefore distinguished them by the differences of their objects, as the joy of rest, of work, of play, of knowledge and of beauty. And these differences we found were correlated with a qualitative difference of the joys connected with them, because they involve a difference of sensation or of mental activity. Has then joy no varieties dependent on differences of instinct and impulse? Has it indeed any impulse at all?

Now if we compare fear and anger with joy we are impressed by the fact that an impulse is conspicuously present in each of the former, and absent from or at least obscure in the latter. But if joy have no impulse, it has no end, and without an end it cannot be an emotional system. Yet joy seems to be an emotion and no abstraction. It is held to be one that stimulates functional activity, and at least many of its varieties have this effect. The organic changes which it tends to set up, and by which it is conditioned, are accompanied by an increase of pleasant bodily sensations. Intense joys thrill us, and this thrill is a pleasant sensation. Yet we cannot make the constitution of joy clear to ourselves by

merely characterising it as so much pleasant sensation and thought. Pleasure enters into a great many emotions. It enters into anger when the angry impulse is in process of accomplishing its end. It even enters into fear as we approach security. The mere presence of pleasure does not distinguish joy. Can it be distinguished as the only emotion that is all pleasure? There are tender joys that have some pain in them, and difficult joys that may perhaps contain more pain than pleasure. They have cost us dear, and the body may be broken with exertions. In the joy of martyrs, the supreme proof and triumph of faith consist in ability, not merely to suffer for it, but to rejoice in suffering "for the sake of Jesus." And all noble love is capable in some measure of feeling the joy of suffering for the sake of the beloved object. But the greater the suffering, the greater must the love be—the stronger in courage and will—that has the capacity to rejoice in suffering.

While then most joys are fuller of pleasure than is any other emotion, there are some in which the bodily sensations are predominantly painful, and the only pleasure lies in the thought of the triumphant will. A surplus of pleasure over pain does not in all cases distinguish joy.

3. *The System and Laws of Joy*

When we speak of the 'system' of an emotion, we mean that the constituents that enter into it, the thoughts that it has or may have, its characteristic feeling and tendencies, the organic processes belonging to it, and the behaviour which is the outcome of these constituents, all bear reference to a common end, and are more or less instrumental in promoting it; and because it is this higher kind of system we sometimes also call it an 'organisation.' Nor do we mean merely that such a system as joy would not have been inherited by the individual unless it subserved in some way the preservation of his life, but that its use lies also in promoting some more particular end. In the body the activity of organs that subserve such particular ends are called 'functions.' And as some of these organs fulfil their functions without our con-

sciousness of the result, so the primary emotional systems at first fulfil their ends without our foreseeing them.[1] These ends belong to the instincts of their systems, and the impulses that we feel at times to accomplish them are due to the activity of the instincts.

The question then arises whether Joy is a system in this sense, whether we can discover in it an instinct, or—if it give rise to no behaviour sufficiently definite and complex to be entitled instinctive in the ordinary sense,—whether it has not an impulse or tendency innately directed to a particular end, and expressing this tendency in forms of behaviour which, however simple, have not been acquired through experience.

If we take any one of the popular varieties of joy to which we have referred, and study it carefully we shall find that, however quiescent it may seem, it has a tendency and an end. Take, for instance, the most quiescent, the joy of rest. Here it is the pleasant state of our body which attracts attention, and gives rise to this sensuous joy or enjoyment. Now if, after our attention had been attracted to the pleasant sensation of the body, joy were not also felt, we should not continue to attend to it, unless some other emotion replaced the joy. Thus, too, the joy of the lover directs his attention to the beloved, so that he "cannot take his eyes off her"; the joy of the miser, to his money; of the proud to their own superiority or power.

Attention is frequently caught for a moment by objects, but after a glance, shifts as rapidly to something else, finding nothing of 'interest' to detain it. But joy exercises a certain attractive force, and draws attention to its object, there sustaining it, so long as the joy is felt, or some other force does not distract us. And thought follows attention; for attention cannot be directed to one object and thought be simultaneously directed to a different one. Thus where a man's joy is, there will his thoughts be fixed.

The first law of joy is then familiar to every one: (50) *Joy attracts attention and thought to its object, and there tends to*

[1] Concerning the degree of foresight short of this which is involved in all conation, see Prof. G. F. Stout's masterly analysis in 'Instinct and Intelligence,' 'British Journal of Psychology,' vol. iii. part 3.

sustain them, so long as the joy is felt. Yet this tendency we do not ordinarily notice unless it is obstructed.

This law is only a particular form of the law common to all emotions, and to which we have previously referred. Fear and anger also attract attention and thought to their objects; yet how different in other respects are their tendencies from that of joy!

There is a second law which belongs neither to fear nor anger: (51) *Joy tends to maintain the self in its present relation to the object.* This law is most clearly exemplified in relation to moving objects. Thus if we take delight in the flight of a bird or the motion of water, we follow it with our eyes. For the object quickly passes out of the field of vision if the eyes and body do not turn to follow its movements. Thus we maintain those bodily processes on which the continued attention to the object is dependent. When the object is immovable as the sea or the mountains, we still tend to maintain sensory accommodation to it so long as we enjoy looking at it. When we are dealing with other kinds of objects, that are not perceptual but conceptual, and do not therefore directly involve sensory accommodation,—as where we enjoy the recollection of a scene in nature, or the anticipation of our own success,—we maintain the relation between the self and the object by detaining the image or the concept of it, and trying to arrest the tendency of thoughts to give place to others in the mental stream, and quickly to pass out of mind, so that we have to hold to this image or concept if we are to continue to enjoy its object. And here the impulse of joy which is always present, whether we are conscious of it or not, is often noticed.

There is a third law which brings out still more clearly the characteristic tendency of joy. It is this: (52) *Joy tends to maintain the object itself as it is.* On its negative side this law means that in joy we tend to avoid altering the object. When enjoying rest we tend to maintain that state of rest, and not to alter the position of our body. When enjoying exercise we tend to maintain that state of exercise, and avoid changing it for some other kind of exercise. When enjoying a game, we tend to continue playing the

same game: for the game is the object. The girl continues to dance because she enjoys it; she dances till joy is ending and fatigue begins. Yet, in such cases, we ordinarily do not feel an impulse, still less a desire in the enjoyment, and the more complete our enjoyment the less we are likely to feel either; for the action is so secret and automatic that we do not so much seem to be sustaining it as enjoying its fruits.

When the object is not a state of our body, nor a game which involves the exercise of it, but an independent existence,—as another living being, or a part of nature, as a beautiful valley or hill,—then the tendency of joy to maintain the present state of the object is not revealed, so long as its present state is unchanged and there is no expectation of its changing. But as soon as change arises, or there is an expectation of it, this tendency of joy becomes manifest. Thus when a man takes delight in the grounds and shrubberies which he has laid out at his country house, or even in the decoration of his room and the arrangement of the furniture, he is opposed to anyone altering it. If there is a landscape we enjoy, we are opposed to a railway being made through it, or to the trees being felled, or to the view being obstructed by buildings. And if a man himself makes 'improvements,' that is because in some direction he notices a defect which mars the completeness of his enjoyment.

Thus do we tend to maintain the object of joy as it is, and oppose any alteration of it. Joy is essentially a conservative system, which resists 'improvements' and 'progress,' because it does not discern defects, so long as enjoyment is complete. And here we notice the application of a general law to which we have already referred: that Joy, like every other emotional system, is innately connected with anger, so that when its impulse is opposed, and the opposition is sufficient but not insuperable, that anger comes to its assistance. A second effect of opposition, and even of one too small to arouse anger, is to bring the conservative impulse of joy into consciousness. The process is no longer smooth and mechanical; there is effort in it, and this effort diminishes, where it does not extinguish, the enjoyment. The child who is taken away from his toys or picture-books at bed-time, may

scream, or kick, or burst into angry tears. The girl who is called upon to leave a dance too early, may plead for delay, or argue, or disappear in a passage. Thus does the impulse of joy which is so secret and automatic when unimpeded, rise into a recognised impulse or desire ; and yet it is the same system, so long as anger does not extinguish and replace it. Even here anger may act in strict subordination, as sometimes where it supports fear, and though it destroy for a time the emotion, yet subserve the system. The spoilt child who is allowed to have his picture-books again, when he cries and kicks, forgets his anger and recovers his enjoyment.

There are then three laws relating to the impulse of Joy. The first is: (53) *Opposition to the impulse of Joy tends to enlist in its service the anger which is caused by opposition, and has, as its particular end, the breaking down of opposition.* The second is: (54) *In proportion to the degree in which the impulse of Joy is opposed it is raised into prominence in consciousness.* The third is: (55) *In proportion to the degree in which the impulse of Joy is prominent in consciousness is the emotion of Joy destroyed.*

We shall now consider the evidence bearing on this third law. The child who is struggling and arguing to be allowed to go on playing with his toys no longer feels his enjoyment. The girl who is pleading and framing excuses to be allowed to stay longer at a dance has also lost hers. For in both cases the attention is no longer directed to the thing itself, but to breaking down, by force or argument, the opposition to it. And here we notice a difference between fear and anger on the one side, and joy on the other. For while Anger the more its impulse is opposed becomes the more angry, and Fear,—except where anger intervene,—the more fearful, Joy the more it is opposed becomes the less joyful.

We find further evidence of the essential incompatibility between the feeling of joy and the prominence of its impulse in other cases. If we consider the cause of Joy we find that, in one class of cases, some felt impulse or desire has been an essential condition of it, and that another condition has been the fulfilment of the end of that impulse or desire. And here it is precisely as the impulse or desire disappears from

consciousness, with the fulfilment of its end, that the joy arises. The impulse or desire may be felt as more or less pleasant. In proportion as it progresses to its end it tends to become more pleasant; but while there is something impelling it beyond its present state, it cannot be satisfied with the incomplete result, and feel joy in contemplating that. Even at those stages of a prolonged desire where we contemplate the progress we have made and rejoice in it, it is just then that the feeling of the impulse passes out of consciousness.

It would seem as if the joys of exercise and games would be an exception to this law and a contradiction of the form in which we have expressed it. For is not the continuance of the impulse to take exercise necessary to the continuance of the exercise? But the question is how far this impulse obtrudes in consciousness. In difficult games, like golf or cricket, an impulse is strongly felt while we are in process of learning them. We try to accomplish complicated and co-ordinated movements, and fail. Our desire is eager; but joy is not felt because of our failure. Yet even here we sometimes find that we have enjoyed ourselves on the whole. At other times it is the reverse; for the striving to make the proper movements and the frequent failures exclude enjoyment. And where we have enjoyed ourselves on the whole, we seem able to distinguish the enjoyment of a novel experience, that of the fresh air, and of the exercise itself, from the striving to master the game. Thus the case is complicated; and the game itself is a succession of impulses and actions. We have to play each stroke, or to make the right movement; if we do one better than before we have the enjoyment of success or progress.

The enjoyment of the game comprises a series of enjoyments, that do not seem to be felt in those moments in which we feel a strong impulse or striving, but in the moments of complete or partial success; and in the enjoyment of the exercise or of muscular sensation, of the air, of the novelty, and of the presence and co-operation of other human beings. And these fuse in retrospect, in our 'enjoyment on the whole.' But our greatest enjoyment is reached,—which, in

our youthful enthusiasm, we so often anticipate in thought,—when we begin to play the game well, and almost automatically, so that impulse and striving obtrude but little in consciousness; our instrument seems to become part of ourselves, the right movements occur naturally, and almost of themselves, and there is the joy of final success and satisfied ambition.

The joy of exercise and sports seems then to conform to the same law: to become complete in proportion as the feeling of impulse or striving passes out of consciousness, and to be mixed or incomplete so far as this feeling is prominent. In those sweet, but rare moments in which thinking is felt as enjoyment, there is absent the painful striving to gain a clear conception, to gain the right thoughts and the right words to express them; but these come spontaneously, and without effort, and often with a pleasant shock of surprise and novelty. But when we are in a hurry, and desire to get to the end, and our mind is confused, and there is an opposition we cannot overcome, and only common thoughts and expressions occur to us, here, where the feeling of impulse or striving is greatest, and the degree of success least, enjoyment has ceased, and distaste and disappointment have replaced it.

The six laws that we have distinguished in this section are cumulative evidence that joy is a system and has an end; and that the system is more comprehensive than the emotion; so that when the emotion of joy is momentarily effaced by the intrusion of anger, or by the prominence of its own impulse, the system works to restore it. What then is the end of joy? The first three laws define it. It is to maintain attention to the object of joy or the representation of this object, to maintain this object in the same relation to self, and in its present state. It is, in short, to produce no change in, but simply to conserve the existing situation. And this appears to be the common end of all varieties of joy, which we have here reached before, and not after considering the particular ends of these varieties. Let us first notice how two out of the three laws referred to distinguish the end of joy from the ends of fear and anger. For neither fear nor anger

endeavours to maintain the object in its present relation to self, and in its present state.

When we turn to another side of the system of joy the difference is still more manifest. What instinctive behaviour and what instincts are there in this system? When we compare joy with fear and anger, what a difference! There the variety of the instincts was so great, the difference of their behaviour so marked, that we could find no other than a very abstract end common to all, and which failed to distinguish them. Here it is the common end which is distinctive; for, as regards variety of tendency, there seems to be none. Variety of another kind there is, but this depends on the difference between the objects of joy: that primarily unimportant difference which we have avoided in the preceding chapters. Variety of particular end determined by particular instincts, that we have not yet found. Instead of a most complex body of behaviour, here is at bottom a uniformity of behaviour, arising out of the uniformity of tendency and end. For notwithstanding the striking differences between the joys of exercise and rest, the joys of the appetites and the tender joys of affection, they are all doing the same thing, maintaining that state of the object and relation to self which already exist, and maintaining them unobtrusively as far as possible, by excluding the impulse from notice. But we have not yet considered a characteristic achievement of Joy, and yet not a late one in evolution, nor confined to man, but widely distributed in the animal world,—the Joy of Play, the Play-impulse, wherein we shall find an astonishing variety, and the exercise of a number of instincts belonging to widely different systems.

CHAPTER VIII

JOY (II)

4. *The Play-Impulse and the Behaviour of Play*

WHEN we watch animals at play we see a kind of behaviour unique in its way and yet containing many imitations of what they do in their 'serious' moods. For the difference between play and work or 'serious' activity strikes every one. Spencer goes so far as to call play a "tendency to superfluous and useless exercise,"[1] and Groos, for whom it has a very important use, still speaks of it as "an instinct, producing activity without serious motive."[2] Has then play its instinct, and is it through this that it becomes play and not serious activity or work?

A conspicuous feature of play is that it exhibits the instinctive activities which belong to the other and serious sides of life. Thus the instincts connected with pursuit, flight, concealment, fighting, destruction, and many others are constantly exercised in animal play. But if play involves the exercise of the same instincts as does the serious sides of life, what constitutes it play? Is there in addition a special instinct, as Groos suggests? The answer sometimes given is that in play the instincts exhibited are not directed to any useful or serious end. But the theory now widely adopted is that animal play does subserve a useful end, because by means of it an animal exercises its instincts before the necessity of employing them arises, thus learning

[1] 'Prin. of Psy.' vol. ii. ch. ix. p. 630.

[2] 'The Play of Animals,' ch. iii. 2, p. 102.

to perfect them by practice. From this point of view, play seems to have, not only a useful, but also a very serious end, and without it the animal would often perish. "The tiger, for instance, no longer fed by his parents, and without practice in springing and seizing his prey, would inevitably perish, though he might have an undefined hereditary impulse to creep upon it noiselessly, strike it down by a tremendous leap, and subdue it with tooth and nail, for the pursued creature would certainly escape on account of his unskilfulness." [1]

Again, whoever says that play does not subserve, at least directly, any useful or practical end, cannot mean to deny that the ends of the instincts are practical, and that these ends they inevitably pursue. For instance, the instincts of flight are directed to the end of removing the animal from the neighbourhood of danger by rapid movement. The instinctive behaviour may be different in different animals according to their different modes of locomotion, but it is directed to the same end. Similarly the instincts of concealment are directed to the end of concealing the presence of the organism by getting into cover, or into a hole of the ground; here too the behaviour differs from one group of animals to another, though it is directed to the same end. And these instincts of flight and concealment must be directed to these practical ends of flight and concealment, whether they are active in the system of fear or in that of play. That is to say if animals in their play call such instincts into activity, they too will flee from one another and conceal themselves. Similarly with other instincts. How then is this clear line of division established between earnest and play where both involve the activity of the same instincts, and in employing them have to accept their ends?

If an instinct has always to pursue its own proximate end, it may still make a great difference in what system it is organised. For instance, an instinct of concealment is subordinated to a different end in fear from that to which it is subordinated in anger when that system employs it. So also is it subordinated to a different end in play. Here there is another and ulterior end to be considered, the end of the

[1] Groos, *op. cit.* ch. ii. p. 74.

emotional system as a whole. But how does play obtain this end, and why is it not the congeries of ends of its several instincts? Has, then, play a special instinct of its own, directing the instincts of flight, of concealment, of destruction, of fighting, of pursuit, and all others which it on occasion employs, to its own peculiar end? At least we can say from observation of its behaviour, that play is not an expression of the systems of Fear and Anger, or of the appetites of Hunger and Sex—the chief forces of animal character—however frequently it may employ their instincts. For if, as may happen in the course of play, the animal does become angry, or afraid, or hungry, and turn aside to pursue the 'serious' ends of these systems, the spirit of play is lost.

What is this spirit of play which thus excludes fear and anger, as well as the appetites of hunger and sex?

When we consider that play does not spontaneously arise when we are tired or sick, and not often when we are old; but when we are young, and vigorous, and in good health; and that it is apparently dependent on a surplus activity over and above the present serious needs of the organism; when further we observe the good spirits, gaiety, and good temper which characterise play in the animal world, and, in addition, the laughter or the smiles which accompany it among human beings, we can hardly doubt that play is a characteristic behaviour—perhaps the most characteristic behaviour—of the system which we have been considering in the previous chapter—the system of Joy. As it is with play, so is it with joy. We are more disposed to feel joy when we are well than when we are ill, when we are fresh than when we are tired, when we are young than when we are old; for the bodily organs are better nourished, and the energy is greatest, and it is therefore at such times that Joy which is the spirit of play is most often manifested. "Youth," said Groos, "probably exists for the sake of play."[1] Spencer also noticed that play generally exercises those organs which have been relatively quiescent for some time, and in which repair of tissue has not been exceeded by waste, and which therefore tend to discharge their surplus activity; and that this "useless

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. ii. p. 75.

activity of unused organs . . . passes into play ordinarily so-called where there is a more manifest union of feeling with the action."[1] This is the joy of bodily activity of animals and children let loose out of doors after they have long been shut up—a joy which is at first satisfied by rushing about without aim or direction.

Let us then assume that play is a characteristic behaviour of joy, and especially of that mood of joy which wells up in us from good health, rather than of the joy that we owe to circumstances; this being so, what light does a knowledge of this system of joy and its laws throw on the behaviour of play—of its suppression of fear, anger, and appetite, of its distinction from the serious side of life, coinciding with employment of the instincts belonging to this side?

We have first to review the principal forms of animal-play. We have already had occasion to notice that the instincts of locomotion, the ways in which different groups of animals propel themselves from place to place, whether by running, by flight, by swimming, by creeping, by leaping, by climbing and swinging themselves from branch to branch, like the apes and monkeys,—some of which instincts are more perfect than others, and depend less on practice and skill acquired by individual experience,—that these instincts are common to nearly all emotional systems, and therefore are generally active in play. The surprising thing in play is that these instincts, so necessary to the satisfaction of the appetites, to anger and the triumph over enemies, to fear and the escape from all kinds of danger, are found divorced from the practical ends of these systems, and apparently obtain no others in exchange for them, but are exercised merely for their own sake. This fact we not only can explain, but it is precisely what we should expect to occur, if instincts are not severally bound up with one emotion to the exclusion of others, but are capable of entering into systems very different from those with which they are chiefly or originally connected. For if any given instinct is disconnected from its usual system, it is no longer subordinated to the end of that system. Hence when an animal is at play, and not hungry,

[1] 'Prin. of Psy.,' ii. ch. ix. p. 630.

nor angry, nor afraid, the instincts of locomotion, and all their acquired tendencies, are no longer directed to satisfy hunger, anger, or fear. Thus when dogs alternately pursue and flee from one another, we see flight not only without fear, but without danger being present to occasion fear, and pursuit and fighting of all kinds not only without appetite or anger, but without anything which need occasion either.

In the second place we seem to find that the instincts are not only disconnected from these primary ends, but obtain no others in place of them. Hence the opinion that there is no serious motive in play, that it is "superfluous" and "useless" exercise. This opinion we can only hold so long as we do not discern the emotional system of which play is a characteristic form of behaviour. We have studied the system of joy, and the end to which it is directed,—so much clearer and more definite than in the case of either fear or anger. Now joy explains the apparent fact that play has no serious end. For the end of joy itself is apt to escape our notice because there is nothing in this end which still remains to be accomplished; for joy tends merely to maintain the present relation between self and its object, and to maintain the object as it is taken to be, so long as the joy continues to be felt.

Hence it is that there is scarcely any instinct or other tendency, belonging to the different emotions, the exercise of which may not conceivably become an object of joy. For if its ordinary exercise carries with it some degree of pleasure, then, under exceptional conditions,—as where it has not been exercised for some time, or where as in healthy childhood and youth there is a considerable surplus of energy,—it may carry so much pleasure that either the exercise itself or the visible actions in which it is accomplished, become an object of joy to us. Hence the joy of exercise when we are fresh and vigorous, which is the lowest form of play,—as when dogs who have been chained up race about wildly with manifest delight when they are let loose. Many birds and insects appear also to enjoy flying about when they have no longer to satisfy their appetites. Thus Hudson says of the fire-fly that he has "never been able to detect it doing anything in the evening beyond flitting aimlessly about like house flies in a room,

hovering and revolving in company by the hour, apparently for amusement."[1] Such movements can "be considered as play only so long as they are simply exercised. As soon as the bird is far enough on to turn his flying to account in the search for food, play changes to serious activity."[2] But this does not show that the play has no end, but that it has none beyond playing, which is the end of this variety of joy which has the impulse of play. And what we call 'play' is only play inasmuch as the instincts called into activity by it have become detached from the systems of fear, anger, and appetite, and have become attached to joy, and are now exercised because their exercise arouses joy; whereas when fear and anger intervene, the presence of their unsatisfied impulses destroys the joy, according to the law to which we have already referred.

Thus we understand what "serious activity" means in distinction from play. It means any activity which is not indulged in for itself, or for the actions it manifests, but for some ulterior end.

A conspicuous feature of the play of animals is the way in which the same movements repeat themselves again and again. The house flies are always doing the same thing, revolving round one another, meeting, and darting apart. Now objects of joy may be divided into two classes, first those which are independently existing things, as other living beings, and parts of nature, as mountains or rivers, or secondly objects which are dependent on ourselves, as our own actions. The first may long continue in their present state and remain objects of joy: the second cannot. Our actions cease as we accomplish them. But as it is part of the end of joy to maintain the object as it is, this end has to be accomplished in a different way in this class of cases: we must repeat the actions. Thus we repeat the songs we enjoy, and read again and again the same poem. We tend to repeat them as long as the joy is felt, and we should repeat them much oftener if the joy were not soon lost through the monotony of the stimulation.

Play belongs to the second class, not to the first. When,

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. xiii. p. 170. [2] Groos, *op. cit.* ch. iii. 2.

for the joy we feel, we continue looking at something beautiful, we do not generally call it play, though, as in play, we have no end different from the present state. But when our own actions are the object of joy, and to maintain them we make the same movements recur again and again, that we call play.

Mere exercise is the lowest and most monotonous form of play. The joy is all in the exercise. There is nothing to give us joy in the results we have accomplished, for we have accomplished nothing. But there is an innate tendency in the mind to systematise its activity,[1] to make of it something more than mere exercise. This we find in every instinctive activity, which is not merely exercise, but a system of actions. Thus play reaches a higher form when various instincts and acquired capacities are exercised, and one which on account of its variety is able to sustain itself for a longer time.

Why does not this systematic character of the higher forms of play destroy the joy which we feel in them? If we had to learn how to accomplish their results it would do so, as we saw in the last chapter. The presence of impulse and effort, the unattained end, the frequent failures to achieve it, would exclude joy. But the innate structure of instinct, so far as it is sufficiently defined, or so far even as the acquired processes connected with it have become habitual, carries us to its end without a consciousness of effort, or with a minimum of effort, Hence it is that the objects of many joys are rhythmical processes, which until they became rhythmical were not enjoyed. In learning an art, as skating or cycling, as long as our movements are faulty and not properly co-ordinated, we do not enjoy them, but as soon as they become easy and regular, impulse and effort tend to disappear and enjoyment supervenes. There is also, in addition to the process itself, the joy of the achievement. The child repeats again and again its little achievements, because of the joy of its success. These survive in its memory, while its failures are forgotten. Thus Joy has an important function: it tends to strengthen and to conserve good things in the widest sense by fixing them in our memory. Through its tendency to repeat the same actions, it gives recurrent exercise to the instincts, and

[1] See book i. ch. ii.

strengthens the organs connected with them, thus training the young "in directions that will be useful to them in the necessary struggle for existence."[1] But the experimentation of the child, its capacity for varying its methods to attain its ends, is not the work of joy, but of those impulses which, although they often alternate with it, tend to exclude it.

In the higher forms of play there are, then, two things to distinguish: the exercise itself, and the result of it,—the visible movements through which the instincts which are exercised accomplish their proximate ends.

In some hunting and fighting plays the instincts do not wholly accomplish their proximate ends, but are partially inhibited. If the instincts to kill or to destroy are active, they must be partially inhibited so far as the infliction of pain which they involve would put an end to the play. This applies to many cases, but not to all. Plays are either solitary or social, are concerned either with lifeless or with living objects. The destructive instinct of monkeys, parrots and cockatoos is frequently exercised on lifeless things, or such as do not feel pain. "The destructiveness of monkeys is proverbial. They gnaw boards as dogs do. . . . Long tailed monkeys amuse themselves by breaking off tough branches as they clamber from limb to limb."[2] Cockatoos try to destroy everything within their reach: "They gnaw through planks five or six centimetres thick . . . they even smash glass, and try to penetrate masonry."[3] The "favourite mischief" of certain parrots was "throwing their water cups out of the cage after they had satisfied their thirst. Their delight was evident if the cups broke."[4] In such cases the instinct of destruction is not and need not be restrained, because the breaking of things in pieces in one way or another subserves and does not spoil enjoyment. The exercise itself, the visible actions in which it is manifested, and the destructive action in which it culminates, probably all swell the total enjoyment. But the destructive instinct is in the service of joy, and is no longer directed to the ends of appetite or of anger.

Again, if we consider the solitary play of certain animals

[1] Groos, *op. cit.* ch. iii. 2.
[2] *Ibid.*, ch. iii. 1.
[3] Brehm, quoted by Groos, *ibid.*
[4] Groos, *ibid.*

with living objects, as the play of the cat with the mouse, in this too the instinct to kill or destroy is not, because it need not be, restrained. The enjoyment is not social, but solitary. The mouse is pursued, caught, tortured; is set free, escapes in terror, is pounced on and caught again, until at length it succumbs to its injuries. For the maintenance of this play the mouse is not required also to take enjoyment in the game. The cat has the play to itself.

There are also the tormenting or 'teasing' plays which are also solitary, exclude enjoyment on the part of their victims, but stop short of destruction. In fact these do not manifest the destructive instinct, but the instinct of supremacy. "After establishing its supremacy by this means the teasing is apt to develop into cruel torture."[1] Thus Brehm describes how on board ship some baboons tormented two apes. "The baboons flew at them, tore them apart, poked them in the ribs, pulled their tails, and tried in every way to break up their devoted friendship. They climbed over them, tugged at their hair, forced themselves between the inoffensive pair, until the frightened creatures sought refuge in another corner, only to be followed by their tormenters and maltreated afresh."[2] However incapable animals may be of forming the abstract conception of power over others, we cannot interpret such cases without assuming that they are capable of deriving extreme joy from perceiving the weakness of their opponents, their incapacity to make an effectual resistance. The enjoyment of the play consists not merely in the exercise of this instinct to subject others, but in perceiving the situation of subjection which it brings about. Such a case differs from the 'serious' manifestation of this instinct, which we have already considered, only so far as the system of joy replaces the system of anger. There is possibly also manifested in such cases the acquired tendency to inflict pain, and to enjoy the expression of it, though here manifested in a playful spirit, and not in revenge for a former injury. And if such animals can enjoy inflicting pain when they are not angry, it is not surprising that this disposition should be greatly developed among human beings, so that Seneca, who was often witness

[1] Groos, *op. cit.* ch. iii. 4, p. 136. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

of its effects, could write: "Such men therefore laugh, rejoice, enjoy themselves greatly, and are as unlike as possible to angry men, since cruelty is their relaxation."[1]

Passing by these kinds of play we come to those in which not only two or more animals co-operate, but which are genuinely social. For when boys at school join in inflicting 'practical jokes' on timid or spiritless boys, and in rendering them ridiculous and contemptible, such play cannot be called "social." But we refer to those in which there is no victim who must suffer in order that the rest may have enjoyment. Here it is not the pursuer and its prey that play together, but animals of the same group, or animals that are brought up or associated together. "Among beasts of prey the pursuer is far more active and interested in the game than the fleeing one, while with herbivorous animals the contrary is the case."[2] But an essential condition of the game is that the instincts of killing and of rivalry stop short of their proximate ends, or the encounter becomes 'serious,' anger or fear is aroused, and the game interrupted. Thus dogs that seize one another by the throat must not bite so hard that their teeth penetrate the flesh. Animals often inadvertently hurt one another in play. Thus a dog and badger which had been associated together became playmates. "The essentials of the game were that the badger, roaring and shaking his head like a wild boar, should charge upon the dog . . ., and strike him in the side with its head; the dog, leaping dexterously entirely over the badger, awaited a second and third attack, and then made his antagonist chase him all round the garden. If the badger managed to snap the dog's hind-quarters an angry tussle ensued, but never resulted in real fight. If Caspar, the badger, lost his temper he drew off without turning round, and got up snorting and shaking and with bristling hairs, and strutted about like an infuriated turkey-cock. After a few moments his hair would smooth down, and with some head-shaking and good-natured grunts the mad play would begin again."[3] Thus

[1] 'De Ira,' L. ii. C. v. [2] Groos, *op. cit.* ch. iii. 3.
[3] Beckmann, quoted by Groos, *ibid.*

there is some influence present which tends to restrain the instincts of rivalry and destruction, and even the instinct of defiance or threats does not provoke fear or anger. This instinct is also manifested by seals in their play: "Two of them open their powerful jaws, angrily howling in a fearful way, as though a serious combat were about to take place, but instead they lie down peacefully side by side, and perhaps begin mutual lickings."[1]

What is the influence in Play that tends to restrain or modify the powerful instincts of supremacy, defiance, and destruction, so that while these are active they neither provoke anger, nor fear, nor inflict pain, but, on the contrary, maintain the spirit in which the game is played? It is this spirit itself; it is the system of Joy, which has as its end to maintain the present relation to its object, and this object as it is. For here the 'object' is the game; and this 'relation' is the accommodation of the sense-organs to it, with the attention which follows the same direction. All these conditions, joy in the game tends to maintain as the end of its system. The dog darts away in wide sweeps, pursued by his mock opponent. He dodges, and changes his direction. He is overtaken, and seized by the throat, and the fight begins. In the end one may fall under the other, and the other stand supreme over him. That Joy should tend to maintain this process until fatigue begins and the joy ceases and both animals must stand, or lie down and pant for breath, is intelligible. But by what adjustment of itself does joy so act as to restrain a powerful instinct which is already active from pursuing its appropriate course to its end? Suppose that it did pursue its course to the end, what then? The game is at an end, and the end of joy is defeated. The teeth of the one animal have penetrated the flesh of the other, which thereupon desists through fear, or else the fight becomes 'serious' with anger on both sides. But in this case the impulse of joy is defeated. Joy tends to maintain its object, the game as a game, and therefore resists anything that would alter its nature. The girl who is enjoying her party is inclined to resist attempts to curtail it. The

[1] Finsch, quoted by Groos, *op. cit.* ch. iii. 4.

man who is enjoying his rest is annoyed if called away on business. Joy therefore admits the characteristic behaviour of an instinct as long as it is an object of joy. When it is an object of fear or anger, joy tends to restrain it, and to exclude these systems as incompatible with its own. Thus joy acquires the power of restraining the instincts of rivalry and destruction at a certain point, because such restraint is in accordance with its fundamental tendency. Sometimes, as with monkeys, the mother animal may punish the young when they overstep the limits of play, and thus further the same end at which their enjoyment aims.

This restraint of dangerous instincts may seem to be facilitated by the fact that they are so frequently exercised in play before they are called into serious activity: before, too, the organs are sufficiently developed for these instincts to become dangerous: as kittens, for instance, before they can tear anything with their teeth and claws. But, at this early age, there is still the same opposition between the impulse to play and the impulses of fear and anger; and still, under the influence of anger, the animal tries to cause injury to its opponent, and, under the influence of the enjoyment of the game, tries not to do so.

Still, if we find that the cat can cruelly play with the mouse, why should not one of the animals continue the game in play after it has ceased to be play for the other? It is in the nature of some animals, and not of others, to play in a cruel and solitary way. But this cruel play can only be maintained where one animal is in a position of greatly superior strength or skill to the other, as the cat to the mouse. Where two animals are more or less equally matched this would be impossible. The instincts of one exceeding the limits of play would provoke anger in the other: the anger of the second would provoke anger in the first, and the spirit of play would be lost. Thus it happens, in these social plays, that the fundamental impulse of joy tends to acquire a sufficient control over dangerous instincts by subordinating them to its end.

We must now formulate provisionally the law of the behaviour of play implied in the preceding section: (56) *The*

joy or enjoyment of play tends essentially to exclude all behaviour that would simultaneously excite, in the playing animal,—and, in social plays, both in the playing animal and in its companion, —anger, fear, or repugnance, and, therefore, restrains the manifestation of certain instincts within the limits required by its end.

As we rise in the scale of intelligence the joy of play acquires a new feature. The delight in certain games for human beings and perhaps for certain animals does not merely consist in the exercise, nor yet in the manifestation of certain instincts and acquired tendencies, but also in the knowledge that the game is an imitation of something that, were it real or 'earnest,' might arouse the serious emotions of fear, anger, and sorrow. At least, so far as we are even faintly aware of this fact, it becomes an additional source of enjoyment. Feeling secure, we can enjoy a certain proximity in our situation to danger. The resemblance and the contrast intensify the enjoyment. St. Augustine was perplexed by the fact that men went to the theatre to witness tragic spectacles which they would shrink from experiencing in reality.[1] But the spectacle is a play which they enjoy partly because they know it to be a representation.

Now so far as the imitation of the real is a source of joy, joy tends to maintain the imitation. The play is consciously acted, and restrained within the limits of a representation. Thus in different ways the control of instincts and other tendencies is acquired in play through the action of the fundamental tendency of joy in which these instincts are for the time being organised.

The conclusion to which our study of Play, as the typical form of the behaviour of joy, now brings us, is that Joy, notwithstanding the apparent monotony which impressed us in the last chapter, is richer in instincts and acquired tendencies than any other emotional system. For whereas other systems are principally confined to the instincts which are originally connected with them, there are scarcely any which may not be called into activity through the enjoyment of play. Thus at one time or another all the instincts of flight, of pursuit,

[1] 'Confessions,' B. iii. 2.

of concealment, of killing or destruction, of threatening or defiance, of fighting for supremacy, of subjection, may be active in play, as well as the acquired tendency consciously to inflict pain, and innumerable other acquired tendencies,—as to imitate the expression and behaviour of all human emotions,—until life itself in all its contrasts becomes represented in play. But in joy there is this significant fact that all these instincts and acquired tendencies do not originally belong to itself, but to other systems. Still it makes them its own, and impresses its peculiar character on all of them.

Has Joy then no special instinct to account for the transformations it effects, so that tragedy itself becomes a delight? That will depend on whether we are to call its system, or any part of it, an instinct. Joy has a special impulse innately organised for the pursuit of a distinctive end. Like Fear and Anger, it subordinates the proximate ends of the various instincts it employs to this fundamental end. And this fundamental end is to maintain the situation which is the cause of joy, so long as the joy in it is felt. Notwithstanding the astonishing variety of its behaviour a general character pervades it. For whereas Anger is aggressive and Fear avoids aggression, and both work to effect some change in the existing situation, Joy alone attends and behaves in such a way as to maintain it as it is; and this behaviour, while much of it may be acquired in the course of an animal's life, is, at bottom, innately determined. According to the definition of Instinct we adopted in Chapter I, the system of joy should not be called an instinct, because it pursues a certain end; but so far as it innately determines a characteristic form of behaviour for the attainment of this end, this disposition should be called an instinct.

CHAPTER IX

SORROW

1. *Of the Common Varieties of Sorrow and Melancholy*

Of all the primary emotions Sorrow is the most difficult to interpret. It has been alternately lauded for its beneficial effects and condemned for its sterility. It seems to have many and even opposite tendencies. Yet we cannot doubt that whether for good or ill it is one of the great forces which mould character. But when, passing from these generalities, we turn to examine it, how marked is the contrast to anger, fear, or joy! What variety of instincts can we expect to find in its monotonous and depressing system? What strength can it have for carrying them into effect if it have them, or for choosing between their alternative impulses? Surely our instincts, requiring some energy for their accomplishment, should be organised in any other system than that of sorrow! Let us first study its varieties as disclosed through the different types of behaviour which they manifest.

There is a sorrow that gives free vent to its tears, sobs, and groans, and by its violence and abandonment moves the spectator more than any other variety. "When a mother," says Darwin, "suddenly loses her child, sometimes she is frantic with grief, and must be considered to be in an excited state; she walks wildly about, tears her hair or clothes, and wrings her hands."[1] Gogol, in his celebrated novel, "Dead Souls," thus describes its effect on his hero:—"Hopeless sorrow, like a carnivorous worm, coiled itself about his

[1] 'The Expression of the Emotions,' ch. iii.

heart, . . . he sobbed aloud in a voice which pierced the thick walls of his prison . . . dashed his head against the wall, and struck the table with his fist, so that he wounded it till it bled; but he felt neither the pain in his head nor the violence of the blow."[1] He "fell upon a chair, completely tore off the skirt of his coat, which was hanging in shreds, flung it away from him, and, thrusting both hands in his hair, over the improvement of which he had formerly taken so much pains, he tore it out remorselessly, enjoying the pain by which he strove to deaden the unquenchable torture of his heart."[2]

There is a second and opposite type of sorrow, which is tearless and mute, and concentrated within the mind. This sorrow "too deep for tears," or with "tears that at their fountains freeze,"[3] is held to be the worst. People say, 'if she could only weep she would feel relief.' De Quincey in interpreting this type says: "The sentiment which attends the sudden revelation that all is lost! silently is gathered up into the heart; it is too deep for gestures or for words; and no part of it passes to the outside. Were the ruin conditional, or were it at any point doubtful, it would be natural to utter ejaculations, and to seek sympathy. But where the ruin is understood to be absolute, where sympathy cannot be consolation, and counsel cannot be hope, this is otherwise. The voice perishes; the gestures are frozen; and the spirit of man flies back upon its own centre."[4] Here the difference between the two types is made to depend on the nature of the loss or ruin experienced, or on the interpretation placed upon it. But there are other causes. How a man manifests sorrow often seems to rest on innate differences of temper or character, or on different stages of mental development. The child approximates to the first type; the man with his self-control to the second. But there are men also with the expansive, emotional character of the child, and who exercise a like charm, in spite of their weakness. There are others as innately disposed to reserve, and to repress emotional expression, although this tendency may be only shown at an age at

[1] Ch. xvi. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam,' xx.; 'fill'd with tears that cannot fall,' xix.

[4] 'Works,' 'Suspiria de Profundis.'

which self-control becomes possible. They are those of the 'ardent temper.'[1] If the others express more than they feel, these feel more than they express. Their "still waters run deep." "O have a care of natures that are mute!" says Meredith; "They punish you in acts."[2]

There is a third type of sorrow which is without either the impulsiveness of the first or the concentration and self-control of the second, but which sinks under a sense of weakness and discouragement, because it produces, or is conditioned by, loss of energy and physical depression. This is the sorrow which the physiological psychologists describe as having a "paralysing action . . . over the voluntary muscles,"[3] and as accompanied by a "feeling of fatigue, of heaviness."[4] The sorrowful man "moves slowly, staggers, creeps along swinging his arms, his voice is weak, without brilliancy, in consequence of the weakness of the muscles of expiration and of the larynx; in preference he remains inert, prostrate and silent."[5] This type, while it is sometimes the immediate effect of misfortunes, is also the subdued state into which violent sorrows pass after they have exhausted us. There is a mood corresponding to it, a depressed condition of body, which disposes us to feel it.

There is a fourth type at the opposite extreme to the last, which is not accompanied by a feeling of fatigue or prostration, but by an activity approaching frenzy. It is that one of "our Ladies of Sorrow" which De Quincey named the "Mater Tenebrarum." She, he says, does not move slowly, but "with incalculable motions, bounding, and with a tiger's leaps." "She is the defier of God. She is also the mother of lunacies, and the suggestress of suicides."[6] Lear in his grief curses his daughters, and cries, "O, let me not be mad, not mad, sweet heaven! Keep me in temper; I would not be mad."[7]

If we compare these four types of sorrow, which illustrate different varieties of its behaviour, we must judge that two of them at least are not pure, but mixed. The second is due to self-control. This self-control so characteristic of certain

[1] See *supra*, book i. ch. xv. [2] 'Modern Love,' xxxv.
[3] Lange, 'Les Emotions,' 'La Tristesse.' [4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*
[6] 'Suspiria de Profundis,' 'Our Ladies of Sorrow.' [7] A. i., sc. v.

natures is due in part to inherited disposition ; but it does not act without a motive. It is at the service of the system in which it is organised. Our deepest love for others, as well as the self-regarding sentiment, may lead us to restrain the expression of emotions. Sorrow apart from such control, is, like all emotional systems, impulsive ; that is to say, it tends at once to realise the expression and behaviour characteristic of the emotion. Wherever it has sufficient energy, and according to the degree of its intensity, tears, sighs, sobs, groans, and cries for help are its natural and spontaneous expression and behaviour.

The third type differs from the first chiefly by the fatigue or prostration which characterises it. Sorrow, when prolonged, tends to have a depressing effect, even if, sometimes, its immediate effect is stimulating. This type is therefore that which all prolonged sorrow tends to assume, or which characterises it at first where there is lack of energy. For when sorrow overtakes an energetic nature, or one whose energy is not yet exhausted, its effect must be very different from that which it has on the weak or indolent. But we cannot base a distinction between the intrinsic varieties of sorrow on the varying degrees of energy which different natures manifest any more than on that of the different degrees of intensity or strength in which the sorrow may be aroused. Every emotional system tends to accomplish its particular end ; and the strength which it has for this purpose depends, other things equal, on the degree in which it is aroused, and on the energy at its disposal.

The fourth is clearly a mixed type and illustrates the frequent union of sorrow with anger, in energetic natures. For threats, defiance, and revenge betray the presence of anger. The interference of anger may seem also to be indicated in the first type so far as it manifests the destructive tendency in the tearing of the hair and clothes ; but here the destructiveness is directed against oneself.

The four types we have been considering are not then based on inherent differences of the tendencies or instincts comprised in sorrow, such as we found to exist between the varieties of fear and anger ; but merely on the different

degrees of energy which belong to it, or on the degree in which it is controlled, or elicits anger. Shall we be more likely to find what we require in those varieties of its feeling which we name Sadness and Melancholy?

The feeling we call sadness is expressed rather by sighs than by sobs and tears, and in fact if these were added to it we should call it sorrow or grief. Sadness is never acutely painful, and is therefore often prolonged, as the chronic state of subdued sorrow or grief. The decline of sorrow into sadness shows that both are at bottom the same emotional system working at different degrees of intensity or strength. We have sad thoughts and recollections, sad events overtake us,—estrangement from those we love, repulse of affection, the nearness of suffering that we cannot relieve. Sadness also wells up in us as a mood when we are weak and depressed; and this sadness without external justification, except such as we make, tends to last as long as the bodily state which evoked it.

The term 'melancholy' is often employed to express the same state; but it has also a more comprehensive meaning, and sometimes includes fear, suspicion, and discontent as well as sorrow.

When it is accompanied by loss of self-control, by delusions or hallucinations, it is called 'melancholia.'

Two kinds of melancholy are distinguished, one of which is partly pleasant and has only a faint ingredient of sadness, the other, wholly painful. Burton noticed that the habit of yielding to the first disposes us to the second. Of the former, he says: "Most pleasant it is at first, to such as are melancholy given, to lie in bed whole days . . . to walk alone in some solitary grove . . . by a brook side, to meditate on some delightsome and pleasant subject . . . and build castles in the air. . . . So pleasant their vain conceits are that they hinder their ordinary tasks and necessary business, they . . . are ever musing . . . and still pleasing their humours, until at last the scene is turned upon a sudden by some bad object, and they being now habituated to such vain meditations and solitary places, can endure no company, can ruminate of nothing but harsh and distasteful subjects.

Fear, sorrow, suspicion, *subrusticus pudor,* discontent, cares, and weariness of life, surprise them in a moment . . . no sooner are their eyes open, but this infernal plague of melancholy seizeth on them, and terrifies their souls, representing some dismal object to their minds, which now by no means . . . they can avoid."[1]

This union of fear and sorrow is frequent in melancholy. "Fear and Sorrow are the true characters and inseparable companions of most melancholy,"[2] Burton goes so far as to say; for if we are disposed to feel sorrow or sadness in contemplating the present, then, if our thought is turned to the future, the same disposition leads us to anticipate evils; and the evils we anticipate tend to arouse fear in proportion as they seem to exceed those from which we are presently suffering. When, on the other hand, the present evil is so great that none seems to us greater, melancholy and sorrow exclude fear; as is expressed in the line of Wordsworth: "Hope died, and fear itself in agony was lost!"[3]

Let us, then, attempt to formulate this law: (57) *The melancholy mood excludes fear when the present suffering is so great that it cannot lead us to anticipate greater suffering in the future, but tends to elicit fear when the present suffering is not so great but that it can lead us to anticipate greater suffering in the future.*

Gray, the poet, suffered constantly from melancholy; but he observes that the pain of it may be so faint as to be easily borne. "Low spirits," he writes, "are my true and faithful companions: they get up with me, go to bed with me, make journeys and returns as I do; nay, and pay visits and will even affect to be jocose and force a feeble laugh with me; but most commonly we sit alone together, and are the prettiest insipid company in the world."[4] These lesser degrees of sadness he called "leucocholy." In contrast to them, "there is another sort, black indeed, which I have now and then felt, that has something in it like Tertullian's rule of faith, *Credo quia impossibile est;* for it believes, nay, is sure of everything

[1] 'Anatomy of Melancholy,' P. i. S. ii. mem. ii. sub. vi.
[2] *Op. cit.* P. i. S. i. mem. iii. sub. ii. [3] 'Guilt and Sorrow,' xxxix.
[4] 'Letters,' quoted by Matthew Arnold, 'Essays and Criticism,' 'Gray.'

that is unlikely, so it be but frightful; and on the other hand excludes and shuts its eyes to the most possible hopes, and everything that is pleasurable; from this the Lord deliver us. . . ."[1]

While melancholy is often the chronic state into which violent sorrow subsides, it is then, sometimes, a mood produced by some state of the body, or by our habit of yielding to it; and in former times it was regarded as one of the four temperaments. Referring to our four popular types of sorrow, it will be seen that neither sadness nor melancholy belongs to the first nor to the fourth variety. Not to the fourth, because, though frequently allied with fear, both seem to exclude anger. This is a noteworthy fact, because ordinary sorrow frequently arouses anger against its cause and sometimes against the order of the world which permits such suffering. There are therefore laws of the interaction of sorrow and fear, and of sorrow and anger, of great importance; and though with our present knowledge of their conditions we cannot define them adequately, we may attempt in a later chapter to formulate them tentatively as a guide to further research.

In the description of Melancholia by pathologists we may recognise the most contrasted types of sorrow, the weak and the violent. In the first the patient is depressed, and remains for hours in the same position, brooding over his misfortunes. "A universal gloom pervades his mind, and a distaste for all previous avocations and interests declares itself; exercise and all forms of recreation no longer appeal to him, and a dull uniform level of indifference is engendered to the outside world. . . . Life has lost its freshness—Nature presents him with no delights, and whatever there be of beauty or happiness or gaiety around, but serves to emphasise his gloom as he feels their want of kinship to his nature."[2] He "exhibits to a notable degree the effort which it causes him to think, reflect, or attend to what is said or to what he reads."[3] He is indolent, because all effort is repugnant to him: "All forms of mental exertion cause ennui and distaste, the attention

[1] 'Letters,' quoted by Matthew Arnold, 'Essays and Criticism,' 'Gray.'
[2] Bevan Lewis, 'Text Book of Mental Disease,' part ii. p. 168.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

cannot as formerly be directed without undue effort, and so reading becomes laborious. . . ."[1] His "eye is fixed, dull, heavy, sluggish in its movements . . . . the eyelids are drooped, the limbs motionless."[2]

Besides the common and depressed form of Melancholia, there is also an excited form, "melancholia agitans,"—which bears a close resemblance to one of the violent types of normal sorrow. The patients frequently exhibit "acute symptoms—*i.e.* restlessness, incessant movement, insufferable anguish. . . . ."[3] They "walk up and down like tigers in a cage, or roll about on the floor, bite their finger-nails or wring their hands, or shout, or groan, or moan, or weep loudly, or tear their clothes, and in all their attitudes and motions express strongly their mental pain."[4] This expression and behaviour of sorrow appears to the writer to be uncontrollable by the will, and to be in excess of the inward suffering. Such exaggeration is characteristic of "the Celtic race." "The wailing and weeping, the gesticulation and motor grief of an Irishwoman are usually out of all proportion to the mental pain."[5]

Melancholia is then a prolonged mood of sorrow caused and sustained, wholly or in part, by some pathological state. Whether depressed or excited, whether rising into intense emotion or subsiding into a feeling too faint to be called emotion in the ordinary sense, it is still the same system which is active as in normal sorrow, but presenting the symptoms of disease in its abnormal persistence, in the loss of self-control, in the presence of hallucination or delusions. We should therefore not be likely to find among the varieties of melancholia the strong type of normal sorrow, deep, self-controlled, and silent. But, as in melancholy, we frequently find sorrow in union with fear. The delusion of having committed an unpardonable crime naturally arouses the fear of future punishment; just as when a dreaded doom cannot be escaped, sorrow supervenes on fear. The two emotions have a natural affinity for one another. Hence it is that some

[1] Bevan Lewis, 'Text Book of Mental Disease,' part ii, p. 168.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[4] Clouston, 'Mental Diseases,' p. 82.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

writers regard fear as the essential emotion of melancholia. "We give the name of melancholia," says one, "to this condition in which we see the gradual development of a state of apprehensive depression, associated with more or less fully-developed delusions."[1]

There are certain forms of melancholy caused by visceral disease, and persisting as a mood, in which we find the same union or alternation between sorrow and fear. The depressed mood "comes on suddenly without reason and forces the patient to seek some solitary place. If it attacks him during a meal the patient will rise and leave the table as if to vomit. He will sit in some obscure corner of the ward away from his fellows or will retire to his own room and shut himself in. He will leave his home and seek some solitary place where he may weep alone and unseen. . . . He usually has an intense desire to weep—a desire that in many cases he is unable to control, and yet he is unable to say why he is miserable or why he weeps."[2] Many "are haunted by a vague idea of impending ill. They do not know the nature of this ill nor to whom it will happen."[3]

If we disconnect Sorrow from the other systems which may interfere with it, or may control it,—from fear and anger in the one case, and from love in the other—its several varieties seem reducible to two, the depressed and the excited. Are these—so contrary in their manifestations—primitive varieties of the same emotional system, or is one or the other to be explained by the influence of some factor extraneous to it? If sorrow were always a depressing emotion we should expect to find it always conditioned or accompanied by, or tending to produce, a depressed condition of bodily functions. We should not expect to find an energetic type at all. But not only are acute sorrow and melancholia sometimes accompanied by unusual energy, but certain calm and energetic natures are by temperament or habit melancholic. Aristotle thought that men of genius were of

[1] Krepelin 'Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry' (trans. Th. Johnstone), Lect. I., p. 6.

[2] Henry Head, 'Certain Mental Changes that Accompany Visceral Disease,' 'Brain,' vol. xxiv. pt. iii. [3] *Ibid.*

a melancholic temperament. Albert Dürer in his "Melancholia" represents not weakness but strength. She is a "robust female figure . . . . not melancholy either from weakness of the body or vacancy of mind. She is strong and she is learned; yet though the plumes of her wings are mighty, she sits heavily and listlessly, brooding amidst the implements of suspended labour, on the shore of a waveless sea."[1] This is not the sadness of the idle, but "the sadness of the most learned, the most intelligent, the most industrious."[2] For he that "increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

Our attempt to understand the system of sorrow through a study of its most conspicuous varieties of behaviour has not disclosed its essential nature, because these varieties have been shown to be determined either by the influence of some extraneous system, as anger or fear, or by variations in the amount of energy present in the organism. For we have to take account of the facts that the degree of energy possessed by any given individual may not only differ considerably from that which another possesses, but from that which he himself possesses at other times. If we suppose a sudden sorrow to overtake a man in whom there is little available energy to resist its depressing influence, it is obvious that it will have a more crushing effect than in the case of a man in whom there is a great store of such energy. In the one case its influence may be unresisted; in the other, it may evoke a resistance so effective as to mask the depressing effect. The sorrow of a healthy child is often violent in its manifestations when things with which he is engrossed are taken from him: the sorrow of an energetic man is often restless, because there is present the energy to restore, where that is possible, the loss sustained.

Let us now pass from considering the behaviour of sorrow to consider the nature of its system; and as this is so much more concealed than in the case of anger or fear, we shall endeavour to trace the causation of sorrow, and to discover the difference that any new sorrowful event makes to the state that precedes it.

[1] P. G. Hamerton, 'The Intellectual Life,' part x. letter ii.
[2] *Ibid.*

2. *Of the Causation of Sorrow*

As there is a primitive fear or anger aroused by stimuli innately connected with its excitement, and an acquired fear or anger dependent on preformed sentiments, so there is also a primitive sorrow, and a sorrow which is dependent on an acquired love or hate. Miss Shinn, in her careful observations of her niece, records in the second half of the first year "three or four instances every month of crying, sometimes bitterly, over disappointments or withdrawal of something enjoyed."[1] At first there was "no grief" at such withdrawal; but in the twenty-third week "she nearly cried several times at having things taken from her, or being interfered with while she was playing with them; and in the next week she was bitterly grieved at such incidents, and cried till her eyes were red."

Now we notice that in this case sorrow is caused by some interference with or frustration of a present impulse. The child's activity is engaged. He is playing with something. There is an impulse to continue the occupation. Now we have noticed that one of the most familiar causes of anger is interference with present impulse; and here we find this interference evoking not anger but sorrow. Still, there is a difference in the degree of the interference. While a certain degree of interference tends to arouse anger, an interference that amounts to frustration tends rather to arouse sorrow. Similarly while some bodily pains excite anger, as the sharp or smarting pain of a blow, other bodily pains crush us, and take away the power of resistance and of anger, and excite sorrow. Just then as we can resist some pains but not others, so we can resent a certain degree of interference with or opposition to impulse, but not a greater degree.

The causation of sorrow is then connected with some event that overpowers us or is irremediable. Where we can resist we may become angry, where we cannot there is room only for sorrow. Sorrow is the emotion of weakness. But we can be overpowered in one of two ways: (1) by an opposition to impulse so great that we cannot resist it;

[1] 'Notes on the Development of a Child,' part iii. p. 243.

(2) by a pain so great as to deprive us of energy to resist it. There are therefore two kinds of weakness: (1) our bodies may be weak, and the amount of energy for resistance small; (2) or our bodies may be strong and energetic, but the opposition to our impulse or desire may be so much stronger that resistance is unavailing. Thus in the later sorrows of life—as those that depend on the death or destruction of an object loved—whatever our strength and energy, we recognise that it is unavailing. Here sorrow is the emotion of conscious weakness, conscious not of the weakness of the body, but that all its strength is weakness in comparison with the force opposed to it. But the young child is weak in both ways: it has little strength and energy, and the power of those that control it is supreme. Thus in the first year we should expect that the general situation would dispose the child to sorrow much more frequently than to anger.

The sorrow of the child arises not only from interference with its occupations, but from other causes, such as bodily pain and discomfort. All pain is connected with an impulse to be rid of it, an impulse of repugnancy or distaste. But the child does not know how to be rid of its pain: the pain persists, and its impulse is unavailing. Here again there is present a situation of weakness, which is one of the essential conditions of sorrow, whether the child is conscious of its weakness or not. Hence the frequent crying of the young child when suffering bodily discomfort or pain, which calls the mother to its assistance. When the period of dentition arrives, fretfulness becomes chronic. Miss Shinn observes that her niece possessed a joyous disposition. "Besides the pure joy in existence that seemed to fill her, her pleasure in her own increasing freedom of muscular movement and sense activity, her delight in motion and frolic, seemed to fill her days with an exuberant joyousness."[1] But when dentition commenced, her mood changed from joy to sorrow: "for several hours she would be restless, fretful, ready to cry on slight occasion, and would demand attention and diversion constantly."[2]

Again the hunger of the child may not be satisfied at the

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. ii. p. 239. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

proper time. The impulse of its hunger is impeded by its weakness, by not possessing the congenital endowment by which so many animals find the teat. Its mother sleeps, but the first cries of its sorrow awaken her. This is that which Descartes regarded as "la première tristesse de l'enfant,—la faute de nourriture."[1] The absence of light is also a cause of sadness. Thus a sick child tried to lessen her "disagreeable sensations and her suffering," by the light. "La disparition de la lumière attriste le petit patient. Son regard est fixé au loin et les yeux peu mobiles; il est évident qu'il ne cherche que la lumière."[2]

In all these cases there appear to be two constant conditions of the causation of sorrow: (1) a present impulse; and (2) the frustration of this impulse, whether by a force opposed to it which is overpowering, or by the insufficiency of energy, strength, skill, or knowledge at the disposal of the impulse. This holds both of primitive sorrow, which is due to the frustration of some fundamental impulse,—as that of hunger or of the repugnance to discomfort or pain,—and of the sorrow to which we render ourselves liable through our sentiments, as that which overtakes us when the object we love is injured or destroyed. But in primitive sorrow there is an innate connexion between the emotion and the stimulus or cause which excites it; in the later sorrows this connexion is acquired. The first may therefore be entitled, in accordance with our usage of the word, instinctive sorrow, in the same sense in which we speak of an "instinctive sympathy." The second or later sorrows are sometimes not caused by the frustration of an impulse which had been active in us before the emotion was aroused. Thus when told of the sudden death of someone we love, our minds till that moment may have been occupied with something else; but at the news of the catastrophe this sentiment becomes active. Our thought, at first, is often surprised and confused, and it takes some time before we are able to realise our loss, and feel the sorrow consequent on it. It is not until the desires of this sentiment,—its desires of union and companionship, and reciprocating

[1] 'Les Passions de l'Âme,' 2me part.

[2] Sikorski, quoted by B. Perez, 'L'Enfant de trois à sept ans,' ch. ii. iii.

sympathy and love,—are felt to be frustrated that the sorrow arises. Let us, in accordance with our method, formulate this conclusion as a law of the causation of sorrow: (58) *When either a primary impulse, or a desire, or a sentiment is frustrated, sorrow tends to be evoked, in proportion, other things equal, to the strength of the impulse, or desire, and the degree of its frustration.*

3. *Of the Nature of the System of Sorrow*

The cause of sorrow being assumed to be such as we have explained in the last section, the next question is what difference does the occurrence of sorrow make to the impulse which has been frustrated? How does it help this impulse, or what in general is the utility of sorrow?

In the first place, has sorrow an impulse and end of its own in addition to the impulse which has been frustrated? Sorrow appears to have one principal impulse,—the cry for help or assistance. It is the emotion of weakness, the expression of failure. If we cannot help ourselves, we should possess some means of calling others to our assistance. Sorrow provides this means. The expression of its emotion is a cry different from that of other primary emotions,—or which at least in human development becomes distinctive. The cry of sorrow in the young child is different from the cry of anger or the cry of fear, and from the "crowing" and "cooing of joy." In some animals, too, there are cries indicative of sorrow: the bleating of lambs when separated from their mothers; the whining and howling of the dog, outside the door, or fastened up in the yard; the mewing of the cat.

Now, that the system of sorrow in the child is, or contains, this impulse directed to obtain from others the strength or assistance it needs, is shown, first, by its cries and other gestures which normally do obtain this assistance, and secondly, by the fact that when its inarticulate cries become articulate it expresses in language this appeal. And there are other expressions besides the cry which indicate the end of the system. Thus Miss Shinn remarks of her niece that "In the sixth month, being separated from her mother when hungry, she cried hard for her, watching at every turn in a corridor

and every door passed through, and was instantly comforted at sight of her."[1] Again in the sorrow at persistent bodily pain the same child often appealed, as we are all apt to do, for some means of distraction. During the pains of dentition she was not only disposed to cry "on slight occasion," but "would demand attention and diversion constantly."[2]

Thus the expressions and gestures of sorrow,—the glance of the eyes, indicating the direction of expectation, its watchings and waitings, as well as its pathetic cries,—all are evidence that the essential end of its system is to obtain the strength and help of others to remedy its own proved weakness.

When we pass from these primitive sorrows connected with the frustration of impulses to the later sorrows of the sentiments, this primitive end of the system is often masked. The emotion falls under the restraint of some sentiment. Thus in the self-regarding sentiment we come to distinguish those cases in which others can help us from those in which they cannot, and learn to repress useless sorrow. Hence the controlled and silent type to which we have already referred: "The voice perishes; the gestures are frozen; and the spirit of man flies back upon its own centre."[3] The sentiment of pride also restrains the impulse of sorrow, so that the cries of weakness may not escape from us. And hence, too, sorrow, on its side, is held to improve us, because it counteracts pride. And not only do the self-regarding sentiments frequently restrain sorrow, but also our affections, for the loving conceal their troubles. And thus from all these causes, as well as from temperament, there arises the silent type of sorrow in which its primary impulse is suppressed or deflected into other channels, so that it appears as if the emotion had no longer this impulse. Yet the sorrow which is concealed may address itself to another source of consolation; and those who are overwhelmed by some disaster, and call in vain for help to men, turn at length to Heaven. Prayer is the manifestation of the impulse of sorrow in this situation. "La douleur est le pont naturel qui relie l'âme à Dieu."[4] Man, says Luther, only

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 16.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 241.
[3] See *supra*, p. 312.
[4] Leibnitz, 'Théodicée.'

prays earnestly in his afflictions. One of the survivors of the wreck of the *Titanic* related his experiences on a raft with the frozen water washing over them: "We prayed through all the weary night, and there never was a moment when our prayers did not rise above the waves. Men who seemed long ago to have forgotten how to address their Creator recalled the prayers of their childhood and murmured them over and over again."[1]

There is a secondary tendency in sorrow that seems to belong to its fundamental impulse. It is in sorrow that we need so much disinterested sympathy, not only to ease the fullness of the heart, but to obtain counsel and help. Friendship and love are accounted of special advantage in misfortunes. And in fact the demand for sympathy is a development of the primitive cry for help. Unless others enter into and compassionate our afflictions they cannot or will not help us.

From this survey of the facts we conclude that sorrow is a system which possesses a characteristic impulse, first manifested in the infant's instinctive cry for help, a little later by watching for its approaches; the cry itself becoming more distinctive of sorrow, and joining itself to articulate language, appealing for relief, distraction, sympathy; and finally, on the frustration of all hope of help from men, turning to Heaven.

Now whether we are to say that there is an instinct in sorrow directed to obtaining help from others in our weakness will depend on the degree of definiteness and complexity which the primitive behaviour of our emotions must attain before their behaviour can be called instinctive. If the various cries of animals by which they express the threats or defiance of anger are instinctive, then also is the cry of sorrow instinctive. We have spoken of an instinct of threat as included in the system of anger; we shall also speak of an instinct to seek assistance as included in sorrow. Whatever verbal differences may arise at this point, the fact appears to be evident, that sorrow has an end of its own which is innately determined, an expression or behaviour instrumental to this end, which,—however much it may be modified and added to in

[1] Colonel Gracie, 'The Standard,' April 20, 1912, p. 9.

the course of development,—in its characteristic cry is also congenitally determined.

Like other instincts, this which belongs to sorrow may perhaps be found sometimes connected with other systems. Intense bodily pain provokes a cry which is not conditioned by a frustrated impulse. One of the varieties of fear appears also to have an instinctive cry for assistance. In the child, its cry is more piercing, and later becomes a shriek. Other types of fear are quite mute, and accomplish their end of escape through secrecy and silence. But fear is often combined with sorrow, and especially in the child; for, like other systems, its impulse is often frustrated. Then the impulse to evoke assistance combines with, and supports, the preceding impulse of fear. And the impulse of sorrow itself may be frustrated; and thereupon, sorrow becomes the more sorrowful. Thus, men who foresee some great disaster which they greatly fear, and can by no means avoid, feel sorrow and fear together, and cry aloud with sorrow and shriek with fear, and yet no help comes to them; and sorrow and fear reach a climax of agony. When the *Titanic* foundered in an icy sea, in the darkness, with sixteen hundred persons still on board, one of the saved who witnessed the scene from a boat, described the sinking of the vessel by the bows. "Suddenly the lights went out, and an immense clamour filled the air in one supreme cry for help. Little by little the *Titanic* settled down; and for three hours cries of anguish were heard like some vast choir singing a death song. At moments the cries of terror were lulled, and we thought it was all over, but the next instant they were renewed in still keener accents of despair. As for us, we did nothing but row, row, row, to escape from the obsession of the heartrending death cries."[1]

We have now considered the system of Sorrow, and the peculiar instinct which belongs to it, and the utility of this instinct,—the only one that could be of service to it in its situation of weakness,—and how, through experience and the growth of the mind, this instinct acquires a more complex behaviour, and how the expressions of weakness,—the tears

[1] 'The Standard,' April 20, 1912, p. 12.

and sighs and sobs,—subserve this instinct, and move even the stranger to pity and disinterested service; and yet how often all the means at its disposal, original or acquired, are fruitless, because the situation does not admit of remedy, or only with time, so that we call sorrow 'vain.' But yet we cannot rightly understand sorrow unless we bear in mind that though primary, and one of the first emotions, if not the first to be manifested in child-life, it is not independent, but is always related to a frustrated impulse, emotion, or sentiment which is the cause of its emotion; and that even where it wells up in us as a mood, it must still imagine such frustration, in order to render its state intelligible. And thus some frustrated impulse, real or imaginary, must be held to be present and to persist in the state of sorrow itself; for if this impulse were not felt or imagined to persist, sorrow would be at an end. The child that for a time forgets its hunger because it is distracted and amused, ceases to cry.

CHAPTER X

OF THE LAWS OF THE TENDENCIES OF SORROW IN THE SENTIMENTS

1. *Of Two Different Tendencies of Emotion*

In the last chapter we dealt with the common varieties of sorrow, with the manner of its causation, and with its fundamental impulse and end ; in this chapter we shall consider some of the secondary tendencies of sorrow, those which it manifests in sentiments, and of the functions that it there comes to perform.

In every emotional system we may distinguish between two kinds of tendency belonging to it: (1) Those which are 'conative,' which we feel and, so far as we identify ourselves with the system, strive to realise ; and (2) those tendencies which we do not feel and which are accomplished independently of our concurrence. An example of the first is the tendency of anger to threaten, injure, or destroy its object: an example of the second, is the tendency of anger to arouse pride, and of pride frequently to arouse anger, and of both frequently to exclude fear and to harden our feelings,—effects which occur without our concurrence, and sometimes to our astonishment or dismay. Yet any one of these tendencies, when we distinguish them, may be voluntarily pursued. Thus, a man may try to become angry to increase his feeling of strength, or to exclude fear, as he may take alcohol to stimulate his courage.

This second class of tendencies is that by which secret changes of our character are effected, such as we do not often

recognise ourselves even after they have taken place; but those who live with us often notice them. The first, being due to our concurrence, are less concealed from us. And thus through the one class or the other a man's character becomes changed, grows hard or tender, reverent or scornful, modest or shameless, according to secret laws of the emotions by which one excites or represses another, strengthens or weakens its tendencies.

We shall here confine ourselves to the first class, and consider a secondary group of conative tendencies not essential to sorrow but which it assumes in sentiments of love. This is the sorrow most familiar to us, that which is caused by the frustration of love itself through the loss or destruction of the beloved object. Its tendencies are also familiar, and have been again and again described in literature.

2. *The Law of Attraction*

The first and most familiar tendency is that sorrow, though a painful emotion, always manifests a certain attraction to its object. If sorrow is caused by separation, this attraction is shown by recollection. In the anguish at being alienated from one whom we love, we recall all the facts, and consider how the misunderstanding or the blame can be removed or forgiveness accorded, so that two who love one another may be reunited. And there is sorrow in physical separation. Lambs separated from their dams bleat or cry, and wander about in search of them. Dogs separated from their loved masters watch and whine, and travel often long distances to find them.

When sorrow is caused by death, this attraction is shown by reluctance to be separated from the corpse, by gazing long and fixedly at it, and at the coffin, and for the last time into the open grave, and sometimes by a resolution to be united in death; afterwards by maintaining the recollection of the object, and by cherishing everything which keeps this recollection fresh. Thus those who sorrow shut themselves in their chambers, and refuse to see company, that the course of their thoughts and recollections may be unimpeded; or they admit only those who will talk of the dead with them, and

sympathise with their grief. And they keep everything that reminds them of the departed, and which makes remembrance more vivid—old letters, keepsakes, and portraits; and they wander about the places where they were often together, and sometimes keep the rooms where they lived unchanged.

Literature is full of expressions of this universal tendency of sorrow at the loss of a loved object, and how when it is opposed it becomes obstinate, and, like other obstructed impulses, often manifests anger. This obstinacy is frequently noticed. Rachel mourneth for her children, and "will not be comforted." Spenser represents this tendency in conjunction with that of self-injury and desire for solitude:—

> "She wilfully her sorrow did augment,
> And offered hope of comfort did despise;
> Her golden locks most cruelly she rent,
> And scratched her face with ghastly dreriment;
> Ne would she speke, ne see, ne yet be seene,
> But hid her visage and her head down bent,"[1]
> . . . . . .

Wilhelm, says Goethe, at the loss of Mariana, passed "days of pain unmixed, ever-returning and purposely renewed."[2] "All grief," says Seneca, "is obstinate."[3] In addressing Livia, he says: "I knew that I must not oppose your grief during its first transports, lest my very attempts at consolation might irritate it, and add fuel to it."[4] "Il est des douleurs," says Marmontel, "plus attachantes que le plaisir même. Jamais, dans le plus heureux temps, lorsque la maison paternelle était pour moi si douce et si riante, je n'avais eu autant de peine à la quitter que lorsqu'elle fut dans le deuil."[5] And of sorrow's resistance to consolation, he says: "Ne le lui proposer pas comme une dissipation; les grandes douleurs y repugnent; il faut à leur insu tâcher de les distraire et les tromper pour les guérir."[6]

Resistance to consolation is secondary to this great clinging impulse of Sorrow; lest by being consoled we come to think less of the object, and finally to forget it altogether; and as

[1] 'Faery Queen.'
[2] 'Wilhelm Meister,' book ii. ch. i.
[3] 'On Consolation,' i. (Bohn).
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] 'Mémoires,' Livre i. p. 96.
[6] *Op. cit.*

instrumental to it,—and especially in the first stage of sorrow, —we endeavour to maintain the painful remembrance of the object, and the painful state of sorrow itself:

> "O sorrow, then can sorrow wane?
> O grief, can grief be changed to less?
> . . . . .
> O last regret, regret can die!" [1]

And this may even become a deliberate resolution, as it is expressed in an old ballad:—

> "The tear shall never leave my cheek,
> No other youth shall be my marrow—
> I'll seek thy body in the stream,
> And then with thee I'll sleep in Yarrow." [2]

And this endeavour sometimes strengthens itself in another way, by setting up the perpetual recollection at which it aims as an ethical ideal, involving remorse in forgetfulness and failure, according to the laws of the relative ethics of the sentiment.[3] Goethe, describing the sorrow of Meister for the loss of Mariana, writes: He "bitterly reproached himself that after so great a loss he could yet enjoy one painless, restful, indifferent moment. He despised his own heart, and longed for the balm of tears and lamentations. To awaken these again within him, he would recall to memory the scenes of his bygone happiness . . . and when standing on the highest elevation he could reach, when the sunshine of past times again seemed to animate his limbs and heave his bosom, he would look back into the fearful chasm, would feast his eyes on its dismembering depths, then plunge down into its horrors, and thus force from nature the bitterest pangs. With such repeated cruelty did he tear himself in pieces. . . ." [4]

If the attraction of sorrow for its object is shown not only in maintaining union with the object in thought, in resisting consolation, in renewing its own suffering, in setting up all that it strives to do as an ethical ideal, it would seem that it must

[1] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam,' lxxviii.
[2] 'Mallet.' [3] See book i. ch. xi.
[4] 'Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship,' book ii. ch. i. (Carlyle's trans.).

on reflection attach a value to the state of sorrow itself. Augustine describing his grief in youth at the loss of a loved friend, wonders in his profound way at this value set upon the painful emotion, asking whether the tears of love are pleasant or painful: "Thus was I wretched, and that wretched life I held dearer than my friend."[1] Coventry Patmore, in his description of the inconsolable sorrow of lost spirits, conceives it as preferred to enjoyment:—

> "Retaining still such weal
> As spurned lovers feel,
> Preferring far to all the world's delight
> Their loss so infinite, . . ."[2]

And Tennyson, who calls sorrow "cruel fellowship,"[3] and "sweet and bitter in a breath,"[4] yet invokes her to dwell with him, and be "no casual mistress but a wife."[5]

There is thus ample evidence that, in this type, sorrow is attracted to the object, and does not avoid it on account of its painfulness, whether the sorrow be caused by absence, alienation, or death. Remembrance of the object, resistance to consolation, pursuit of solitude, renewal or augmentation of suffering, valuation of sorrow, and the ideal of its constancy, are but diverse manifestations of this attraction, different means which it adopts in different situations to attain its end.

Let us now attempt to express this tendency which has such various manifestations, as a universal law of the sorrow of love: (59) *The sorrow of love is ever attracted to the beloved object, and, in diverse ways, strives to maintain all that remains of the former union.*

3. *The Law of Restoration*

There is a second tendency belonging to this same type of sorrow, and so much involved with the first that the two are often confused together. This is the tendency of sorrow to restore the former state of the object, or the former relation in which it stood to the subject. Thus the attraction of

[1] 'Confessions,' B. iv., ii. (Ed. Pusey).
[2] 'The Unknown Eros' 'Tristitia.'
[3] 'In Memoriam,' iii. [4] *Ibid.* iii. [5] *Ibid.* lix.

sorrow to its object during prolonged absence is shown not only in absorbing recollection of it, but also in the desire to restore the former conditions of sense-perception. When the object is present, and sorrow arises on account of its illness, misfortune, or death, the force of attraction is still shown by maintaining this presence; but there also arises the desire to restore the former state of the object before it was overtaken by misfortune or death. Thus the two tendencies, though so much involved with one another, remain distinguishable. Even in our 'regrets,' to which we may refuse the name of 'sorrow,' on account of their insufficient intensity, how clearly this tendency is shown. If we break anything which has been a joy to us, our first thought is how it can be mended; and when it is simply lost we desire to find it—to restore it to the former relation to ourselves. And so when the same emotional system is excited in the higher degree that we call sorrow, this tendency is often revealed in the first spontaneous cries to which it gives rise. Thus Juliet's mother exclaims when she first sees her daughter lying in appearance dead:—

> "O me, O me!—my child, my only life!
> Revive, look up, or I will die with thee!—
> Help, help!—call help."[1]

Here we see expressed not only the desire for restoration, but with it sorrow's universal appeal for help. But even where death is certain, and the futility of the appeal induces its repression, still it is present in the thought, because the tendencies themselves are working in the emotion. In grief for the loss of his friend, another poet, while recognising the impossibility of restoring him to life, is constrained to cry:—

> "Ah yet, ev'n yet, if this might be,
> I falling on his faithful heart,
> Would breathing thro' his lips impart
> The life that almost dies in me. . . ."[2]

And we have the reiterated appeal not only for the restoration of life, but of the former union; which, like so

[1] 'Romeo and Juliet,' A. iv., Sc. v.
[2] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam.' xviii.

many other wishes for the impossible, survives in the imagination :—

"Deep folly! yet that this could be—
That I could wing my will with might
To leap the grades of life and light,
And flash at once my friend to thee."[1]

Sometimes the impulse for restoration, recognising its end to be impossible in this life, looks to another, and with sorrow's cry for help, appeals to the pity of the Eternal to reunite those who have here been separated. And even Death seems to afford an imperfect bond of union, but—

"Dark is that last stage of sorrow
Which from death alone can borrow
Comfort."[2]

And the lover calls to the spirit of his beloved to restore their union :

"Take me to thee!
Like the deep-rooted tree,
My life is half in earth, and draws
Thence all sweetness; oh may my being pause
Soon beside thee!

"Soul of my soul!
Have me not half, but whole.
Dear dust, thou art my eyes, my breath!
Draw me to thee down the dark sea of death,
Soul of my soul!"[3]

And sometimes it seems to be the dead that calls to the living :—

"I wish I were where Helen lies;
Night and day on me she cries,
Out of my bed she bids me rise,
Says 'Haste and come to me.'"

Hence from the impossibility of the end being accomplished in this life, and the possibility of union in or through death, arises so often the suicidal impulse, and the resolution in which it may culminate : "Il delibère de mourir en cette

[1] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam.' xli.
[2] G. Meredith, 'The Shaving of Shagpat,' 'The History of Bhanavar the Beautiful.'
[3] *Ibid.*

tristesse, n'ayant autre plaisir que de suivre son enfant au sepulchre."[1] Sorrow, at this stage, often becomes calm and 'unemotional'; for any check to its impulse, which so much increases the emotional intensity, is no longer felt, since it has found a way in which it can discharge itself, has formed a resolution on which it is prepared to act. The emotion may be said to have almost ceased; but the system is the more efficiently active. Thus Romeo, on being informed of the death of Juliet, shows no weakness, yields to no outburst of emotion, invokes no help from men, but, calm and restrained, the inherent force of sorrow quickly forms into a resolution :—

> " . . . get me ink and paper
> And hire post horses ; I will hence to-night."

And is followed by the reflection :—

> " O, mischief! thou art swift
> To enter in the thoughts of desperate men !
> I do remember an apothecary——." [2]

We have furnished sufficient evidence of this second impulse of sorrow and of its various manifestations, according to the outlet which the impulse discovers, and shall now attempt to express the law of its tendency : (60) *The sorrow of love tends to restore that state of the beloved object, or that relation to it, the loss or destruction of which is the cause of sorrow.*

Thus the former law reveals the tendency of sorrow to preserve what we still have, and this, to get back what we have lost.

4. *Of the Source of the Tendencies of Attraction and Restoration in Sorrow*

To what source can we trace these secondary tendencies of Sorrow? Are they inherent in it at the stage at which it becomes a constituent of a sentiment; or are they derived from some other emotion of the same system? When we speak of this higher stage of sorrow, we imply that the love of which it is now a part is an essential condition of it, so

[1] Calv. *Instit.* 332 (quoted by Littré, Dict. Art. Tristesse).
[2] 'Romeo and Juliet,' A. v. Sc. i.

that, apart from love, the loss or destruction of a certain object would not be a cause of sorrow; but this does not hold of the primitive varieties of sorrow which do not depend on any love of their objects, but on the frustration of some fundamental impulse.[1]

We can hardly overlook the resemblance between the law of Attraction of sorrow and the fundamental law of Joy. For joy, we found, tends to maintain the present situation,—that state of the object and relation of the subject to it which for the time exists. Now what is the normal relation of joy to sorrow in love? That joy precedes sorrow. In some cases joy is present from the beginning; in others it grows with acquaintance. In sex love it strikes us suddenly, and in most cases at first sight. It is the same with places: in some we feel a delight at first sight; in others we gradually come to feel enjoyment as we know them better. After this joy, and with the loss of its object, comes sorrow, if the force of joy is sufficiently strong, if the attraction of other things does not counterbalance the loss. Now joy tends to maintain the object and our relation to it. But when sorrow comes, this object or this relation has been injured or destroyed. What remains becomes the object of sorrow; and as joy holds to what it has, sorrow clings to what remains, to memories and keepsakes, to the body in spite of disease or death, to the character fallen from our ideal.

Now we have become familiar with the fact that instincts, and acquired as well as innate tendencies, originally belonging to one emotional system, may also become organised in others to which they are of advantage. It seems probable that the tendency of sorrow which attracts it to the object is derived from the joy that preceded it; for both make union with the object a principal end. But, if so, the kind of sorrow which we call pity seems to be exceptional. In pity we sorrow at the injury or suffering even of strangers, in whose presence we have felt no joy. We feel pity and horror at the great calamities that overtake numbers of persons whom we have never seen. But how much stronger is ordinarily our pity for those we love!

[1] See ch. ix. 2.

This pity may be one of the emotions that are only developed in and through love; though afterwards it may acquire sufficient independence to be capable of being aroused on behalf of strangers.

The second tendency of this type of sorrow bears no resemblance to anything we find in joy. Joy has no tendency to restore a former state of its object because it takes delight in the present state. Neither does joy tend to restore the relation between self and the object of joy, because that relation is still present. The object must first be injured or destroyed, or the relation to self be lost; that is to say, the condition of sorrow must first be operative before there can be place for a restorative tendency.

Now it is a familiar experience that the absence of some new object that has delighted us, that we were even beginning to love, awakens a longing for renewed experience of it. This shows itself in many directions. If people have seen a play that delighted them they want to see it again. If they have been for a holiday in the country, and the place which they have visited has day by day revealed new attractions, renewing their joy in it, they feel that they must revisit it on another occasion. Yet in these cases we should not say that the impulse to restore the former state is always accompanied by a feeling of sadness. For where joy is not interrupted, and we remain long in presence of the object, we may part from it without sadness; but after some time has elapsed, if the joy has been strong enough, we begin to desire it afresh, and, sometimes, at first without sadness. But where joy is first interrupted, and afterwards frustrated, with the impulse to restore the former state, anger and sorrow may be successively aroused, as we see so often with children who stamp on the ground and cry when deprived of what they enjoy. Miss Shinn relates of her niece that while at the beginning there was "no grief" at such deprival, because the memory was not perhaps sufficiently strong to preserve the traces of it, yet that in the twenty-third week "she nearly cried several times at having things taken from her, or being interfered with while she was playing with them; and in the next week she

was bitterly grieved at such an incident, and cried till her eyes were red." [1]

While in these cases sorrow is felt, there are others where deprival does not elicit it, while yet there is present an impulse to restore the former state. Call away a dog from his food; he is angry at the interruption, and as he obeys turns his head repeatedly to look at the food, desiring to return to it. Or call the same dog away from the fire, and oblige him to lie down some distance off; by and bye he stealthily returns. So also if we are enjoying a book, and somebody interrupts us, all through the interruption we feel that we want to get back to it; but while we sometimes feel anger, we do not feel sorrow.

When, therefore, the impulse of joy to maintain the present state is interrupted, so that this state is not maintained, it at once tends to arouse this second impulse to restore the former state with or without the emotion of sorrow, which supervenes when the degree of frustration is sufficient. While this second impulse is so characteristic, as we have seen, of the sorrow of love, which is never without it, the impulse may nevertheless be elicited without the emotion. There seems to be an innate connexion between it and the impulse of attraction manifested by joy, so that whenever the latter is interrupted the former tends to be evoked. Let us then assume this to be one of the laws of the innate connexion of emotional dispositions at the root of love to which we have referred in the first book [2]: (61) *Whenever the impulse of joy which maintains the state on which it is dependent is interrupted, so that the joy also is at an end, it tends to elicit an impulse to restore that state.*

While then we must now recognise that both the impulses of attraction and of restoration belong to the system of sorrow, so far as it is organised in the sentiment of love, we do not conclude that these impulses cannot be active without exciting the emotion. Our whole study of the primary emotions has shown us that however much we are inclined at first to assume that there is an indissoluble connexion between an emotion and the impulses and instincts belonging to its system, yet

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 243. [2] Ch. iv. 1. p. 35—38.

these impulses and instincts may not only be found in other systems, but may be elicited without exciting the emotion, where they are carried out rapidly and without obstruction. The bird flies away instinctively from anything that moves suddenly in its neighbourhood, and only stops when it is at a sufficient distance. We have no ground for assuming that it always experiences an emotion of fear; it is sufficient that the impulse is aroused which is connected with an instinct of flight. We also avoid dangerous collisions in the crowded streets and, through instinct and habit combined, make the appropriate movements, often without any emotion of fear. In both cases the system of fear is elicited for our protection on its instinctive and mechanical side, arousing in consciousness impulses and the sensations that accompany their fulfilment, without emotion.

It is the same here. The interruption of joy elicits some part of the system of sorrow, and often the impulse of restoration accomplishes its end at once. The disobedient child goes on with what he is doing, and does not attend to what is said to him; or he returns to do it again. A man interrupted in what he is doing may turn his head and dismiss the intruder. Even when the obstruction persists, and the impulse along with it, still there may be no feeling of sorrow, but rather anger aroused by the obstruction, and which is directed to overcoming it; but still working in the interests of the impulse of restoration, as that, too, works in the interests of the initial joy. In such intricate and hidden ways are the systems of our emotions connected together.

Now we found that an essential condition of primitive sorrow was the frustration of some impulse—as that of hunger, or that of bodily pain—how far does this hold of the sentiment of love? The cause of this sorrow is generally referred to some external event, as absence, or death, rather than to a change provoked in the sentiment itself. But it is plain that prolonged absence does frustrate the desire of union which is one of the essential tendencies of love, and that death does this in a still greater degree, and that both provoke sorrow because this frustration is recognised or felt; and even when we know that absence will not be prolonged,

still this union, so far as the sensible presence of one to the other is concerned, is at present severed.

How much sorrow is conditioned by the frustration of impulse is shown by the increasing intensity with which it is felt when its own impulses are frustrated, and on the other hand how much it is mitigated when we hope that these impulses will succeed! And there is always an interaction between sorrow and hope, or some other prospective emotion, when sorrow foresees the end at which it is aiming. This we shall have to consider when we come to deal with desire. At present we have only to notice that sorrow is either increased or diminished according as its impulses are obstructed or furthered. Thus sorrow has an inherent impulse to cry for help, and in man to express this in articulate language; and when repeated cries bring no help, sorrow increases. Similarly, the impulse of restoration is frustrated by death, and our cries of sorrow are vain, and therefore this sorrow is the worst, unless we have hope of some other union. And between such frustration and the fulfilment of the impulse there are gradations of all degrees that modify the intensity of sorrow. If the prospective emotions of hope and despondency are not definitely aroused there occur variations of expectancy according as the changes which occur are favourable or the reverse. The dog, outside the door in the cold, yelps with sorrow. The yelp is its primitive cry for help. Its sorrow varies in intensity according as the expectancy which accompanies its cries is favourably affected or the reverse. When footsteps are heard along the passage approaching its neighbourhood, the dog begins to wag his tail, and the cries of sorrow diminish. But when the footsteps pass by and recede into the distance, and the door remains unopened, with this frustration of its impulse, the cries of sorrow are redoubled.

Thus is the emotion of sorrow acted on by the changes to which its impulses, and the expectant attitude which belongs to them, are subjected; and thus are we told to sorrow always with hope, lest we sorrow with despair.

The laws of sorrow implied in the preceding account we shall now attempt to define: (62) *The absence, injury, or*

destruction of an object of joy tends to arouse a type of sorrow which is distinguished by its impulse of restoration, and derives from the preceding joy an impulse of attraction to its object; (63) *According as these impulses of attraction and restoration of sorrow are furthered, impeded, or frustrated, the emotion is itself diminished, increased, or reaches its maximum.*

We have now seen how much more complex the system of sorrow is in the sentiment of love than in its earlier manifestations. Two additional impulses to which we have referred become organised in it, themselves branching out into a number of subordinate tendencies, producing resistance to consolations, obstinate resolutions, pursuit of solitude, and others. Are these tendencies instincts? Our answer will depend on the latitude of meaning we attach to the term. That their ends are innately determined there can be little doubt. They produce also a kind of behaviour which in part, and in its most characteristic part, is not learnt through experience. The child does not learn to go on doing something that it enjoys, but this behaviour underlies most of the things that it does learn to do, and is instrumental to them. Neither does the child wholly learn through experience to return to do what it has enjoyed doing. The dog looks back at the food from which he has been called away, and returns to it when he can. We look back at places which have attracted us in quitting them; and the many glances that lovers in parting throw after one another plainly tell their wishes to be together still. And thus in the very process of losing anything and therewith our joy in it, we adopt instinctively or at least through inherited endowment, a behaviour instrumental to getting it back. If much of the muscular co-ordination of bodily movements is acquired by the child through experience, this use to which it is put does not seem to be acquired.

The tendencies of attraction and restoration belonging to this type of sorrow have then a behaviour which, in its general character, does not seem to be learnt through experience, any more than its end is so learnt, but to be in part instinctive. The principal function of sorrow in love follows from the

nature of these tendencies. We have noticed in the first book,[1] that joy and sorrow as they succeed one another are the most common cause of our love of an object. But this statement is ambiguous. If the conclusion we reached in the first book is valid, we neither acquire the primary emotional dispositions that are implied in love, nor yet their organisation with one another ; both of which are part of the constitution of the mind. What we usually acquire is the connexion between them and some object on behalf of which they are displayed. Until this connexion is formed, there is the disposition to love, but not love itself. Now it is through the succession of joy and sorrow about a given object that love is acquired for this object. Their function in love is to establish this bond ; and from this point of view they are the most important emotions of its system. And as soon as joy in the presence of anything is felt for the thing itself and not for its advantages, the whole system of love is rendered incipiently active on its behalf. But though love is so often stirred within us a little, and for so many things, it is seldom aroused to strong and enduring activity ; but commonly passes away as quickly as it has arisen. It is the great function of sorrow in love, through its tendencies of attraction and restoration, to establish a durable bond with the object. For the bond which joy alone forms with an object would in its absence be quickly dissolved, were there no sorrow to reinforce it.

[1] Ch. iv.

CHAPTER XI

OF THE LAWS OF THE INCREASE AND DIMINUTION OF SORROW

THERE are some familiar laws of the increase and diminution to which sorrow is liable that we shall attempt to define in this chapter, to serve as a basis for the further research that will (1) reveal the facts that contradict them, and (2) bring out their remaining ambiguities: thereby taking that step in advance without which we cannot carry these laws nearer to the ideal of universally true or scientific laws.

It is a general law that (64) *The intensity of emotions is proportioned, other things equal, to the degree in which they contrast with preceding or accompanying states.* This law has been frequently noticed. Adam Smith expressed it as follows: "The vivacity . . . of every sensation, as well as of every sentiment, seems to be greater or less in proportion to the change made by the impression of either upon the situation of the mind or organ; but this change must necessarily be the greatest when opposite sentiments and sensations are contrasted, or succeed immediately to one another."[1] It seems to be a particular form of this law that (65) *Sorrow tends to be increased by the close precedence of joy, and in proportion to the clearness of our remembrance of it in our experience; and, again, by perceiving the signs of joy around us, and in a less degree by the thought that, while we sorrow, others rejoice.*

Many observations in literature bear witness to this law.

[1] 'Hist. of Astronomy,' sect. i.

Thus, Dante says,

"Nessun maggior dolore
Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
Nella miseria." [1]

Tennyson repeats it:

"This is truth the poet sings
That a sorrow's crown of sorrows is remembering happier things." [2]

It is implied in what Balzac says of the fortitude of one of his characters: "Il a fallu, comme elle, n'avoir connu qu'une rapide saison de bonheur pour résister à tant de secousses!" [3] Another says: "Le meilleur remède que je sache pour les douleurs présentes, c'est d'oublier les joies passées." [4] Shakespeare represents the unfortunate queen of Richard II. as declining to hear tales of joy or sorrow?

"For if of joy, being altogether wanting,
It doth remember me the more of sorrow;
Or if of grief, being altogether had,
It adds more sorrow to my want of joy;" [5]

Meredith says:

"The curse of sorrow is comparison
As the sun casteth shade night showeth star,
We measuring what we were by what we are,
Behold the depth to which we are undone." [6]

Moreover the comparison which increases sorrow may include not only our own past joys, but those of others around us: "Oderunt hilarem tristes, tristemque jocosi." [7] For sometimes the expressions of another's happiness reminds us of our own lost happiness:

"Thou'll break my heart, thou bonnie bird
That sings upon the bough;
Thou minds me o' the happy days
When my fause love was true." [8]

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1 'Inferno,' canto v. line 121.
2 'Locksley Hall.'
3 'Madame de la Chanterie,' ch. liv.
4 Desper, 'Cymbal,' p. 157.
5 'Richard II.,' a. iii. sc. iv.
6 'The Shaving of Shagpat,' 'The Thwackings.'
7 Horace, 'Epistolae at Tollium,' i.
8 Robert Burns.

And people are aware of this; for when they come into the presence of anyone afflicted with sorrow, they repress the expression of enjoyment, and replace it by one of sympathy and sadness. And thus it is that when disaster comes in the midst of enjoyment it would at once make the greatest impression, did we not so often fail to realise it. Adam Smith observes: "Grief comes on slowly and gradually, nor ever rises at once to that height of agony to which it is increased after a little time. But joy comes rushing upon us all at once like a torrent."[1] But with some quick minds it is different. "When any distress or terror," says Goethe, "surprises us in the midst of our amusements it naturally makes a deeper impression than at other times, either because the contrast makes us more keenly susceptible, or rather because our senses are then more open to impressions, and the shock is consequently stronger."[2]

(2) There is a complementary law to the one we have been considering: (66) *Sorrow tends to be diminished by the close precedency and by the remembrance of other sorrow in our experience, and again by the perception of the signs of sorrow around us, and in some, though in a less degree, by the knowledge of such suffering.*

This law, like the preceding, seems to be a particular form of a more general law, which has also been referred to by Adam Smith. He states it in the following terms: "As the opposition of contrasted sentiments heightens their vivacity, so the resemblance of those which immediately succeed each other renders them more faint and languid."[3] "A parent," he proceeds, "who has lost several children immediately after one another, will be less affected with the death of the last than with that of the first, though the loss in itself be, in this case, undoubtedly greater; but his mind being already sunk in sorrow, the new misfortune seems to produce no other effect than a continuance of the same melancholy. . . ."[4] "Those who have been unfortunate through the whole course of their lives are often indeed habitually melancholy, and

[1] 'History of Astronomy,' sect. i.
[2] 'The Sorrows of Werther,' June 16.
[3] 'History of Astronomy,' sect. i.
[4] *Ibid.*

sometimes peevish and splenetic, yet upon any fresh disappointment, though they are vexed and complain a little, they seldom fly out into any more violent passion, and never fall into those transports of rage or grief which often, upon the like occasions, distract the fortunate and successful."[1] Adam Smith concludes that on this law are founded "in a great measure, some of the effects of habit and custom. It is well-known that custom deadens the vivacity of both pain and pleasure, abates the grief we should feel for the one, and weakens the joy we should derive from the other . . . : because custom and the frequent repetition of any object comes at last to form and bend the mind or organ to that habitual mood and disposition which fits them to receive its impression, without undergoing any very violent change."[2]

Whether this law that, where successive emotions resemble one another the last tends to be on that account weaker, can be maintained with the generality which Adam Smith ascribed to it may be doubted. Our experience of the behaviour of anger seems to contradict it. If a man is already in some degree under the influence of anger, it will probably be increased by opposition to his wishes. Children are so well aware of this fact that they select the most favourable times for requesting favours of a parent that are likely at others to be refused. There are indeed some men, says Gratian, "who cannot refuse"; with them no skill is required. "But with others their first word at all times is No; with them great art is required . . . Surprise them when in a pleasant mood, when a repast of body or soul has just left them refreshed . . . The days of joy are the days of favour, for joy overflows from the inner man into the outward creation." It is not "a good time after sorrow."[3] In a quarrel we often observe anger to be steadily increased as the insults become more degrading to the person to whom they are offered. It seems to be partially the same with fear. For although sudden fears are the worst, the coward's fears grow with his cowardice. The fact that he has frequently experienced fear

[1] 'History of Astronomy,' sect. i. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] 'Art of Worldly Wisdom,' trans. J. Jacobs, ccxxxv.

in the past does not render his sensibility to it the less lively in the future.

There are therefore limiting conditions of the truth of the law; and we have here to contract it to those cases of sorrow to which it seems perfectly applicable. A succession of sorrows tends to blunt our sensibility to fresh ones. A Spanish author observes: "one sorrow soothes another's bitterness";[1] and another that "To think of bygone sorrows soothes the troubles of to-day."[2] Seneca observes that a "long course of adversity has this good in it—that though it vexes a body a great while, it comes to harden us at last."[3]

It is a part or consequence of this same law, though it shocks us to recognise it, that Sorrow is lessened or consoled by the perception or the knowledge that others suffer around us, or have similarly suffered in the past. You "cannot mention," says Seneca, "any house so miserable as not to find comfort in the fact of another being yet more miserable."[4] Cicero thinks this consolation superficial: "Levis est consolatio ex miseriâ aliorum."[5] Yet death would be a more terrible evil to contemplate were it not common to us all; and it is a noteworthy fact that if the evil from which we suffer seems peculiar to ourselves, or not fairly distributed in the world, we are apt to have an angry feeling at its injustice. Here is that railing against governments, or that "challenging of the heavens" which De Quincey found in certain kinds of sorrow, which those who have respect or piety will repress, although their sorrow none the less tends to evoke it under these conditions. What we suffer we think others ought to suffer. "Mythology tells us that the Gods are not exempt from suffering, its aim, I suppose, being to lighten our sorrow at death by the thought that even deities are subject to it."[6] And "it is a consolation," says Seneca, "to a humble man in trouble that the greatest are subject to reverses of fortune, and a man weeps more calmly over his dead son in the corner of his hovel, if he sees a piteous funeral proceed out of the

[1] 'Vayas-y-Ponce,' quoted by Harbottle, 'Dict. of Quotations,' p. 37.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 49.
[3] 'Of Consolation': To Helvia, ii.
[4] 'On Consolation,' xii.
[5] 'Epistolæ,' vi. 3.
[6] Seneca, *op. cit.*, xii.

palace."[1] Yet this consolation is not therefore unkindly, but often is accompanied with sympathy and pity :

> "When we our betters see bearing our woes,
> We scarcely think our miseries our foes.
> Who alone suffers, suffers most i' the mind,
> Leaving free things, and happy shows, behind ;
> But then the mind much sufferance doth o'erskip,
> When grief hath mates, and bearing fellowship.
> How light and portable my pain seems now,
> When that which makes me bend makes the king bow ; . . ."[2]

(3) The laws that we have just considered seem to be closely connected with two others, and often to be confused with them. The first is that (67) *In proportion as the event which causes sorrow is both sudden and unexpected, it tends also to arouse surprise, and therefore to increase the intensity or strength of the sorrow ;* and the second that (68) *In proportion as the event which causes sorrow either occurs gradually or is foreseen, the sorrow on that account tends to be felt with less intensity or strength.*

We are so well aware of these two laws that when any great and sudden disaster has to be communicated to another we break the news gradually to him, so that his mind may be prepared for it, and the shock be less violent. For even if he do not foresee it, yet by withdrawing his mind from amusements, or by preparing it for serious thought, the contrast between the emotion and the feeling that precedes it will be less marked, and therefore, in accordance with the preceding law, the sorrow will not be felt with the same intensity. But further by leading the mind gradually and partially to anticipate the event we have to announce its suddenness and unexpectedness is diminished, and with them the surprise ; and with their diminution the immediate intensity of sorrow will be also diminished. For, as we shall notice in a later chapter, surprise tends to intensify every emotion with which it blends.

Hence it is that these different causes of the intensity of sorrow being often implicated with one another, are often confused. For the more one state of mind con-

[1] 'De Ira,' l. iii. xxv.

[2] Shakespeare, 'King Lear,' a. iii. sc. vi.

trasts with another, the more it is apt to surprise us, and the less, the less. If we are already in a sorrowful state of mind, a new misfortune, however suddenly imparted, and however unexpected its particular form may be, will surprise us less because the preceding state of mind makes us not only feel sorrow, but also prone to anticipate it in the future; whereas if imparted to us in the same way in the midst of enjoyment, it surprises us the more because the mind is then without the thought of sorrow.

For the same reason that we break bad news to people by degrees, do some natures try to familiarise their minds with the thought of the certain or probable evils in store for them. There are others who adopt the opposite course, and try not to think of such evils, either feeling confident that when the time comes they will have the courage for dealing with them, or because they prefer to live in a fool's paradise. It is of the latter that Seneca is thinking when he says: "we never expect that any evil will befall ourselves before it comes; we will not be taught by seeing the misfortunes of others that they are the common inheritance of all men, but imagine that the path we have begun to tread is free from them . . . When, therefore, misfortunes befall us, we cannot help collapsing all the more completely, because we are struck as it were unawares: a blow which has long been foreseen falls much less heavily upon us."[1] For "by looking forward to the coming of our sorrows we take the sting out of them when they come."[2] "He who has not been puffed up by success," he thinks, "does not collapse after failure . . . .; for even in the midst of prosperity he has experimented on his powers of enduring adversity."[3]

Thus does surprise render it more difficult for us to control sorrow when it comes. But the observation of Adam Smith that we cannot realise a sudden misfortune at once though it holds of many, yet does not exempt them from the influence of surprise, which, when they have grasped the situation, still tends to intensify their sorrow. At first, the shock of surprise tends to confuse the mind so that we cannot understand what

[1] 'Of Consolation,' ix. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] Of Consolation: To Helvia, v.

has taken place; and sometimes, when it is extreme, we do not recover from the effects. Upon this Montaigne remarks: "Voila pourquoi les Poetes feignent cette miserable mere Niobé, ayant perdu premierement sept fils, et puis de suite autant de filles, sur-chargée de pertes, avoir esté enfin transmuée en rocher,—diriguisse malis: pour exprimer cette morne, muette et sourde stupidité, qui nous transsit, lorsque les accidens nous accablent, surpassans nostre portée. De vray, l'effort d'un desplaisir, pour estre extreme, doit estonner toute l'ame, et lui empescher la liberté de ses actions."[1]

We have, therefore, to take into account a limiting condition of the law that surprise intensifies sorrow. The effect of surprise on the nervous system must not be so great as permanently to deprive us of the degree of intelligence required to estimate misfortunes.

(4) Another of the familiar laws of the increase and diminution of sorrow is that (69) *Sorrow tends to be diminished by the knowledge that another sorrows with us.* And the complementary law is that (70) *Sorrow tends to be increased by the knowledge that another rejoices at our suffering.*

> "To weep with them that weep doth ease some deal,
> But sorrow flouted at is double death."[2]

"A principal fruit of friendship," says Bacon, "is the ease and discharge of the fulness and swellings of the heart. . . ."

"Friendship works two contrary effects, for it redoubleth joys, and cutteth griefs in halves."[3]

It has been usual in modern times to refer this diminution of sorrow to the influence of sympathy. Sympathy in this sense means something more than the mere fact that the emotion of another corresponds with our own, though even the knowledge of this correspondence tends, as we have seen, to diminish sorrow. But the sympathy referred to means the disinterested use to which such sympathetic emotion is put, as shown by the readiness of the other to afford us help in misfortune.

[1] 'Essais,' l. i. ch. ii. 'De la Tristesse.'
[2] Shakespeare, 'Titus Andronicus,' A. iii. Sc. i. l. 245.
[3] Bacon, Essays, 'Friendship.'

Now we should anticipate that this would tend to alleviate sorrow, because sorrow is the emotion of weakness, and its fundamental impulse is the appeal for help; and the knowledge that someone is willing to help us is a partial fulfilment of its appeal. On the other hand, the knowledge that, when we are so weak, our enemy is ready to take advantage of our weakness, will tend to increase sorrow by obstructing its impulse, and, when anger is aroused, to make it bitter.

(5) There are two other complementary laws closely connected with those we have been considering. (71) *Sorrow tends to become more painful through being kept secret*; and (72) *Sorrow tends to become less painful through being disclosed.*

"Give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak,
Whispers the o'erfraught heart, and bids it break."[1]

"Strangulat inclusus dolor."[2]

"Sorrow concealed, like an oven stopp'd,
Doth burn the heart to cinders where it is."[3]

"La douleur, qui se tait n'en est que plus funeste."[4]

"He oft finds med'cine who his griefe imparts."[5]

"So sorrow is cheered by being poured from one vessel to another."[6]

"And yet unless we mourned in Thine ears, we should have no hope left."[7]

With regard to the second and complementary law there is a condition which plainly limits it. It does not ease sorrow to tell it to one who receives it with ridicule and contempt. The recipient must feel sympathetically the emotion, or be thought to feel it, and the universal appeal of sorrow for help must seem to be favourably received. Thus the law must be re-stated so as to take into account this condition:

[1] Shakespeare, 'Macbeth,' A. iv. Sc. iii.
[2] Ovid, 'Tristium,' v. i. 63.
[3] Shakespeare, 'Titus Andronicus,' A. ii. Sc. v.
[4] Racine Androm, iii. 3.
[5] Spenser, 'Faery Queen,' B. i., C. ii., St. xxxiv.
[6] Hood, 'Poems,' 'Miss Killmansegg,' 'Her Misery.'
[7] St. Augustine, 'Confessions,' b. iv. 10.

(72A) Sorrow tends to become less painful by being disclosed, so far as it seems to evoke pity in the recipient, or at least sympathetic emotion.

It seems to be also a law that (73) *Sorrow, like other painful states, becomes less painful and less intense when its emotion is controlled, and more intense and painful when uncontrolled.* But we must distinguish between that control of sorrow which consists in concealing it from others and the control of the emotion itself. The first, as we have seen, increases it under certain conditions: the second diminishes it. Yet sorrow is often said to be relieved by tears and sobs and sighs; because, sometimes at least, it works itself out in this way and comes to an end. There are those in whom it is intense but shallow, like the anger of the "irascible." In other cases loss of self-control has not this compensating advantage.

"Le chagrin du peuple," says Dostoievsky, "est ordinairement taciturne et patient. Mais quelquefois il éclate en pleurs, en lamentations qui ne cessent plus, surtout chez les femmes. Ce chagrin-là n'est pas plus facile à supporter que le chagrin silencieux."[1] "L'espèce de soulagement que procurent ces lamentations est factice et ne fait qu'aggrandir la blessure du cœur, comme on irrite une plaie en la touchant. C'est une douleur qui ne veut pas de consolations: elle se nourrit d'elle-même."[2]

(6) There is another law frequently expressed in fables, that sorrow is increased when we recognise that our misfortunes are partly caused by our own folly, or even by something that belongs or, once belonged, to us. "An eagle that was watching upon a rock once for a hare, had the ill-hap to be struck with an arrow. This arrow, it seems, was feather'd from her own wing, which very consideration went nearer her heart, she said, than death itself."[3] In "A Tree and a Wedge,"[4] and in "A Thrush taken with Birdlime,"[5] Æsop expresses the same truth: "I am not half so much troubled, says the thrush, at the thought of dying, as at the fatality of

[1] 'Les Frères Karamazof.' [2] *Op. cit.*
[3] 'Æsop's Fables,' xlviii. (Ed. Sir R. L'Estrange). [4] *Ibid.*, xlvii.
[5] *Ibid.*, xlix.

contributing to my own ruin." Yet in these cases it is not clear that the individual is to blame for his misfortune, even if partly caused by something which belonged to him. In "An Axe and a Forest,"[1] the misfortune of a community was due to its lack of foresight. The trees agreed to give so much of their wood as would serve to make the handle of the woodman's axe; but the thrush and the eagle could not help what served for lime and arrows falling from their bodies.

These fables illustrate a general fact of human nature: that it seems to us strange and unnatural that we should become the cause of injury to ourselves, or that anything which has been part of us should injure us. It still surprises us, though it is of such frequent occurrence. For we are not careless about anything that we love, nor do we willingly injure it; all our care being to protect it, and further its welfare: and we love ourselves. Misfortunes of this kind seem therefore to be contrary to the very principle of love, and astonish us. Sorrow is increased, not diminished, by knowing that "we have made our own bed, and must lie in it." And when something that once was part of us causes us injury,—as our own children,—we are the more surprised that its nature should now be so changed. For we have pursued its welfare; and that it now should return us evil for good conflicts with our expectations. And the same is true of anything we have loved, because we expect to be loved in return. For if it has not been part of our bodies, it has still been united to us and cherished by our minds. The rest of the world may be indifferent or hostile; but this part will surely stand by us. When the reverse of this happens, it frustrates the natural attitude and expectation of love; and hence the sorrow caused by this kind of ingratitude is so keen. Cæsar as he fell exclaimed, "Et tu Brute!"; and Lear when he thought of all he had lavished on his daughters, cried out, "That way madness lies."

We may then attempt to express this law as follows: (74) *When either we cause injury to ourselves, or something that was*

[1] 'Æsop's Fables,' xlvi.

once part of us, or anything we have loved, does this the sorrow that we feel tends to be greater on that account.

We may be inclined to interpret this law as a particular form of the law of contrast previously referred to ; but there need be no other contrast than that which underlies and conditions surprise. For the injury which is done to us, whether by ourselves or another, contrasts with our expectations, and therefore surprises us ; and surprise intensifies the emotion. But there is another cause which has a great if not a predominant influence in intensifying this sorrow. When anything we have loved harms us, not only does the injury conflict with our previous attitude of mind,—which in love is so unsuspicious,—but it frustrates one of the principal ends of love itself. If the frustration of any impulse tends to arouse sorrow, the stronger the impulse the stronger, other things equal, will be the sorrow. When therefore one of the principal tendencies of the sentiment is frustrated, this is the frustration not of any isolated or occasional impulse, but of one that binds together the emotional forces of a great system. How much greater then will this sorrow tend to be.

What then is this principal desire of the sentiment which is here frustrated ? Through the perpetual conjunction and interaction between love of whatever object and self-love,—the one drawing us away from self, making us self-forgetful, urging us to pursue disinterested ends ; the other, reminding us of self, requiring that the ends of the self-system be not sacrificed by our action,—it happens that when we love anyone, we desire to be loved in return. And this desire is strongest in sexual love, is strong and indispensable in friendship, and is still strong in the most unselfish love of parents for their children. When therefore the loved object itself, which must surely love us a little in return, turns against us, and becomes the cause of our misfortunes, the sorrow that we feel is the greater because one of the principal desires of love is frustrated, and all the expectations grounded upon it.

The study we have made in this chapter of the familiar laws of the increase and diminution to which sorrow is liable, shows us how much may be done in the case of such laws as these, so fully illustrated in literature, to raise them to a higher

degree of precision and truth by a more complete collection and comparison of the facts under them. But while there are many who can add to our knowledge in this way, not everyone can discern the significance of new facts, and the precise modifications that we frequently require to make in a law in response to them.

CHAPTER XII

OF SOME OTHER LAWS OF THE NON-CONATIVE TENDENCIES OF SORROW

1. *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to arouse Anger*

We have to consider in this chapter certain other tendencies of sorrow which, like those dealt with in the last chapter, are non-conative, and have results but not ends, and operate whether we strive to accomplish them or not. However clear this distinction may be in theory, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a particular tendency belongs to the one class or the other. Passing from primitive varieties which we have already dealt with, we shall confine ourselves to the sorrows of love, and of self-love.

The tendency of sorrow to arouse anger under certain conditions appears to be part of the fundamental constitution of the mind. There is an innate connexion between our primary emotional systems, on which the organisation of the sentiments rests. As there is an innate connexion between joy and sorrow, so that when joy has ceased, through the loss, injury, or destruction of its object, it tends to be replaced, at once or after a certain interval, by sorrow, so sorrow itself, when its impulse is opposed but not frustrated, tends to arouse anger. It does not try normally to evoke anger, but anger comes to its assistance when opposed. Even well-meant attempts at consolation may evoke angry exclamations :

> "One writes that 'other friends remain,'
> That 'Loss is common to the race'—
> And common is the common-place,
> And vacant chaff well-meant for grain."[1]

[1] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam,' vi.

Job soon became angry with the three friends that came to console him, and they passed the rest of their time together in recrimination. Sorrow draws Romeo to the tomb of Juliet, and this impulse being opposed by Paris, provokes him to anger :—

> "Good gentle youth, tempt not a desperate man,
> Fly hence and leave me ; . . .
> Pull not another sin upon my head,
> By urging me to fury : . . ."[1]

Not only does sorrow tend to arouse anger in defence of its end, but also a revengeful anger against its cause. Thus the wife of Job said to him: "Dost thou still retain thine integrity? Curse God and die." And Job "cursed his day":[2] "Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said, There is a man child conceived."[3] In two out of the three types of sorrow which De Quincey draws in the "Suspiria de Profundis," anger is represented as in the closest connexion with sorrow. Of the "Mater Lacrymarum" he writes, "Her eyes are sweet and subtle, wild and sleepy by turns ; oftentimes rising to the clouds ; oftentimes challenging the heavens." Of the terrible "Mater Tenebrarum," that "She is the defier of God . . . . the mother of lunacies, and the suggestress of suicides."

If even our tender sorrows are often accompanied by anger, this is normally the case with the bitter sorrows of self-love. Envy, though a peculiar emotion, is often based on sorrow at our own ill-success, combined with anger against those who possess what we have failed to get. Seneca in the contrasted portraits which he draws of the griefs of Octavia and Livia at their sons' deaths, one of which he holds up to our disapproval and the other to our approval, says of the former, "She hated all mothers, and raged against Livia with especial fury, because it seemed that the brilliant prospects once in store for her own child were now transferred to Livia's son." But of Livia he says that, having laid her son in the tomb, she "left her sorrow there. . . . She did not cease to make frequent mention of her Drusus, to set up his portrait in all

[1] 'Romeo and Juliet,' A. v., Sc. iii. [2] Job, ch. ii. [3] *Ibid.*, ch. iii.

places, and to speak of him and listen with the greatest pleasure while others spoke of him: she lived with his memory; which none can embrace and consort with who has made it painful to himself." [1] "Choose between these cases," he says, and if you choose the former, "you will shun the sight of other people's children and your own." [2]

The law of the connexion between sorrow and anger is one that we cannot precisely define, because it essentially depends on a certain quantity or degree of opposition which we cannot measure. This degree must neither be too small nor too great. If too small it leaves us unaffected; if too great it overwhelms us, and increases sorrow. Nor is even this degree constant; but it varies with the available energy we possess. When we are well and strong it takes a greater power to crush us; when we are weak and ill, a much less. There must therefore be a ratio between the energy at our disposal and the opposition to which we are subjected, before the arrested impulse of sorrow, or that of any other emotion, can excite anger. Recognising these facts we may give this inadequate expression to the law: (75) *Sorrow tends to arouse anger under opposition to its impulse, when the opposing force is not too strong and there is sufficient available energy to resist it.*

The union of sorrow with anger points then to the fact that there is still sufficient energy present to pursue the end of sorrow, and resist obstructions to it. For even in desperate sorrow, as that of Romeo at the supposed death of Juliet, union in death is possible, and to that end all the available energy may be directed. Anger will subserve this end and free it from obstruction. But where anger breaks out against the cause, and accuses heaven, or revenges itself on the innocent, it no longer subserves this end of sorrow. It is anger caused by the fact of the painful emotion itself, and the suffering it inflicts. For man, in his self-love, puts forward claims to happiness and exemption from suffering; and his pride is set to avoid humiliation. But all sorrow is a humiliation to pride. When therefore self-love predominates, and this kind of anger is aroused, sorrow becomes the indirect

[1] 'Of Consolation,' iii. [2] *Ibid.*

occasion of some of the worst effects attributed to it. We meet men embittered by misfortunes who, where they do not hate, secretly envy others and rejoice at the misfortunes that overtake them. This is the type that Seneca draws in his portrait of Octavia. Still it has a certain strength : it is doing something ; and this distinguishes it from the next type of sorrow, which does nothing.

2 *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to break the Spirit*

If sorrow under one degree of obstruction arouses anger, under a greater degree it redoubles sorrow. Still the impulse of sorrow persists, and puts forward again its ineffectual longings, which return to it again repressed and crushed. From this circle there seems to be no escape.

The belief that nothing can be done,—that a loss is irreparable and cannot be mitigated,—which arises so often at the death of a beloved object, or when love is rejected or forgotten, or the belief in the worth of the object is destroyed,—where there is self-control and patience, may yet be modified or proved to be mistaken ; for there is always some end still possible where sorrow is guided and restrained by love. But supposing it persists, and that anger does not strengthen sorrow, because the obstruction is too great or prolonged, and the energy of resistance too small, what will be the effect? The sorrow will remain with its longing ; but nothing will be done to give effect to it. It will brood and maintain the same thoughts, and only resist interference. It will become incapable of willing anything else, indolent, and indifferent to everything around it. It will lose hope and courage. Yet if this is the general tendency, the stronger the love, the more energetic and courageous the natural temper, the more will these counteract the depressing effect. But in weak characters, and wherever its full effects are accomplished, the 'heart' or 'spirit' is broken.

We shall now attempt to formulate the general law of this type of sorrow : (76) *In proportion to the degree and frequency with which the impulse of Sorrow has been crushed or suffered frustration, are energy, self-control and courage*

destroyed, as well as the susceptibility to all stimulating emotions, as anger, hope, and confidence.

We may take the following descriptions from literature as evidence of this Law. Tourgueneff in "L'Abandonnée" gives a girl's description of herself after abandonment by her lover:—"Moi je restais indifférente à tout. Une insensibilité complète me gagna ; mon propre sort ne m'inspirait plus aucun intérêt. Me rappeler, penser à lui, c'était là ma seule occupation, ma joie unique . . . Il s'écoula deux ans, trois ans . . . six, sept ans passèrent, le temps s'enfuyait. Indifférente je le regardais s'enfuir, et la vie avec lui."[1]

Dostoievsky in "L'Esprit souterrain" has also described the effect of the frustration of sexual love on a weak but ardent character:—"Cette mélancholique aventure d'un amour sans espoir et jamais guéri devait avoir sur le caractère d'Ordinov une triste influence. Ce cœur ardent, cette âme de poète furent aigris et stérilisés ; il vécut inutile aux autres insupportable à lui-même."[2] But with him the depressing effect was not so complete. He was "embittered," and therefore still able to feel anger. He did not, like the other, live in the tender memory and ideal of his love ; but in the preoccupations of his self-love. Grief for him was taken as suffering ; and he did not accept this suffering ; but sought relief from it in sensual indulgences. What is more remarkable, he took delight in his own degradation:—"Je goûtais de secrètes délices, monstrueuses et viles, à songer en rentrant dans mon coin par une de ces nuits pétersbourgeoises . . . que . . aujourd'hui encore j'avais fait une action honteuse, et que ce qui était fait était irréparable, et à aigrir mes remords et à me suer l'esprit et à irriter ma plaie à tel point que ma douleur se transformait en une sorte d'ignoble plaisir maudit, mais réel et tangible . . . le plaisir consistait justement en une intense conscience de la dégradation."[3] Thus he had not only surrendered the ideals of his love, but through spite or hatred, sought to make himself the opposite of what those ideals would have had him be.

Now it is clear that Sorrow could neither have a destructive

[1] 'Étranges Histoires : L'Abandonnée.'

[2] 'L'Esprit Souterrain,' Deuxième Partie.

[3] *Ibid.*

or debasing effect on character so general, nor that it could break the 'spirit' or 'heart,' if its influence were limited to the sentiment of which it is a part. If we have lost one object of love, there are others still left us. Why do they no longer console us?

3. *Of the Tendency of Sorrow to Destroy the Value set upon the Objects of other Sentiments and to Increase the Value set on its Own*

It may seem strange at first sight that the emotion of one sentiment should have such a wide-spread influence on the emotional life of other systems, yet no fact is more conspicuous, or more amply illustrated in literature, than that sorrow tends to diminish and destroy the value which other sentiments attach to their objects. This is often referred to in metaphorical terms. The earth seems to be 'darkened.' We can see nothing cheerful around us; we dress in black, and sit in darkened rooms. Occupations that we had formerly pursued with zest lose their interest, or inspire us with repugnance. These marked changes may only be manifested in great sorrows; but the tendency, though often counteracted, is present in all. Augustine thus describes his sorrow in youth at the death of a beloved companion: "At this grief my heart was utterly darkened, and whatever I beheld was death. My native country was a torment to me, and my father's house a strange unhappiness; and whatever I had shared with him, wanting him, became a distracting torture. Mine eyes sought him everywhere . . . . and I hated all places for that they had not him . . . I became a great riddle to myself."[1] Werther the student and lover of nature writes: "I am unable to work, I cannot think. I have no longer any feeling for the beauties of nature, and books are distasteful to me."[2] Tennyson compares his sorrow at the loss of his friend to that of a lover:

"A happy lover who has come
To look on her that loves him well,
Who 'lights and rings the gateway bell,
And learns her gone and far from home;

[1] 'Confessions,' B. iv. 9.

[2] Goethe, 'The Sorrows of Werther,' Aug. 22.

"He saddens, all the magic light
Dies off at once from bower and hall,
And all the place is dark, and all
The chambers emptied of delight:

"So find I every pleasant spot
In which we two were wont to meet,
The field, the chamber, and the street,
For all is dark where thou art not."[1]

Goethe in describing the sorrow of Meister at the loss of Mariana, represents the young poet and lover of the stage as treating with contempt his own talents, which he had before rated so highly; that which "next to love, and along with it, had given him the highest hopes and joys."[2] "In his labours he could see nothing but shallow imitations of prescribed forms without intrinsic worth . . . His poems now appeared nothing more than a monotonous arrangement of syllables, in which the most trite emotions and thoughts were dragged along and kept together by a miserable rhyme. With his theatrical talent it fared no better. He blamed himself for not having sooner detected the vanity, on which alone this pretension had been founded. His figure, his gait, his movements, his mode of declamation were severally taxed; he decisively renounced every species of advantage or merit, that might have raised him above the common run of men, and so doing he increased his mute despair to the highest pitch."[3] Thus, through sorrow, the valuation which a man's self-love places on himself may be destroyed like the value he places on other things; and thus, as it has been often observed, sorrow abates pride.

This general effect does not only take place when sorrow is caused by a real loss, but also when it is due to a mood or temper. An emotional mood or temper tends to produce beliefs in conformity with the nature of its emotion. When sorrow is felt it may delude the sufferer into believing that he has suffered some loss, or that he lacks something without which life is miserable. If such delusions only reach an extreme

[1] 'In Memoriam,' 8.
[2] 'Wilhelm Meister,' B. ii. ch. ii. (Carlyle's trans.).
[3] *Ibid.*

form in insanity, they are also present in a lesser degree in ordinary moods of sorrow, and for the moment are believed in. To permanent melancholy life seems worthless. Amiel in his Journal represents himself as casting contempt even on his literary ambition :—"The book would be my ambition . . . if ambition were not vanity, and vanity of vanities."[1] And thus he expresses his weariness and disgust with life: "By your natural tendency you arrive at disgust with life, despair, pessimism . . . Melancholy outlook on all sides, disgust with myself . . . I cannot deceive myself as to the fate in store for me; increasing isolation, inward disappointment, enduring regrets, a melancholy neither to be consoled nor confessed, a mournful old age, a death in the desert."[2]

We must now attempt to define this law of sorrow: (77) *Sorrow, whether caused by loss or destruction of an object of love, or by separation from it, or merely by the mood or temper, tends to destroy the belief in the intrinsic value of all other things previously valued.*

We commonly distinguish between intrinsic value and value in use. There are many things which we only value so far as they are instrumental to other things, the furniture of our house, the house itself, health, and even money and power, so far as we do not come to love them. But there are other things that we value intrinsically because we love them: our friends, our family, our country. And these two kinds of value, though we distinguish them in analysis, are often united in the same things; and it is a great art of life so to combine them. If workmen are only regarded as instruments, their relation to their employers and social life in general are not likely to be harmonious; but the sentiment of respect confers on them intrinsic value. The craftsmen of the past knew how to impart a charm and beauty to the common utensils of life, and thus gave them an intrinsic value beyond their utility.

We also distinguish between the greater or less degree of value which things are judged to have in comparison with other things of the same class: all instruments have some value, but some more than others. Finally we sometimes

[1] 'Journal Intime,' quoted by Matthew Arnold, 'Essays in Criticism.'
[2] *Ibid.*

distinguish between the value of a thing for others and its value for oneself, whether that value be intrinsic or extrinsic.

Now the kind of sorrow to which we have referred, that which feels its impulses for help, union, and restoration frustrated, may not destroy the value in use ascribed to other things, but it tends to destroy their intrinsic value as fitting objects of love or respect. This tendency seems to be the consequence under certain conditions of another tendency which, in comparison with it, is fundamental. Extreme sorrow tends to destroy the intrinsic value attached to other things, because it destroys our capacity to enjoy them. All love has this capacity. If we love a person we enjoy seeing him ; if we love a game we enjoy playing it. We may then express this law : (78) *Extreme sorrow, when it arises in one sentiment, tends to destroy the capacity for joy inherent in other sentiments.*

All the observations, to which we have already referred, as to the effect of sorrow in darkening the world for us, in making a death in life, in rendering us indifferent to everything about us, may be interpreted in this sense, that we can no longer take enjoyment in them, and often disgust replaces joy. St. Augustine speaks of the "very loathing of the things which we before enjoyed ;"[1] Werther says, "Books are distasteful to me." We must therefore take this to be the fundamental law, and on it the destruction of the intrinsic value attached to other things is dependent.

The conception of value cannot be present in the love of animals for their young, nor yet in the affections of very young children ; yet, under the influence of extreme sorrow they lose the power of enjoying other things. When this abstract conception is developed, it comes to be applied to objects of joy or love, and to have a great influence on them. We may say that in joy there is present an implicit valuation of its object. The tendency of joy to maintain the union with its object implies that this object is valued ; and this judgment of valuation, where the mental development is adequate, may always be elicited. The diffused enjoyment due to good health and youth, in making us enjoy even common things,

[1] *Op. cit.* B. iv, (v.) 10.

makes us value human life. The particular joy that we derive from some particular person or thing becomes a striking event to us when it has been preceded by some contrary emotion. Then we feel a sudden freedom from gloom, ennui, or sorrow, and can hardly help enlarging on the value of an object which has made so great a difference to our state of feeling. All the natural exclamations of joy are evidence of this fact: 'How glorious!' 'How splendid!' 'How excellent!' 'How good!' are the words that we spontaneously utter; all of which imply a valuation of the object as something superior to common things of the class. It is the same with the diffused joy that wells up in us in healthy youth:

"Oh, our manhood's prime vigour! . . .
Oh the wild joys of living! the leaping from rock up to rock,
The strong rending of boughs from the fir-trees, the cool silver shock
Of the plunge in a pool's living water, the hunt of the bear,
And the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair,
And the meal, the rich dates yellowed over with gold dust divine
And the locust-flesh steeped in the pitcher, the full draught of wine
And the sleep in the dried river-channel where bulrushes tell
That the water was wont to go warbling so softly and well.
How good is man's life, the mere living! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy!"[1]

Thus the intrinsic valuation of a thing is consequent on the enjoyment of it, and hence the valuation of life in general follows naturally from the enjoyment of all its activities.

Now if we compare the judgments of value that we pass on objects of joy with the judgments that we pass on objects for which we feel contempt or indifference, the contrast between them is striking. Our natural tendency in respect of things and persons to which we are indifferent is to withdraw attention from them, and not to trouble to form judgments about them; but they are often thrust upon us, and then we exchange indifference for repugnance or contempt. Thus when dull persons and places surround us, we abuse them as 'wretched,' 'poor,' 'mean,' 'insignificant,' 'worthless,'—terms which, in opposition to those which belong to the natural exclamations of joy, indicate that a very low or even a negative value is attributed to their objects.

[1] Robert Browning, 'Saul.'

Joy then seems to be an original source of the intrinsic values we attribute to things; and although judgments of value do not arise with every experience of joy, yet they tend to arise when intellectual development is sufficiently advanced. They form part of the fully developed thought of its system. We must therefore add this tendency to the others that we found to be inherent in joy, and we must attempt to formulate the law of its action: (79) *Joy tends to form judgments which attribute intrinsic value to its object, when the intelligence is capable of forming them.*

We can now understand in some degree how the sorrow of love can have such a destructive influence on human life as it is proved to have in some cases, since it is antagonistic to the joy of every system except its own. That this influence is not principally due to the depressing effect attributed to it is clear from the fact that it neither incapacitates us from feeling the joy of its own love,—which comes back on waves of memory,—nor from entertaining the hope of re-union. And were separated lovers reunited, the dead restored to life, the alienated reconciled, and the ungrateful turned loving, what a cause of rejoicing would that be! This tendency to destroy joy elsewhere we must then attribute to the function of sorrow in love, namely, to subserve the strength and persistence of its own system by destroying everything that may compete with it.

If joy is an original source of the values we attribute to things, so also is sorrow. It has its own measure, and does not merely echo the valuations of joy. Sometimes we value a thing for the first time after we have lost it; we then often attach to it a much higher value, but sometimes also a lower value. Thoughtless and healthy youth sets little value on health until it is injured or destroyed; the home is neglected until lost; and how much love do we accept without gratitude until bereft of it. There are also some things that we seem to love; but when we have lost them, the sadness we feel is so faint or soon forgotten that we have to recognise that we over-estimated them. There are superficial natures that in this way forget their friends, and make new ties, as superficial, that replace the old. Yet still, and in proportion to the

intensity and persistence of sorrow, it tends to enhance the value of its own object by making us incapable of enjoying other things. In joy it is in part the objective value that delights us,—the superiority of the thing to others of its class, —as the exclamations of joy which we cited themselves indicate; but it is in sorrow that we especially learn what the value of a thing is for ourselves. As Augustine observes: A man "when he has an abundance of these passing goods trusts not in them, but when they are withdrawn, he recognises whether they have not taken hold of him. . . . For on that we set not our heart, when present, which we part from without sorrow."[1]

"For so it falls out
That what we have we prize not to the worth
Whiles we enjoy it, but being lack'd and lost
Why, then we rack the value, then we find
The virtue that possession could not show us
Whiles it was ours."[2]

"And then they, too late,
Perceive the loss of what they might have had
And dote till death."[3]

"When he shall hear, she died upon his words,
The idea of her love shall sweetly creep
Into the study of imagination;
And every lovely organ of her life
Shall come apparelled in more precious habit;
More moving, delicate, and full of life,
Than when she lived indeed."[4]

"There is no idealiser like unavailing regret, all the more if it be a regret of fancy as much as of real feeling."[5]

"My imagination sees nothing but her, all surrounding objects are of no account, except as they relate to her."[6]

This subjective value of a thing seems to mean its capacity to arouse in us both sorrow and joy, and to make itself

[1] Hom. on Ps., "On True Religion," 47.
[2] Shakespeare, 'Much Ado about Nothing,' A. iv. Sc. 1.
[3] Beaumont and Fletcher.
[4] Shakespeare, 'Much Ado about Nothing,' A. iv., Sc. i.
[5] Lowell, 'Among my Books,' ii. p. 67. The reference here is to Dante's love of Beatrice.
[6] Goethe, 'The Sorrows of Werther,' Aug. 30.

beloved in consequence ; and further, it seems to be proportionate to the strength of these emotions. For if the thing has a value for others it may have none for oneself; and if it is useful it may be only useful ; but if it have power to arouse in oneself both joy and sorrow independently of its uses, then for oneself it will tend to have an intrinsic value. It seems, then, that the intrinsic value we place on any object that we love is largely constituted by the succession of joy and sorrow about it, and by the modification of its value which each in turn effects.

If it is through sorrow alone that we principally estimate the value of a thing for ourselves ; still sorrow, as we have seen, does not therefore enhance the total value attributed to it. The effect produced depends on the strength and persistency of sorrow. "Absence," says la Rochefoucauld, "weakens common sentiments, but strengthens great ones, as the wind extinguishes the candle and stirs up a conflagration."[1] The difference of the effect is due to the result of the competition between sorrow for what we have lost and joy in the old objects we have loved and which still surround us, or in the new things that appeal to us with a fresh charm. Either these, or some one of them, console us, so that by degrees we forget what we have lost ; or obstinately we turn away from them, and refuse to be comforted ; and this is accompanied by that depreciation of their value to which we have already referred. But these things, or rather the systems to which they belong, resist this depreciation. For each so far as it is a love of anything has its own capacity for joy and sorrow : each has its own valuation. There is the worth of friendship, of ambition, and of life itself ; and these systems after a little time may reassert their old hold upon us, so that the value of what we have lost is diminished or destroyed by their competition. It is only in proportion as these other things can no longer awaken joy in us, bearing no comparison with what we have lost, that sorrow enhances the value of what we have lost.

If we then state the law absolutely, that sorrow always tends to enhance the value of the lost object, this statement

[1] 'Maximes,' cclxxvi.

of it is contradicted by certain facts. We have therefore to express it conditionally, so as to exclude these cases: (80) *So far as the sorrow of love diminishes the value of all objects previously valued, and prevents one attaching a value for oneself to new objects, it tends to increase the value already placed on its own object:*

But beneath these beliefs of the surpassing value of what we have lost are the emotions by which they have been established, and these are—not sorrow alone,—but sorrow in conjunction with some antagonistic emotions organised in the sentiment of Love to destroy the competition of other things. These are repugnance, disgust, and contempt, through which we turn from or reject the proffered consolations of competing objects. There is then a law that is more fundamental, and which would be operative even though the conceptions of value were not present to the mind: (81) *The sorrow of love tends to arouse repugnancy, or disgust, or contempt for all objects that distract it from its own object, and thereby strengthens itself.*

Now there seems to be an exception to the law that sorrow tends, under certain conditions, to increase the value placed on the beloved object. There is a sorrow not caused by the absence or death of the loved object, but by his degradation or dishonour, and by alienation from him, which often inflict the greatest anguish that love can suffer. For death, it is said, is better than dishonour. If under such conditions we lose our belief in the worth of the person, how can such sorrow fail to diminish instead of increasing the total value placed on him? But the loss of our belief causes the sorrow, not the sorrow that loss; and in the total value placed on a person there are other qualities than his moral worth, and this, if degraded may be restored. His importance and his value still seem to be increased by the action of sorrow; for if there were no sorrow, or sorrow gave place to anger, in condemnation of him as worthless and bad, his potential value would be ignored, and the greatest achievement of love, the restoration of the character, would remain unattempted. The parable of the lost sheep illustrates the law that sorrow even here tends to increase the value placed on the lost object.

CHAPTER XIII

OF THE TENDENCY OF SORROW TO STRENGTHEN AND PERFECT THE CHARACTER OR TO WEAKEN AND DEGRADE IT

1. *Of the opposite Opinions concerning the Value of Sorrow*

THE remarks made in daily life and the reflections that we find in literature on the value of sorrow are so different and apparently contradictory as to present to us a problem of unusual difficulty. For any attempt to furnish an adequate theory of this emotional system must take into account and be able to interpret these opposite opinions of great writers, and to discern the limitations under which they apply. The nature of sorrow is so complex, its effects in different characters so various, that it is rare, if not impossible, for any writer to show an insight into all of them. Hence there arises a great diversity of opinions as to its value.

Nothing is commoner than to hear sorrow spoken of by some as vain and useless, and as the source of all that is best in us by others. It is alternately regarded as weakening us both physically and morally; and as strengthening and hardening us. It is held to make us bitter, envious, and hateful; and also to make us gentle, sympathetic, and pitiful. It is regarded by theologians as a chief instrument of religion, as drawing us to a faith in, and a love of, God; and it is shown by others to be the frequent source of impeachments of His providence, justice, and love.

Of the uselessness of sorrow, Seneca says: "If fate can be overcome by tears, let us bring tears to bear upon it; let every day be passed in mourning, every night be spent in sorrow instead of sleep; let your breast be torn by your own

hands, your very face attacked by them, and every kind of cruelty be practised by your grief, if it will profit you. But if the dead cannot be brought back to life, however much we may beat our breasts, if destiny remains fixed and immovable for ever, not to be changed by any sorrow, however great . . . . then let our futile grief be brought to an end."[1]

And in Shakespeare, whose genius reflects all opinions, we find this expression of the vanity of sorrow :—

"When remedies are past, the griefs are ended,
By seeing the worst, which late on hopes depended,
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone,
Is the next way to draw new mischiefs on.
What cannot be preserved when Fortune takes,
Patience her injury a mockery makes.
The robb'd, that smiles, steals something from the thief ;
He robs himself that spends a bootless grief."[2]

"Usually," says South, "the sting of Sorrow is this, that it neither removes nor alters the thing we sorrow for ; and so is but a kind of reproach to our reason . . . Either the thing we sorrow for is to be remedied, or it is not : if it is, why do we spend the time in mourning which should be spent in active applying of remedies ; but if it is not, then is our sorrow vain and superfluous."[3] Yet sorrow belongs to love, and in certain situations is the fitting expression of it. If we are not to sorrow, we must not love. If we are to find consolations outside, love will be forgotten. But if love is to find a solution of the problem of sorrow,—and no other solution will be accepted by it,—it must be one that in assuaging sorrow does not produce forgetfulness. An old epitaph says :

"We bury love.
Forgetfulness grows o'er it like the grass.
That is the thing to weep for, not the dead."

The Stoical solution of sorrow is the solution of an antagonistic system. To maintain his superiority to fortune, the Stoic sets up his pride as a virtue in place of love.

Montaigne has expressed a contemptuous opinion of the value of sorrow : "Je suis de plus exempts de cette passion,

[1] 'Of Consolation,' vi.
[2] 'Othello,' A. i. Sc. 3.
[3] 'Sermons,' vol. i. S. i.

et ne l'ayme ny l'estime: quoi que le monde ayt entrepris, comme à prix faict, de l'honorer de faveur particulière. Ils en habillent la sagesse, la vertu, la conscience: Sot et vilain ornement. Les Italiens ont plus sortablement baptisé de son nom: la malignité. Car c'est une qualité, tousjours nuisible, tousjours folle: et comme tousjours couarde et basse." [1]

Even the noble Spinoza joins in the depreciation of sorrow, but rather in comparison with joy, which he held to be the greater perfection, than altogether on account of its own nature and effects: "It is superstition that sets up sorrow as good, and all that tends to gladness as evil. God would show Himself envious were He to take pleasure in my impotence and in the ills which I suffer. Rather in proportion to the greatness of our joy do we reach a higher perfection and participate more fully in the divine nature . . . How should the Divine Being take delight in the spectacle of my weakness or impute to me as meritorious, tears, sobs, terrors—all signs of an impotent soul?" [2]

Yet from the earliest times to the present a contrary opinion has also been expressed by the wisest men of the hidden uses and meaning of sorrow. "Sorrow is better than laughter," says the writer of Ecclesiastes, "for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better. The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning; but the heart of fools is in the house of mirth." [3] The austere Milton cries:—

> "Hence vain deluding joys,
> The brood of folly without father bred!"
> "But hail thou goddess sage and holy,
> Hail, divinest melancholy!" [4]

Grey writes in his "Hymn to Adversity":—

> "When first thy Sire to send on earth
> Virtue, his darling Child, design'd,
> To thee he gave the heav'nly Birth,
> And bade to form her infant mind.
> Stern rugged Nurse, thy rigid lore
> With patience many a year she bore;
> What sorrow was, thou bad'st her know,
> And from her own she learn'd to melt at others' woe."

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[1] 'Essais,' L. i. ch. ii.
[2] Quoted by Renan, 'Spinoza.'
[3] Ecclesiastes, ch. vii, v. 3 and 4.
[4] 'Il Penseroso.'

"Scar'd at thy frown terrific, fly
Self-pleasing Folly's idle brood,
With Laughter, noise, and thoughtless Joy
And leave us leisure to be good."

Edgar, in "King Lear," describes himself as made pitiful through sorrow:

"A most poor man made tame to fortune's blows;
Who, by the art of known and feeling sorrow,
Am pregnant to good pity."[1]

Yet here too there are often opposite effects to note: "Les petits chagrins rendent tendre: les grands dur et farouche."[2] Borrow conceives of sorrow as superior to joy as a stimulus to great actions: "As the sparks fly upward, so is man born to trouble, and woe doth he bring with him into the world. . . In the brightest days of prosperity—in the midst of health and wealth—how sentient is the poor, human creature of thy neighbourhood! . . . Then is it not lawful for man to exclaim, 'Better that I had never been born!' Fool, for thyself thou wast not born; . . . and how dost thou know that this dark principle is not, after all, thy best friend; that it is not that which tempers the whole mass of thy corruption? It may be, for what thou knowest, the mother of wisdom, and of great works: it is the dread of the horror of the night that makes the pilgrim hasten on his way. When thou feelest it nigh, let thy safety word be 'Onward'; if thou tarry, thou art overwhelmed. Courage! build great works—'tis urging thee . . . Thou wouldst be joyous, wouldst thou? then be a fool. What great work was ever the result of joy, the puny one? Who have been the wise ones, the mighty ones, the conquering ones of this earth? The joyous? I believe not. The fool is happy, or comparatively so—certainly the least sorrowful, but he is still a fool . . ."[3]

2. *Attempt to estimate the Value of Sorrow by estimating the Value of its Functions in different Systems*

Now it is not merely difficult, but in the present day foolish, to attempt to decide whether sorrow, which has such a com-

[1] 'King Lear,' A. iv. Sc. 6.
[2] André Chenier.
[3] Borrow, 'Lavengro,' ch. xviii.

plex and various nature, is on the whole good or bad: nor is it our business to attempt to form such a judgment. We shall content ourselves with reviewing some of its tendencies,—and those which we have been able to discern,—and with judging in what respects, and under what conditions, they are useful or the reverse. We shall begin with primitive sorrow, and recall its biological function; from it we shall pass to the sorrow of love, and try to sum up its functions in that great system; thirdly we shall refer to the tendencies of sorrow in self-love, and what its action is on the sorrows that are not its own.

The essential tendency of primitive sorrow we found to be the appeal for help. That the cry of sorrow here tends to preserve the life of the young, by bringing those who watch over them to their assistance, is sufficiently obvious. With every unsatisfied need of the child there tends to arise sorrow, because it is helpless and cannot by itself attain its ends; with pain too sorrow arises, when the child cannot free itself from pain.

Passing from the frequent sorrows caused by frustrated impulses to those caused by some catastrophe in love, or to those lesser disasters which soon overtake it, we found that at the beginning the function of sorrow was to build up a stable connexion with the object and, in alternation with joy, to enhance the valuation of it, so that the love formed for it might become strong. These results sorrow tends to accomplish proportionately to its own strength. From the beginning let us pass to what appears the end, when the connexion which has been formed is severed by death. Here we found that in the apparent folly and obstinacy of sorrow wisdom was concealed. Here too the great poets divined what the philosophers failed to understand. As in that learning by experience which we find joined to animal instincts, so that, when the impulse fails to accomplish its end in the ordinary way, there tends to arise a variation of means,—an experimentation,—through which, after repeated trials, the end is often accomplished; so in this extreme sorrow of love, which knows not even what it has to achieve, but finds its fundamental tendency for union frustrated, there tends to arise with its

persistency at least a partial fulfilment of its end in a way unlooked for:—

> "This woeful gain
> Thy dissolution brings, that in my soul
> Is present and perpetually abides
> A shadow never, never to be displaced."[1]

And, as in the first sorrows of love, which pass when the presence so much desired is restored to us, so sorrow, having formed a new bond of union, is effaced or mitigated, In "In Memoriam," Tennyson has returned to this problem. "If we describe," says Mr. A. C. Bradley, "in the most general terms the movement of thought and feeling in *In Memoriam*, the description will also be found to apply to Lycidas or Adonais. In each case the grief of the opening has passed at the close into triumph."[2] "'The way of the soul' we find to be a journey from the first stupor and confusion of grief through a growing acquiescence often disturbed by the recurrence of pain, to an almost unclouded peace and joy."[3] And beliefs often arise in this process, formed in different ways from our scientific judgments, that in some way the dead are still present to us or will be reunited to us hereafter. Here we see the wisdom of sorrow in refusing consolation according to the way of the world. For love, accepting its suffering, triumphing over self-love that desires relief from pain, at length, through its sorrow, establishes a new union of thought in place of the sensuous union, and that which is lacking now it hopes to recover hereafter. And this hope love sustains, like its sorrow, like its belief in the worth of the object.

It is the function of sorrow to preserve the constancy of love through even greater misfortunes, through disgrace and dishonour worse than death, so that the ends which love pursues may never be relinquished. Here it is the same. If the sorrow passes before its work is accomplished, love passes with it. And if in the former case it has, in striving to recover the lost union, to find a new union, in this it has to find a new way to

[1] Wordsworth, 'Maternal Grief.'

[2] 'Commentary on Tennyson's "In Memoriam,"' ch. iii. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

restore a nature hardened in evil and ingratitude. In the lesser sorrows of alienation, it is the sorrow that keeps us on the watch for some means of restoring the bond of love. And finally, in respect of our own sins, negligences, and omissions, as judged by the conscience of love itself, and that relative ethics prescribed by it, though sorrow on behalf of those faults can no more undo the past than it can bring back the dead to life, yet it finds a new way of restoration in the appeal for forgiveness and the resolution of repentance.

Sorrow has then great functions to perform in love, first in establishing it and afterwards in sustaining its constancy, so that in misfortune its great ends may not be abandoned. These functions are based on the two principal tendencies which we found to belong to sorrow in this system: to preserve union with the object, or all of it that still remains, and to restore the former state or union that has been lost or destroyed. Through both of these the universal and primitive tendency of sorrow persists: the appeal for help, the seeking for a power to succour its weakness wherever that power may be.

We have lastly to deal with the functions of sorrow in self-love; and here they are substantially the same. For everything that is desired for self,—existence, wealth, power, reputation, pleasure, and happiness,—when lost, is loved the more; and its value for self is enhanced, so far as the sorrow at the loss is strong and persistent. Thus sorrow has certain useful tendencies even for self-love, and preserves the valuation and pursuit of those things which, to its thinking, are the only good things. That it has many tendencies that are harmful is what we are led to expect from our study of all the primary emotions. It is the business of love, and also of self-love, to select those which are serviceable and to repress the rest. But emotions are often, if not ordinarily, subjected to little control, especially when very strongly excited; and it is then that their ill-effects become most apparent, so that a man carried away by them becomes "his own worst enemy."

It may be admitted that the effortless and apathetic sorrow which does nothing is bad for every system that has to employ it. But how often does this description answer to the

facts? We have found that obstinate and silent sorrow is secretly achieving something, by preserving the constancy of love when every motive of self-interest is against it. There are, again, two kinds of weakness. There is the emotion that makes us feel so weak that we can do nothing. There are circumstances that are overpowering, and events that are irreparable, before which a man, whatever his strength, can only recognise his weakness. The sorrow that a man then feels often has a fund of extraordinary energy. No wonder that where it can achieve nothing it breaks out in rage against its cause, and that, again, control of it being lost, it subserves neither love nor self-love; or turns to that kind of hatred in which a man will "cut off his nose to spite his face."

In other cases sorrow, through eliciting anger, becomes the source of envy and misanthropy. Yet it often subserves one or other of the ends of self-love. There are two systems that interpret some of the worst effects that are attributed to it. Pride and vanity,—though here we cannot enter upon any analysis of them, are always concerned with self-valuation; and sorrow, because it forces a man to recognise his weakness, and urges him to appeal for help, is a profound humiliation for pride. Yet, loving power and position, pride must be affected with sorrow, as well as humiliation, at their loss; and if the loss cannot be remedied, sorrow and humiliation persist. How can that self-valuation, which is the single preoccupation of pride, be restored? Envy is one solution of the problem. All valuations are relative; and if a man cannot regain his ascendancy, he may secretly aim at depreciating others. Yet envy, though a useful, is a dangerous weapon for pride; for to depreciate others, unless pride can conceal its motive and carry conviction, leaves their superiority unaffected. And hence envy has been noted to change soon into hate, which offers a prospect of effecting a real change in the situation. But wounded pride has another alternative: it has at its disposal an inexhaustible fund of contempt which, as its own loss is the greater, is drawn upon more frequently. Thus sorrow, rendering constant the sense of the loss of power or superiority, recovers through envy, hatred, and contempt some part of its self-valuation.

Sorrow has then a useful function to perform even in self-love and pride, and some of the worst changes of character ascribed to it have their utility for the systems to which it belongs. The bad effects of sorrow may be traced either to the system which it subserves or to its being insufficiently controlled. Hence the significance of the line, "Let Love clasp grief lest both be drowned."[1]

To give a profound, comprehensive, and adequate interpretation of sorrow would tax the powers of the greatest minds, nor could it be accomplished by them until all the diverse effects of sorrow in the different systems of the mind had themselves been severally understood. But by degrees, by accumulating a great variety of facts from real life and literature, and by tracing in each case the particular circumstances, we may at length be able to achieve what the greatest would now fail in attempting.

[1] Tennyson, 'In Memoriam,' I.

CHAPTER XIV

DISGUST

1. *Of Primitive Disgust and its Distinction from the Emotion Developed from it*

We shall consider, in the present and subsequent chapters, two emotional systems which, in respect of their earliest forms, are also primary, and, like sorrow, are in a certain sense opposites of joy. While Disgust, which we shall first study, has great biological importance as a force of character it is inferior to joy, sorrow, fear, and anger. What has been said of suffering: "Tu fais l'homme, ô douleur, oui, l'homme tout entier,"[1] could hardly be applied to Disgust.

We have throughout our study of the primary forces of character laid little emphasis on them as emotions and much more on them as emotional systems; that is, as systems which are both constituted of emotions and of the instincts and other tendencies organised with them. We have not wished to imply that when any one of these is active it is always accompanied by the emotion. When the activity of the instinct is most sudden and unopposed, the emotion, if it be brought into activity at all, will be of low intensity and definiteness. This fact is conspicuous in both fear and anger. Further, the activity of an instinct, though, in normal cases, it has some psychical impulse complementary to it, has not, therefore, a distinctive emotion complementary to it. There are many instincts of great individual importance and distinctness that have no corresponding distinctive emotions. What single distinctive emotion is connected with the nest-

[1] Lamartine, quoted by Littré, 'Dict.' Art. 'Douleur.'

building instinct?[1] May it not evoke different emotions in different situations?—joy, for instance, when the nest is finished; but, during the process of building it, vague, changing emotions, of which the analogues in our minds are hope, anxiety, and despondency? So, also, the locomotory instincts of different animals have some impulse connected with them, which precedes or accompanies their activity; but they possess no distinctive emotions. They become organised, as we have seen, in a variety of emotional systems, as anger, fear, hunger, and others, without altering fundamentally their emotional character. For, although such instincts have each their own impulse and qualitatively distinct sensations connected with them, an impulse with its sensations does not constitute a distinct emotion. Impulses, which during excitement have some resemblance to emotions, are vague in quality, and present little difference from one another.

This is the case with primitive disgust. It is at first an instinct with an impulse, but not a definite emotion; later, when it becomes also a definite emotion, this instinct is less active and obtrusive. When the peculiar sensations of this instinct are most violent and oppressive, the emotion, instead of being correspondingly intense, does not even exist; and when the emotion is most clearly felt, these sensations are less felt and fall into the background of consciousness. But whether a definite emotion or only a definite instinct, whether in its primitive or acquired form, it is still at bottom the same force directed to the same instinctive ends of ejecting, repulsing, or withdrawing from the thing that disgusts us. These two forms of the same force continue to subsist in us together, having both their utility, like the roadway and the railway in the State. We still at times experience the impulse and the violent sensations of vomiting, and, at others, the feeling of disgust for persons of uncleanly habits or lives.

In the preceding chapters of this book no attempt has been made to retrace the process by which the primary

[1] Such highly-complicated or "chain-instincts" (see Art. "Instinct, especially in solitary wasps," by Prof. C. Read, *The British Journal of Psy.*, vol. iv., pt. i.) form a class apart. They cannot be connected with any one emotion.

emotions have been developed. It is buried in the obscure past of the race, a past darker on the psychical than on the biological side. But we may, perhaps, assume that instincts have preceded definite emotions,[1] though the excitement of the instinct was normally accompanied by an impulse—an impulse that was felt with increasing intensity under conditions of arrest, and that, when most intense, bore some resemblance to an emotional state. Now, in the case of disgust, Nature has admitted us a little way into her laboratory, and has disclosed to us, in part at least, how from certain definite instincts there has been developed a definite emotion.

M. Richet[2] has investigated the causes and physiological conditions of the most familiar variety of disgust, and has shown that its excitement is due to a sensory stimulus affecting the nerves of taste or smell, thence spreading to other nerves, and leading at last to the contraction of the muscular fibres of the stomach, and producing vomiting or nausea. The bitter taste of vegetable poisons, unwholesome food, and the smell of putrescent matter, arouse this primitive disgust; as also, when we are surfeited, the excess of food, or, when we are ill, the taste or the smell even of the food which ordinarily pleases us. This disgust is obviously of service to the organism by protecting it against the appropriation of substances poisonous or unwholesome, as well as from excessive feeding, and from taking food at times at which we should be unable to digest it. But this primitive disgust is not yet a constituent of our character, nor is it any more an emotion than the impulses that expel waste products from the body. It is, however, accompanied by the oppressive sensations of vomiting or of nausea.

The second variety of disgust is aroused by sensations of touch, or by the perception of certain objects by means of touch, and does not require the co-operation of gustatory or

[1] M. Ribot holds that the complex emotions have been developed from simple emotions, 'and the latter from needs and instincts.'—'Psy. of the Emotions,' 2 part, introduction, ii.

[2] 'L'Homme et l'Intelligence,' pp. 41–84. See also Th. Ribot, 'The Psychology of the Emotions,' 2 part, ch. i. ii.

olfactory sensations. We are disgusted by the touch of certain parasitical insects, or by the cold and clammy touch of snails, slugs, and reptiles ; and afterwards the sight of them will arouse this disgust. In distinction from the first type we notice here the absence of vomiting and its accompanying sensations ; faint sensations of nausea may indeed be present, but this does not appear to be always the case, unless the sense of smell is also stimulated. In this type we come nearer to an 'emotion' of disgust, for the violent sensations of the first type are not aroused. The touch of a toad arouses sensations of shuddering rather than of nausea.

Before considering this second type further we must notice that there is a more developed variety of the first in which sensations of disgust are aroused through taste or smell,—and, afterwards, indirectly, through association,—but the cause of these sensations is also perceived through sight or touch: as when after noticing a disagreeable odour in the neighbourhood of some animal we regard it with disgust; or when we feel disgust at the sight of some dish of food on account of our former experience of its disagreeable taste. And so by association we are disgusted at the sight of animals of filthy habits, and of such as feed on dead bodies,—especially when we are in their near neighbourhood,—and also at human beings who appear unclean in their persons.

This type, with its perception of the object to which the disgusting sensations are due, is probably not primitive. We can trace in many cases its development. In primitive disgust we are absorbed by our internal sensations. The sick infant may only be aware of its disagreeable sensations and of the impulse that expels the liquid from its stomach and mouth. The disgust it feels is a mass of sensation with this impulse. Probably it does not at first perceive the cause, and refer its sensations to that. It is the same with any other voluminous and disagreeable bodily state. We are absorbed by the sensations and impulse connected with them. But the child, as it develops and increases in experience, connects the effect with the cause, and at the sight of the cause has its former disagreeable sensations and impulse revived in a less intense form, and refers these to the

perceived object. Its disgust has become a definite emotion with a definite object.

Now no one would call the impulse and sensations of nausea, vomiting, and cold sweat an emotion any more than those of a colic or of a fever. They may, indeed, become the object of an emotion and excite our fear, but they are not themselves the emotion of disgust. When the later stage is reached, in which attention is no longer engrossed by this impulse and sensations, but directed to a perceived object to which this impulse and sensations are referred, for which the disgust is felt, this experience would commonly be regarded as an emotion.[1] There will then have been a shifting of attention from a state of the coenæsthesia to a perceived object, and the same sensations that were at first an object have now fallen into the background, and form part of the subjective state of emotion.

Whether we confine the term emotion to this second stage of development, or extend it also to the first, is a verbal question that, from our point of view, is not of great importance. What is of importance is to recognise that both are the same system in different stages of development, and that this system is one of the fundamental forces of the mind.

2. *Of the Innate and Acquired Tendencies of Disgust*

We have considered in the last section the two chief varieties of disgust so far as these are aroused by sensations of taste and smell, on the one hand, or by sensations of touch and temperature, on the other, and have seen that probably, sensations of sight only arouse disgust through association: we have now to distinguish the different tendencies which are manifested in the behaviour of these varieties. In the first and most familiar type, in which the characteristic sensations are those of nausea or of vomiting, there are present the different instinctive or reflex tendencies connected with the extrusion from the body of the offensive substances—the spitting out, the choking, the vomiting, the puffing or blowing out from the nostrils. At first these tendencies are aroused through

[1] 'The Teacher's Handbook of Psy.' J. Sully, pt. iii. ch. xv. p. 376.

the taste or smell, but soon by association, and, usually in a weaker degree, through sight. "The idiosyncrasy of antipathy," says Preyer, "to many articles of food (even in the fourth and fifth years) went so far that even the sight of such food called forth lively demonstrations of disgust, even choking movements, a phenomenon exhibited by many children and one that leads us to infer a largely developed capacity in discrimination of taste and smell."[1] The same author observes, writing of a child a few days old: "Let the tongue be touched with a solution of quinine, warm and not too much diluted, or with common salt, or let it be smeared with a crystal of tartaric acid, and movements of repulsion readily appear, accompanied with choking . . . ."[2]

The movements to which we have referred first occur when that which disgusts us has already found entrance into the body, and it is obvious that it must be differently dealt with according to the part of the body affected. There are, therefore, a variety of different instincts, or reflex tendencies, of ejection, according as the substance is in the mouth or nostrils or throat or stomach. "As we spit out a disagreeable morsel, so we reject an offensive smell by stopping the nose and by driving out the infected air through the protruded lips, with a noise of which various representations are exhibited in the interjections of disgust: Piff! Phew! Phit!"[3]

To these instinctive tendencies must be added others when disgust is caused by satiety: as the thrusting of an object away with lips or hands. "When the child has sucked enough at the breast that yields milk in great abundance, so that his stomach is full, then he actually pushes the nipple away with his lips (3rd to 5th week). In the 7th month, I saw plainly that the mouth-piece of the bottle was vigorously thrust out with the tongue, almost with disgust. The head had already been turned away some time before."[4]

The turning of the eyes, the head, and the body away is another group of tendencies belonging to disgust. They

[1] 'The Mind of the Child,' 'The Senses and the Will,' ch. iv.
[2] 'On the Development of Mind in the Child,' ch. i.
[3] H. Wedgwood, 'On the Origin of Language,' ch. iii. 'Interjections.'
[4] Preyer, *op. cit.* 'The Senses and the Will,' ch. iv. pt. 4.

often imply the perception of an object through sight, and then belong to a later stage of disgust to which the term 'emotion' is more properly applied. For it is not things seen that first arouse disgust, but things tasted, smelt, or touched. If these tendencies are partly acquired, they are directed to an end which is not acquired: namely, to exclude from experience or perception, and, later, even from thought, the disgusting object. The end is analogous to that of the primitive tendencies of ejection; for, if those exclude substances from the body, these exclude experiences and thoughts from the mind. "The mind revolts against certain opinions, as the stomach rejects certain foods."[1] "Si quelque proposition vous charme, vous dites la goûter; vous la rejetez au contraire des yeux, du nez, de la bouche, des épaules, et de la main, si elle vous est importune; mais si elle attente à l'ordre moral, les expressions de la lutte violente sont plus énergiques encore; ce sont les expressions du dégoût physique, du vomissement, de la dyspnée mortelle; elles prennent, dans ce dernier cas, la forme de l'horreur et d'épouvante."[2]

As primitive disgust is often aroused by satiety, by the taste, or even at the sight of food for which we have felt an appetite, so is this later emotion of disgust often felt for objects that we have enjoyed to excess. "L'entière satisfaction et le dégoût se tiennent la main."[3] The emotion is in this respect like the primitive impulse. There are some things for which we acquire disgust, so that the least occupation of the mind with them tends to arouse it, as stupidity, cowardice, meanness, cunning, ingratitude. There are others which we may enjoy until satiety arouses disgust. But excess in the satisfaction of desire is not so likely to be followed by disgust, where the desire is not of appetitive origin as where it is. The greedy man at length pushes away his food. The smell of it is now repulsive to him. He turns his eyes from it, and gets up and leaves the room. But in the too prolonged satisfaction of

[1] Hazlitt, 'Characteristics,' cxxxvi.

[2] Louis Grandeur, 'De la Physionomie,' ch. iii. p. 44.

[3] 'La Fontaine,' quoted 'Dict Larousse,' Art. 'Dégoût.'

other desires there is the cessation of enjoyment rather than disgust; leading to the discontinuance of our occupation, to the occurrence of some other desire giving a fresh direction to our thoughts. When physical exercise is too prolonged we become fatigued, enjoyment ceases, and there is no longer the former impulse. Fatigue evokes the contrary impulse for rest. If we have to continue walking to reach our destination, we feel repugnance to the exercise, but not usually disgust. When we have too much of the company of those we love, the excess blunts our enjoyment, but produces disgust more often where it is sexual than where it is ordinary affection. What usually arises is a desire for some distraction, without our feeling either disgust or repugnancy, unless the desire be opposed. But the young become disgusted with their home-life, when it is monotonous and their work does not call them forth; and they long for distractions. They feel the monotony, and yet that they are expected to show contentment and even gratitude.

Now, in all these acquired forms of disgust, the tendency which is most conspicuous is this turning of the eyes and body away from the object, so that the mind may be no longer occupied with it. Thus, when the young are digusted with their homes, their attention and thoughts are directed away from it as much as possible; parents get little interest and attention. Thus, too, we turn away our eyes from the sight of dead bodies, and our minds from the disease and death about us. But it is some time before we acquire this attitude. A naturalist observed children who were watching corpses being brought out of a river. The young ones, who knew nothing of death, were indifferent, the elder ones turned away with repulsion.[1] Thus disgust hinders curiosity and all the mental operations that lead us to investigate the nature of things; something "becomes a perpetual source of disgust, and serves as a perpetual repellent to the eye of scrutiny."[2] It is also true that curiosity tends to inhibit disgust, as we see in so many doctors and pathologists whose intellectual curiosity overcomes their disgust at disease. Let

[1] Richet, 'L'Homme et l'Intelligence,' ii. p. 60.

[2] Bentham, 'Ration. Judic. Evid.' iv. 292.

us then express this law of the interaction of disgust and curiosity: (82) *Disgust tends to exclude curiosity about its object, and all further knowledge of it; and curiosity, likewise, tends to repress disgust at its object.*

There is another law based on this tendency of disgust to withdraw attention from its object: (83) *Disgust tends to repress pity and all disinterested sorrow on behalf of its object; and Pity, likewise, tends to repress disgust for its object.* How often, in the relief of illness and suffering, we see that the pitiful feel little or no disgust at the offices which they are called upon to fulfil; while others, at the mere sight of some filthy beggar, feel no compassion. Seneca, in describing the torments which the tyrant Zysimachus inflicted on one of his own friends,—how he cut off his nose and ears, and shut him up in a den, as if he were some strange animal, where he wallowed in filth and became covered with sores,—says, that "his punishment turned him into so monstrous a creature that he was not even pitied."[1]

3. *Of the Instinctive Tendencies of Tactile Disgust*

We have now to consider a group of tendencies which have exclusively a tactile source. When we are disgusted by the touch of some animal, or some cold and sticky substance, we tend to withdraw our hand or body from it in that peculiar way that we describe as 'shrinking.' Even when we crush disgusting insects with the foot we do it with a shrinking and repugnance. Thus we find 'shrinking' frequently mentioned in connexion with disgust. Wordsworth has the line: "I shrink not from the evil with disgust."[2] Browning describes the disgust of the noble for coarseness of manners:

> "Noble, too, of old blood thrice refined,
> That shrinks from clownish coarseness in disgust."[3]

Saint-Beuve describes delicacy of mind in this metaphorical way: "L'épiderme de cet esprit, si l'on peut dire, est extrêmement fin et répugne à certains contacts."[4]

[1] 'De Ira,' L. iii., xvii.
[2] 'Recluse,' i. 1604.
[3] 'The Ring and the Book,' i. 174.
[4] Quoted 'Dict. Larousse,' Art. 'Repugner.'

This shrinking tendency seems to be not only an instinct, but one that is innately organised in the tactile variety of disgust[1]; as we have seen reasons for holding that it is also organised in the system of fear; and it is, therefore, additional evidence in favour of the theory advanced in Chapter I of this Book, that neither an instinctive nor an acquired tendency is necessarily confined to one emotional system, and that the quality of the emotion may thus be independent of the instinct usually connected with it. Hence there may be a doubt in some cases whether the instinctive behaviour of shrinking—if we confine observation to it—is to be referred to disgust or fear. The same animal, too, sometimes arouses both emotions. We are both disgusted at the cold and clammy touch of snakes and serpents and have a certain fear of them. M. Richet observes the sudden shrinking of the hand at their touch: "Avec un serpent il faut une méfiance instinctive, que l'aspect humble et rampant de l'animal ne pourrait pas nous inspirer. Avertis par l'effroi que nous cause ce contact avec la peau froide et gluante nous retirons immédiatement notre main, brusquement, sans réflexion, avant que le jugement soit intervenu pour nous annoncer qu'il y a un danger."[2] This shrinking, where it is connected with tactile disgust, seems to be accompanied by the sensations of 'creepiness' and shuddering, characteristic of the tactile variety of the emotion, while in the case of fear it is more apt to be accompanied by a painful thrill located in the viscera.

There is another tendency of tactile disgust which seems also to be an instinct, and to belong to it originally. Shrinking is a useful reaction when we have to withdraw from contact with something disgusting, or to avoid touching it. We shrink from contact with dirty people, and, where we have to sit near them, draw our clothes closely around us. But shrinking is no longer serviceable when the disgusting thing has already settled on the surface of the body, as when parasitical insects infect it. In this situation, the instinctive

[1] See W. McDougall, 'Social Psychology,' ch. iii., 'The Emotion of Disgust.' He describes the instinct 'as a shrinking of the whole body, accompanied by a throwing forward of the hands.'

[2] Ch. Richet 'L'Homme et l'Intelligence,' ii. p. 57.

response is a shuddering and shaking of the body in order to get rid of them; sometimes, also, we rush wildly about. Parasitical insects are apt to set up a sensation of tickling, and this seems to be a stimulus of the instinct. If we felt something creeping up our legs or arms underneath the clothes, we probably should shake them violently and rush about; and we should do it immediately, and without reflexion, if we felt disgust. Children, when they tickle the ears of cats or dogs, especially on the inside, provoke a violent shaking of the animals' heads. Preyer notices a case, in the second year, in which his child shook himself in response to a disagreeable sensation of tickling: "In the first half of the second year my boy one day accidentally touched the septum of his nose with a ravelled string. He at once made a wry face, did not cry out, but shook, throwing his body violently this way and that, as if the certainly very disagreeable sensation of tickling in that spot were to be shaken off."[1] Gogol, in his celebrated novel, "Dead Souls," describes this tendency in its connexion with moral disgust. The hero, Tchitchikoff, when his dishonesty has been found out, clings to a certain prince to save him, but evokes disgust by his abject behaviour. "Leave go, I tell you," repeated the prince, "with the same inexplicable sensation of disgust which a man experiences at the sight of some repulsive insect which he cannot bring himself to crush under foot. He shook himself so violently that Tchitchikoff felt the shock of the prince's foot upon his nose, his lips, and his round chin."[2]

Beside this instinctive tendency to shake off a disgusting object from contact with the body, there is also the tendency to cleanse it from pollution, which, however much it has been elaborated by man, seems to have also an instinctive source. If the surface of the body has been fouled by some sticky substance, no shaking will get rid of it; we must wash the part affected. The cat daily licks herself, and if any of the food given to her falls on her body, she will lick the place again and again to make it clean. "Le rat . . . se croit souillé par le contact du moindre objet étranger; et si la main

[1] 'The Mind of the Child,' 'The Senses and the Will.'

[2] 'Dead Souls,' ch. xvi. Ed. Vizitelli.

de l'homme passe sur son corps, il est longtemps à se nettoyer pour enlever jusqu'aux dernières traces de cette pollution indiscrète."[1] The elaborate ceremonies of purification practised by certain peoples seem to have their root in the same instinct. For if we only come to feel disgust at the sight of a corpse, and to turn away our eyes, the touch of its cold and clammy skin had perhaps always a tendency to arouse the emotion ; and this disgust may not be appeased by simply withdrawing the hand, but may impel us also to cleanse it. Among the Polynesians, as soon as the burial ceremony was over, "all who had touched the body or the garments of the deceased, which were buried or destroyed, fled precipitately into the sea to cleanse themselves from pollution, called 'mahurulum,' which they had contracted by touching the corpse ; casting also into the sea the cloths they had worn."[2]

The instinctive tendencies of Disgust thus fall into three classes. In the first class are the instincts of ejection, the vomiting, choking, spitting, and blowing out, which have to deal with substances that have already found entrance into the body. Each of them responds instinctively to its own sensational stimulus, according as the substance is in the mouth or nostrils or throat or stomach. In the second class are the instincts which are aroused by the mere contact of the disgusting thing with some part of the external surface of the body : the shrinking, shaking, and cleansing instincts. Each of these, too, responds to its own particular stimulus, according as the thing is in mere contact with the body, or upon it, and, in the latter event, according as it moves on the body or sticks to it. Lastly, there is the instinct of pushing away, with the hands or feet from contact with the body, something which arouses disgust, either at once or after satiety. In the third class are the tendencies, partly acquired, which are utilised principally by the later varieties of disgust. These are the turning away of the eyes, the head, the body from the thing that disgusts us. When an object is not in contact with the body, but merely perceived by vision, these varieties have their use and the others are not needed. Thus, for

[1] Houzeau, 'Sur les Facultés Mentales des Animaux,' ch. ii. sec. ii.

[2] Ellis, 'Polynesian Researches,' p. 253.

instance, the mere sight of certain food, which has before aroused sensations of nausea or choking, excites an emotion of disgust for it. We do not need to taste it again and be moved to eject it afresh. The slight revival of disagreeable sensations makes us turn away our eyes, mouth, and head from it. Similarly the mere sight of the cold and slimy things that have formerly aroused tactile disgust, revives in a weaker degree our former sensations, dissuades us from touching them again, and makes us turn away from them in disgust. It is this new acquired tendency, this inhibition of former impulses of tasting, smelling and handling of the thing, and this complex turning away from the thing, so that the attention and thought may no longer be occupied with it, that we have to notice. The object is no longer in contact with the body through taste or touch ; it is perceived through vision and recognised as the cause of the former disagreeable sensations ; and disgust is now felt for this cause.

Thus, too, there are many acquired forms of disgust which spring from the original satiety of appetite. The child who so early pushes the teat from its mouth, comes to push away its toys when it is satiated with them. And where we are no longer dealing with physical things, and cannot push them from us, we still put out our hands as an expressive gesture, when we have had too much of them, and turn away. Enough ! we cry out to the man who repeats again and again the same statement. Enough ! we say in disgust with the factitious amusements which society pours upon us, and turn away for relief to Nature.

But the instinct to thrust away that which disgusts us has a source not only in the disgust due to satiety, but also in the disgust connected with the sexual appetite, and here has an influence on sexual selection among human beings. There are people of the opposite sex at whom we feel no disgust so long as they keep within certain limits. We shake hands with them ; we talk to them ; we look in their faces and do not turn our eyes away. But let them pass these limits ; let a sexual expression appear in their eyes, at once we turn ours away. If they offered to embrace us, we should thrust them from us. And it is noteworthy how our affections have their

barriers, and how in overstepping them a loved object may disgust us ; and thus it disgusts us to see the affections of father and child, of brother and sister, of man to man, and woman to woman exceeding their customary limits.

It is these later and acquired varieties which are more properly regarded as the emotions of disgust. The instincts to spit out and to retch, though they have their own impulses and sensations, do not seem to constitute an emotion. We have now to consider whether there is any important distinction between them.

4. *Of the Laws of the Development of Disgust*

If primitive disgust is only one of the forces connected with the conservation of bodily life, the definite emotion developed from it is one of the forces of character. We can now lay down certain laws of its development. At the moment at which the definite emotion sprang into existence, the sensations of disgust must have been below their maximum intensity. Suppose, for instance, that as soon as we caught sight of some disgusting human being or animal we were seized with violent and prolonged vomiting, the emotion of disgust would then be impossible. We should become absorbed with our internal sensations ; we should not be disgusted at the animal that caused them. Our bodily state would become an object of anxious attention.

We may therefore provisionally formulate this law of the development of disgust : (84) *In the development of the specific emotion of disgust, the sensations belonging to it must not be so intense as to absorb attention on themselves.*

In every emotion there is a competition between the interest and attractive power of its object and the interest and attractive power of its sensations. We know that normally and in good health the coenæsthesia is not attended to or thought about ; but when any one of its sensations becomes unusually intense or painful or pleasant, that tends to attract the attention. In every strong emotion the coenæsthesia is modified, and some portion of it is raised to a higher intensity, because the functions of the bodily organs are

changed. How comes it, then, that those internal sensations that are raised to a higher intensity do not attract attention to themselves? We must answer: by the competition and attractive power of the object. When we are emotionally affected the object has unusual hold upon the attention. Yet even then we learn more about our internal sensations than at other times, and cannot help at moments noticing the beating of the heart, the trembling, and other symptoms. But, on the whole, our attention is for the time absorbed by the object. When we are angry we think of the man who has injured or offended us: this thought displaces all other thoughts. Still the attractive power of the object has its limits. Were the emotion of disgust to provoke vomiting, the attention to its object would be displaced by the attractive power of the sensations. The definite emotion would be suspended; but the instinct would be fully active, and its sensations raised to the highest intensity.

The competition in emotions between the attractive power of their objects and the attractive power of their sensations suggests a further question. When these sensations exceed a certain intensity do they exclude the possibility of all emotion? By no means; but that emotion which was present, or would have been present at a lower intensity, is for the time excluded. We become engrossed with our internal sensations. But this attitude to our own states may be itself an emotion, and probably will be so in proportion to their intensity. The continuance of a colic or of sickness arouses anxiety for oneself.

Darwin records an observation which supports this conclusion. "I never," he says, "saw disgust more plainly expressed than on the face of one of my infants at the age of five months, when, for the first time, some cold water, and again, a month afterwards, when a piece of ripe cherry was put into his mouth. This was shown by the lips and whole mouth assuming a shape which allowed the contents to run or fall quickly out; the tongue being likewise protruded. These movements were accompanied by a little shudder." And he adds this significant remark: "It was all the more comical, as I doubt whether the child felt real dis-

gust—the eyes and forehead expressing much surprise and consideration."[1]

The second law of disgust, then, is complementary to the first and implied by it: (85.) *The emotion of disgust must refer to something other than its constituent sensations.* This object may be extremely vague and undefined, as when we say that we are disgusted with everything, or with life in general; but it must at least provide something to which thought and attention may be referred, and have sufficient attractive force to overcome the competing, attractive force of the sensations. Now there seem to be states in which this condition is not fulfilled. It is not only external things that arouse sensations of sickness and repulsion, but also, as in the case of other emotions, bodily states themselves. In troubles of digestion and in sickness faint sensations of nausea may be present for considerable periods of time, with an impulse, that is felt at intervals, to retch. If food be offered under these conditions a genuine disgust at it is felt. But the same sensations and impulse are present in a weaker form when it is not offered, or even thought of. In the one case there is an emotion of disgust; in the other there is not. In the one there is some object to refer to, and the attention is directed to that; in the other there is none appropriate to these sensations and impulse. What happens in this case? We either attend to these sensations, and recognise that we feel ill; or we forget about them, or force ourselves to attend to something else. But, in the latter case, these sensations, however unconscious we are of the fact, colour our mental attitude, and dispose us then to feel disgust with things in general. Thus at times there arises an emotion of disgust partly constituted of these same sensations and impulse.

There is, then, a third law which has been implied in the preceding remarks: (86) *In the development of the emotion of disgust, the sensations belonging to it, being restrained by their own weakness and the attractive force of the object from concentrating attention on themselves, form part of the emotional attitude to this object.*

We have attempted to lay down certain general laws of the

[1] 'The Expression of the Emotions,' ch. xi.

development of the specific emotion of disgust from the impulse and instinct belonging to the first type. We have only to go back to a period sufficiently early in the life of the child to find this impulse and its connected sensations without the emotion. The attention is then absorbed on these sensations. Sooner or later disgust comes to be felt at something with which its original disgust has been connected. This attracts attention, and withdraws it from internal sensations. Like ourselves, the child may have swallowed some food that produced nausea or vomiting. The sight of a similar object on a future occasion may arouse an emotion of disgust at it.

Thus, in certain cases, the emotion of disgust felt in the perception of an object is due to the re-excitement of an instinct, aroused primarily through taste or smell, in a degree not sufficiently strong to engross the mind with its internal sensations. How far this is the only source of the emotion we have next to inquire.

5 *Of Primitive Tactile Disgust*

The hypothesis that other varieties of disgust were derived through association from the disgust caused by sensations of taste and smell [1] does not seem able to interpret the peculiar instincts present in tactile disgust. Nor is it otherwise probable that the disgust felt when some insect creeps over the skin, or that excited by slugs, snails, and other cold and clammy things, has been derived from our former experience of their taste or smell. The sense of smell seems here to play little or no part; and although children put many things into their mouths, they do not experiment on slugs and snails often enough to account for the general disgust felt at them. And, further, we may remark that there are many sweetmeats that are both cold and sticky to touch that we eat with enjoyment; and while the cold and clammy touch of oysters in the hand may disgust us, the taste of them in the mouth is in many cases a stimulant of appetite. The French eat a certain kind of snail; and this disgusts the English,

[1] Ribot, *op. cit.* part ii. ch. i., ii.

not because they have tasted them and found that the taste directly excites disgust, but because they recall their cold and slimy touch. We seem, then, driven to conclude that there is an original disgust, caused by sensations of touch and temperature, that we experience in other parts of the body than on the tongue. Hence, in such cases there may be no revival of sensations of nausea, except where a disagreeable odour is connected with the object, but sensations of shuddering or 'creepiness' are apt to replace them.

Assuming, then, that tactile disgust is an original variety based on its own instincts, we have next to inquire whether the activity of one or other of these instincts involves from the first the emotion which is now connected with all of them. These instincts we have distinguised as those of shrinking, of pushing out the hands, of shaking the body, of licking it or cleansing it in some other way. They are based on the sensation of something in contact with the body, and, according to the nature of the sensation as stimulus, one or other of these instincts is excited. Now, at least, the activity of these instincts does not evoke any sensations as violent as those which sometimes accompany gustatory disgust; nor, in fact, any of such intensity as would oblige us to attend to them. The intensity of the sensations does not seem therefore, to stand in the way of the emotion of disgust. It is rather, that the action, following often very rapidly upon the stimulus, is concluded before the emotion can be felt—as in many cases of fear.

In ordinary reflex actions we feel neither an emotion nor even an impulse to accomplish them. If a hand is approached closely to the eye, to remove something from it, the eye blinks. We do not feel any impulse to accomplish the action. The action is too rapid, and the process automatic. There is first the sensational stimulus, and upon this there follows the reflex action, also accompanied by sensation. But between the two, and as a condition of the occurrence of the second, there is neither emotion, nor even an impulse felt. The act of shrinking from something, or of pushing it away, or of shaking the body, or of licking it is somewhat more complex; but each of them is also innately connected with its

sensational stimulus, and the instinctive behaviour is frequently completed with such rapidity as to preclude the presence of emotion.

Is this exclusion of emotion, as in the first variety of disgust, more likely to occur in the beginning than at a later period? We should conclude that it is. In those cases in which the emotion of disgust is clearly present we perceive, an object that had on a former occasion excited one or more of the instincts of disgust—as some cold and slimy thing that we then touched, not knowing what it was. The perception of this object tends to re-excite the same instincts again. We shrink from this object, but the perception of it holds for a little while our attention, and the shuddering, the shrinking, and the readiness to thrust it from us fall into the background of consciousness, and colour the emotional attitude toward it. These intervals, during which the attention is engrossed with the object, and an emotional attitude to it is generated, increase in frequency with mental development, because we are so often able to recognise the object before it comes in contact with us.

To sum up: In the primitive disgust due to taste or smell there is probably no emotion of disgust present at first, because the intensity of the sensations of vomiting, spitting out, or blowing out are so intense that they direct attention to themselves, and preclude a perception of the cause and an emotional attitude toward it; and, in many cases, the actions are accomplished too rapidly to allow of the presence of emotion. In the primitive disgust due to sensations of touch and temperature, localised in some part of the external surface of the body, the obstacle to an emotional attitude is especially the suddenness and rapidity with which the instinctive acts are accomplished; and the confusing effect of the surprise caused by the new sensations, precludes sometimes an emotional attitude to the cause; and this may also apply in the first case, as the intensity of the sensations may be here, too, an additional cause of the direction of attention to them.

Our tentative solution of this problem furnishes us, then, with another law on which the development of the emotion seems

to depend: (87) *In the development of the emotion of disgust there must be some condition that delays or prolongs the primitive instinctive response, and provides a sufficient interval for the perception of the object and the adoption of an emotional attitude to it.* We can often observe such an interval in the case of other emotions besides disgust; and dogs, before springing to attack, will sometimes watch one another and growl and show their teeth, during which time the emotion develops.

6. *Of the Nature and Function of the Emotion of Disgust*

We come to feel an emotion of disgust at the sight of a great variety of things, some of which are only remotely connected with primitive varieties: food which has occasioned nausea; things which are cold and clammy to the touch; parasites and various insects; dirt, disease, and dead bodies; persons who are unclean, or given to gluttony, sensual excesses, or perversions; characters that are mean, shameless, or despicable. And, taking up a more general attitude, we come to feel disgust for life, as a whole, or for our particular mode of life,—as a life that has too much of one kind of experience: the quiet and retired life of the scholar and philosopher; the life of excitement and conflict of the politician: we grow disgusted with this mode of life, of which we have too much, to the exclusion of other modes of life, of which we have too little. And, lastly, there is the emotion of self-disgust—disgust at our own conduct when it falls away from our ideals and resolutions. In these latest developments, the objects are so far removed from the causes that excite the original instincts, that we cannot say that the emotion has sprung from one of them more than from others; it is rather, perhaps, the effect of a partial and confused re-excitement of all.

Let us next consider what the different varieties of the emotion of disgust have in common. In the first place each, whatsoever its origin, may have the same facial expression, differing on different occasions in the degree and fulness with which it is elicited. Moderate disgust, Darwin observes, "is exhibited in various ways: by the mouth being widely opened,

as if to let an offensive morsel drop out; by spitting, by blowing out of the protruded lips, or by a sound as of clearing the throat."[1] "Extreme disgust is expressed by movements round the mouth identical with those preparatory to the act of vomiting. The mouth is opened widely, with the upper lip strongly retracted, which wrinkles the sides of the nose, and with the lower lip protruded and averted as much as possible."[2] Moderate disgust may be also expressed by certain gestures, as by putting out the hands and averting the eyes and head. This expression of disgust on the face is the more surprising, inasmuch as we have concluded that at least one, if not two, of the original roots of disgust is independent of sensations of taste and smell. When the emotion is formed, its expression would lead us to infer that it had no other roots but those connected with these sensations, and that we could only feel disgust at an object so far as we had previously tasted or smelt it, or so far as it resembled, or had been associated with, such an object. But this view we have rejected.

If all varieties of the emotion, as distinguished from the original instincts, have substantially the same expression and gestures, we must conclude that in all of them one or other of the instincts of ejection is at least faintly re-excited, and provokes the sensations that normally accompany them. These sensations of nausea, of spitting, of clearing the throat, of blowing through the mouth, no longer so intense as to engross attention on themselves, become therefore part of the emotional attitude of disgust.

These reflexes or instincts of ejection, which are faintly re-excited in the emotion, have no longer to perform their original functions, except in rare cases. For we are here not concerned with things that have gained admittance into some part of the body and have to be ejected, but with things perceived outside, or with intangible objects of the mind. In the disgust felt at another person's conduct, or our own, the instincts of ejection have nothing else to do but to give the characteristic expression to the emotion, and, by evoking the sensations connected with them, to give fulness to the emo-

[1] 'The Expression of the Emotions,' ch. xi. [2] *Ibid.*

tional feeling. Its central tendency is not therefore to be found among these instincts, but must be looked for elsewhere.

This is the constitution of the emotion of disgust as distinguished from the instincts or reflex actions that appear to have preceded it. There are several distinct instincts: those of the gustatory, tactile, and visual roots, and these different roots combine to grow into and form one emotional system.

We come now to the chief question: What is the use and function of the emotion, as distinguished from the use and functions of the several instincts that have preceded it?

Each instinct of disgust has its own organisation, its own stimuli innately connected with it, and its own behaviour. In the emotion the different instincts, the different types of behaviour, the different organisations find a common organisation.

It is this conception of the emotion that we have now to apply tentatively to the facts. We find, then, as we have already noted, that the original instincts of disgust, that are excited with the emotion, have only, in most cases, to fulfil a symbolical or expressive function; for the air that we blow out is not really vitiated, nor is the saliva that we expectorate the cause of our disgust. "Would thou were clean enough to spit upon,"[1] says Timon. The central tendency of the emotion is that to which we have already referred as a tendency to turn away the eyes, head, or body, so that there may no longer be a perception of the disgusting object. Where the object is not perceived, but only thought of, there arises the corresponding tendency to turn away our attention and thoughts. Its chief function is therefore preventive. If we went farther we should be more disgusted, and one or other of the original instincts would be fully exercised. For we have either had previous experience of the object, as where it is something we have tasted or smelt or taken hold of, and then the emotion prevents us from renewing our experience, or it is some person or thing

[1] 'Timon of Athens,' A. iv. Sc. iii.

that now arouses disgust at first sight, and then the emotion tends to prevent our acquaintance from going farther.

Disgust now, as an emotion, becomes a force of character, and not, like its original forms, a force merely conservative of the bodily life. And this force acts in an opposite way to Joy. For while joy holds us in the presence of its object, disgust makes us turn away from it. And as joy is the chief influence which makes us love things and persons, so disgust is one of the conspicuous forces that inhibit such a sentiment, and, where one is already formed, bring it to an end. "Les amours meurent par le dégoût."[1] Thus books and knowledge itself may come to disgust us, and money and fame and all other things that we have once loved. And with regard to all of them the instincts of ejection play only their symbolical and expressive part, and also, for the most part, the instinct of rejection—the putting out our hands to thrust them from us. These instincts can only recover their original functions where the object of disgust is something physical. Thus, if a person who disgusts us approaches too closely, we shrink from him; if he lays hold of us, we push him from us or shake him off. And yet there may be nothing about him that would have aroused any one of these instincts, neither a disagreeable odour, nor a blotchy complexion, nor a cold and clammy touch; our disgust here is all 'moral.' This emotion has, therefore, a range of adaptiveness to which no one of the instincts could possibly approximate, being able to excite just that instinctive tendency, and to utilise just that type of behaviour which it requires in the circumstances, and always exciting the instincts of ejection in some degree on which both the feeling, as well as expression, of the emotion seem partially to depend. In such a case the excitement of this or that particular instinct of turning away, of shrinking, of shaking off, of pushing, depends not on the original stimuli of these instincts, but on the previous existence of the emotion itself, which thus becomes a centre through which these several instincts may become interconnected.

Darwin was surprised at the fact, that, instead of the original stimuli, ideas could so rapidly arouse disgust. "It is remarkable," he says, "how readily and instantly retching,

[1] La Bruyère, 'Les Caractères,' 'Du Cœur.'

or actual vomiting, is induced in some persons by the mere idea of having partaken of any unusual food, as of an animal which is not commonly eaten ; although there is nothing in such food to cause the stomach to reject it. When vomiting results, as a reflex action, from some real cause—as from too rich food or tainted meat or from an emetic—it does not ensue immediately, but generally after a considerable interval of time." [1] Now it is not the " mere idea " that arouses vomiting in such a case, but that idea in conjunction with the emotion of disgust which it excites, as is evidenced by the facial expression, and by a remark which Darwin makes afterwards, that the vomiting is apt to follow " whenever the mind revolts at the idea of having partaken of any kind of food, or at anything disgusting." [2] The emotion having been aroused by an idea, a variety of reactions may follow from it, instinctive or acquired, according to the interpretation which is placed upon it. Thus, if the event is not that we have swallowed something, but that we have touched something, and if the touch does not at first arouse disgust nor until we have interpreted it as contact with putrescent matter, then the reaction is not retching, but a washing or cleansing of the part. And the emotion has this adaptability just in so far as it is aroused, not by the original stimuli of one of the instincts, but by ideas which delay the action, and bring a mental process into predominance, leading the emotion to form an idea of the response which is appropriate to the situation. Thus as we no longer lick the body, if water is not at our disposal, we may cleanse the part affected in a variety of ways that we have learnt through experience, as by rubbing it on the grass or on leaves.

The distinction we have drawn between the higher and unifying stage of development to which we have confined the term ' emotion of disgust,' and the lower stage of the separate instincts that have preceded it, if it be true, is far from being unimportant, because it marks the rise of a more complex type of organisation to which various instincts may contribute and in which they become organised. For every emotion has a great variety of behaviour open to it in comparison

[1] *Op. cit.* ch. xi. [2] *Ibid.*

with the narrow limits of variation of an instinct. The emotion organising this variety of behaviour, instinctive and acquired, adding to it also, is like the sentiment organising a variety of emotions. Each in turn is a more comprehensive and complex type of organisation. Each in turn is more adaptable than that which precedes it. Each in turn organises thought and will in higher degree and kind. In the emotion we watch the uprising of that which is called 'conation' in a higher sense than is the impulse of an instinct. For to accomplish a tendency which sometimes we may hardly feel, the results of which at first we cannot foresee, to which our perception and thought are subordinated, by which we are swept along, and the ends of which we do not control, hardly seems to be due to our own 'striving.' Still in the emotion we shall never expect to find more than a little hasty thought and impulsive volition. The higher types of both can only arise in the prolonged delays and conflicts and indefinite variety of response characteristic of the sentiment.

We shall now in conclusion formulate tentatively the law of the emotional system of disgust which we have already explained: (88) *The emotion of disgust organises in one system instincts and other tendencies which were previously independent or attached to separate groups, and thus is in a position to control from its centre the varieties of behaviour which are connected with these instincts.*

CHAPTER XV

REPUGNANCE

1. *Of Repugnance as a Primary Emotion*

It is generally assumed that Sorrow is the opposite of Joy, although if we compare the tendencies of the two emotions they are in many cases complementary and not opposed; since the tendency of the most familiar variety of sorrow, that which arises from the loss of an object of joy, is to recover that state of the thing, or that relation to it, or that occupation with it, which rendered it an object of joy. In the system of love the two emotions are therefore never opposite but complementary.

If the tendency of joy is to hold us in presence of its object, sometimes as spectator, sometimes as agent on whose sustaining activity the joy principally depends,—as in the enjoyment of games and sports,—then the opposite tendency is one that repels us from the thing, so that we withdraw attention from it and bring our occupation with it to an end. We have found that the emotion of Disgust has this tendency, and it is therefore a true opposite to Joy. There is another opposite emotion to joy with a similar tendency, but having a wider range of causes which may excite it and objects to which it may be referred, which we shall here call Repugnance. The similarity between their tendencies may lead us to infer at first sight, that repugnance is a derivative of disgust, and to conclude, in any case, that an emotion which lacks a distinctive tendency cannot have great importance assigned to it.

We shall first consider the evidence that this emotion

exists, and secondly that it is a primary emotion distinct from disgust.

It is a noteworthy fact that we have no single term to express this emotion, but rather a variety of terms of which we sometimes employ one, sometimes another, according to the situation. These terms are 'displeasure,' 'distaste,' 'antipathy,' 'aversion,' 'repugnance,' 'repulsion,' and even sometimes 'dislike,' where we employ it to express an immediate feeling that we have sometimes in the presence of certain persons and things.

Many observations in literature imply the existence of this emotion, and describe the sudden way in which it takes possession of us. Thus Hazlitt says, "There are persons that we like, though they do not like us. . . . There are others to whom no civilities or good offices on their part can reconcile us, from an original distaste: yet even this repugnance would not, perhaps, be proof against time and custom."[1] A French author has remarked: "La race tudesque et la nôtre n'ont jamais pu s'unir, même dans l'amour, que par la violence; il y a de ces répulsions de sang que rien ne surmonte."[2] These statements then imply both the existence of this repulsion, repugnance, or distaste, and that it may be aroused 'instinctively,' or through an innate connexion between the stimulus and the emotion: a circumstance that, if it be established, points to the emotion being a true primary.

We frequently also acquire this repugnance both for things and persons: and how clearly is it the opposite of that delight or enjoyment in them which comes too seldom! We may take a few examples:—"J'ai toujours vu que les grandes aversions ne naissent que de bagatelles qui revenaient souvent."[3] "Le peu de penchant, ou plutôt la répugnance que je me sentais pour un second mariage, après tous les malheurs du premier, faisait le seul obstacle que ma parente eût à lever."[4]

"Du nectar idéal sitôt qu'elle a goûté,
La nature répugne à la réalité."[5]

[1] 'Characteristics,' xlvii.
[2] L. Colet, quoted 'Dict. Larousse,' Art. 'Répulsion.'
[3] Mdme. de Maintenant, quoted 'Dict. Larousse,' Art. 'Répulsion.'
[4] Le Sage, *op. cit.*
[5] Lamartine, quoted *op. cit.*

We shall now take certain examples to show that this repugnance is not the same emotion as disgust, and that it has certain stimuli which innately, from our earliest years, tend to arouse it. There are certain experiences that at once excite repugnance, and in such a uniform way from the beginning, that we cannot suppose the connexion to have been acquired. The most familiar example is the experience of physical pain. Let the experience of physical pain be of sufficient intensity, and very soon we feel this impulse of aversion to it, the impulse to get rid of it. If again we take any primary impulse, as for instance the impulse to exercise or to rest, bound up with this impulse, when we feel it, is the repugnance to our present state. Now these two cases, the feeling of repugnance to rest when we have the impulse to exercise and the feeling of repugnance to exercise when we have the impulse to rest, bear no resemblance to disgust. Nor is there any more resemblance to it in the repugnance to physical pain. And here the connexion between the stimulus and the emotion can hardly have been acquired: we must assume it to be innate.

So too in the life of the child, it turns away from certain experiences with repugnance, not with disgust,—as it turns to others with joy: not only from physical pain, but from darkness to light, from dull things to bright colours. This emotion has a much wider range than disgust. For all our impulses and desires, when their satisfaction is delayed, carry a repugnance to our present situation, no matter how agreeable to us it had been before. Thus if we desire to live in town, we feel repugnance to continue living in the country. If we desire to be rich we no longer feel contented with our moderate fortune, and our present state becomes repugnant to us. But we never feel a repugnance more widespread than under the influence of great sorrow. Things that formerly gave us delight then become distasteful.

Repugnance then has a very wide range; in the tempers of some a much wider range than joy has; and if it is not derived from disgust, still less can we suppose it to be derived from any other emotion. Repugnance, therefore, is primary; but is it a primary emotion or only a primary impulse?

There are many primary impulses which are not distinctive emotions, and which for other reasons, which we explained in the last chapter, it seems important to distinguish as a class from the emotions, however much they approximate to them in some respects. Is not repugnance simply one of them, an impulse of aversion opposite to the impulse of desire, not an emotion of repugnance, opposite to the emotion of joy? But why should we have an impulse of aversion to certain things, and an impulse of attraction to others, unless there were an emotion of repugnance in the one case, as there is an emotion of joy in the other, to account for it? And repugnance seems to have a certain distinctiveness of feeling, if we observe closely such cases as the repugnance that we sometimes feel for our surroundings, or for the company of people who, although they do not arouse disgust, are unsuited to us. In addition to this, is repugnance a centre with which are organised a variety of tendencies, instinctive and acquired, such as we have found all the emotional systems to be which we have hitherto studied? That question we can only answer after we have examined its behaviour.

2. *The Meaning of the Terms "Displeasure," "Distaste," "Repugnance," "Aversion," "Antipathy"*

The difficulty that we find in studying this emotion or impulse is enhanced by the variety of terms that may be used to denote it. The terms 'pleasure' and 'displeasure,' because their scientific connotation confines them to expressing abstract elements that are found in a great variety of states, are improperly used to denote emotions. Yet in their ordinary usage they are frequently employed to denote them at a low degree of intensity. Thus we say it is a 'joy' to meet a friend, a 'pleasure' to meet an acquaintance; or that it is 'pleasant' for us to visit foreign countries, but a 'joy' for the young who have never been out of their own land.

As it is with the term 'pleasure,' so is it with the term 'displeasure.' In its ordinary use the term does not so often stand for an abstract element, the opposite of pleasure, as for a composite emotion comprising a certain degree of anger. To be displeased with a person is to feel in some

degree angry with him. This meaning of the word is recognised by Johnson, who also notices the more abstract meaning of "uneasiness; pain received."[1] In Murray's dictionary we find the following definitions of these two meanings: (1) "The fact or condition of being displeased or offended; a feeling varying according to its intensity from dissatisfaction or disapproval to anger and indignation provoked by a person or action";[2] (2) "The opposite of pleasure; discomfort, uneasiness, unhappiness; grief, sorrow, trouble."[3] And as pleasure often implies a certain degree of joy, so, too, displeasure often implies a certain degree of its opposite, repugnance. But if 'pleasure' may be used to denote either bodily or mental pleasure, 'displeasure' is chiefly used to denote unpleasant or painful attitudes of mind. Some things displease us at once, and as it were 'instinctively,' dark or gloomy things, harsh, creaking, scraping, or violent noises; other things only displease us through our past experience of them. Thus places we have visited with expectations of enjoyment, and where we have experienced only disappointment, discomfort, and annoyance, if we catch sight of them only from a passing train, cause us displeasure. To recollect them, to hear them named by others, still more to hear them praised, displeases us. So also people whom we have met, and with whom we have felt ourselves embarrassed, and unable to engage in an easy conversation, or people whom we see frequently in some club or other public place without ever accosting, it displeases us to meet again; so that we feign not to recognise them or get away as soon as we can. And thus it happens that from so many disagreeable experiences we have many disagreeable thoughts; and sometimes trains of them follow one another, so that whatever we think of displeases us. Further we are displeased by obstacles in our mental life, when we cannot see our course clearly, and by conflicts of motive when we know not what to decide, and these immediately displease us just as it immediately displeases us to desire one thing and to be forced to do another.

[1] Johnson's Dictionary, Art. 'Displeasure.'
[2] Art. 'Displeasure.' [3] *Ibid.*

In all these cases though the meaning of the term 'displeasure' makes the quality of feeling prominent, yet it involves much more than this: the whole attitude of mind with its particular impulse of aversion. And while in such cases displeasure often includes anger, it does not include, or even suggest, disgust; it is the emotion that we have already expressed by the term 'repugnance,' although this term brings into prominence the impulse inseparable from it.

The term 'aversion' emphasises, and is sometimes confined to expressing the conative side of all states that have an impulse to avoid the things which cause them; and if that which we have taken to be a distinct and original emotion were no more than an impulse common to a variety of painful emotions, then we should choose the term 'aversion' to express it. But this is so far from being the case that in respect of the examples we have taken, the terms 'displeasure' and 'repugnance' do not only imply such an impulse, but specially indicate a particular feeling which accounts for it.

The term 'distaste' suggests, in its literal sense, some degree of the disgust which is aroused by sensations of taste, and therefore is not a suitable term to express an emotion which is neither the same as disgust nor derived from it. Certain kinds of food are distasteful, and distaste is here a name for a weaker form of disgust. Yet it is frequently used to express our attitude to modes of life that merely repel us. The literary man has a distaste for the business life with its daily routine and regularity; the countryman who works out of doors, for the life of the clerk at his desk. In these cases 'distaste' means a displeasure or repugnance which is independent of disgust. Yet there is no doubt that disgust and repugnance are often not only confused in our thought, but blended in our experience. The marked resemblance, if not identity, between their tendencies and behaviour makes it easy for the feeling of the one to blend with that of the other, and the blending of them in our experience renders us liable to confuse them in thought.

'Antipathy' is a term that expresses better than does 'distaste' the original distinctness of this emotion. Certain people are immediately antipathetic to us, and so are certain

places and occupations. But the term 'antipathy' has another employment to which we shall here confine it. It suggests the opposite of all sympathetic emotions, and its range is coextensive with them. For if in sympathy there is identity of feeling between two persons, here there is opposition or antagonism. It is perhaps for this reason that antipathy suggests hate? There is an immediate antipathy felt sometimes by one man for another, that is not confined to repugnance, but vaguely suggests the presence of tendencies in the background that would only find their satisfaction in inflicting suffering, injury, or death; as if indeed there were stimuli that were capable at once of exciting the complex and innate system of hate, as there are assuredly others that may at once arouse love. But wherever hate is aroused its system involves a disposition to feel an antipathetic emotion to that which the hated person feels: when he rejoices, then sorrow; when he sorrows, then joy; when he hopes, then fear; when he despairs, then triumph. In other cases there is a certain difference. When he shows anger then anger rises against him; when pride, then a pride that overtops his; when contempt, then a contempt that reduces his to insignificance. And these, though similar, are still antipathetic emotions, because directed against the other to inflict injury or suffering on him. All these antipathetic emotions belong to the system of hate, and they belong to nothing else. "A soft answer turneth away wrath," and sorrow appeaseth it; but they neither turn aside nor appease hate.

Thus each of these different terms seems to imply more or less clearly the existence of an opposite emotion to joy, which yet is not the same as disgust.

3. *The Mood of Repugnance*

As there is a diffusive mood of joy, welling up in us in good health, and especially in youth, making objects of joy out of things and events that could not normally arouse it; so there is also a mood, and even a fixed temper of repugnance to which the sick and old are prone, equally diffusive, making things that usually arouse joy displeasing to us.

This mood shows itself in several way: (1) by a turning

away of the eyes, head, and body from everything that awakens our repugnance in order to avoid attention to it, recognition of it, occupation with it; (2) by the pursuit of solitude; (3) by continual fault finding and complaint; (4) by manifestations of anger; (5) by the expression of despondency and sorrow. In the most familiar meaning of the term 'displeasure' we have already found evidence of the frequent conjunction of repugnance with anger.

The turning away of the eyes, head, or body is only one of the ways in which we get rid of an object which is either repugnant or disgusting to us, and is confined to those cases in which it can be perceived. But we have noticed a group of cases which specially distinguishes repugnance from disgust, in which the object is not external to us. We feel an instinctive repugnance to physical pain; but we cannot get rid of it by such movements of the eyes or body. We have acquired the power to some extent of controlling our attention, and sometimes we practise not attending to the pain by directing our thoughts elsewhere. Sometimes we become restless, as if we might find some movement or position that would lessen the pain. Sometimes we exert great muscular effort, which diminishes the amount of attention we can give to it. But when we have learnt to distinguish the cause of the pain, we acquire a number of other methods by which it may be removed, and the end of our repugnance attained.

The behaviour characteristic of repugnance, and especially of its mood, then, shows that there are several tendencies involved in its system. The chief or central tendency is to get rid of that to which we feel repugnance, that is, to exclude it from our experience. This is the organising tendency of the system; other tendencies are subordinate or accessory to it. Thus, for instance, there is the tendency to arouse anger when the chief tendency is obstructed, and sorrow when it is frustrated. In the mood of repugnance, and when human beings in general become repugnant to us,—even those we love,—there naturally arises the desire for solitude. Men become misanthropical, avoiding their fellow creatures. And because at such times they are relatively insusceptible to the opposite emotions of joy and admiration, they lose sight of

those intrinsic valuations of things which are due to the influence of these emotions. Nor is it only these values which are temporally lost, but an opposite scale of values replaces them. Because repugnancy conceives of the things to which it is repugnant as bad, being the opposite emotion to joy, which conceives of the things to which it is attracted as good. Hence the tendency characteristic of repugnance to depreciate and find fault,—especially conspicuous in its mood,—when the stage of intellectual development is reached at which conceptions are formed of objects.

The two principal laws of repugnance we shall now formally express: (89) *Repugnance tends universally to exclude the perception or thought of its object.* (90) *At the conceptual level of intelligence repugnance tends to attribute bad qualities to its object, and to deny or lose sight of the good ones, substituting negative for positive values.* The influence of repugnance on other primary emotions may be summed up in the following law: (91) *Repugnance tends to exclude joy; and when its impulse is opposed, to evoke anger; and when it is frustrated, sorrow.*

We shall now take the evidence of literature in support of these laws. The mood or temper of repugnance has often been studied by great writers, and if the last law which we have formulated be valid, we should expect that it would be difficult without some analysis to distinguish it. For when things and persons in general become repugnant to us, the impulse to get rid of them will be obstructed. We can avoid this man, or that, but to avoid mankind involves the severing of all human ties. Hence even the solitude we pursue is continually interrupted. Under the influence of this mood, we therefore become so liable to anger that it appears as if our mood were the irascible. That this is not the real base of our emotional state is shown by the frequency with which sorrow is substituted for anger. For the impulse being primarily to avoid things, and not to threaten, injure, or destroy them, the number of things that are repugnant to us frequently frustrates the impulse, and we recognise that it cannot be satisfied; and from this arises sorrow.

Thus at one time the mood seems to be one of irascibility or

anger, at another time one of depression or sorrow; but the hidden cause of both is the disposition to be displeased with nearly everything around us. The common remark made about anyone in this state is that "it is impossible to please him," or that "he finds fault with everything." Such people have "jaundiced eyes to which all order withers, all things here are out of joint."[1] Sometimes these defects appear to be part of the permanent character, and not due to misfortune or ill-health. "There are men of gloomy character," says Gratian, "who regard everything as faulty, not from any evil motive but because it is their nature to."[2] When repugnancy is neither a mood nor a permanent temper, but an emotion with a definite object, the same effects may still be observed, though limited to a single case. There are people who have bound themselves, or been bound together, for life, though one of them is so subtly repugnant to the other that he cannot please her, except by keeping out of sight; and though his services be never so good, and such that were they done by another no fault would be detected in them, yet being done by him they appear defective. And here too there will arise sometimes an apparent irascibility at the presence of this person, and at other times sorrow or melancholy,—because the connexion between them cannot be severed,—masking this fundamental fact of repugnance.

Molière in "Le Misanthrope" has made a profound study of this temper. Alceste appears to us as almost incapable of joy. Neither the presence of his friend nor of the woman he loves delights him. Something counteracts the disposition to this emotion, displeases him and makes him discern their faults. With mankind in general it is worse. Yet it appears to him that his repugnancy is based on their vices and not on the vice of his own mood. For he prides himself on his sincerity and honesty, and can find no one else like him:

> "Mes yeux sont trop blessés, et la cour et la ville
> Ne m'offre rien qu'objets à m'échauffer la bile;
> J'entre en une humeur noire, en un chagrin profond,
> Quand je vois vivre entre ceux les hommes comme ils font,

[1] Tennyson, 'Locksley Hall.'

[2] 'The Art of Worldly Wisdom,' cix. trans. J. Jacobs.

"Je ne trouve partout que lâche flatterie,
Qu'injustice, intérêt, trahison, fourberie ;
Je n'y puis plus tenir, j'enrage ; et mon dessein
Est de rompre en visière à tout le genre humain."[1]

Thus both his sorrow and anger arise from the same cause, and from it, too, the hatred which he thinks he feels for men in general :

"Non, elle est générale, et je hais tous les hommes :
Les uns parce qu'ils sont méchants et malfaisants,
Et les autres, pour être aux méchants complaisants,
Et n'avoir pas pour eux ces haines vigoreuses
Que doit donner le vice aux âmes vertueuses."[2]

Scott in "The Pirate" has also described the character of a misanthrope. Owing to disappointments in his youth all human beings have become repugnant to Basil Mertoun, including his own son. He selects as his place of abode one of the Shetland islands, and an abandoned house in the most solitary part of it, where, as he says, "there would be neither human luxury nor human society near the place of my retreat."[3] The sight of cheerfulness was specially repugnant to him. "From loud mirth he instantly fled ; and even the moderated cheerfulness of a friendly party had the invariable effect of throwing him into deeper dejection than even his usual demeanour indicated."[4] "Surely, sir," says his son to him, "such distaste for life is not the necessary consequence of advanced age?" "To all who have sense to estimate that which it is really worth,"[5] is the answer. Thus, like Alceste he ascribes his solitary habits and moroseness to the defects of mankind, not to the defect of his own mood or temper. Like Alceste, too, his habitual mood alternates between sorrow and anger, masking the fixed temper of repugnancy which underlies both, He had "his dark hour," and at its approach he "retreated to an inner apartment," into which even his son was not permitted to enter. "Here he would abide in seclusion for days, and even weeks, only coming out at uncertain times, to take such food as they had taken care to leave within his reach." His son learnt "to note

[1] 'Le Misanthrope,' A. i. Sc. i. L. 88
[2] *Op. cit.*, A. i. Sc. i. L. 118.
[3] Vol. i. ch. i.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] Vol. i. ch. vii.

the particular signs which preceded these fits of gloomy despondency, and to direct such precautions as might insure his unfortunate parent from ill-timed interruption (which had always the effect of driving him to fury)." [1] His anger was aroused even by the voices of his servants, reminding him of the society from which he sought to escape, and he dismissed one in the following speech: "Not for being a liar, a thief, and an ungrateful quean, for these are qualities as proper to you as your name of woman, but for daring in my house to scold above your breath." [2]

Thus the temper of repugnancy appears to have this singular character that it cannot be confined to the emotion with which it is directly concerned, but brings in its train alternately an irascible and a melancholy mood. For according to a law which is now familiar to us, repugnance arouses anger when it is opposed in one degree, and sorrow in the higher degree of frustration; and the mood of repugnance, being so diffused and general, is always liable to be either thwarted or frustrated; but what feels like frustration when we are weak, is only obstruction when we are strong and will not be beaten. Thus we may enunciate this law: (92) *The mood of repugnance tends to give rise to and to be accompanied by either a mood of anger or of sorrow, according to the degree of opposition to which it is subjected and the degree of energy available for resistance.*

There are two principal varieties of this mood and temper. When its tendency to detect the faults of its objects, to exaggerate them, even to invent them, in order to justify itself, and, again, to obliterate the good qualities, so that there may be nothing to produce pleasure or joy,—when this tendency finds its satisfaction in the criticism of human nature, it produces misanthropy; when in the criticism of human life and the world, it produces pessimism. The one provides as wide a field in which the mood may expend itself as does the other.

There are times in which our general displeasure with things fastens on the fundamental evils of human life rather than on the vices of human nature, and when, like Alceste, we do

[1] Vol. i. ch. ii. [2] *Ibid.*

not discern the part which our ill-humour has played. And it is then as natural to condemn human life, because it subjects us to pain, disease, old-age, and death, and to separation from those we love best, and to form arguments and even philosophical systems to justify our pessimism, as it is to point to the vices of mankind to justify our misanthropy. And when this mood is a permanent temper, we cannot estimate how much the changed valuations of things are due to it, and how much to bad qualities of the objects. But when it is temporary and is succeeded by a mood of cheerfulness, we are often astonished to find how the same intellect then furnishes very different arguments and conclusions.

Pessimism, even more than misanthropy, is characterised by melancholy. For if to make men virtuous is difficult, to alter the destiny of human life is impossible. And here melancholy often may be judged to be the fundamental mood, instead of an effect of the general displeasure or repugnance concealed behind it.

The temper of repugnance has then effects on character of the utmost importance, and we must now attempt to formulate the law of its influence: (93) *So far as the mood of repugnance becomes a fixed temper, it tends to develop either misanthropy or pessimism.*

There is another tendency of repugnance without which this effect would not arise. As its central tendency is opposite to that of joy, so it is antagonistic to love. To avoid a person and to think badly of him is contrary to the action of love, which is to unite oneself to him and to think well of him. As a mood the same tendency is generalised. But the mood passes and the effect which it begins to have may pass with it: the temper weakens or destroys all old sentiments of love, and counteracts the formation of new ones. Thus Alceste refuses to acknowledge Philinte any longer as his friend, or Célemène as his mistress; Mortoun has no affection for his son. If the love for anyone escapes destruction, it must be strong enough to resist this disintegrating influence.

It appears then to be a law that (94) *So far as the mood of repugnance persists, it tends to destroy old sentiments of love and to prevent the formation of new ones.*

In addition to its tendency to counteract love, does this mood also tend to produce hate? To avoid a thing is not necessarily to hate it. The end of hate, derived from anger, is to destroy or to cause suffering to its object. But we have noticed that the mood of repugnance meets with such recurring opposition that anger is frequently aroused. Tied to the thing that is repugnant to us, we may come to hate it. Thus we may hate the places, people, or occupations from which we cannot free ourselves. But the mood of repugnance is so general that we cannot free ourselves from its innumerable objects; and so long as it subsists, it tends to constitute fresh ones. Thus there is ever fresh occasion for anger, which, like the repugnance, is checked, and cannot fulfil its end. For what can a man do against the world or mankind? Still, so far as the temper of repugnance remains constant, the ends of anger are only occasionally suggested, or are subordinated to its own end of aversion; and the sentiment developed, however much at times it seems to resemble hatred, is still directed to a distinctive end. This misanthropy or pessimism has not the malevolent character of genuine hate, directed against persons, classes, and institutions. Thus we find Marmontel[1] taking up the problem of Alceste again, withdrawing him from the court and the city, and by a return to nature and primitive manners, effecting a cure of his misanthropy. For moods are sometimes the effects of circumstances, sometimes of organic conditions.

4. *Of the Relation between Repugnancy and Disgust*

While repugnance has a great importance as a mood, and still more when it is a fixed temper, its central tendency, as we have previously noticed, possesses no distinctiveness. It is the same as that of one of the varieties of disgust. The difference between them is one of origin and emotional feeling: as forces of character they are substantially the same. From our point of view we ought therefore to class them together; and there is a wider sense in which we may use the term 'repugnance' than that which we have hitherto adopted. There is a sense in which the emotion of disgust is itself a

[1] Contes Moraux, Vol. ii, 'Le Misanthrope Corrigé.'

kind of repugnance, because it is characterised by the tendency of aversion, the tendency to exclude its object from perception and thought. From this point of view, the repugnancy we have been considering appears as only one variety among several. Going back to reconsider the chief varieties, we can distinguish them by their differences of origin. There is, first, the variety of repugnance that springs from sensations of taste or smell, and which manifests the various instincts or reflex acts of rejection; secondly, the variety that springs from sensations of touch that affects other portions of the body than the organs of taste or smell, and manifests other instincts; thirdly, that variety which springs originally from sensations of vision or of hearing, and not merely through association with the two former varieties: as the repugnance to certain colours, or combinations of colour, or to gloomy rooms, or to harsh, scraping, or ugly noises; fourthly, that variety which springs from sensations of bodily pain; fifthly, that from certain experiences of conflict,—as where we are kept in the present situation in spite of our impulse or desire to change it. From these five original sources, of which the three last have been considered in the present chapter, all the varieties of repugnance which we have been able to distinguish appear to arise, from the first two, the emotions of disgust, from the others, the emotions of repugnance that lack the character of repulsion. For we notice that while those we considered in the last chapter have the expression about the mouth which is connected with the instincts of disgust, the others do not generally have this expression: for instance our repugnance to physical pain expresses suffering but not disgust; our repugnance to being confined in one situation while we desire to be in another, expresses annoyance but not disgust. As we have remarked, there is often a confusion in our mind between disgust and other kinds of repugnance; so that our repugnance to an occupation that in point of origin has no connexion with the instincts of disgust may yet be named disgust and assume the expression characteristic of it. Thus too our repugnance to life we frequently speak of as our disgust with it.

We have to notice in conclusion two other emotions which are familiar to us, but not generally recognised as varieties of repugnance. These are 'ennui' or 'boredom' and 'discontent.'

5. *Ennui*

Between the things that immediately arouse in us either joy or repugnance there are a number of other things that we call 'uninteresting,' to which we are indifferent. We have no feeling for them. We do not spontaneously attend to them. They do not often arrest the movement of our eyes, which pass over them as if they had no individual existence. But when they detain us they arouse repugnance, because they are 'dull and uninteresting.' These things and persons, although they have at first such a negative character, play a great part in our lives. They are so numerous that we cannot avoid them altogether. And it is a relief when we are not detained by any one, but pass from one to another in hope of something better. Some people are constantly disappointed in this hope ; and the more they pursue change, the more clearly is the result the same. Others cannot change their situation, and have to reconcile themselves to the same uninteresting persons and surroundings, and to direct their attention to the former, and to converse with them, showing them politeness and respect; for everyone has a claim to respect. Such persons and things cease then to be indifferent to us, and become a principal cause of ennui, because we have to occupy our minds with them.

Now as soon as we feel ennui in dealing with such persons and things, we feel also an impulse to get away from them, because our occupation is repugnant to us. The mind cannot without effort and difficulty maintain attention to them. Lacking all interest, it grows rapidly fatigued. It is this feeling of fatigue which distinguishes ennui from other varieties of the emotion of repugnance. The eye-lids droop ; the face lengthens and has a languid expression. We say that certain people 'weary' us.

Ennui is also distinguished by the way in which its peculiar repugnance is evoked : namely, not by any objectionable

quality in the thing itself, but by the mere fact of our enforced occupation with it. A dentist's drill as it files a tooth, and sets our teeth on edge, even when it is not painful, is repugnant to us; but we do not call it ennui. There are certain persons the very sight of whom is repellent to us, and even to hear them named; but neither do we call this ennui. In that sudden repugnance there is no fatigue; but fatigue is an essential feature of ennui. Children when they cease to feel interest in their walks, cry out that they are tired, and drag at their nurses' sides; but when they are told some story that interests them they cease to feel both ennui and fatigue together.

We may then perhaps define ennui as a kind of repugnance induced by fatigue at having to attend to, and to think about, things and persons that lack interest for us. Many things that begin by interesting us soon fall into the great class of the dull and uninteresting. There are games that we like at first and so long as their newness arouses curiosity, but which bore us afterwards: or which we like so long as we make progress in playing them; but afterwards, when we suffer from the monotony of our own play, they no longer refresh us, but arouse fatigue and ennui. Yet it is a striking fact that we do not call mere physical fatigue ennui, though it induces a repugnance to exercise. We are simply tired, and because we are tired further exercise is repugnant to us. The fatigue which enters into ennui must therefore be of that kind which is connected with mental activity. It is the fatigue due to sustaining attention and thought in a direction which now has no interest for us.

Yet we are often bored, as we say, when we are doing nothing. When the body is at rest the mind still works on; and, having no interest to sustain its thought in any one direction, even its fitful and capricious exercise fatigues it; or, surrendering itself to the moment's inclination, the momentary interest leaves it, and is succeeded by ennui. Thus it seems that our energy is quickly exhausted, or at least ceases to be available, where there is no interest to organise it.

The definition of 'ennui' that we have ventured to give follows the principal use of the word in English.

In the dictionary we find the following definition: "The feeling of mental weariness and dissatisfaction produced by want of occupation or by lack of interest in present surroundings."[1] The French who invented the term employ it with a more extended signification. According to Littré it includes "toutes sortes de souffrance de l'âme"; such for instances as those "caused by the death of persons we love, or by their absence, by the loss of hope, by any misfortune whatever."[2] Such a use of the term to include such different kinds of suffering as sorrow, ennui, and common repugnance, tends to confuse the difference between them. Sorrow indeed always induces a repugnance to our present state, and repugnance, when its impulse is unavailing, produces sadness or melancholy. Hence the definition of Gratiolet: "L'ennui est une tristesse mêlée d'un sentiment plus vif de répulsion et de dégoût. Aussi les mouvements d'effort et de révolte sont-ils plus prononcés dans l'ennui proprement dit que dans la tristesse."[3] Certainly ennui is frequently blended with sadness; the feeling of fatigue which accompanies it will often account for that, and also the fact that it is not an abrupt emotion that suddenly arises and as suddenly ceases, like many other kinds of repugnance, but one that comes on gradually with fatigue, and continues so long as the impulse is held in check by the situation. But for this reason ennui is also often blended with anger, and becomes a kind of annoyance.

The distinction, then, of ennui as an emotion, arises from the peculiar way in which its repugnancy is evoked, and the fatigue which accompanies it. In respect of its tendency it lacks distinctiveness: following the general law of repugnance in endeavouring to get away from its object and to exclude it from perception and thought.

6. *Discontent*

It seems probable that there is a certain relationship between Repugnance and Discontent, complementary to the relation that we find between their opposites, Joy and Content.

[1] 'A Dictionary of the English Language,' Murray.

[2] Littré, Dict. Art. 'Ennui.'

[3] 'De la Physionomie,' ch. cxxvi.

For we frequently find 'joy' and 'content' coupled together, or one or other with the third term, 'happiness.' Likewise 'discontent' and 'misery' are frequently connected together, perhaps because the emotional state which the one denotes is a cause of the emotional state denoted by the other. But neither of these is often coupled with the term 'repugnance': so little do we recognise the primary, emotional state denoted by this term.

Now the relation between discontent and repugnance is that the one is a variety of the other. Discontent is a late variety of repugnance aroused exclusively by ideas. Like repugnance, it regards that with which we are discontented as bad, as having a negative value. It has the same impulse of aversion, raised in its late emotion into a desire. Thus when discontented with our surroundings we desire to get away from them; when discontented with our situation we desire to get out of it; when discontented with the rate of pay we receive for our work, we desire to get out of that lower rate of pay into a higher one. In all these cases of 'discontent' we have the conception of some better state, and it is this conception of a better state that makes us discontented with the worse.

The cause of 'discontent' is therefore different from that of ordinary repugnance: the cause is the conception of some state better than our present state. And if we set aside this conception, we should no longer be discontented, though we might still feel repugnance to our occupation or surroundings. And thus, as it is said, it is easy for any man to grow discontented, and easy to arouse his discontent; but it is easiest of all when his situation contains conspicuous evils that are absent from the lot of other men or of other classes. On the other hand, it is difficult for any man to be contented, because the conception of a better state to which other men have attained must often disturb him and arouse a feeling of inequality, which is apt to blend with that of injustice. And even when he cannot see how this better state is to be attained, discontent rankles in him, making his present state by the comparison repugnant to him. Hence the old writers regarded content as a virtue being so difficult of attainment.

Thus, in this class of cases, discontent is disturbed by a conception of inequality. It discerns a better state, and sees this enjoyed by others around it. There is an inequality, and the worse or inferior side has fallen to it. It desires to get away from this inequality, not because it loves equality, but because this inferior side is repugnant to it. Thus discontent is the common social evil from which all modern States suffer because these pursue an ideal of equality, and after all changes inequality still remains.

There does not seem to be, then, any important difference between the impulse of discontent and that of ordinary repugnance; only its cause is different, and far removed from the causes of the primitive forms of emotion, implying conceptions of a better state, and often of the inferiority of one's own state in comparison with that of others. A very young child could not feel discontent, though it would be susceptible to the primitive forms of repugnance, as to those of joy, from the earliest age.

Following its cause, the object of discontent has a greater generality and comprehensiveness than that of the primitive forms of repugnance. We are discontented with our agreements with others on account of the poor recompense we derive from them, and these agreements bind all our actions at certain times; or we are discontented with our position in society, and this 'position' permeates our relation with others, and gives us an insufficient value in their eyes; or we are discontented with our lot in life, and here our object is still more comprehensive. Thus discontent is apt to persist just because it attaches to some such general feature of our lives; for it is difficult to change such things. And this persistency becomes even part of its meaning, as in the case of 'melancholy.' For the mere repugnance to our present state which we feel when we desire some other, which ceases as soon as we attain to the other, we do not call discontent. It is too particular for that. Unless we are to confuse discontent with every unsatisfied desire, we must connect its peculiar repugnance with some general and recurrent feature of our lives. Thus both the object as well as the cause of discontent is something conceptual, belonging with the emotion itself to

a relatively high stage of mental development, to which the animals probably do not attain.

Being an emotion so highly intellectualised in respect of its cause and object, possessing also a desire conscious of its end in place of a blind impulse, we should expect that discontent, while conforming to the general law of repugnance in respect of its tendency, would yet give a particular form to this law. The primitive ways of getting away from an object repugnant to us are to turn away the eyes, head, or body from it; and if it approaches us, to thrust it from us, and if it is invisible, like bodily pain or painful thoughts, to try to turn attention from it, or to make restless movements. But if we are discontented with our inferior pay, or our inferior position in society, or with our wretched lot in life, no one of these primitive methods will be of any avail for getting rid of our inferiority. We may turn our attention from it, and in this way we may get rid of the emotion, and forget our discontent; but the real relationship which causes it remains. And this obstacle to its impulse tends to arouse anger. Hence the characteristic behaviour of discontent betrays the influence of that emotion: vents itself in abuse of our situation, and of those to whom our lot in life binds us; and—among workmen—in disputes, strikes, attacks on person and property.

It is in this respect that discontent contrasts so markedly with the emotion of ennui, which we last considered. If ennui in its weariness, in its enforced occupations or idleness, inclines to sadness, discontent inclines to anger, and finds in this strong emotion its best ally. Hence its expression is different. The face is lowering and sullen.

While then the emotions of repugnance alternate uncertainly between the support of anger on the one side, and sorrow or sadness on the other, discontent is habitually connected with anger, and even when depressed and sad is still sullen. Being so apt to persist, its anger is frequently of that repressed and reflective sort from which hatred develops. Common opinion connects discontent with envy and hate. But here we are confined to the tendencies of the primary emotions, and cannot consider the laws of their secondary forms. The tendencies of discontent will vary with the sentiment in which

it is organised. If in egoistic sentiments it have the effects which are so frequently attributed to it, in others it may have different and even opposite effects. There is a noble discontent with ourselves, which is set to detect faults not without but within, and urges us to remove our vice and ignorance; which is dissatisfied with our state, because our progress is so slow and chequered.

Ennui and Discontent are then secondary forms of repugnance. As to the primary emotion itself, which is so little recognised, we have found that it has a function to perform scarcely less important than that of joy; teaching us what things to avoid, if not for our security, for our happiness, and turning us away from those places, persons, and occupations uncongenial to our nature, from which, or from whom, as we derive no joy we can never naturally come to love. Yet looking around us, we remark how frequently we have to occupy ourselves with such things, if not to live with them, and that even the things we love best require us to submit both to our immediate and acquired repugnances in the pursuit of their ends, and thus become a test of our constancy.

CHAPTER XVI

SURPRISE

1. *Adam Smith's Theory of the Causes of Surprise and Wonder*

SOME emotions are often spoken of together because of their opposition; others because of their resemblance. Joy and Sorrow, Pride and Humiliation, Vanity and Shame, are opposites; Surprise, Wonder and Admiration, like Envy, Jealousy, and Hatred, resemble one another.

Adam Smith has prefixed to his "History of Astronomy" a remarkable account of the three former emotions. "What is new and singular," he tells us, "excites that sentiment which, in strict propriety, is called Wonder; what is unexpected, Surprise; and what is great and beautiful, Admiration."[1] He is careful to explain that the distinction he draws is one of nature and not merely of language: "All that I contend for," he says, "is, that the sentiments excited by what is new, by what is unexpected, and by what is great and beautiful, are really different, however the words made use of to express them may sometimes be confounded."[2]

A special danger attaches to the method of defining things through their causes when applied to the emotions. Here 'cause' generally means some event that seems to have a great, but not therefore the sole or most important, influence on the result. There is often a variety of such causes that arouse a given emotion, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to include them all under one term. Anger, as we have noticed,

[1] 'The Hist. of Astronomy,' p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 4.

may be aroused by a sudden blow, by an insult, and by an obstacle to an impulse or desire ; and the attempt to define it by the last cause is fallacious. The definition of Fear, as an emotion caused by the idea of danger, overlooks the early fears of child-life, aroused by sudden and intense sensations before the idea of danger has been formed. Descartes' definition of Love, as "an emotion of the soul" which "incites it to unite itself freely to the objects which appear to be suitable to it,"[1] overlooks those early forms of love which precede conceptions of the suitable and unsuitable, and of the good and bad. And, as is well-known, an emotion which has been first excited by one cause may afterwards be re-excited by some other which was casually associated with it.

According to Adam Smith, wonder must be aroused by the new and singular, yet it is sometimes, and especially with men of genius, the oldest and most familiar things that arouse it. In a beautiful and often quoted passage Kant says : "Two things there are, which, the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider them, fill the mind with an ever new, an ever rising admiration and awe : the starry heaven above, the moral law within"[2]; and both arouse and sustain wonder. Compared with this sort of wonder, that aroused by mere novelty is insignificant. The new is not the distinctive cause of wonder; it may be caused by anything that, while it excites, also baffles our curiosity.

Adam Smith recognised how frequently surprise and wonder are mixed together through the conjunction of what he regarded as their distinctive causes. For what is new is often unexpected, and, while it excites our wonder, also surprises us. But he did not notice that the new may surprise us when we do expect it. If we know that we are to visit a new country, when our visit takes place, we may still be struck and surprised by the difference between our experience of it and our expectation. From the description of a man whom we are to meet we cannot altogether foresee the effect

[1] 'Les Passions de l'Âme,' 'Deuxième Partie,' Art. 79 ; 'L'amour est une émotion de l'âme causée par le mouvement des esprits qui l'incite à se joindre de volonté aux objets qui paraissent lui être convenables.'

[2] 'Critic of Practical Reason,' conclusion.

which his first appearance will make upon us. It is because of this difference between the effect and our preconception of it that the new events that are expected may still surprise us.

As we are often surprised by the events that we have expected, so others that we have not expected may fail to surprise us. Things which happen uniformly throughout the day we do not often consciously anticipate. We have grown too accustomed to them. The clock on the mantel-piece strikes the hours and half-hours at regular intervals. The day slowly passes and twilight comes; and the servant lights the room. But how many of these events do we think of before they happen, or attend to when they do? They pass for the most part unnoticed. They cannot surprise us, not because we have expected them, but because they are so monotonous and regular. If some break occurred in their established order, and we noticed it, we should be surprised, and say, "The clock has not struck the hour"; "the servant has not lighted the room." "What is the meaning of it?" Yet in both cases the negative condition is the same: the event is unexpected. But the one event was in conformity with our preceding experience; the other conflicted with it. Therein lies the difference between them, and the reason why in the one case we are not surprised whilst in the other we are. The mind adapts itself to events that are monotonous and regular, dispensing with our foresight and attention; but it cannot adapt itself at once to those that are new and irregular. There is a momentary hitch, which occasions the shock of surprise. It is for this reason that both the new and also the sudden and unexpected are so apt to surprise us.

There seems to be a law implied in this connexion which we may attempt to enunciate: (95) *The degree of surprise is, other things equal, proportionate to the degree in which the present experience of something jars or conflicts with the memory of past experience of it, or with present expectation.* This conflict is determined by a difference (1) in the intensity of the experience, or (2) in its manner of occurrence, or (3) in its nature, compared with the preceding experience or with the present expectation.

(1) We are startled by a sudden, loud noise, because it contrasts with the preceding state of things. But where the disturbance has followed a similar state we are not. We grow accustomed to the rattle of rifle-fire; it may still be disagreeable, but after a time it no longer startles us. But we are startled by even faint noises when they contrast with preceding silence: as in the stillness of the evening, by the faint noise of a footstep behind us, or even by the crack of the furniture. For our preceding experience has not prepared the mind for it.

(2) We are startled, also, when an event occurs in a very different manner from preceding events. As we pass down stairs a child springs upon us from its hiding-place. If it had approached us in the ordinary way we should not have been startled.

(3) We are also surprised when familiar things are changed for us suddenly, or appear in unfamiliar surroundings. If I meet a friend in a place where I have never before seen him, and do not now expect to see him, I am surprised because there is a conflict between the present experience and the effect left on the mind by my previous experiences of him. But if I meet him where we have occasionally met before, I am less surprised, because there were some previous experiences similar to the present one. For the effects of previous experience survive, though we be not conscious of them, and interact with present experience; and the conflict on which surprise depends may lie between a present experience and these subconscious facts of memory.

In other cases the conflict on which surprise depends lies between two facts, both of which are present to consciousness. We are surprised when our experience is different from our expectation, and in proportion not merely to the degree of this difference, but to the degree of confidence with which we expected it not to be different. If we have an appointment to meet someone, and he fails to keep it, the degree of our surprise tends to be proportioned to the degree in which we expected its fulfilment.

Thus in all cases the cause of surprise seems to be due to some jar or conflict between a present experience and some-

thing else in the mind, be it present expectation or the effects of past experience, and to which we cannot at once adapt ourselves.

2. *Adam Smith's Theory of the Nature of Surprise*

If Adam Smith's theory of the causes of surprise and wonder does not serve to discriminate the two emotions, his account of the nature of surprise approximates to a true theory. Surprise, he tells us, "is not to be regarded as an original emotion of a species distinct from all others. The violent and sudden change produced upon the mind, when an emotion of any kind is brought suddenly upon it, constitutes the whole nature of surprise."[1] Thus, there are surprises of fear, anger, joy, sorrow, disgust, of hope and disappointment, of gratitude, pity, shame, and many other secondary emotions. But his denial that the surprise mixed with them is an original and distinct emotion, must be taken to mean that it is not capable of separate existence. The violent and sudden change produced upon the mind constitutes its "whole nature." But this at least seems to confer upon it uniqueness of feeling, as well as considerable intensity, and constitutes it an original emotion in this sense. Though mixed with fear, anger, joy or sorrow, it is the same in all, yet different from any one of them.

It is a great heightener of the intensity of other emotions. Those "violent consternations which at once confound whole multitudes, benumb their understandings and agitate their hearts with all the agony of extravagant fear, can never be produced by any foreseen danger, how great soever. Fear, though naturally a very strong passion, never rises to such excesses, unless exasperated both by Wonder from the uncertain nature of the danger, and by Surprise from the suddenness of the apprehension."[2] Yet it mixes more readily with some emotions than with others; and Smith observes, though without due allowance for the different tempers of men, that there is something in its nature that "makes it unite more easily with the brisk and quick motion of joy, than with the slower

[1] *Op. cit.*, sect. i. [2] *Ibid.*

and heavier motion of grief." "The heart springs to joy with a sort of natural elasticity, it abandons itself to so agreeable an emotion, as soon as the object is presented: it seems to pant and leap forward to meet it, and the passion in its full force takes at once entire and complete possession of the soul. But it is otherwise with grief: the heart recoils from, and resists the first approaches of that disagreeable passion, and it requires some time before the melancholy object can produce its full effect. Grief comes on slowly and gradually, nor ever rises at once to that height of agony to which it is increased after a little time . . . The change produced by a Surprise of joy is more sudden, and upon that account more violent and apt to have more fatal effects, than that which is occasioned by a Surprise of grief."[1]

This remarkable passage is of that rare kind in the work of the older psychologists which describes a movement of the mind, and enables us to discern the law underlying it. Let us first attempt to enunciate the law which it implies: (96) *Surprise tends to increase the intensity of every emotion with which it blends, or by which it is rapidly followed.* This seems to be a genuine and universal law of mind, though further research may disclose facts that contradict it. The emotion of joy, however, may not arise in the first shock of surprise, but after the confusion of the mind has to some extent abated. If, however, the shock of surprise is excessive, and the joy itself too intense, it may be brought to an end by a swoon or by anxiety about oneself.

There is a second law implied which is not true without qualifications. The heart does not always spring to joy "with a sort of natural elasticity," but recoils from it in depressed moods or under the influence of acute sorrow. There are, too, angry moods that resist other joy than that which arises from the satisfaction of their impulses. There are apprehensive moods that respond to sudden terror, but exclude all cheerful emotions. But so far as the temper of a man is joyous, as in youth and health, it responds to surprises of joy, and resists those of sorrow. Thus when some sudden misfortune comes to the cheerful, they at first refuse to believe

[1] *Op. cit.*, sect. i.

in it. "It cannot be true," they say. But to the melancholy and pessimistic, it is that in which they are most disposed to believe.

3. *Of the Chief Varieties of Surprise and what they have in common*

Now there are two chief varieties of surprise that we may name 'sensational' and 'cognitive' surprise. Of the three causes of surprise to which we have referred, the two which are connected with the intensity of an experience and its mode of occurrence, belong to sensational surprise; that which is connected with the nature of its object belongs to cognitive surprise. When we are startled, our surprise is sensational. Thus we are startled by a sudden loud noise, or by someone springing upon us from a hiding-place, or by someone from behind clapping us upon the shoulder. We are startled by the sudden sensation, so different from our preceding experience, not by our cognition of its object or cause. In fact it is of the essence of this type that we must feel the shock before cognising the object. If we could see the child approaching before she springs at us, and identify her action as a game, we should not be startled. If we could foresee the lightning-flash, or anticipate the thunder, we should not be surprised, unless it were much brighter or louder than we had expected. When, on the other hand, our surprise is cognitive, we must first recognise the object as a condition of feeling the emotion. If I meet a friend, after a long absence, and am shocked by his altered appearance, I must first recognise him to be the man I knew, if I am to feel surprised. My memory of him must interact with my present experience, and while it enables me to recognise him, must leave uninterpreted, and in conflict with it, the fact of his altered appearance. If I find a strange man in my room at night, I must first recognise him to be a man, if not also a stranger, if I am to feel the sudden shock of surprise at his presence.

Of these chief varieties of surprise, the first two must be classed as primitive surprise. They correspond to the primitive varieties of fear and anger which we considered

in former chapters. Like those, primitive surprise is aroused by sensations without cognition of an object, or with a minimum of such cognition. Consequently, we find that primitive surprise is manifested in the earliest child-life. Descartes regarded it as "the first of all the passions,"[1] but for the too restricted reason that it did not presuppose a cognition of its object as either "suitable" or 'not suitable' to us.

This surprise is contemporaneous with the child's first fears and is in fact part of them. Thus Preyer remarks that "every surprise, even a joyous one, is at the first instant akin to fright on account of the unexpectedness it brings with it—the sudden impression on the senses."[2] Thus the blinking of the eyes which is one of the expressions of surprise both in children and adults,[3] was observed in his child as early as the twenty-fifth day, when he "for the first time spoke to him in a deep voice,"[4] and on the sixtieth day, "the quick, simultaneous shutting and opening of both eyes in case of fright at a quick approach to the face (just as in the case of a sudden, loud noise) is already the rule."[5] This primitive variety of surprise, like the corresponding varieties of fear and anger, persists through life, and we, like the child, are startled by any strong or rapid change of sensory stimulation; and our surprise is mixed with fear.

As regards the nature of the jar or conflict which we found to be a condition of surprise, it is different in the two varieties. In cognitive surprise it lies between a present cognition and the memory of preceding cognitions of the same or similar objects. When the latter interacts with the former it often elicits beliefs that are contrary to what we

[1] *Op. cit.* Art. 53, 'L'Admiration.' 'Lorsque la première rencontre de quelque objet nous surprend et que nous le jugeons être nouveau, ou fort différent de ce que nous connaissions auparavant, ou bien de ce que nous supposions qu'il devait être, cela fait que nous l'admirons et en sommes étonnés; et pour ce que cela peut arriver avant que nous connaissions aucunement si cet objet est convenable ou s'il ne l'est pas, il me semble que l'admiration est la première de toutes les passions: et elle n'a point de contraire, . . .'

[2] 'The Mind of the Child,' pt. i. ch. i. 3.

[3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*

seem to see before us. Thus if we meet a person in a place we have never before seen him, or where our previous knowledge assures us he cannot be, because he is in some far distant locality, we say "It cannot be he," and yet we see him in front of us. Now contrast this with the conflict in sensational surprise, as that of a loud noise, a sudden flash, or something that we have not seen that strikes against us. Here it is the intensity of the sensation or its manner of occurrence that jars with the memory of preceding sensations, and not any judgments that we may afterwards form about it, as that it is something "new, or very different from what we have known before." The shock of surprise arises before we have time to form such judgments. Thus in the one case the jar or conflict which determines surprise lies between a present cognition and the memory of preceding cognitions; in the other between a present sensation and the memory of preceding sensations.

We have seen what evokes surprise, let us now see what brings it to an end. When we are startled, and have turned round and recognised the child that sprang upon us, or the friend who clapped us on the shoulder, our surprise is generally at an end. That is to say, this type of sensational surprise, being evoked by a sensation that precedes the cognition of its cause, is put an end to by this very cognition. But if on turning round we were to recognise not a child who had sprung upon us but a man, not a friend who had clapped us on the shoulder but a stranger, our surprise would both continue and change its character: it would become cognitive surprise, and attain to that degree of it to which we apply the term 'astonishment.' No longer would the sensation surprise us, but what it means or imports. That a man should have done this thing, or a stranger, would conflict with the total effect left by our experience of the behaviour of sane men in general.

We have next to consider what brings cognitive surprise to an end. When an extraordinary event has happened and one that seems irreconcilable with our preceding experience, we inquire into it. It arouses curiosity. And when curiosity is satisfied, we have a knowledge of the event more complete

than that with which we began, namely, that the event which startled us was the action of a man or a stranger. For instance, if we have found out that the man is insane, the extraordinary character of his behaviour is explained, and will no longer surprise us. Thus cognitive, like sensational surprise, is put an end to by a cognition of the object, but it must be a cognition that removes the conflict. And as when we have identified the child that startled us we are no longer surprised, so when we know that some extraordinary behaviour is the action of a madman, the conflict with our preceding experience is removed, since that experience referred to the behaviour of normal individuals.

Having seen both what elicits surprise and what puts an end to it, we can more clearly understand its nature. It occupies the interval of time between the happening of two events, and is the feeling of shock which fills this interval. It represents in both its chief varieties an inability of the mind to interpret a present occurrence, or of the nervous system to adapt itself to a new situation. Hence the mental state is one of confusion or bewilderment. Not knowing what to do, the mind can give no direction to the limbs, which, except for certain expressive gestures,—as throwing up the hands or covering the mouth or forehead,—remain motionless; and action is suspended until we begin to recover from the surprise. This is especially noticeable in those higher degrees of cognitive surprise which are named 'astonishment' and 'amazement.' Thus we speak of being 'petrified' with astonishment, and of being 'dumbfoundered' with amazement. For the mental confusion is so great that we cannot speak, because we know not what to say. Darwin describes a savage who saw a man on horseback for the first time, and his "stupefied amazement." "He stood incapable of moving a limb, riveted to the spot, mouth open and eyes staring . . He remained motionless until our black got within a few yards of him, when suddenly throwing down his waddies, he jumped into a malga bush as high as he could get." He "could not speak, and answered not a word to the inquiries made by the black . . ."[1]

[1] 'The Expression of the Emotions,' ch. xii.

Thus surprise is a sudden feeling of shock united to this mental attitude of confusion or bewilderment.

This conclusion is borne out by what we know of the physiological conditions of surprise. For as the nervous system cannot adapt itself to an extremely strong stimulus, so it cannot adapt itself at once to a sudden change of stimulus, or to a situation which is in marked contrast to our preceding experience. And this failure of adaptation is expressed in the motionless attitude, the staring, stupid expression, the inability to do anything, or to speak. Only exclamations, as 'Oh!' 'Ah!' 'Good gracious!' come from a man at such times. The organised activity of the mind is suspended. But in ordinary cases the nervous system quickly recovers from its failure. The man regains his control, looks round, and sees, or inquires, what has happened.

The bodily sensations connected with surprise often survive the emotion. When we have been startled, and, looking round, discover the trivial explanation, saying, "Oh! it was only you," our surprise is at an end: the sensations of the quickened heart-beats and breathing take longer to subside. But surprise is not constituted of these sensations alone; it is essentially, like all emotions, a mental attitude: a sudden confusion of mind with the accompanying feeling of shock.

This mental confusion and shock of surprise is always sudden, no matter how slow and regular may be in certain cases the initiation of the experience. Someone may approach us slowly and in the ordinary way; but if we recognise him to be someone whom we expected never to see again, the shock and confusion of mind are suddenly felt. The disturbance which it produces, says Descartes, "has from its commencement its full force."[1]

There are other states of conflict and confusion of mind that are not to be confounded with surprise. When we have a choice of action, which must be determined by a clear and adequate foresight of consequences, there is not only mental conflict, but we are often unable to foresee either

[1] *Op. cit.*, Art. 72.

course clearly; this is not surprise, because the mind is not thrown into sudden confusion. But when we have followed a clear principle that seemed evident and are brought suddenly to a contradiction, we are surprised and confused. It is this sudden confusion of mind, with its feeling of shock, suspending both our self-controlled and our impulsive actions, that distinguishes surprise from other states of confusion and conflict.

The common mind has then distinguished this state of shock and confusion, and named it surprise. For such a sudden feeling stands out distinctly from preceding and subsequent events; and, being so distinct and impressive, is naturally named. What importance it has for science, and what effects it has on mental life, we shall now attempt to estimate.

4. *Of the Tendencies of Surprise*

If asked,—what are the uses of Fear or Anger,—we should think of their numerous impulses and ends, and of their general functions in the economy of the mind. But what impulse and end has Surprise? This question is difficult to answer because surprise is so often, if not always, mixed with some other emotion, and that which belongs to the second may be attributed to the first. But we can now distinguish its tendencies from those both of fear and anger, and should not think of attributing to it either the impulses of shrinking, concealment, and flight of the one, or those of threat, punishment, and destruction of the other. But there is another emotion with which, on the theory of Adam Smith, it has peculiarly close relations. For, according to that theory, we must hold that the new arouses both surprise and wonder, because in the new there is some element of the unexpected. With curiosity, at least, it is so closely connected that they may seem to be one emotion.

In all the varieties of surprise to which we have referred there is some question expressed or implied. When we are startled by a noise we say, "What is it?" When we meet a friend in a place where we have never seen him before, we ask, "How did he come to be there?" If we are surprised by

his altered appearance, we look at him with a mute inquiry. When we are struck by the face of a stranger in our company, we ask, "Who is he?" Of a new appliance, "What is its use?" Even when a child springs upon us from its hiding-place, if we do not express a question, that is because the answer is at once forthcoming. According to Descartes, surprise was the only emotion which had neither "good nor evil for its object, but only the knowledge of the thing which surprises us."[1] Yet in all these cases the silent or spoken interrogation may not belong to surprise.

If we compare surprise with wonder, what seems to be a chief difference between them, as inferred from the customary words or phrases we use to express them, is just the absence of curiosity from the former and its presence in the latter. For the peculiar attitude of surprise is expressed in exclamations: Oh! Ah! Good gracious! As its thought is too confused at first to frame an intelligible statement, so it cannot at first ask a question. The greater the surprise, the more is it confounded, petrified, and dumb. Only as we recover from our surprise, curiosity, in so many cases, supervenes and mixes with it. But wonder, although its inquiry is so often mute and repressed, essentially contains curiosity. Even common idioms support this conclusion. We say we are surprised at an occurrence; but we wonder what it means.

There are certain compounds of surprise in which it mingles with other emotions that exclude curiosity, even when the degree of surprise is moderate; as the surprise of sudden admiration with its exclamation, "Oh! how beautiful!" or the surprise of gratitude at some unexpected kindness, with its "Oh! thank you: how good of you!" Though here we sometimes add in receiving a present: "Do you really mean it?" "Is it really mine?" There is, too, the surprise of horror with its exclamation, "How awful!"

The interval of surprise corresponds, as we have seen, to physiological failure, to an inability to adapt oneself to a new situation, and to a mental failure to interpret what has

[1] *Op. cit.*, Art. 71, 'N'ayant pas le bien ni le mal pour objet, mais seulement la connaissance de la chose qu'on admire.'

occurred,—proportionate, in both, to the intensity of the surprise. Its essential attitude is one of exclamation, giving expression to the emotion itself, but neither framing questions nor propositions about the cause of it. These follow in proportion as surprise subsides, or when it is of such moderate intensity from the beginning that they can be combined with it.

We conclude, therefore, that the one impulse which, at first sight, we are inclined, with Descartes, to attribute to it,—that involved in understanding the surprising event itself,—belongs to either curiosity or wonder. Lacking this impulse, we cannot regard it as an emotional system: it has neither impulse nor end. It is a temporary state of disorganisation.

If surprise, in distinction from the other primary emotions, does not strive to fulfil an end, it has other, and non-conative tendencies, some of which we have already noticed. It is a signal that something requires to be attended to and understood. It indirectly excites the mind to give this attention to the object. Hence it so often excites curiosity or wonder. There is a striking contrast between the negligent way in which we pass by familiar things and give marked attention to those that are new. This difference might be attributed to the pleasure which novelty arouses; but this pleasure must be itself referred to surprise. It is because new things cannot be assimilated in the mechanical, subconscious way in which the old are,—because they arouse at least a momentary suspense and conflict,—that they frequently afford us pleasure. For this stimulates mental activity which languishes among old and familiar things. A large part of our enjoyments from day to day are due to surprise. For so many things that we enjoy at first, we cease to enjoy when they no longer surprise us.

It is then a law that (97) *The effect of surprise is to make us attend to the event that surprises us.* But this is not the same thing as to say that surprise has an impulse to attend to it. Under an intense shock of surprise we are for the moment too confused to attend to anything. The stupid gaze and open mouth of surprise look quite different from the intelligent glance of attention. The one shows that we are

momentarily bereft of our faculties ; the other that we are in full possession of them. But the passage from one to the other is often so rapid that we are apt to confound them ; though the one declines as the other increases. It is, then, a law that (98) *Surprise survives with diminishing intensity in the act of attention that follows it.*

There is a familiar law that we may next notice. (99) *Surprise tends to free the mind from what before occupied it.* It is therefore a frequent cause of forgetfulness. We have to give our attention and thought to the surprising event ; and this takes them away from what before occupied us. Thus we try to distract a child when it is crying or suffering discomfort by showing it new things. Hence it is that when anyone is suffering from mental trouble he is recommended to go to new places, and to find new occupations. If this influence of surprise only lasts so long as the new event or situation is not interpreted and understood, yet, by providing fresh occasions of surprise, we can renew this influence.

The law to which Adam Smith drew attention, that surprise intensifies every emotion with which it blends, has certain important consequences. (100) *Surprise, in proportion to its intensity, tends to diminish the efficiency of the emotion excited with it.* The mind being bewildered cannot adapt itself to the situation. If we stand stock still with gaping mouth and staring eyes, we are neither able to escape from sudden danger, nor to avenge a sudden insult. We may be so surprised by an unexpected kindness that we cannot express our thanks. Now, in all these cases, the particular impulses of the emotion are arrested, and its system is disorganised, by the action of surprise, in proportion as the intensity is great.

There are certain recorded cases of extreme surprise which are evidence that it not only inhibits the impulse of the emotion blended with it, but that it sometimes prevents our feeling the emotion which otherwise we should feel in the situation. As the impulses which belong to different emotions have never been carefully discriminated, we must expect that the effects which are due to surprise will be sometimes attributed to the emotion combined with it.

In the case to which we have already referred[1] of the native who saw a man on horseback for the first time, his astonishment prevented him acting on the impulse of his fear. He "stood incapable of moving a limb, riveted to the spot, mouth open and eyes staring." This expression and behaviour we must judge to be the effect of his surprise, not of surprise and fear together. For there is neither an attempt to take to flight nor to conceal himself; nor is there the state of collapse which is sometimes the effect of extreme fear. That the impulses to take to flight and conceal himself are at first arrested, is clear from his subsequent behaviour. For as the first petrifying effect of his surprise diminished, these impulses asserted themselves. "He remained motionless until our black got within a few yards of him, when suddenly throwing down his waddies, he jumped into a mulga bush as high as he could get." Yet fear was present with surprise from the beginning, if we may trust the person who observed the occurrence. For as he approached the man unseen and called to him, the man, he says, "turned round and saw me. What he imagined I was I do not know: but a finer picture of fear and astonishment I never saw."[2]

In another case we shall find that fear was not felt at first, but only astonishment, although the situation was one of extreme and sudden danger. Mr. Ch. Richardson, the well-known engineer of the Severn Tunnel, has recorded several instances of railway servants and others being so affected by the approach of a train that they have been unable to save themselves by getting out of the way, though there was ample time to do so. This may have been through the effect of terror. But one man, who was nearly killed in this way, only just saving himself in time, informed me that he experienced no feeling of terror; he was unable to explain why, but he couldn't help watching the train as it darted towards him. In this case it seems to have been a sort of hypertrophy of attention. His attention was so riveted that he was unable to make, or rather he felt no desire to make, the appropriate movements. He said, "I had to shake

[1] *Supra*, p. 426.

[2] Darwin, *op. cit.* ch. xii.

myself, and only did so just in time. For in another moment the express would have been on me. When it had passed, I came over all a cold sweat, and felt as helpless as a baby; I was frightened enough then."[1]

The significant facts of this case appear to be the following. (1) The man's behaviour at the beginning shows that he was spell-bound by surprise, though he did not recognise it. (2) His surprise not only arrested, as in the last case, the appropriate impulse of fear, but prevented him from feeling the emotion; for he says he neither felt "terror," nor did he "desire" to make the necessary movements. (3) The impulse to save himself was at length elicited, and he was just able to act upon it in time, though not through the strength of the impulse alone, but by a voluntary effort, probably arising from the control of the self-regarding sentiment: the man had "to shake himself" before he could act. (4) After the action, and when the danger was past, for the first time he felt the emotion of fear, and "came over all a cold sweat," and felt "helpless."

We may remark of this case that it is additional evidence in support of the general theory advanced earlier in this book, that some impulse of an emotional system may be elicited, felt, and acted on without the emotion itself being felt where the action is very sudden. Here where it was suspended for a few moments, it probably would have been felt but for the action of surprise. But the conclusion that specially concerns us at present, and which we seem able to infer from both recorded cases, as well as from those general types of case to which we previously referred, we may express in the form of a law: (101) *Surprise, in proportion to its intensity, tends to arrest and exclude from consciousness the impulses excited with it by the particular situation; as surprise subsides these impulses tend to arise into consciousness, and to determine action in accordance with their ends.*

We must leave this law at the stage at which we have tentatively formulated it, although it is not certain that surprise when it exceeds a certain intensity counteracts the

[1] Quoted by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, 'Animal Intelligence,' ch. x. pp. 387, 388.

subconscious action of the impulses referred to. It indeed tends to exclude these impulses from consciousness, and therefore, so far as the fulfilment of their ends depends on conscious processes, tends to arrest them. But there are recorded cases in which under the influence of an astounding fear people have saved themselves without knowing how they did it. In the disaster on the Metropolitan railway of Paris, a young woman escaped by her own efforts, and was apparently so stupefied by surprise, that she did not know what she did. Ever since she has been unable to give any explanation of what took place "from the moment at which the carriage in which she was took fire to that in which she found herself in the open air. She had however saved herself, almost certainly without help, in obeying her instinctive impulses."[1]

The cases to which we have referred do not contradict the law which Adam Smith enunciated, if we take due account of the limiting condition which we have attached to it: namely, that surprise intensifies the emotion blended with it, or by which it is rapidly followed. For the fear which the man felt after he had escaped from the train may have been the greater because of the surprise that preceded it. If he had not been surprised, and had adopted the obvious means of escaping from his situation, on review of it he would not have been liable to such a considerable degree of fear.

5. *Of the Question whether Surprise is a Primary Emotion*

We have finally to consider whether we can accept the central theory of Adam Smith that surprise is never a separate and complete emotion in itself, but no more than the initial phase of some other emotion excited with it. That this theory holds of a great many cases we have already seen. In all sudden joy, sorrow, fear, anger, disappointment, wonder, and admiration, surprise is blended with them. And further in its earliest forms it seems never to be an independent emotion. If fear is one of the first emotions of child-life, surprise mixes with it when the event is sudden and

[1] 'Traité de Psychologie Pathologique.' II^me^ Partie, par Dr. A. Marie, 'Étiologie générale des Troubles Psychopathiques.'

unforeseen.[1] A little later we find joyful surprise. The child is delighted by the sudden appearance of some familiar thing after its momentary disappearance ; and the games of "peep-bo" and "hide and seek" are invented to give it this delight. Still it may be maintained that there are other cases in which the child seems at the first moment of its surprise to be poised between a tendency to cry from fear and to laugh from joy. Such a case may be that which Preyer records of his child when, on the twenty-fifth day, he noticed a blinking of the eyes when he "for the first time spoke to him in a deep voice."[2] But it is at a later stage that we seem to meet with cases that clearly indicate the freeing of surprise from its dependence on other emotions. Bain has maintained that surprise is a "familiar instance" of the truth of his theory of the existence of indifferent feelings of "neutral excitements." For while he admits that there are "surprises that delight us, and others that cause suffering," he contends there are many that "do neither."[3]

If it is true that surprise is always due to a jar or conflict which hinders the interpretation of the experience, it might be held that such a conflict would cause some degree of pain. But when the mind is in a healthy, vigorous state, a difficulty is often a source of pleasure, which in a weak, depressed state is painful. And thus the conflict on which surprise depends would seem to be pleasurable or painful, according to circumstance, and the emotion would not therefore be "indifferent." But Bain, who recognises that in surprise there is "an element of contradiction and conflict" which, if acute, would of itself be painful, maintains that most surprises "give merely a neutral excitement of different degrees of intensity."[4]

This question is one to which no certain answer can be given. It may be urged, on the one hand, that we fail to

[1] Preyer, 'The Mind of the Child,' pt. i. ch. i. 'On the sixtieth day the quick, simultaneous shutting and opening of both eyes in case of fright at a quick approach to the face (just as in the case of a sudden loud sound) is already the rule. At such times the child often throws up both arms quickly, alike whether he is lying down or is held in the arms.

[2] *Ibid.*, 'It was a reflex movement of surprise,' he adds.

[3] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. i. 13. [4] *Op. cit.*, ch. iv. 9.

notice very faint degrees of pleasure and pain, and on the other, that, if we cannot discriminate them, they may be inferred to be absent. At least there are surprises which include neither fear nor anger, nor disappointment, nor gratitude, nor joy, nor sorrow. If the meeting of friends by a strange coincidence is a joyful surprise, there may be the same degree of surprise in meeting those to whom we are indifferent. The feeling of this surprise is distinct from other emotions. That it is frequently followed by curiosity does not conflict with the fact that in its own nature its attitude is one, not of inquiry, but of exclamation. The only question which concerns us is whether or not surprise is sometimes complete in itself and distinct from other emotions. Even the railway-servant who stupidly stared at the approaching train, instead of moving out of its course, did not, according to his own account, at first feel fear with his surprise. That it was followed by fear does not contradict the supposition that it was at first unmixed.

We therefore conclude that the feeling of surprise may be sometimes complete in itself and distinct from other emotions. But is surprise to be regarded as an emotion? We have attempted to show that, while in its own nature it has certain characteristic tendencies and effects, it has neither impulses nor an end.[1] Yet it is certainly an important force in character, and, in its lesser degrees, a valuable stimulus to the mind; but it is not an emotional system. If we then know the facts of its nature we can keep quite distinct the question of its name. In the ordinary use of the term it is an emotion. As a feeling capable of great intensity it is naturally classed with other feelings, such as fear and anger, which have a similar capacity. But in another respect, and which has more importance for a science of character, it is unique and exceptional. Unlike all the other primary emotions, it cannot assimilate or reject ideas, nor rise from a stage of blind and instinctive impulse to fore-

[1] Dr. McDougall also holds that 'Surprise is an affective state that implies no corresponding instinct and has no specific conative tendency;' and for this reason he excludes it from the class of the primary emotions. See his 'Social Psychology,' ch. v. p. 157.

sight of an end, nor increase the complexity of its system by organising a greater number of both instinctive and acquired tendencies ; for, as a momentary state of disorganisation, it is the opposite of all that we mean by system. If it be possible so to modify—at least for scientific use—the ordinary connotation of the term as to include these important features, then surprise will no longer be classed among the emotions.

CHAPTER XVII

CURIOSITY AND WONDER

1. *The Impulse of Curiosity.*

If Curiosity is one of the primary emotions its constitution is the simplest of all of them:—a single impulse to know, instinctively governing and sustaining the attention, and evoking those bodily movements which will enable us to gain a fuller acquaintance with its object; this includes most, if not all, of the essential facts of its nature. Where is there anything comparable to the wonderful structure of Fear and Anger with their variety of alternative instincts? Here there seems to be only one instinct, and one impulse corresponding to it in consciousness, and ordinarily no emotion.

What is this instinct, or, rather, what is the peculiar character of the instinctive behaviour in which it is expressed? Curiosity is so widely distributed that we ought to find little difficulty in describing its instinctive forms of behaviour in different groups of animals. The curiosity of monkeys is known to be one of their conspicuous traits. In an often-quoted case, Darwin relates how in spite of their "instinctive dread" of snakes, when he had placed a stuffed specimen in one of their compartments that they "collected round it in a large circle, and staring intently." But fear restrained them from handling it. When he substituted for it a "dead fish, a mouse, a living turtle, and other new objects," although frightened at first, "they soon approached, handled and examined them."[1] The second case was a fuller ex-

[1] 'Descent of Man,' pt. i. ch. iii.

pression of their curiosity than the first, because less restrained by fear. With dogs, curiosity is also shown by intently looking at the object, and approaching it, and snuffing at it. "The curiosity of a dog is very ludicrous when a bettle runs before him; evidently he is a little afraid of the tiny creature, but he cannot rest until he has smelled it all over."[1] "Curiosity is shown by fish in the readiness, or even eagerness, with which fish will approach to examine any unfamiliar object."[2]

Thus each animal under the influence of its curiosity employs its own mode of locomotion for approaching nearer to the object, and exploring it on different sides, and also those means of knowledge provided by its sense-organs. In this employment and co-ordination of different means of knowledge consists the behaviour of curiosity. That this behaviour in animals is instinctive in whole or great part is generally acknowledged: a very small part of it is instinctive in human beings. In great part the child has to learn to walk; only a part of the process of grasping an object and holding it in the hand as a condition of examining it is instinctive; it cannot at first co-ordinate movements of the eyes, head, and body for keeping an object in the centre of the visual field, and it only gradually acquires this power. The impulse of its curiosity requires it to learn to do all these things as means to its end.

When curiosity is declared to be an instinct,[3] we require to know in what sense it is an instinct. If its end is innately determined, it does not follow that the behaviour which is instrumental to this end is also innately determined. And even if walking, and grasping and continuing to hold something, and following the direction of a sound, or something moving in the visual field were as much instinctive as acquired, yet it is not by these movements severally considered that the behaviour of curiosity is distinguished, but by the way in which they are combined. For we may grasp and hold fast to something to eat it; we turn our eyes and

[1] K. Groos, 'The Play of Animals,' iii. 8.
[2] Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' quoted by Groos, *op. cit.* iii. 8.
[3] See W. McDougall, 'Social Psychology,' ch. iii. p. 57.

body to keep an object before us because it delights us; we approach an object to injure it, as well as in all these cases to satisfy our curiosity. In so far as the impulse of curiosity requires us to combine movements of the head and body with the exercise of the sense-organs about an object, its behaviour in the child is not instinctive but acquired, though instinctive in many animals.

There are, however, simpler and earlier forms which are more purely instinctive. We can sometimes satisfy our curiosity in part by merely looking at a person and observing his expression. And the way young children stare at people, so long and fixedly as sometimes to embarrass them, seems to show that they employ this simpler method of satisfying curiosity before they learn the more complex; and they may begin to do this before they are able to follow an object with movements of the eyes and head. Yet this sustained sensory accommodation and attention to the same object does not serve to distinguish curiosity. For we do the same thing when we feel joy in the presence of someone and when we love him. But when another person looks steadily at us, we can distinguish the expression of curiosity from that of enjoyment or of love. There is something in the watchful scrutiny of the former which, as soon as we notice it, is apt to offend us and put us upon our guard.

The simplest behaviour of curiosity, then, includes a sustained attention and accommodation of some sense-organ in reference to its object, as does also the earliest form of joy; and this behaviour is, if not wholly, in great part instinctive and unlearnt. And if there is little to distinguish it from that of joy in the beginning, having a different end it becomes progressively differentiated. When curiosity is called an instinct the thought of this end is included in the meaning. It is meant that curiosity is pre-organised to pursue this end of knowledge by means that are in some degree unlearnt, and that it is also instinctively excited by certain sensory stimuli. This system is the instinct of curiosity. The impulse connected with it will sometimes exercise one sense organ, sometimes another, according to differences of the situation, or of the nature of the animal, but still pursues the same end.

The dog listens from curiosity, or looks intently, or looks and approaches, or snuffs at something, or touches it with his paw; and its instinctive behaviour is different in each case.

Passing next to that side of the system which is present in consciousness, the impulse, if it is also an emotion, is lacking in distinctive, emotional quality. What it is clearly and conspicuously is an impulse rather than an emotion; but which like all impulses when it is checked, is susceptible of a considerable degree of excitement. But, unlike fear and anger, we do not feel it to be as much an emotion as an impulse. The eagerness of curiosity on some occasions which makes it feel like an emotion is the eagerness of any other impulse or desire when it is strong and obstructed. All impulses have this common character, and, apart from the appetites and organic needs, have little to distinguish them from one another. Most desires feel substantially the same at the same intensity.

While impulses and desires have a common and relatively undifferentiated character in comparison with emotions, we can recognise their difference from one another by the difference of their ends, and of the means appropriate to them. From this point of view we cannot confuse the difference between desiring fame, desiring power, and desiring money, however alike they are in respect of their impulses.

Curiosity then seems to be rather one of our primary impulses than one of our primary emotions, to be classed with the impulses of flight, of concealment, of shrinking, of pretending death belonging to the emotion of fear, or with the impulses of threat, of revenge, of destruction belonging to the emotion of anger, rather than with the more comprehensive systems of these emotions. And we obtain further confirmation of this conclusion when we notice that curiosity may be organised in many of the systems of primary emotion. All of them involve at least attention; and attention is essentially 'expectant,' and expectancy is often an unexpressed interrogation. Sudden fear is not merely expectant, but includes a dreadful curiosity: "What is it?" "What can it mean?" "What will happen next?" we think:—a ship struck in the ocean, a house rocking in a still night, give rise to such startled questions;

and according to the answers we give to them, will the fear be either allayed or intensified. And so also when anger is provoked, angry questions may surge around the principal event: "Why did he do it?" "Why should he have acted in this way?" "How shall I punish him?" or "revenge myself?"

It is this functional difference between impulse and emotion which makes it important to distinguish them; just as it is a functional difference that makes it important to distinguish emotions from sentiments. The one is a less complex system than the other. Sentiments can contain emotions; but not emotions sentiments. Likewise, emotions can contain impulses, but not impulses emotions.

2. *The Nature of Wonder*

While curiosity is only an impulse, with its connected instinct and behaviour, wonder is at all events an emotion. If it is never violent, as are anger and fear sometimes; if it is often cold and intellectual, it is yet capable of considerable intensity. It has an emotional distinctness that we might think comparable to that of fear and anger on the one side, and joy and sorrow on the other, did we not remember that in some cases it shades into mere curiosity, and in others into astonishment. Is not, then, wonder the primary emotion to which the impulse of curiosity normally belongs;[1] for does not wonder always contain curiosity? Further, if we examine this curiosity of wonder, it seems to be of an arrested or baffled kind. When the impulse of curiosity can be satisfied at once, as in so many of the cases of surprise previously noticed, wonder is not elicited. The central condition on which emotions are sometimes dependent must then be present here —arrested impulse. If curiosity is not an emotion, it may give rise to one, where its instinctive tendency is obstructed. But is the emotion of wonder, which is aroused under this condition, a true primary emotion, or is it secondary and derivative?

Wonder appears very early in child-life. When an infant is brought into a room, we often see it plainly expressed.

[1] See W. McDougall, *op. cit.* part i. ch. iii.

The child looks from one thing to another with wide open eyes, pausing here and there, yet neither by the movements nor fixation of the eyes seeming to satisfy its curiosity, if it be curious; for the expression of wonder continues, and the calm emotion seems to absorb it. The expression is different from the shock of sensational surprise, when we are startled, and which perhaps in the child is always combined with fear. And it is sometimes different from the shock of the higher surprise which we call astonishment, although astonishment is often combined with wonder. For when we are surprised to see someone in a place where we never expected to see him, our surprise may be painful; and we may be astonished at events that terrify us. But wonder seems to be in itself a pleasant emotion. If it is due to a baffled curiosity, the obstruction of its impulse does not give pain, nor arouse anger, as do most obstructions. Thus Wordsworth says:

> "From floor to roof all round his eyes the Child with wonder cast,
> Pleasure on pleasure crowded in, each livelier than the last!"[1]

Is this emotion, so characteristic of the young child's expression, due to a blending of other emotions, or is it simple and unmixed? It seems to contain both surprise and curiosity. Bain says: "Wonder contains surprise, attended with a new and distinct effect, the effect of contemplating something that rises far above common experience, which elevates us with the feeling of superiority. We wonder, and are astonished at the genius of Shakespeare. On the other hand, it may be something that falls beneath what is ordinary, and thereby inspires one or other of the emotions connected with the mean, the little, the contemptible, the bad."[2]

Adam Smith brings into prominence the inquiring attitude of wonder to which Bain omits to refer; but it does not seem to have been his opinion that wonder was always combined with surprise. They would be conjoined when their causes were conjoined: when the "new" was also "unexpected." When something quite "new and singular," he

[1] 'Poet's Dream,' 43. [2] 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. iv. 9.

says, is presented, the memory "cannot, from all its stores, cast up any image that nearly resembles this strange appearance."[1] "It stands alone and by itself in the imagination, and refuses to be grouped or confounded with any set of objects whatever. The imagination and memory exert themselves to no purpose. . . ."[2] "It is this fluctuating and vain recollection, together with the emotion or movement of the spirits that they excite, which constitutes the sentiment properly called wonder. . . . What sort of a thing can that be? What is that like? are the questions which, upon such an occasion, we are all naturally disposed to ask. If we can recollect many such objects which exactly resemble this new appearance, and which present themselves to the imagination naturally, . . . our wonder is entirely at an end. If we can recollect but a few, and which it requires, too, some trouble to be able to call up, our wonder is indeed diminished but not quite destroyed. If we can recollect none, but are quite at a loss, it is the greatest possible."[3]

This passage shows that, in Adam Smith's opinion, the "new" arouses wonder in proportion as it both excites and baffles our understanding; that those things which are most mysterious will tend to arouse the greatest degree of wonder; that wonder, then, contains an impulse of curiosity concerning the new object, being, as he also says, an "uncertainty and anxious curiosity excited by its singular appearance";[4] and that, finally, the knowledge which satisfies this curiosity is the end of wonder, and in attaining it "our wonder is entirely at an end."[5]

We have next to inquire whether wonder, in addition to curiosity, always contains surprise. That it does, as we have seen, is the opinion of Bain. It has been defined as "A feeling of mingled surprise and curiosity excited by something extraordinary."[6] Many of the observations about it indicate that it has the immobility of surprise. Thus Bacon says: "Wonder causeth astonishment, or an immovable posture of the body."[7] Like surprise and astonishment it is

[1] 'Hist. of Astronomy,' sect. ii. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.* [6] Dictionary (Howell & Co.).
[7] Quoted in Day's 'Collacon,' p. 1034.

often speechless. Benedict in "Much Ado about Nothing," says, "I am so attir'd in wonder, I know not what to say."[1] And certainly the wonder which is excited by the new, or by something that contradicts our previous beliefs about a person, is normally accompanied by surprise. Yet we notice even here, that it is after the first shock of surprise—which so confuses the mind that it cannot ask questions—that wonder commences. This, too, Adam Smith recognised. For were a sudden conflict sprung on the mind between a present event and previous experience relating to the same object,—as where the pure and gentle Hero was suddenly accused of unchastity, and with the greatest show of evidence,[2]—we should first start with surprise, and after "that momentary emotion was over,"[3] we should wonder how it can have been possible, as did Benedict.

If surprise is usually one of the most transient emotions, wonder is often one of the most prolonged; and it would seem that, if it is at first accompanied by surprise, it must often outlast the momentary failure to adapt oneself to the situation. Thus we wonder at our own hearts when some new emotion springs up after a long period of monotony, some new joy or new hope that lifts us suddenly out of it; and long afterwards we continue to wonder at it in recollection; the question how it was possible remains unanswered. The novelty has worn off; but we still wonder because we fail to understand. And thus it is that old and familiar things may arouse a deeper and more lasting wonder than that which is dependent on novelty. The ocean and the heavens, though we have seen them a thousand times, or the small and delicate flowers by the road-side, may still arouse wonder at their transcendent quality.

Does then wonder essentially contain surprise seeing that wonder seems in some cases to outlast it and to be independent of the shock of novelty? Yet old things may reveal new aspects. Human nature, we say, is always the same; the same types of character and circumstance recur again and again in the succession of lives: but life is "for ever old

[1] A. iv. Sc. i.

[2] 'Much Ado about Nothing.'

[3] Smith, *op. cit.*, sect. ii.

yet new." The stars and the ocean appear the same, or their changes have grown familiar to us. Their novelty is not essential to our wonder, for whether new or old they may still arouse it, if they baffle our understanding.

Now in the higher kind of surprise which is astonishment, the understanding is also baffled. And if this baffling persists, and does not depend on the novelty of the experience, but on its nature, it may occur again and again, and on each occasion re-excite astonishment; and it is just this fact we have to recognise in all the deeper kinds of wonder.

Thus the higher kind of surprise or 'astonishment' seems to belong to wonder; and we should be inclined to draw the same conclusion from observing its expression. For if wonder is not dumbfoundered and stupefied, except sometimes in the initial stage when it is no more than astonishment, yet something of the immobility of surprise still attaches to it. It has recovered the use of the senses and of attention. Its eyes are not stupid, but have a rapt expression; only the body tends to remain at rest.

It has, however, been maintained that surprise is not essential to wonder. "According to Dr. Th. Brown," says Dr. James Martineau, wonder "first arises when the astonished mind begins to look round for an explanation of the event which has startled it, or at least dwells on the circumstances and surveys the possibilities they contain. If this be so, the feeling arises by intellectual addition to the primary emotion, and is excluded *a fortiori* from the inexperienced consciousness. I do not perceive that wonder thus presupposes surprise."[1] For "it is a matter of common experience that this feeling is especially lively in childhood where there is least established experience to be shocked."[2] "Nothing excites surprise, except what is contrary to a prior expectation."[3]

If Adam Smith was in error in supposing that the new was exclusively the cause of wonder, the opinion of Dr. Martineau that only what is contrary to expectation can excite surprise, is another mistaken attempt to refer an

[1] 'Types of Ethical Theory,' vol. ii. ch. v. 4.
[2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*

emotion to a single cause. We have tried to show that in the lower kind of surprise there is often no expectation present to be contradicted. It is often because we do not expect the occurrence that it so much surprises us. And while in the higher surprise there is frequently such expectation, this is not always the case. From childhood onwards we have been accustomed to find ourselves in the presence of many things that we do not understand. For the most part we pass by them without their arousing our astonishment and wonder. They do not conflict with our previous knowledge. There is no apparent contradiction between what we perceive and what we know about the same thing. There is simply the common and ever-recurring fact of our ignorance before the most familiar phenomena of nature. It does not conflict with experience that we do not understand them; on the contrary, it is in accordance with experience from our earliest years. Yet these same familiar things may arouse our wonder: the beauty of some, the power of others; the fragility of little things that sustain themselves amidst the great forces around them. However familiar, there is something inexplicable about them that from time to time astonishes us; that also delights us and detains the attention; that excites curiosity and also baffles it. The child again and again puts the sea-shell to its ear, expects the mysterious sound, yet still wonders at it. Inexplicable things and events are the natural objects of astonishment and wonder: new things, to children and the less reflective minds; old things, to the most thoughtful. Out of the combination of astonishment, of baffled curiosity, and—whether new or familiar things—of the delight which also attracts attention to them, arises the emotion of wonder.

There are, in conclusion, those cases of wonder to which Bain refers: we may wonder at things that are evil, mean, or contemptible. Such cases are more rare, because these things are apt to arouse repugnance or disgust, and to turn away our attention from them, and with it our wonder. In distinction from primitive surprise, attention is essential to wonder. But what here first detains the attention and overcomes repugnance? Sometimes the novelty of the occurrence, sometimes a horrible fascination, sometimes a secret in

clination to the vice in ourselves; but whatever be the cause, once the extraordinary nature of the object has aroused astonishment, has stimulated and baffled curiosity, there arises wonder. And this wonder, being now connected with the nature of the thing, outlasts its novelty, and can be renewed so long as the curiosity remains unsatisfied.

The things, then, which excite wonder do not merely arrest, but detain the attention; whereas the objects of repugnance, disgust and contempt, though they momentarily arrest, repel the attention. No one of these emotions is a constituent of wonder, although each may be combined with it, in the way in which antagonistic forces may be combined in the same state of consciousness.

Two laws have been implied in our account of wonder which we must now attempt to define: (102) *Wonder tends to arrest and detain the attention on the thing which excites it; whereas Repugnance, Disgust and Contempt tend to arrest and detain attention on the things which excite them only so long as may be necessary to avoid them.* (103) *Repugnance, Disgust and Contempt tend to exclude Wonder in relation to their objects; and Wonder tends to exclude Repugnance, Disgust and Contempt in relation to its object.*

The cases in which there is something repugnant in an object which is at the same time felt as wonderful, and wherein the repugnancy is only in part counteracted, are then exceptional. The wonderful is ordinarily an object of delight. Hence it is that we find these three terms 'surprise,' 'admiration' and 'wonder' often combined. Surprise enters into all admiration; for admiration is the joy or delight we feel in an object, mixed with astonishment at its superior qualities or excellence; and admiration, as joy and astonishment, so often enters into wonder. And hence this emotion, being both delightful and stimulating, capable of indefinite continuance and renewal, because grounded in the nature of the object, is fitted to become the base of the greatest sentiments of great minds: of the exalted sentiment for truth as well as of the highest love of woman. For the things that exalt us most and that we are to love unchangeably must ever be capable of renewing our surprise, admiration and wonder.

3. *Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Knowledge*

There are two principal varieties of wonder; and these appear to have opposite tendencies and effects. We shall take first that which has been held to be the source of philosophy and the sciences. It is the force and principle of the mind which leads us to pursue truth for itself as an end. It is therefore distinguishable from ordinary curiosity, which works in the interests of so many emotions and sentiments. But in wonder curiosity is freed from alien control, and pursues knowledge as an end. Hence it becomes the base of the love of truth.

From very early times this type of wonder has been discerned by the greatest intellects as the source of their disinterested pursuit of truth. Thus Plato says in the Thaetetus: "Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder."[1] Aristotle expresses more fully the same opinion: "For from wonder," he says, "men, both now and at the first, began to philosophise, having felt astonishment originally at the things which were more obvious . . .; then by degrees . . . about more important subjects."[2] For "Wonder and learning too are generally pleasant; wonder because it necessarily involves the desire of learning . . . ."[3] "He that labours under perplexity and wonder," he says, "thinks that he is involved in ignorance. Therefore also the philosopher—that is the lover of wisdom—is somehow a lover of fables, for the fable is made up of the things that are marvellous. Wherefore, if, for the avoidance of ignorance, men from time to time have been induced to form systems of philosophy, it is manifest that they went in pursuit of scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not on account of any utility that it might possess."[4] Bacon also says: "For all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there groweth

[1] Thaetetus, 155, D (Jowett).
[2] 'The Metaphysics,' B. i. ch. ii.
[3] 'The Rhetoric,' B. i. ch. ii. (Welldon's trans.).
[4] 'The Metaphysics,' B. i. ch. ii.

that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no more *Lumen siccum*."[1] And many others have recognised the same influence of wonder. According to Adam Smith, who analysed the emotion in conjunction with Surprise and Admiration, Wonder, with the imagination supporting it, is ever trying to "fill up the gap"[2] in our knowledge which has evoked our astonishment, or to find the "connecting chain" of events that will remove the apparent irregularity. Hence he concludes, like his predecessors, that Wonder, "and not any expectation of advantage from the discoveries, is the first principle which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy";[3] and that "they pursue this study for its own sake, as an original pleasure or good in itself."[4]

We must now attempt to express this law of the tendency of wonder; and since these great writers did not distinguish between the wonder which had the influence they ascribed to it and any other variety which had not, we must at first state the law absolutely. (104) *Wonder is a complex emotion due to the conjunction of joy, astonishment, and curiosity, which pursues as its end the knowledge of that which causes it.*

It is remarkable how often wonder is spoken of as pleasant; since it may, as we have seen, combine with painful emotions which counteract its pleasantness. Thus Wordsworth referring to the same variety which we have been considering, says: "With Indian awe and wonder, ignorance pleased With its own struggles, did I meditate On the relation those abstractions bear To Nature's Laws."[5]

This pleasure, and even enjoyment, is again frequently referred to by those who are preoccupied by the second variety of wonder which we have next to consider.

4. *Of Wonder as the Source of the Love of Mystery*

There are people who enjoy mystery, and are eager to find it, and who, far from desiring to satisfy the baffled curiosity

[1] 'Of the Advancement of Learning,' 'The First Book.'
[2] *Op. cit.*, sect. ii.
[3] *Op. cit.*, sect. iii.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] 'The Prelude,' B. vi. l. 121.

of wonder, try to maintain it as it is. They have grown to love wonder. Nor is this at all a late and unusual development. It is conspicuous in children. In an admirable passage Shaftesbury has described it. "For what stronger pleasure is there with mankind, or what do they earlier learn or longer retain, than the love of hearing and relating things strange and incredible? How wonderful a thing is the love of wondering, and of raising wonder! 'Tis the delight of children to hear tales they shiver at, and the vice of old age to abound in stories of times past. We come into the world wondering at everything; and when our wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at."[1] And in "Henry VIII" Shakespeare indicates the same tendency of wonder to maintain itself, and to seek for fresh objects to replace those which are exhausted:

> "But as when
> The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phœnix,
> Her ashes new create another heir,
> As great in admiration as herself."[2]

Hume in his celebrated chapter on "Miracles" refers also to the pleasantness of wonder, and notices the same tendency. He speaks of "the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous." "This," he even says, "is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events."[3] "With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relation of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners."[4] For "the gazing populace receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition and promotes wonder."[5]

Thus we notice, in marked contrast to the preceding variety, that in all these cases the impulse of wonder appears to be arrested, does not press forward to its goal of knowledge, but remains complacently in its state of ignorance. And many others have observed the same fact. But Hume

[1] 'The Moralists, a Rhapsody,' pt. ii. sect. v. p. 325.
[2] 'Henry VIII,' A. v. Sc. iv.
[3] 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,' sect. x. part ii.
[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*

also distinguishes another tendency. "The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived."[1]

The complex law which is implied in the preceding observations appears to be contradictory of our provisional form of the law of the first variety of wonder, that wonder promotes investigation, to remove ignorance and to attain to knowledge. In this second variety, it does not promote investigation, but remains satisfied in its state of ignorance.

It would seem that there must be something variable in the constitution of an emotion that can produce effects so opposite and striking. Wonder, in fact, is not a simple emotion; and its composition is variable. We have referred to the joy or admiration which normally enters into it, to its astonishment, and its obstructed curiosity. A curiosity which is satisfied at once has no sufficient interval to arouse wonder. But while our impulses often feel pleasant, no one would say that they are generally pleasant when they are obstructed. On the contrary, it is under these conditions that they tend to become unpleasant. Here, then, we have, as a remarkable exception, an emotion the impulse of which must be obstructed in order that the emotion may be felt, which yet, according to general testimony, is felt to be pleasant. This pleasantness is due to the joy or admiration contained in it.

In the familiar examples of wonder, we find first an admiration for the excellence of something, whether in respect of its beauty, or its power, or its organisation, which contains astonishment at such excellence. The cause of the pleasure in the wonder is this admiration; which, being a kind of joy, has the tendency of all joy to maintain the object as it is, and to maintain also the present relation of the self to it so long as the joy is felt.[2] So long as this tendency is fulfilled, the pleasantness of the emotion is not interfered with, and it runs out to its natural term. But with the joy there is also a baffled curiosity, and this obstruction tends to be felt as unpleasant in proportion to the strength

[1] 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,' sect. x. part ii.

[2] See *ante*, B. ii. ch. vii, 3.

of the impulse. There are, then, two antagonistic principles in wonder: the one tends to maintain the present state, and with it the wonder; the other tends to supersede the present state by a fuller knowledge of the object; and this works, therefore, to destroy the wonder. In the wonder at the base of philosophy and the sciences, curiosity, after a little, obtains supremacy over the attitude of joy and astonishment; in the wonder at the base of the love of the marvellous and of mystery, the joy and astonishment remain supreme; and the mystery of the thing and the undercurrent of curiosity seem to increase both the delight and the wonder. For the baffled curiosity, which in itself tends to diminish the enjoyment, carries a compensation: it exalts the object and increases the admiration for it, as something far above our comprehension, and, therefore, increases the joy.

We have found, then, an explanation of the opposite effects of these two kinds of wonder, and we have now to attempt to formulate the law of their action: (105) *In proportion as the joy in wonder is stronger than curiosity, the impulse of curiosity already obstructed by the situation, is altogether held in check by joy; its question is reiterated, but is not allowed to seek for an answer. In proportion as the impulse of curiosity in wonder is stronger than the tendency of joy (being, indeed, irrepressible in the greatest minds), the first delight of wonder gives place to active investigation of the object.*

From this law it seems to follow that only those possess a great gift of wonder who never satisfy its curiosity; but the reverse of this seems to be the truth. For curiosity, which is always at first obstructed in wonder, is either easily satisfied or it is not. If it is, wonder is soon at an end, and its object may hardly seem to have been worthy of the emotion. But how many other occasions of wonder are presented in its stead, inspired by admiration for the great, the beautiful, and the mysterious? And thus wonder is the Phœnix which, through its own destruction, comes to life again. There is, however, a second reason why this active and investigating wonder develops rather than exhausts the capacity of feeling the emotion, and is not supplanted in those ardent minds that pass their lives in investigation. From common things,

as Aristotle said, wonder may rise, step by step, to the highest; and, as difficulties increase, curiosity, however eager and indefatigable, finds itself again and again repressed. With each such repression wonder is renewed; until at length we reach the highest things which overtax the greatest minds. How great and wonderful those objects are only those know who have given all the powers of their minds to master them; not those who rest in that other and indolent wonder, in which all sorts of superstitions and delusions develop, little worthy of wonder, because they have not trusted their understanding.

We have now finished this inadequate study of the chief emotional systems organised in the sentiments, of which wonder, if not a primary system, is one of the most important, being the source of the sentiment for truth, and exalting the worth of every beloved object. We have now to consider another system, which, though no longer regarded as an emotion, is more important than any emotion in the organisation of the sentiments. This system is Desire.

BOOK III

THE SYSTEM OF DESIRE

CHAPTER I

THE SYSTEM OF DESIRE

1. *Of the Differences of Impulse, Appetite and Emotion*

In this chapter we have to introduce a new feature into the conception of character outlined in the First Book; and in so doing we shall be acting in accordance with our method. By the study of Desire we shall carry further that conception; we shall discern fresh problems of the science, and be directed in the search for other laws than those we have hitherto recognised. And here, too, we shall not attempt to establish the final truth of our conception of desire, but shall be content to take it "for its value in use," in the conviction that the defects in it will be gradually disclosed by the application of the method and the progress of the science.

The systems of character which, for want of a better term, we named the 'sentiments,' organise certain of the primary emotional systems, and are partly constituted by such organisation. In this unfinished state we left the conception of the sentiments, because we were not then in a position to understand desire, which, also, wherever intellectual development permits of it, is contained in their systems.

An essential feature of the primary emotions, as we conceived them, was the possession of impulses; and these impulses we found to be connected with particular instincts or innate tendencies, and to be the immediate condition or correlate in consciousness of their activity. The emotion, with its impulses, instincts, acquired tendencies and behaviour, constituted, in our view, a single system innately determined

to the pursuit of a particular end. While the presence of the impulse in consciousness involves the excitement of the instinct connected with it, the excitement of the instinct also generally involves the presence in consciousness of the impulse. This sufficiently distinguishes instinct from merely reflex action. The system of a reflex act does not include the intervention of an impulse; the system of an instinct normally does, though perhaps this impulse may not be elicited on all occasions nor when the action is most sudden, rapid, and unimpeded.

Like the emotions, the Appetites also include impulses, and these are in fact their most prominent constituents. Hunger urges the animal to pursue, to select, and to appropriate its food; and various instincts, according to the nature of the animal, are involved in these actions. Hunger, then, is like the primary emotions, in respect of the variety of instincts that may be contained in its system—hunting instincts, appropriative and destructive instincts. For every one of these there must be a particular impulse which, apparently, is connected with the excitement of the instinct. Each impulse is connected with its particular instinct, and only indirectly with others. What then is hunger? Has it a major impulse connected with these minor impulses, each in its place; or is this central factor, though called an appetite, substantially the same thing as emotion?

If we could not regard the primary emotions merely as feeling, neither can we regard the appetites merely as conation, though feeling is in general more prominent in the one, and impulse in the other. Such an abstract point of view is contrary to our method. We have to take the whole fact as it is, and not employ the term 'appetite' to denote some abstracted portion of it. The appetites have their own feeling, and when their satisfaction is delayed, are capable of a considerable degree of excitement. This excitement is the emotional side of the appetite.

Appetites, we may say, even if they resemble emotions, have distinctive features of their own. Appetites are centrally initiated within the body; emotions from without; and appetites have a regularity of recurrence which is foreign to the emotions; when they are not satisfied at the proper time,

they become more violent. But these distinctions do not hold of all cases. Appetites are sometimes initiated from without and emotions from within. Emotions when they are impeded also become more urgent; and sometimes, when due to a mood, have some degree of regularity. Nor can we distinguish appetites from emotions on the ground that the latter can, and the former cannot, be organised in sentiments. The hunger of a man belongs to his self-regarding sentiment, and is instrumental to all the objects that he values for himself. The sexual appetite is an essential constituent of sexual love, however much it be subordinated to the higher ends of that system. Without, then, denying that there are important differences between appetite and emotion, we must regard them as substantially the same, and range them in the same class. Hence it is that all the old writers, from Descartes to Hume, included Desire among the emotions, or "passions" as they were then named.

A more difficult problem concerns the relation of impulses to emotions. For if we cannot regard the appetites merely as conation, neither can we so regard the impulses. We have already dealt with this problem in preceding chapters, and have now shortly to recapitulate our conclusions. Common impulses to walk, to run, to sit down, to grasp things, to sleep, had not, we found, the same individuality of feeling as fear or anger, as joy or sorrow, but still possessed feeling, were pleasant or unpleasant under varying conditions, and were even capable of a considerable degree of 'excitement' under prolonged obstruction. They are not therefore merely varieties of 'conation'; nor are they altogether without intellectual constituents. If our primitive impulses have not thought, in the narrower sense, they have a certain prospective awareness. They are looking forward to the next step in advance, though they do not definitely anticipate it. In fact, if we regarded 'impulses' as merely statical facts, we might define them as 'undifferentiated, prospective emotions.'

Our principal distinction between impulses and emotions was dynamical, not statical, and bore on the functions which each is destined to perform. Impulses, with their connected instincts and acquired tendencies, are constituents of our

primary emotional systems; but the latter are not constituents of the former; they are more comprehensive systems. Impulses, in fact, function in emotions, and are subordinated to their general ends, just as emotions function in and are subordinated to the ends of sentiments. But those impulses which, like the appetites, organise a number of subsidiary impulses, we must class with the emotions.

There are then three principal orders of systems. The simplest and least comprehensive are felt in consciousness as 'impulses'; the second, which comprise a number of the former, include our emotions and appetites; the third, which are the most comprehensive of all, organise a number of emotions with their attendant impulses and instincts.

Such impulses, then, however much they seem like emotions under statical analysis, are not emotions, for the same reason that emotions are not sentiments.

2. *Of Desire as an Emotional System*

We are now in a position to take up the problem of desire. In some impulses—those that are more developed on their intellectual side—there is the thought of a result or end distinguished from any result already accomplished and from the vague prospective attitude immanent in an impulse; and this gives to them a more definite and distant outlook. Such impulses, in agreement with ordinary usage, we shall call 'desires.' Thus it is 'desire' when having been separated from one we love, we feel an impulse toward reunion, and have a thought of this reunion as distinct from all that we may be accomplishing to effect it.

Besides an intellect capable of foreseeing the end of the impulse, because of a former experience of its satisfaction, there is a second condition of the first development of some impulses into desire: the presence of an obstruction to the impulse. Where an impulse is at once satisfied, as where a hungry animal eats what it sees in front of it, there is scarcely a sufficient interval during which the end can be foreseen, and to justify us, therefore, in calling it desire. Perception guides the impulse to its destined end, whether the steps

to this end be one or many; and this is probably the case with most animal impulses. Where, on the other hand, some obstruction delays the impulse, there is time to form the thought of the end and of the means requisite to it. Thus Bain remarks that if "all motive impulses could be at once followed up, desire would have no place"[1] and—we may add—thought would be superfluous.

While, then, obstruction and delay give a fuller opportunity for the development of desires from impulses, they are not necessary in all cases. One of the most frequent ways in which desires arise is that the thought of an end first arises and then provokes desire for this end. Thus, after sufficient experience, the thought of some kind of food or drink may arouse desire for it; or the thought of many experiences we have enjoyed,—days in the country, the meeting with one person or another, whatever we did and enjoyed doing,—when we think of them at some future time, provoke a desire for them. In all such cases it is not the impulse which must be first felt before the thought of its end can arise, but the thought of the end arises first, and both provokes the impulse and transforms it into desire.

While obstruction to an impulse is not a necessary condition of its becoming desire, when desire has arisen obstruction of one kind or another occurs in all except the simplest cases. For, apart from the delay caused by opposition of circumstances and conflict of motives, desires only gradually acquire a knowledge of their means, and until this knowledge is obtained their satisfaction is delayed. And this delay affords them time to develop the possibilities of their systems; for the knowledge of the end, which first distinguishes desire from mere impulse, is of no importance except, and so far as, there is the power to reflect on the means, to choose them more deliberately, and to acquire through experiment and reflection other means than those innately possessed. Thus desire is distinguished from impulse in a more important way than by the mere foresight of its end, namely, by the capacities of its system, which are elicited

[1] 'The Emotions and the Will'; The Will, ch. viii, 'Desire.'

through delay; and in this sense it is true that desire would remain undeveloped if all impulses could be at once satisfied.

Through delay due to one cause or another, desire becomes what Locke called it, an "uneasiness"; for when an impulse is obstructed it arouses a restless, disagreeable feeling. We might be inclined to call this "uneasiness" the characteristic emotion of desire, something which fluctuates between a feeling which we can scarcely distinguish and one of great and sometimes violent intensity, which, if it has not the complete individuality of fear or anger, is more definite than many emotions. But many of the emotions share in this feeling, because they contain impulses which frequently develop into desires.

This uneasiness of desire undergoes, in the course of its process, certain noteworthy changes. It is a common-place that the relative proportions of pleasure and pain in an impulse are prone to constant changes in response to the checks and releases to which it is subject. In desire these changes tend to assume the form of definite emotions. For we feel Hope when the chances of accomplishing our desire seem good, or when we cling to these in thought; Confidence when we feel certain of its accomplishment; torturing Anxiety, when the event is long in suspense; the pang of Disappointment when the event has been expected and is not fulfilled; Despondency when we fail to make progress; and Despair when hope is shut out because attainment is impossible.

Thus in Desire we alternate between a number of emotions according to the events which influence it. But we have still to draw the most important conclusion; these peculiar emotions arise in desire and nowhere else. They belong to it, and are dependent on its precedence and continuance. If, for instance, we desire wealth, or power, or fame, we alternate from time to time between hope and anxiety; we are sometimes confident; we are liable to despondency and despair. But if we do not desire any one of these things, we do not feel any one of these emotions in relation to them. We cannot feel these emotions in impulse as distinguished from desire; because foresight of the end is essential to all of them. Hope carries the thought of that event for which we

hope; despondency of that in respect of which we have failed; despair of that which we can never hope to attain; confidence of that of which we are certain of attainment; and anxiety of that of which we are in doubt. Thus these emotions belong only to desire, and cannot be developed in any impulse that blindly pursues its end. A vague "uneasiness," and fluctuations of pleasure and pain in the process, there replace them.

Yet "uneasiness" is also characteristic of desire and many of its emotions. Hope is an uneasiness, because it is not confident; anxiety is a torturing uneasiness; despondency is a supine uneasiness; disappointment a surprised uneasiness. But what shall we say of despair and confidence? Has all uneasiness vanished in certain expectation of the worst, or of the best? It would seem that it has in some cases; but the climax has not then been reached, which may be better than confidence or worse than despair.

The attempt to describe the unique nature of desire by some other term than 'desire' itself has led us into these difficulties. It is desire itself that persists through its several emotions, and though Locke's term fits certain of its states, it cannot be applied without strain to all. Uneasiness best describes the uncertainties of Anxiety and Hope, less aptly the states of Despondency and Disappointment, is least applicable to the emotions of Confidence and Despair.

Desire is then a very complex emotional system which includes actually or potentially the six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety, Disappointment, Despondency, Confidence and Despair. And if we were disposed to define impulse as "undefined, prospective emotion," we might define this higher differentiation of it as "a system of definite, prospective emotions." But Desire, like Love, may be satisfied or repressed before it has an opportunity to develop the richness of its system; or the circumstances to which it is subject in its career may be too monotonous to elicit the variety of its states; but it is still, and essentially, an organisation of those emotional dispositions which are characteristic of its process.

CHAPTER II

THE LAWS OF THE EMOTIONAL SYSTEM OF DESIRE

THE conception of Desire as such an emotional system as we have described in the last chapter, suggests new problems, and directs us to the search for new laws. In distinction from the primary emotions which in their earliest forms are aroused only by sensations or perceptions, the prospective emotions of desire are aroused only by ideas, and refer to ideal objects. For they depend on desire, and on the thought of its end. They are conditioned by some change in this thought. If we did not think differently in despondency from what we do in hope, and in confidence from what we do in despair, and if in all these cases our thought did not differ from the mere thought of the end desired, none of these emotions would be possible. We might be in a sinking ship, or shut up in a burning house, and, like an animal, perceive our situation, and be possessed by primitive fear; but unless we interpreted this situation—unless the desire for life arose, and with it the further thought that no escape was possible—we could not despair; nor could we there feel hope without the thought of escape. And thus it is with all the emotions of desire: each has a thought of its own, and each makes some addition to the bare thought of the end. We may then lay it down as the first empirical law of desire that: (106) *The prospective emotions of desire are only aroused by thoughts: being first dependent on the thought of the end and, secondly, on some modification of this thought, which operates as the special stimulus of one or other of these emotions.*

There is also a second law which has been partly implied in the last chapter. Just as we found that desire must be

obstructed before the intellectual side of its system can be developed, so also it must be obstructed before its prospective emotions can be elicited. Many of our desires are accomplished so rapidly that there is neither sufficient delay nor variety of situation for emotions to arise. We desire to go out, and we go out; we desire to rest, and we sit down; we desire to go to sleep, and we break away from our book or our companion; we desire change of scene, and we readily fulfil this desire. But to feel hope or anxiety, our desire must be held some time in suspense. We cannot measure this time; but we know that it must be sufficiently long for the thoughts to arise on which the prospective emotions depend. Let us then attempt to formulate a law, which, in respect of such interval, must be left indefinite: (107) *The prospective emotions of desire depend on the occurrence of some obstacle to its satisfaction, which may provide a delay sufficient for the thoughts specifically determining those emotions to be elicited.* But delay is only one of the conditions on which these thoughts depend: and of the others the most important is that which the situation is understood to be; for this is different when we are hopeful and when despondent. There is then a second law: (108) *The prospective emotions of desire depend on some supposed change of situation, affecting the prospective fulfilment of its end, to which their thoughts respond.* For such a change of situation, if not a real one, must still be supposed to exist.

What shall we say of these thoughts themselves, and can we define them? It is difficult to define them because they may be themselves so vague. Thus if we were to assume that in Hope there must be a probability of attaining the end desired, there would be some cases that would contradict it. For the probability may be on the other side, yet we may cling in hope to a bare chance: like people that take a ticket in a lottery. Nor need the thought be so defined that the event which we hope for is conceived of as either probable or possible. We may hope that it will come to pass without further defining the chances in favour of it. But one negative condition we may particularise: we must not conceive that this event is impossible, or despair will replace hope.

We do not then seem able to enunciate the law of the

occurrence of hope, because we cannot define the thought which is an essential condition of it. It is neither true in all cases that such a vague thought as we have described will elicit hope, nor that a more definite thought of the chances in our favour is always necessary; because there is another condition which co-operates, and is not fully manifested in consciousness. The state of the body gives rise to moods of the mind; and these dispose us sometimes to hope, sometimes to despondency. When we are well we are more disposed to the former; when ill, to the latter. But we have no precise knowledge of these physiological conditions. And the tempers of some persons predispose them more to the one emotion than to the other. And thus it happens that when our bodily state or temper is favourable, we can hope with fewer chances in our favour that when it is adverse, and that it then requires a greater present failure or a greater probability of failure in the future to make us despondent. For these reasons it does not seem possible to define the kind of thought that essentially gives rise to hope, because this thought is so variable. We can only lay down this law: (109) *We tend to feel hope when we think and believe that the chances in our favour are good, or have become better than they were;* but the influence of this thought is often counteracted by the mood or temper, and something less than it is often sufficient. It is the same with despondency. At one time it takes a little cause to make us despondent, at another, a greater. And the thought too is variable, and often obscure: failure to attain the end, or to make progress toward it, prolonged delays, adverse circumstances: these experiences, though accompanied by ill-defined thoughts, are the common causes of the emotion. But (110) *In proportion as we think that the chances in our favour are bad, or are less good than they were, we tend under all circumstances to feel despondent;* though the influence of this thought is often counteracted by our mood, or our temper, as well as by courage or patience.

In Despair and Confidence it seems that the subjective conditions are always more definite. We do not despair unless we believe that the event desired cannot be accomplished. Belief is essential to it. In confidence, we must believe that

this event will certainly be accomplished. Belief is also essential to it. Yet these beliefs are furthered or counteracted by bodily and mental conditions, so that under some conditions, of the precise nature of which we are ignorant, we may form these beliefs with little or no justification, while under other conditions, we seem to be influenced by what we call 'reason.' Let us, then, state this provisional law: (111) *We cannot despair or feel confidence unless we believe, in the first case, that the end desired cannot be achieved, or, in the second case, that it certainly will be.*

In Disappointment there is the thought and expectation of an end being realised followed by its sudden frustration; or the experience of the end being realised, and of its falling below expectation. The event being always unexpected, surprise enters into the emotion. The law of Disappointment is therefore that, (112) *Whenever we think and expect that the end desired, or any process auxiliary to it, will be realised, or that, being realised, it will attain to a certain character, then, when it is not realised, or does not attain to this character, we tend to feel disappointment.*

In anxiety we have the thought of two alternatives: we hope that the end desired will be realised, but we are anxious because it may not be. We cannot get away from this thought, and are torn between it and the other, and in a state of suspense so painful that we sometimes say that any certainty is preferable to it. Here, too, certain moods and tempers tend to fix the unfavourable alternative in the mind so that we become anxious when there is little cause for anxiety; whilst there are other moods in which we are so foolishly confident that good grounds for anxiety can obtain no hold of us. The law of Anxiety is therefore that, (113) *Whenever the hope of attaining the end desired is in conflict with the thought that it may not be attained, and this thought obtains some hold of the mind, then we tend to feel anxiety.*

This seems to be as far as we can at present go in the attempt to define the thoughts which are essential conditions of these emotions. We must now attempt to make clear the nature of these emotions themselves and certain curious relations in which they stand to one another. The primary

emotions which we considered in the last Book had all of them, with the exception of Surprise, their particular impulses, and ends which these impulses subserved, and even as organised in sentiments, these ends were seen to be still operative. Is it the same with hope, despondency, anxiety, disappointment, despair and confidence? Have these their own ends each distinct from the others; or, on the other hand, have they not all the same end, and is not this the end of the desire to which they belong? For in desire we hope that this end will be accomplished; we are despondent when we make no progress toward this same end; we are anxious when we feel it to be uncertain; we are disappointed when we have expected it, or some result contributory to it, to be realised, and it is not; and we feel confidence, or despair, according as we believe that this same end will, or will not, of a certainty be accomplished. And there seems to be no other end of all these emotions. They do not seem to contribute to desire any special impulses and ends of their own, or, if they do, these become confused with the end of desire itself. For if hope has a strong impulse toward its end, this is the impulse of desire: and if despondency has a slackened impulse, this is still the impulse of desire. These emotions modify its impulses, strengthen or weaken them, stimulate one and depress another. For beside its central impulse,—which persists until its end is realised or the desire is extinguished,—desire has a number of subordinate impulses which occur at different stages of its process,—as to get up, to sit down, to take a train, to change the course of its ideas, to converse with this person or with that, to vary its methods. These do not seem specially to belong to hope more than to anxiety, nor to despondency more than to disappointment. They simply occur because desire has to organise its means in relation to changes in the situation, and these means require particular impulses to accomplish them. Yet if these emotions have no impulses of their own, they must be different not only from the primary emotions, but from all those of which we have hitherto made no mention,—as shame and humiliation, pride and vanity, awe, reverence, aspiration, remorse, repentance,—all of which have impulses and ends of their own.

CHAPTER III

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS OF DESIRE

THE conception of Desire as potentially a system of prospective emotions has suggested to us new problems, and these, as we anticipated in our chapter on the method of the science, have led to the search for, and the tentative formulation of, new laws. We have to deal with one of these problems in the present chapter. Here is Desire, in which we find a new group of emotions apparently different from the primary emotions of fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy and sorrow: how have they been developed, and what nature do we find them to possess, and what are their respective tendencies? With regard to the first question we cannot directly answer it, because we cannot observe the process of this development. As soon as impulse has grown into desire, and we foresee its end, and its end is in suspense, because we cannot immediately accomplish it, one or other of these peculiar emotions arises according to the situation which evokes it. We cannot watch its differentiation. It springs into sudden maturity, like most other things in the mind that possess a unique character of their own. Unable to watch the process, we can only study the product, and compare these secondary emotions with one another and with the primary. Certainly there are resemblances between the emotions of desire and those which have preceded them in mental development. Hope has some resemblance to Joy; and Confidence, a greater: Anxiety closely resembles Fear; and Despondency, Disappointment, and Despair approximate to Sorrow.

Are these emotions then secondary forms which the primary emotions assume in the system of desire? The resemblance between their feelings does not afford us grounds for any definite conclusions. Hope is not joy, either because it is checked by doubt and anxiety, or because it belongs to the unsatisfied process of desire. It may be one of the approaches to joy which are there possible; and, at least, it becomes more like joy as the doubt and anxiety which restrain it are diminished, and the man lives in his hope, and his hope approximates to confidence. But these are vague conclusions. To obtain others more definite we must examine the tendencies of the emotions.

Now Hope has not the essential tendency of joy. That tendency we have already considered: it is directed to maintain the situation in which the joy is felt. Such a tendency in the system of desire would arrest its progress, and detain it at the stage at which the joy was felt;—if hope were joy. Hope, on the contrary, has the eagerness of desire itself for the goal, because it belongs to desire. Nor does Confidence—though it slacken the striving of desire—suspend the process, and make us satisfied with that; but, like Hope, follows the tendency of desire away from the present to an unrealised future event; whereas Joy tends to conserve the present and to protect it against alteration.

Yet though Hope is lacking in this essential tendency of Joy, its own tendency is to some extent analogous. Let us take first those desires that we ourselves are instrumental in fulfilling, and afterwards those the fulfilment of which we leave to external events. We desire to meet a friend, and hope to meet him at a particular place. There are other places at which we might also meet him; but hope tends to direct and maintain our efforts along the line on which its hope is fixed. Or we desire to make money, and hope to be successful in a particular line of business. There are many other ways in which money may be made, but we discard them; because hope directs and sustains our energies in this single direction.

Now take the other class of desires. A man is to retire from business at a certain age with a fixed salary. He looks forward to this time, and his hopes are fixed on it. He has had

too much work ; and the monotony of it is repugnant to him. Yet he cannot hasten the event ; and only the years can fulfil it. He might retire now if he speculated with his fortune and were successful. But his hope sustains his thoughts along the line of the other and slower method, and protects him against the allurement of that which might be rapid but is hazardous. And Hope seems to have a genuine impulse to follow this line ; for if others are suggested, unless one of these arouses a greater hope, they are apt to be rejected.

Thus Hope, like Joy, has a conservative tendency ; but, unlike joy, it does not tend to conserve the present situation, but to conserve the method by which we hope to achieve a new situation. How different is it from Despondency ; which not only slackens desire, but especially dissuades us from following any longer the method which seems to be leading to failure, but in which we had hoped for success.

Let us then enunciate this as the first law of Hope : (114) *Hope tends to conserve the direction of thought and effort along the line of possible attainment on which hope is set, and in this subserves and specialises the energy of desire.*

Hope then resembles joy both in respect of its feeling and central tendency without however becoming identical with it in either ; preserving its own individuality in both. Has, then, the later emotion, been developed from the earlier and primary ?

Hope is restrained from becoming joy by the doubt and anxiety which interacts with it. But confidence displaces this doubt and anxiety without itself becoming joy ; because it is still a part of the process of desire, and as such is turned to the future and never satisfied with the present. If Hope may be developed from Joy, there is no clear evidence that it is. It is more likely to be a definite form of one of the undefined changes to which, as we have seen, all impulses are subject. For these are sometimes more pleasant, sometimes less, according to the influences that further and impede them. When such influences are favourable they become more pleasant, and when we recognise their favourable character, this pleasant feeling seems to be transformed into hope.

If hope bears some resemblance to joy, anxiety closely resembles fear. It is usual with the poets to call this emotion of desire 'fear.' Thus Cowley in his ode to Hope calls it "Brother of Fear," [1] and Milton says that "where no Hope is left is left no Fear." [2] Yet it is certain that, before hope has been developed, the primitive disposition of fear exists, independent of both desire and hope, and responsive to the sensational stimuli with which it is innately connected. And on closely examining the tendencies of this primitive fear, we usually find them to be different from those of anxiety. The common end of primitive fear is to make good the escape of an animal from danger. The methods only are different in different cases and with different species of animals. Thus where one takes to flight, another remains motionless or conceals itself. Which of these characteristic modes of the behaviour of fear do we find manifested by anxiety? All of them may be absent, as well as the common end to which they are directed—the escape of the organism from danger. If we are anxious about the course of an illness, about a fall of prices, about the regularity of our employment, we do not hide, we do not run away, we do not remain inert. We face the unfavourable issues; we endeavour to counteract them by all the means in our power. Yet sometimes there is a reversion to the primitive emotion. A young man who desires to be a public speaker, may be anxious about his first speech; but he hopes to succeed. His anxiety impels him to make a careful preparation, and restrains the excessive confidence in his powers which might lead him to make no preparation at all. Another's anxiety about his success, as the day of trial approaches, may give place to unmixed fear, which urges him to abandon his attempt altogether. In that case, he no longer has any desire to make a speech; fear has destroyed this desire. Such a fear, instead of being a constituent of this desire, and a support to it, is an antagonistic emotion which his desire strives to suppress.

In the chapter on Fear we have studied those late fears of the sentiments in which the acquired behaviour of the emotion presents so marked a difference from its primitive forms. We

[1] 'The Mistress,' 'Against Hope.' [2] 'Paradise Reg.' iii. 206.

found that with every one of the great ends of the sentiments there tends to arise at times a fear that this end will not be accomplished: as that the union we desire with a loved object will be frustrated, or that the reciprocating love, or the happiness of this person, will not be attained or preserved. And the sentiments are liable to such fears because they have and cannot divest themselves of these desires. The ends of such fears are no longer the prevention of death to the organism, but the prevention of these adverse events. Hence, in most cases, primitive methods are no longer serviceable. The end of the primary emotion has to be subordinated to the end of desire. It is modified and becomes more general. It is still some kind of prevention or avoidance, but is no longer confined to the prevention of injury or death.

Now, as in desiring an end we are liable at times to a fear that it will not be accomplished, so in the pursuit of it, when events are favourable, we feel hope. We feel only hope, because we are not confident but doubtful. And success being doubtful, other events which are unfavourable are also represented in our thought. If we thought only of them we should be disposed to feel fear unmixed. But as the adverse events also are doubtful, our thought alternates between them and those to which hope is attached. The beginnings of fear are constantly being checked by the influence of hope; as hope itself is restrained from becoming confidence through the action of doubt and fear. Under the influence of doubt, involving fear and hope, there seems to be developed the peculiar emotion of anxiety.

If we attempt to go behind the secondary emotion hope to account for anxiety, then we must assume the action of the more undefined emotion from which we supposed it to have been developed. If the checks and furtherances to which a desire is subject make it feel alternately unpleasant and pleasant, then when we become aware of these influences or foresee them, our thought will become correspondingly pleasant or uneasy. The peculiar emotions of hope and anxiety seem to be dependent on the precedence and interaction of these contrary thoughts and the feelings that accompany them. Thus we are anxious about the course of an illness without

however 'fearing the worst,' because the favourable alternative is constantly asserting itself; and we have hope in this favourable event without being able to confine our thought to it because the other alternative recurs.

Anxiety, then, seems to be much more clearly a differentiation of fear than does hope of joy; but however unfavourable a possible event may be judged to be to the fulfilment of desire, it will not give rise to anxiety unless it first to some extent excites fear. In our unimportant desires we do not feel fear. We may desire to get away, and think we shall be detained by our business; but we do not feel anxiety on account of this unfavourable alternative, because our desire is not sufficiently important. Unless the failure of the end is capable of arousing fear when we anticipate its failure, we do not feel anxiety when it is doubtful.

With every desire, however unimportant, there is a certain aversion to the continuance of the present state. If we desire to go out we are averse to remaining in the house. The present state no longer affords us joy, because we desire some other state. The former is now repugnant to us. So also when we think of any event, incompatible with our desire, as probable, that also tends to arouse at least repugnance, but in the greater desires, fear. In the lesser, when unfavourable alternatives recur in our thoughts, and appear sufficiently probable, we feel a vague but unpleasant emotion through the interaction of hope and repugnance. For if desire has certain definite and peculiar emotions in its system, it has also others which are less defined or vague.

If we next consider the tendencies of Anxiety we find that they have the same end as have the later forms of fear.[1] For as these are directed to prevent the occurrence of any event that we fear, so also anxiety is directed to prevent the occurrence of those events that are incompatible with the end desired. Anxiety about the state of our business or the situation of a friend makes us try to counteract the occurrence of those events that would make the state or situation worse; and thus anxiety is an efficient, auxiliary emotion of desire. And here we can discern why these prospective emotions appear as

[1] See B. ii. ch. ii. 3.

if they possessed no distinctive impulses of their own, while the impulses which are undoubtedly present seem to belong only to desire. For emotions that become there organised must be so modified that what survives of their original impulses may be strictly subordinated to its end. Thus, in the present case, while it is clear that anxiety as a secondary form of fear has impulses derived from the primary emotion, and that these have been so modified that their end is merely to prevent the occurrence of events that are incompatible with the fulfilment of desire, yet desire itself, independently of anxiety, has such impulses. For if we desire an end we obviously try to counteract influences that are hostile to it. What, then, does desire gain from its emotion of anxiety, and why is not this emotion superfluous? It gains in the first place the force of an emotion which is not, like fear, violent or inconstant, but capable of a steady and persistent activity, making it mindful of what it might otherwise forget, and making it in general more watchful and careful in the management of its process than it would otherwise be. Thus anxiety, though the impulses that it derives from fear have to be modified into accordance with those of desire, and appear identical with them, yet renders the latter more steady, active, and efficient.

We come in the last place to Despondency, Disappointment, and Despair, which bear such a close resemblance to sorrow. Are they, in fact, not sorrow itself: the first and second, the sorrow which has not altogether excluded hope, the third, the sorrow which has; the first, the sorrow that overtakes us slowly after an accumulating experience of failure; the second, the sorrow that overtakes us suddenly and unexpectedly? We have remarked, in studying the causation of sorrow, that it is always conditioned by a precedent impulse or desire, and that this impulse or desire must, as a second condition, be frustrated—not merely opposed, but frustrated. For instance, the primitive impulses for exercise, for rest, for nourishment, for the cessation of bodily pain, all, when frustrated, tend to arouse sorrow, as also, when satisfied, to arouse joy. Where sorrow is aroused, the prominent impulse felt with it is still the preceding impulse for exercise, or rest, or nourishment, or for the

cessation of bodily pain, but now suffering frustration. Sorrow belongs to this impulse; not this impulse to the sorrow. It is the same with despondeney, disappointment, and despair, they belong to the desire which precedes them and in whose system they are included. They also tend to arise in it when it has suffered frustration, slowly or suddenly, permanently or for the present time. Thus, in addition to the close resemblance between these emotions and sorrow, we find also that the causes that arouse them are substantially the same in both cases. Finally we may consider their tendencies.

The only impulse that we found proper to sorrow was that expressed by the cry, inarticulate or articulate, for assistance, or by some gesture expressive of weakness and dependence. Despondency is so weak and effortless that it makes at least a dumb appeal for help; and thus is it always understood; for when a person is despondent we try to encourage him, and to renew his hope and activity. In disappointment and despair this appeal is often suppressed, or addressed in silence to invisible powers. In the former the event has happened, and we have to face it; in the latter, there is no hope left of escaping from it. Yet here, too, there is sometimes expressed the cry of despair, as in Byron's line,

> "the last despairing cry
> Of some strong swimmer in his agony."[1]

All these emotions have also that appearance of uselessness which is so often charged to sorrow, and which made South exclaim: "If there is hope left why do we grieve instead of setting to work; if there is none, why still do we grieve?"

Thus, from a comparison of their feelings, their manner of causation, and their impulses, we shall conclude that all these emotions are probably differentiations of the primary emotion of sorrow—modifications which its disposition undergoes in the process of desire in consequence of different kinds of failure to realise the desired end. In the next chapter we shall enter with greater detail into the analysis of their tendencies, as well as those of the other prospective emotions of desire.

[1] Don Juan.

CHAPTER IV

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE

1. *Of the Laws of Hope and Despondency*

WHETHER the special emotions of desire have or have not impulses of their own, they have a variety of tendencies; or else their occurrence in its system would be useless and unintelligible. Many of these are frequently referred to in literature, and are the staple of the thoughts of those who observe the behaviour of these emotions. And, as a result of these observations, we seem here able to enunciate genuine empirical laws of character which, although we have to give to them a precise and formal expression, are familiar to every one. And it is in such directions that the foundation of a science of character affords us most hope; because here, in enunciating laws, we have not to depend on detecting them ourselves, but to derive them from the express statements of the great observers of character.

We shall first divide the tendencies of the emotions of desire into two classes: (1) those which bear directly on desire, and (2) those which bear on the interaction of these emotions; and in this chapter we shall chiefly confine ourselves to the first class. We may begin with Hope; and the first law that we have to notice is that Hope strengthens Desire. It is a consequence of this law that Hope strengthens Love; because desire is a chief constituent of all human love. And here we have to attempt to define the sense in which hope strengthens desire: (115) *Hope increases the activity of*

desire, aids it in resisting misfortune and the influence of its depressing emotions, and in both ways furthers the attainment of its end. We shall find that all the observations and reflections to be referred to in illustration of this law attribute the strengthening effect of Hope to our self in general, without specifying any one of its particular systems or activities; for, in all of them, the effect of hope is the same. While Hope has this general effect, the 'hopes' which arise in us are always connected with desires, and their strengthening influence is at first manifested in them.

We notice that the emblem of hope is an anchor, and the appropriateness of this emblem is, as we have said, that hope helps desire to withstand the storms of misfortune:—

". . . which hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast. . . ."[1]

"Upon her arm a silver anchor lay,
Whereon she leaned ever. . . ."[2]

"Hope as an anchor, firm and sure, holds fast
The Christian vessel, and defies the blast."[3]

All observers seem to be agreed on the strengthening effect of hope. Shakespeare says: "The miserable have no other medicine."[4] Milton asks

"What reinforcement we may gain from hope;
If not, what resolution from despair."[5]

Cowley calls hope a "strong retreat,"[6] and says that it blows "the chimic's and the lover's fire."[7] Another poet calls it the "nurse of young desire"; Shelley invokes us to

"hope till hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates."[8]

Tennyson speaks of "The mighty hopes that make us men." In "The Pleasures of Hope," Campbell thus apostrophises it:

"Friend of the brave! in peril's darkest hour
Intrepid virtue looks to thee for power. . . ."

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[1] Hebrews, vi. 19.
[2] Spenser, 'Faery Queen.'
[3] Cowper, 'Hope.'
[4] 'Measure for Measure,' A. iii. Sc. i.
[5] 'Paradise Lost,' B. i, 2, 190, 191.
[6] The Mistress, 'For Hope.'
[7] The Mistress, 'Against Hope.'
[8] Prometheus, A. iv.

And again :

> "Thine is the charm of life's bewilder'd way
> That calls each slumbering passion into play."[1]

The melancholy and morbid Amiel regards it as the spring of all our activity. "At bottom," he says, "everything depends on the presence or absence of one single element in the soul—hope. All the activities of man . . . pre-suppose a hope in him of attaining an end. Once kill this hope, and his movements become senseless, spasmodic and convulsive, like those of someone falling from a height." [2] "What makes old age so sad," says Richter, "is not that our joys but our hopes cease." [3]

Now if hope has a tendency of such supreme importance to desire and love as is so generally attributed to it, it must have a capacity of persistence to some extent comparable to that of both of these systems. In distinction from the transiency of so many emotions, it must have a power of sustaining the systems to which it belongs through the changing fortunes to which they are subject. And this capacity of persistence is one of the most conspicuous characteristics of the emotion, and one which has been most frequently noticed. Its stability and strength are implied in the emblem of an anchor. Campbell calls it "unfading hope" [4] and "eternal hope." [5] Pope says that it "springs eternal in the human breast" ; [6] that it travels through life "nor quits us when we die" ; [7] Cowley, that it is a "sure entailed estate, Which nought has power to alienate" ; [8] which has "so long a reach and yet canst hold so fast" ; [9] La Rochefoucauld, that "deceitful as it is," it "carries us agreeably through life." [10]

But Hope though indispensable to Desire and Love, is not a perfect instrument of either ; and here we meet with a second law of its tendency as familiar as the first : (116) *Hope tends always to make the future appear better than the present.* And

[1] Part the First. [2] Amiel, 'Journal Intime,' 5 Juin, 1870.
[3] Richter, 'Titan.' [4] 'Pleasures of Hope,' Part Second.
[5] *Ibid.* [6] 'Essay on Man,' Ep. i. [7] *Op. cit.*, Ep. ii.
[8] The Mistress, 'For Hope.' [9] *Ibid.*
[10] 'L'espérance, toute trompeuse qu'elle est, sert au moins à nous mener à la fin de la vie par un chemin agréable,' 'Maximes, clxviii.

therefore hope often deceives us; but in this respect also it strengthens desire which, like it, is turned to the future. Thus Shakespeare says:

> "True hope is swift, and flies with swallow's wings,
> Kings it makes Gods, and meaner creatures kings!"[1]

Gratian says: "Hope gives rise to extravagant promises which experience does not fulfil."[2] Cowley calls it "Fortune's cheating lottery! Where for one prize an hundred blanks there be." And the common sense of Johnson, combining its good and evil effects, informs us that the understanding of a sanguine man may "be easily vitiated by the luxurious indulgence of hope, however necessary to the production of everything great or excellent."[3]

It is a remarkable fact that out of all of the emotions of the human heart one should be chosen by common consent as of such supreme importance. No other emotion has had such general tributes paid to it; for love, its only competitor, is a sentiment. Wordsworth, indeed, in a famous sentence, couples both with admiration: "We live by admiration, hope, and love."[4]

But if Hope has this indispensable use and function for desire, what possible advantage can desire obtain from the opposite emotion of Despondency? It is a familiar law that (117) *Despondency weakens desire, just as hope strengthens it.* Bunyan, in the "Pilgrim's Progress," represents Despondency as a slough. "When hope leaves man despondency begins to subdue him," says Plato. There are those, says Locke, who "depress their own minds and despond at their first difficulty."[5] Despondency "is a disease that stunts the faculties, enervates the heart, chills the affections, and dries up every channel of life."[6] "How many feasible projects have miscarried through despondency!"[7] Thus the bad effects of despondency are so much more conspicuous than any good effects it may have that the former alone are noticed. But if it has no good effects whatever, why does it belong to Desire, and what

[1] Richard III, A. v. Sc. ii.
[2] Art of Worldly Wisdom, 194.
[3] Rambler, No. 2.
[4] 'The Excursion.' B. iv.
[5] 'Conduct of the Understanding,' 'Despondency.'
[6] Ellis.
[7] J. Collier.

function can be there assigned to it? Now there is a particular influence of despondency which is evidence of its usefulness in at least one direction. Despondency indeed weakens Desire, but specially weakens the hold over us of those methods by which we are endeavouring to accomplish the desired end. If nothing induced us to desist from wrong methods, if the hope which stimulated us to their pursuit were indestructible, we should never learn by failure. Despondency intervenes, and makes us halt. It is unfortunate that this emotion has also, like hope, the bad effect attributed to it. It has in certain moods and tempers a morbid and enervating persistency. But in general its tenacity is not in the least comparable to that of hope. Having arrested our action, and dissuaded us from continuing the same method, it leaves the mind free for the discovery of a better way, if there is one; and as soon as hope is renewed we set about the discovery of it. Despondency has therefore this useful function in Desire; but, as with hope, its good and evil effects are conjoined, and it needs a constant regulation. We may now tentatively express this second law of despondency: (118) *Despondency specially dissuades us from persisting in that course which has led to failure, yet in which we had hoped for success.*

Two other laws of Hope and Despondency we must name only to pass by, because they refer to a complex quality of character that we cannot at present take into account. (119) *Hope tends to give us courage.* (120) *Despondency tends to deprive us of courage.* That is why we say of one despondent that he needs 'encouraging,' because he is 'discouraged' or 'disheartened.' "Whatever enlarges Hope," says Dr. Johnson, "will also exalt courage."[1] L'espérance, "si elle se trouve avec la crainte et avec la douleur, elle les modère en telle sorte qu'elles n'abattent point le courage."[2]

2. *Of the Tendencies of Anxiety*

The other emotions of Desire have had less notice paid to them in literature, nor shall we find that the observations

[1] 'Rambler': "Espérez et prenez courage," Littré, 'Dict.'

[2] Cureau de la Chambre, 'Les Caractères des Passions,' ch. v.

directed to them have disclosed the laws of their tendencies, some of which are difficult to discover. The harassing effects of Anxiety are frequently mentioned; but its uses are generally ignored. Yet Anxiety has an important function in Desire; it not only hinders our forming extravagant hopes, but renders us cautious and watchful of what we are doing to attain our end. The Duke of Wellington remarked during the Peninsular War that he liked to have Scotsmen about his person because they were more anxious-tempered than Englishmen, and therefore habitually more cautious and watchful. "A mind in the grasp of terrible anxiety," says George Eliot, "is not credulous of easy solutions. The one stay that bears up our hopes is sure to appear frail, and if looked at long will seem to totter."[1] Anxiety, exhausting as it is to the nervous system if long-continued, has not the evil effect of despondency in depressing the activity of desire. On the contrary, it is a constant stimulus, sustaining attention and thought and the bodily processes subservient to desire. We may then attempt to formulate two laws of the tendencies of Anxiety on the process of Desire: (121) *Anxiety counteracts the extravagant anticipations of Hope;* (122) *Anxiety counteracts by watchfulness and forethought the careless attitude into which we are apt to fall through the influence of Hope.*

3. *The Tendencies of Confidence*

The tendencies of the three remaining emotions of desire are more difficult to interpret. The bad effects of Disappointment, Confidence, and Despair are more conspicuous than their advantages. In Confidence, it is observed, we lose that watchfulness and industry which, as long as hope and anxiety guided the process of desire, were so advantageous to the achievement of its end; and the ordinary progression of human affairs is thus summarised by Johnson: "Labour and care are rewarded with success, success produces confidence, confidence relaxes industry, and negligence ruins that reputation which accuracy had raised."[2] A Spanish author

[1] 'Felix Holt.'

[2] 'The Rambler,' May 29, 1750.

observes that "Confidence, the common vice of passionate natures, either looks on dangers as afar off, or does not recognise difficulties until surrounded by them."[1] And another writer remarks: "Too great confidence in success is the likeliest to prevent it, because it hinders us from making the best use of the advantages which we enjoy."[2] "Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions than ruined by too confident security," says Burke.[3] Yet it must be admitted that it is useless to waste thought and industry where these are no longer requisite, and that once the end of our desires is assured independently of our exertions it is reasonable to relax them. We desire to reach our journey's end at the time determined on. We hasten on our way; we hope to be in time; if our course is unfamiliar we anxiously scrutinise all turnings lest we take a wrong direction: but once we are in sight of our goal, and have time to spare, confidence replaces hope and anxiety; we relax our efforts; we allow our thoughts to wander as they are inclined, and we often forget, for a time, the end of our desire; because we think we can now safely leave its accomplishment to the automatic movements of the body.

This seems to be then the function of Confidence in Desire. It relaxes the higher processes of intellect and will, evoked by hope and anxiety, when they seem to be no longer needful. That it often makes mistakes, and is a very imperfect instrument is obvious, and too often endangers our enterprises by unfounded beliefs. But all emotions have their good and evil effects, and need a constant supervision and control which it is one of the great functions of the sentiments to provide. We may, then, provisionally formulate the law of the tendency of this emotion: (123) *Confidence tends to relax the higher intellectual and voluntary processes, and to leave the accomplishment of desire to external events or to processes that are automatic.*

But all such laws as we have instanced are empirical

[1] Harbottle, 'Dn. of Quotations,' Art. 'Confidence.'

[2] Atterbury, quoted by S. A. Allibone, 'Prose Quotations,' Art. 'Confidence.'

[3] Quoted by S. A. Allibone, *op. cit.* Art. 'Confidence.'

generalisations, and liable to exceptions. It is an essential part of our method to formulate them, because they are the hypotheses we need to direct our observation and research in collecting the facts that bear on them, and especially in discovering those contradictory cases from which alone we can elicit the limiting conditions of the empirical law and raise it to a higher level of exactitude and truth.

Now, with regard to the function of Confidence, we find a number of observations that seem to contradict those which we have already noticed. Confidence is held to be a very important quality of character, without which no great undertakings can be accomplished. "Confidence," says Milton, "imparts a wondrous inspiration to its possessor. It bears him on in security, either to meet no danger, or to find matter of glorious trial."[1] "Confidence in oneself," says Sir Philip Sidney,[2] "is the chief nurse of magnanimity." "A persuasion that we shall overcome any difficulty that we meet with in the sciences, seldom fails to carry us through them," observes Locke.[3] "Confidence," says Cicero, "is that feeling by which the mind sets out upon great and honourable courses with a sure hope and trust in itself."[4] "Confidence," La Rochefoucauld remarks, "supplies more to conversation than does intellect."[5] "So soon as you feel confidence in yourself, you know the art of life," observes Goethe.[6] "Reputation," says Alfred de Vigny,[7] "has only one good point, it allows a man to have confidence in himself, and to speak his thought." It is often remarked of armies, after a succession of victories, that the confidence they have acquired in themselves and their general renders them almost invincible.

Thus while the law derived from the first list of observations is that Confidence tends to relax industry and care, as well as the higher intellectual and voluntary processes in the service of Desire, these second observations seem to point to a contrary law, that Confidence imparts to these powers a

[1] Quoted by J. Wood, 'Dictionary of Quotations.'
[2] *Op. cit.* Art. 'Confidence.'
[3] 'The Conduct of the Understanding, § 39.
[4] Hoyt, 'Cyclopædia of Practical Quotations,' Art. 'Confidence.'
[5] 'Maximes,' 421. [6] Faust. [7] 'Journal d'un Poète.'

greater energy and efficiency than they had before. But we have first to notice that the observations in this second list refer to confidence in oneself, which, though it be derived from success in desire, has become a general fact not dependent on the situation of a particular desire; whereas that to which the first observations refer is dependent on the situation of a particular desire, the end of which appears certain of accomplishment, and is not specially a confidence in oneself. The one confidence does not essentially involve the other. If a man is confident in his powers, that does not make him always confident that his particular desire will be accomplished. The confidence in himself is no more than a power that he brings to the service of his desires in general. It counteracts the tendency to despondency and over-anxiety, that would impede the pursuit of their ends. It does not give him the special qualities which a particular desire may need. He may be confident in himself without being confident that some end, which requires for its successful pursuit peculiar qualities of talent or skill, as well as good fortune, will be accomplished. Thus the law that confidence in one's powers increases their energy and efficiency does not contradict the law that confidence in the accomplishment of a particular desire relaxes the powers that are instrumental to it.

Nor is it true in all cases that confidence in oneself is beneficial. There is an over-confidence, or one not founded in fact; and it is commonly held that ambitious men, who have been uniformly successful, sooner or later develop such over-confidence. In the famous soliloquy of Wolsey[1] on his fall, he recognises it in himself:—

> "I have ventur'd,
> Like little wanton boys that swim on bladders,
> This many summers in a sea of glory;
> But far beyond my depth: my high-blown pride
> At length broke under me. . . ."

For if a moderate self-confidence makes difficult ends appear less difficult, an excessive self-confidence makes them

[1] Shakespeare, 'Henry VIII.,' A. iii. Sc. ii.

appear too easy. At this stage self-confidence tends to develop the confidence that whatever end we desire is certain of accomplishment, and thereby relaxes care and industry.

We have, then, found that the empirical law, that self-confidence increases the power at our disposal for accomplishing the ends of desires to which this power is applicable, is not true in all cases. And we seem also to have discovered the condition which limits its range. The ends must still appear difficult. The apophthegms on the beneficial efforts of self-confidence have in view such ends. But ends appear to us difficult in proportion as they make us doubtful whether we can realise them; and when we desire them our doubts arouse anxiety, which, unchecked by hope, produce despondency and discouragement. Now it is here that such great value is attributed to self-confidence. For the belief in our powers makes us hopeful of accomplishing even difficult ends, and strengthens and renders more efficient our powers themselves; because it arouses and sustains this stimulating emotion of hope, and counteracts the depressing influence of despondency and discouragement. The empirical law is, then, more complicated than it seemed to be. It is not true that self-confidence alone increases the power at the service of desire. It only does so, so far as there is recognition of the difficulty of the end with consequent doubt and anxiety. But as confidence makes difficult ends appear less difficult, so it is always tending to displace this salutary doubt. Let it once succeed, and confidence that the end is certain displaces doubt, and carelessness succeeds vigilance.

We are now in a position to formulate the law of self-confidence in its relation to desire, so as to define the point at which it becomes excessive: (124) *Self-confidence, when restrained by the difficulty of the ends that we desire to realise, and balanced by doubt and anxiety, always tends to strengthen and to render more efficient our power to realise these ends.* But confidence that such ends are certain to be realised tends, on the contrary, always to relax our power. It is, then, only under the conditions we have named that self-confidence has the beneficial effects so commonly attributed to it. And we are reminded of the wise maxim of

Gratian to "attempt easy tasks as if they were difficult, and difficult, as if they were easy. In the one case that we may not fall asleep through confidence, in the other that we may not be dismayed."[1]

Thus confidence and self-confidence have useful functions to perform in desire, but they have to be held in check by the system as a whole and balanced by its opposing emotions.

4. *The Tendencies of Disappointment*

Disappointment, unlike Despondency, is combined with surprise, and implies that we have hitherto been hopeful of the issue, if not confident. We speak of the 'pangs of disappointment,' for it brings to our cognisance a sudden check or failure. In Despondency we have been slowly accumulating failure, or failing to make progress, and 'hope deferred maketh the heart sick'; for Despondency arrests the process of desire. But in Disappointment an unexpected event seems suddenly to arrest it; and Disappointment registers the fact.

What tendency has this emotion? It seems to correct the excesses of hope and confidence; which are moderated by an adequate experience of the course of desires, as of life in general, and of the many disappointments they sustain, both in respect of their means and ends. 'There is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip,'—this maxim disappointment teaches. We come therefore to expect failures and disappointments, and to feel them less keenly because we have expected them. And as the experience of former failures is stored for the use of future desires, so the memory of disappointments becomes the occasion of anxiety, before we have as yet met with any inauspicious circumstance, and therefore represses rash confidence. Both anxiety and a restrained hope in new desires are the indirect consequence of the checks and failures experienced in old ones. Unless we had these painful experiences, we should not remember them; we should not

[1] 'Maxims,' cciv. Mr. Jacobs translates the second sentence as follows: 'In the one case that confidence may not fall asleep, in the other that it may not be dismayed.' 'Art of Worldly Wisdom,' by Gratian, trans. by J. Jacobs.

learn to anticipate their recurrence, and to obviate it. The young are generally more rash in pursuit than the old. They are more disposed to hope and confidence. They expect to satisfy their desires, as they fervently anticipate happiness in life. The experiences of disappointment lead them to expect similar experiences in the future. Thus it seems probable that, as the prospective emotions of desire are dependent on thought, it is the thoughts resulting from the painful emotions of disappointment and despondency that are the conditions on which a rational anxiety and hope are dependent, and which exclude rash confidence. Our desires become more efficient through disappointments, because they acquire a better and more trained intelligence which dissects the grounds of hope and confidence. "Disappointment turns life from false dreams to stern realities: it prompts to an investigation of causes, and arouses cognition to a full understanding of the situation. Hope thereby, becomes more rational and realisable."[1]

Though Disappointment has this useful function in desire, its bad effects are more frequently recognised. Certainly, keen and repeated disappointments tend so much to discourage us that the heart becomes deadened to desire—as we see in some old persons; or the desires become confined to petty events that recur regularly with little or no co-operation on our part—as the desire for the change of the seasons, and the change at fixed times from one place to some other accustomed place, and the desire for meals, and for rest, and for the visits of old friends—which have not often the disasters attendant on great desires. The temper, too, is said often to become permanently 'soured' or 'embittered' by disappointments. For these tend to arouse anger, being due to a sudden arrest of desire, and all impulses, which are abruptly interfered with, tend to arouse anger. And if frequent disappointments exclude confidence from desire, they also tend to diminish hopes, which are proportionate to the degree in which we do not expect failure; so that if we become habituated to expect it, hope may be altogether excluded.

[1] Stanley, 'Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling,' ch. xi.

Thus the tendency of Disappointment, like that of Confidence, is complicated by a question of degree, and while up to a certain point it fulfils a useful function in Desire, above that point its influence is bad. Its law appears to be that: (125) *Disappointment, in its after-effect on Desire, always tends to counteract the excesses of hope, to evoke anxious questionings, to suppress all confidence that is not well-founded; so far as it is checked and balanced by hope itself.* Where it exceeds this point and excludes hope, it tends to produce an altogether bad effect—to enfeeble desire, to discourage us from all new undertakings, and permanently to suppress the emotion which of all others is the most important for the healthy and vigorous pursuits of life, substituting for life-giving Hope enervating Despondency. Thus Disappointment, in order that it may fulfil its proper functions, requires the supervision and control of the system in which it is organised.

While Disappointment frequently arises from an unforeseen and temporary check to desire, it is also often elicited when the end of desire has been successfully achieved. That which we eagerly desire while still in the future, when present disappoints us. Here, too, an essential condition of the emotion is the failure to foresee what afterwards occurs: the event falls below our expectation of it. Is this because we conceived it to be better than we afterwards judge it to be? But we do not always preconceive the end of desire as 'good,' or as having 'value': it is sufficient that we desire it. What we find more often is a certain thought of a result or end, as a condition of our desire, and that this end when attained does not conform to this thought, but has a particular character which we may not specify, but, if we try to describe it, may qualify as 'poor' or 'wretched' in comparison with the preconception of it, and feel that, if we had rightly conceived it, we should not have desired such an end at all, or desired it in diminished degree. For it is one of the most familiar observations that the things we desire, when attained, strike us as very inferior to that which we had anticipated. It is the sudden shock of surprise due to the conflict between the event as we interpret it in the present and what we had expected it to be, which causes this disappointment. "He," says La Bruyère, "who desires some-

thing with great eagerness puts into it too much of himself to be sufficiently recompensed by success." [1]

In these cases to which we have last referred, where disappointment arises, not through checks to the process of desire, but with the fulfilment of its end, it cannot be said to discharge any function in that desire itself, which has now come to an end. But it has still a useful after-effect which is at the service of future desires, teaching them to scrutinise their ends, to which at first, impulsively and through inexperience, they are apt to attach too great value or importance. And thus Desire, being, as we shall see hereafter, itself an abstraction, subserves, in respect of such disappointments, the sentiments of which it becomes a part. For the sentiments organise both desires and emotions in their systems.

[1] 'Les Caractères:' 'Du Cœur:' 'celui . . . qui désire une chose avec une grande impatience y met trop du sien pour en être assez récompensé par le succès.'

CHAPTER V

OF THE TENDENCIES OF THE SPECIAL EMOTIONS OF DESIRE (II)

1. *Despair*

WHILE we think of Despair as the most awful emotion to which the human mind is subject, and which we vainly hope to elude for ever, it is, except in extreme cases, where the desire is a matter of life or death, of honour or disgrace, not awful at all. Every desire, however insignificant, may be reduced to despair by the impossibility of fulfilling its end; and thus we may despair of catching a train, or of meeting a friend. But such desires receive little notice: it is the most important only to which familiar observations refer.

If this emotion has any good effects, these are not allowed, according to general opinion, to balance the bad. Hence among the innumerable thoughts about despair scattered through literature, a large number consist of exhortations never to yield to its power.

> "Beware of desperate steps. The darkest day,
> Live till to-morrow, will have passed away."

To the Christian, Despair is both a folly and a crime,[1] because it shuts out the hope that should lift him above it,

[1] 'He that despairs measures Providence by his own little contracted model' (South, 'Sermons').

'As the hope of salvation is a good disposition towards it, so is despair a certain consignment to eternal ruin' (Jeremy Taylor).

'He that despairs, degrades the Deity, and seems to intimate that He is insufficient or not true to His word . . .' (Feltham, see 'Prose Quotations,' by S. A. Allibone).

and the faith that should save him from falling into it. Yet it is admitted by a consensus of observers that Despair elicits courage, and even with such unequalled power as to transform the coward into a brave man. Thus Montesquieu observes that "Nature, who has established among men the different degrees of strength and weakness, has still through despair often made weakness the equal of strength."[1]

> "Despair takes heart when there's no hope to speed;
> The coward then takes arms and does the deed,"[2]

says Herrick. There is a French proverb that: "Le désespoir redouble les forces"; and there are English proverbs, that despair "gives courage to a coward"; that "a coward's fear may make a coward valiant"; that "Necessity and opportunity may make a coward valiant."[3] Despair has also been called "the virtue of a coward." But there is sometimes shown a disposition to deny it the name of courage. Thus Voltaire remarks that it takes the place of . . . . courage,"[4] and Sir P. Sidney that "whatever comes out of despair cannot bear the title of valour."[5] But whether it be higher or lower, there is no question that it produces the kind of resolution[6] and conduct to which the name of courage would not in general be refused. We may then provisionally express the law that (126) *Despair tends to elicit courage*,—and with a strength probably unequalled by that of any other emotion.

Like other literary observations, these do not sufficiently define the kind of courage which despair produces, nor do they consider the varieties of desire, and whether the tendencies of despair are the same in all. We shall, then, study its influence in different desires, confining ourselves at first to those which are most important and belong to sentiments. In the

[1] 'La nature, qui a établi les différents degrés de force et de faiblesse parmi les hommes, a encore souvent égalé la faiblesse et la force par le désespoir' ('Lettres Persanes,' xcv.).

[2] 'Aph,' 229.

[3] 'English Proverbs.'

[4] 'Orphel.,' iii, 4.

[5] J. Wood, *op. cit.*

[6] 'What reinforcement we may gain from hope; if not, what resolution from despair' (Milton, 'Par. Lost,' B. i.). "Resolution extrême inspirée par un grand péril." Littré, Dict. Art. 'Désespoir.'

self-regarding sentiment desires are different according to the end pursued; and here there are some which though reduced to despair we should not suppose to be capable of evoking courage.

Now in this connexion there is one rule which has been implied throughout this work:—when we have a system governed by a certain end, we must assume that the different parts of this system support this end according to the degree in which the system is efficiently organised.

Further we must assume that every system tends to render itself efficient for the attainment of its end; and, however inefficient it may actually be, because it is trying to attain its end, it is also trying to find and organise the means to this end. We have already in the first book attempted to formulate this law in its application to the sentiments; we have here to apply it to desire: (127) *Every desire tends to select, to regulate, and to set in operation the means to its end, and to learn, through trial and failure and imitation, how to render its system more efficient.*

Here, then, we shall start from the conception—which we have already reached—of desire as a system having a variety of constituents, and among these constituents certain peculiar emotions which tend to be subordinated to its end. Let us first suppose that a certain desire springs from the impulse of fear, and is directed to ensure the escape of the organism from danger. A situation arises which is interpreted by the desire to mean that it is impossible to fulfil this end, and that death is inevitable. A man may be in prison, condemned without hope of reprieve; he may be in a ship foundering at sea; he may be surrounded by enemies who seek his life. The situation is then one that arouses despair, and this despair belongs to the man's desire of saving his life. If he had not this desire, he would not feel this despair.

Now the law from which we have started is that despair evokes courage, and this law, like all popular generalisations, is expressed unconditionally, and the terms are not defined. We shall interpret it to mean that despair has an impulse which tends to override fear where it is present, and, where it is not, is still prepared to risk the life of the organism

for the end in view. How can such a law hold of the case we have assumed, where the end is determined by fear, where the desire is to save life, and where despair is one of the subordinate emotions of this system? If the end is to save life, how can one of the subordinate emotions be ready not only to risk life, but sometimes to subject it to the greatest risks?

There are certain observations on despair that indicate the limitations and special significance of the law in such a typical case as we have supposed. From these we may take the following:

> "So cowards fight, when they can fly no further:
> So doves do peck the falcon's piercing talons,
> So desperate thieves, all hopeless of their lives,
> Breathe out invectives 'gainst the officers."[1]

> "When fears admit no hope of safety, then
> Necessity makes dastards valiant men."[2]

"Souvent les désespoirs (des vaincus) aux vainqueurs sont funestes."[3]

> "Le désespoir sied bien à des hommes perdus:
> C'est le secours qui reste à ceux qui n'errent plus."[4]

Now the meaning of all three passages is that when a man is in a desperate situation he will have recourse to desperate remedies, such as at other times he would fear to employ; and that even when his principal motive is fear, and his character cowardly, he will dare to do such things. And hence it is that, having in view such cases, the doubt will arise whether the force which despair evokes is 'courage,' seeing that it may be inspired by cowardice itself; but, at least, it does evoke a force that "takes the place" of courage.

The law has, then, a certain application to this case which seems to be an exception to it. To save life being the end, and the situation desperate, it is reasonable that the desire

[1] Shakespeare, 'Henry VI.' Part iii. A. i. Sc. iv.
[2] Herrick, 'Aph.' 320.
[3] Mair, 'Mort d'Astrub,' ii. 3.
[4] Brebeuf. 'Un homme qui craint tout, est capable de tout. Le désespoir qu'engendre l'extrémité de la peur, nous porte à tenter jusqu'à l'impossible.' 'La Mothe le Vayer,' Opuscules, p. 56.

which is involved in fear itself should adopt means that are dangerous and uncertain, and that apart from a desperate situation would inspire fear. When a greater fear is in conflict with a less, the less is excluded; and thus an appearance of courage is produced. The law of despair in such cases is an application of the law that desire tends to do what is necessary for the attainment of its end. Desire tends to evoke the courage or force which is necessary to perform such actions; and obtains this force through despair, and therefore tends to elicit it.

The contradiction which is felt between this case and the law is due to our conceiving the force which despair evokes as essentially of the nature of courage. For if a man fears death and cannot control his fear, and is so possessed by the desire of life that in a general catastrophe he is incapable of thinking of any one's safety except his own, even of those dearest to him, we should not call his action courageous, though he were to fight with many men, and with those stronger than himself, and attempt things almost impossible. We shall then formulate the law of despair as follows: (128) *Despair tends to evoke an energy in desire and a resolution capable of attempting the most dangerous and uncertain actions.* But where the desire to which despair belongs is itself the servant of fear, it does not attempt to subdue that fear; for this would be contrary to the fundamental law of an emotional system.

Let us take next a law that is referred to in many observations and which is implied in the meaning of the term 'despair': (129) *Despair excludes all hope from desire, and only arises after all hope is excluded.* This law seems to be also contradicted by certain facts. For if the end is unattainable, and the situation affords no hope of improvement, how is it that we do anything at all? But if we adopt even 'desperate remedies,' does not this imply that there is still some hope left? The situation which causes despair affords at first no hope, but either it may change or our conception of it may; and in the desperate struggles which despair undertakes there often arises a 'forlorn hope' not present at the commencement of them. Still the energy of despair seems to be independent of hope, and maintains and increases the activity of desire so

that something must be attempted—as with those who, having, no hope of saving themselves, resolve 'to sell their lives dearly.'

Having considered what is commonly the strongest desire of self-love, that for self-preservation, let us take next one of the strongest desires of true love, that for union with the beloved object. When this desire is brought to despair, we see not only the same recourse to desperate remedies, with the same strength and resolution to accomplish them, but a new tendency is revealed in many cases: namely to self-destruction or suicide. And this tendency to suicide seems to those who observe its action strange and unreasonable: for if the end of one desire is impossible of attainment, that does not show that the end of all other desires is also impossible, or that the hope which is extinguished in one may not be recovered in another. Yet if this one is the principal desire of a masterful sentiment, like love, it has, in its despair, the power of casting contempt on the desires of all other sentiments, and of making their ends appear worthless, as we saw in the chapter on Sorrow. Hence it is that Charron compared despair to the foolish and unrestrained impulses of children. "Despair," he said, "is like froward children who when you take away one of their playthings, throw the rest into the fire for madness. It grows angry with itself, turns its own executioner, and revenges its misfortunes on its own head. It refuses to live under crosses, and chooses rather not to be at all, than to be without the thing which it hath once imagined necessary to its happiness."[1] Yet this choice seems to be a kind of courage; since it is courage when a person is prepared to sacrifice his own life in order to be united to one he loves; though we often say it is not 'true' courage, because he has not the courage to hope on in other directions when the one hope to which he had bound himself is taken from him.

Despair then has a tendency to make a man destroy himself under certain conditions; and not merely when he has lost what he loves, but also in self-love when he is suffering from certain diseases, or from prolonged bodily pain, and has no

[1] 'De la Sagesse,' L. iii. ch. xxv.

hope left of recovery or alleviation; and also when he is dishonoured or disgraced, and has no hope of recovering his reputation.

How are we to interpret this suicidal tendency of despair, and what useful function in desire can we possibly attribute to it? If we take the despair of love we might suppose that it seeks to recover through death a union which in life is for ever frustrated. And this explains some cases; but there are others where there is no reciprocity of love, or the love once given has been withdrawn, which it does not explain. And the suicidal tendency arises not only in love, but, as we have seen, in self-love when we despair through suffering; and under this head we may bring the suffering of disgrace and dishonour, and sometimes also of bereavement.

With all suffering there is essentially connected an impulse to escape from it, when that suffering is, or becomes, an object of attention or thought. When we first feel a painful emotion, we are part of it; we are absorbed in its object, but do not make itself an object of thought. But sooner or later, if it persists, we come to reflect on it. And through our reflection, we then feel this natural impulse to escape from the suffering it inflicts. And thus either immediately or through reflection, we feel the desire to escape from suffering; which desire being brought to despair, may manifest the suicidal tendency. This particular tendency of despair furthers this desire, and also, like other despair, tends to evoke in it the strength, courage and resolution necessary for its accomplishment. For there seems no other way open to it of fulfilling its end, which is to escape from suffering, except through death. We desire to escape from our suffering in this our present life, and come to despair of it. We modify our desire, and surrender the present life, and make the last venture without knowing whether this will banish or even lessen our suffering; and such a desperate and uncertain remedy is ever the outcome of despair.

Thus the suicidal tendency is not an essential character of despair; but belongs to it only in those desires which, being overtaken by disasters, cannot otherwise attain their ends.

Now there are certain facts which seem to contradict the

law which we have provisionally adopted, that despair evokes courage, or at least an extraordinary energy and resolution, in the desire to which it belongs. And we shall be able to recognise these facts if we set aside for the time those great desires which have furnished us with so many maxims and proverbs about the courage of despair. In our lesser desires despair does not evoke increased efforts in pursuit of their ends. On the contrary, we cease to make any efforts at all.

We are all of us liable to entertain wishes for the impossible. We wish to be young when we are old ; to have beauty or talents in which we are lacking ; if childless, to have children ; if ill-mated, to find the true complement of ourselves ; and, at the end of life, to have life over again with our acquired wisdom and experience. But here we do not seek for heroical remedies. We turn our thoughts away, and surrender these desires, rather than waste our energies to no purpose. In every such desire, there would seem, then, to be a provision, when its end is unattainable, for eliciting an emotion directed to the destruction of that desire. We find this implied in such notice as has been taken of these cases,—nearly all observations on despair being concerned with its tremendous effects in relation to the love of life and to the objects we love most in life. Thus Hume remarks that "Nothing is more certain than that despair has almost the same effects upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes."[1] And this we can all verify in our own experience, though we have little experience of great despairs. The common phrase 'to give a thing up in despair' is evidence of it ; and Cobbett in directing young men how to become good scholars, observes, that they do not lack "desire" or the "disposition to learn," but perseverance, and so "out of every ten who undertake this task, there are, perhaps, nine who abandon it in despair."[2]

There appears, then, to be a complete contradiction between what we infer, from our study of great desires, to be the law of the influence of despair upon them and what we infer it to

[1] 'Treatise of Human Nature,' Introduction.

[2] 'Advice to a Young Man,' Letter i.

be from our study of our far more numerous and less important desires. Can it be that the same emotion has such opposite effects, and that these effects are due to no other cause than the greater or less strength or importance of the desire concerned? For, in the one, despair evokes an extraordinary energy and resolution; in the other, it seems to withdraw from desire what energy it has; in the one, despair engrosses thought with the end; in the other, it withdraws thought from it, so that it becomes neglected and forgotten. In the first, despair appears to have a useful function in desire; in the second, to have no function at all, but to be an enemy of the very desire to which it belongs.

But we find that our weak desires are not only destroyed when their ends are recognised to be impossible of attainment, but often also by the same forgetfulness and neglect when their means are found to require arduous and prolonged exertion. Repugnance to such exertions—our natural indolence—overbalances our desire for the end. Many of our affections are so weak that they only remain constant so long as their course is smooth, but cannot stand the shock of adversity. They are brought to an end, not by one of their own emotions, but by some hostile system: repugnance to exertion, or fear of opposition or danger.

Thus a weak desire is easily repressed by hostile influences, while a strong desire is not, but often triumphs over them. Is this a sufficient explanation of the contrary effects of despair in different cases?

Both despair and despondency we found to be secondary forms of sorrow; and sorrow is sometimes violent, sometimes depressed. But no one would suppose that despondency is ever a strong emotion; it has always a tendency to weaken and discourage us. Yet despondency and despair shade into one another. If the one is weak, how is it that the other may be sometimes strong? When weak characters are discouraged by the difficulty of their undertakings, and 'abandon them in despair,' despair works on them like despondency. They lose hope, and with it courage. They despond, and at length give way to despair. No increase of strength and courage comes to them with this emotion. The influence of despair is, here,

the same in kind, only greater in degree, than that of despondency. Let us then assume that there is one universal law of despair. (130) *Despair tends to weaken and discourage desire.* How can we reconcile this with the preceding law, that Despair tends to strengthen and encourage desire? That law was based on the observation of strong desires, this on the study of weak desires. Hence Locke's observation: Despair "works differently in men's minds; sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest or indolency."[1]

As there are some men who will not surrender, but will rather die fighting, so there are some desires that will not yield to the force of circumstances. For them no abandonment is possible. It is this thing or nothing. Here is that for which alone they "care to live or dare to die." There are some desires of such consequence that our whole nature supports them: all other desires come to their assistance. If a man's life is in danger, the desire he has of saving it is generally supported by all his other desires. The whole strength of the man is concentrated here; and this desire becomes stronger than anything he has ever felt before. In the same way, the principal desire of every sentiment is supported by the cumulative strength of its system.

Yet these strong desires may be brought to despair, and the inherent tendency of despair will be the same in them as in weak desires,—to weaken and discourage them. For if the end is unattainable, why strive any longer? The difference in the ulterior effect in the two cases is due to the difference in the reaction of desire on its depressing emotion. In the one case, it yields; in the other, resists. In the one case, the depressing influence of the emotion infects the desire; in the other, the strength of desire triumphs over the depressing emotion. Desire in this case, and in a certain sense, is strengthened by despair; because the weakening influence of this emotion is an essential condition of the triumph of desire over its influence. In the one case, we are made weaker by defeat than we were before; in the other, we gain a strength by victory that we could obtain in no other way.

It should, then, be clear why the ulterior effect of despair on

[1] 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' B. ii. ch. xx.

weak desires is to weaken them further, while its ulterior effect on strong desires is to render them stronger; although the inherent tendency of despair is the same in both cases. It is the same law that meets us in the familiar maxims on the influence of adversity. This law too was expressed by the ancients unconditionally, just as the maxims on the stimulating influence of despair are expressed unconditionally. Adversity, it was said, strengthens us. But if adversity strengthens strong characters, it increases the weakness of those that cannot resist its influence. But the effect of the adversity that causes despair is peculiar. For some characters may be generally weak who yet, when a strong desire is excited in them, may still be strengthened by despair. Weak though they be, adversity then strengthens them. The observations about cowardly natures that cannot control their fears afford cases in point: "When fears admit no hope of safety, then Necessity makes dastards valiant men." For such fear gives rise to strong and invincible desires; and these desires, being brought to despair, may not yield to its influence, but triumphing over it, exhibit energy, strong resolution and an appearance of courage. So also the despair of sexual love may elicit all the latent energy, resolution and courage of a man;—and despair at suffering from prolonged physical pain, or under ignominy which one can never hope to remove,—may make those who are generally weak sometimes strong.

But while strong desires are more likely than weak ones to resist the depressing influence of despair, we cannot say that in all cases they will prevail, because we know not the measure nor the quality of the strength required. Hence it is that we find among familiar descriptions of such cases some of a contradictory nature, which exhibit a man as overcome by his desperate situation. Thus we find this description in Dryden:

> "Drown'd in deep despair,
> He dares not offer one repentant prayer.
> Amazed he lies, and sadly looks for death."[1]

[1] S. A. Allibone, 'Poetical Quotations,' 'Despair.'

Thus both the laws that we have successively adopted are contradicted by certain facts. The law which supplies the limiting condition on which both are dependent appears to be as follows: (131) *Despair tends to weaken the desire which submits to its influence, and to strengthen the desire which triumphs over it.*

There are certain facts which seem also to conflict with this new form of the law. The maxims that invoke us never to yield to despair refer to just those cases in which, according to our theory, desire triumphs over it. It is here that the familiar tragedies of despair abound. For if a man commits suicide, or attempts remedies so desperate that his own life or another's is sure to be the forfeit, he does 'abandon himself to despair,' however courageous and resolute his action may be. What these maxims imply is that a man must never cease to hope, so that he may never be brought to despair. But there are situations that do not leave any room for hope, unless we first abandon the desire to which they appeal. The dead cannot be brought to life; fatal diseases cannot be cured; death cannot be escaped.

Further, what they imply who say we must never abandon ourselves to despair, is that we must never love or desire anything so much that life is impossible without it: and that even in the greatest extremities we must have some resource. Religion is offered us as a consolation for the injustice, the cruelty and the irremediable evils of life. Yet in this sentiment too, as in every other, we may be brought to despair. Losing belief in its object, we are deprived of its consolation. Here we confine ourselves to desire; and in every desire we may be brought to despair. That the most prudent man is he who has other desires to which he can have recourse, and who can free himself from the most tyrannous, does not prevent us from recognising that lesser self-control which a desire exhibits when it masters the depressing influence of one of its emotions.

How far Despair is of service to desire, like its other emotions, we have finally to consider. It seems an excellent arrangement that, when the end is of the first importance, desire should manifest such tenacity in pursuit of it, and elicit

through despair all its latent energy, courage and resolution. For this last struggle may show, no matter what the situation, that some faint possibility with its 'forlorn hope' still remains. And how many great triumphs have been won through such a courage as this! It seems also an excellent arrangement when the end is not of great importance, or the desire for it is weak, that, under the stress of despair, the desire should be abandoned, and man no longer waste his labours in unprofitable fields. How foolish appears to us the conduct of those who will not be taught by events, and all their lives pursue "will o' the wisps." Renan says of the Celtic peoples that they have made little progress in the world, because they are unpractical and pursue impossible ideals.[1]

There is a third arrangement,—combining in some degree the advantages of the other two, and applicable in certain cases,—to which we have scarcely referred. While a desire may be abandoned, a new desire may be formed in its place, which preserves so much of the former end as has not been found unattainable. Man desires to live, and when he comes near his end, his desire to live may become stronger. Forced at length to abandon this desire, he preserves so much of its end as has not been proved unattainable, and now desires to live in a new and strange world. Or he despairs of happiness in this life, and desires another for the sake of it; or he desires union with those he loves, which being denied him here, he there hopes to consummate it.

Thus man, in the extremity of his despair, either puts forth a strength and courage such as he had never shown before, winning a forlorn hope through it, or looks with an assured hope to death to release him from his sufferings; or he prudently abandons his present desire and finds new hope in another; or, finally, sacrificing part, preserves all that he can of his former end, renewing his hope with the sacrifice. And thus in one way or another, through the action of despair, he comes to win back hope. Hence the remark of Racine: "mon unique espérance est dans mon désespoir."[2]

[1] E. Renan, 'Les Races Celtiques.'

[2] Quoted in 'Dict. de l' Académie Française,' Art. 'Désespoir.'

If Despair cannot in most cases be held to subserve the end of the desire to which it belongs,—since, if this end is really unattainable, nothing can advance it; yet despair may subserve the sentiment of which that desire is a part. For man in his self-love finds it to his advantage to abandon some desires, to cling to others tenaciously, and, in respect of the rest, to abandon part to save the remainder.

The evil effects of this emotion have chiefly engaged attention. Its courage is rash and precipitate. It excludes hope, even before all possibilities have been exhausted; which is contrary to the spirit of religion. But these defects indicate that lack of self-control which is characteristic of all emotions, and there is nothing in them which shows that, under the restraints of desire and still more of the sentiments, despair may not fulfill those uses which we have indicated.

We have found Despair a peculiarly difficult emotion to interpret, on account of the complicated and conflicting nature of the facts; nor can we hope that we have been able to do more than carry the theory of its tendency a stage nearer to the standard of a scientific law. Only gradually, and by the accumulation of fresh facts, can all the conditions be brought to light, and successively interpreted. To deal with all of them together, even were they known, might be a problem too complicated for the human mind. Here our method must be that of a slow advance from the abstract to the concrete, dealing first with those problems which are simplest, and abstracting from many of the operative conditions, until at length we are able to interpret those dynamical relations which are the most complex. And this seems to be the method which the human mind naturally adopts. For the generalisations of the great observers of character are enunciated absolutely, and without the disclosure of those conditions which limit the range of their truth. And at this stage the knowledge of character has remained for centuries; nor does it seem possible to make any advance upon it except by a patient investigation of the conditions that have been overlooked.

CHAPTER VI

OF SOME OF THE LAWS OF INTERACTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS

We have divided the tendencies of the special emotions of Desire into two classes: (1) those which bear directly on desire; (2) and those which bear on the interaction of the emotions themselves. In the two preceding chapters we have, as far as possible, confined ourselves to the first class; we shall here study the second. Though some of these laws are sufficiently obvious, they appear to have received little notice in literature.

The first law we may call The Law of the Correlation of Hope and Anxiety. It does not mean that when we feel hope we at the same time feel anxiety; but that we are disposed to feel it, and that this disposition is stimulated, and in a state of readiness to manifest the emotion. What usually happens is that we alternate between the two emotions. We may therefore tentatively enunciate this law as follows: (132) *When Hope is present, the disposition to Anxiety is excited; and when Anxiety is present, the disposition to Hope is also excited.* The second law of the interaction of these emotions is this: (133) *Hope tends always to destroy Anxiety, and Anxiety to destroy Hope; but neither is able to succeed so long as each remains itself.* Thus we find that as we indulge in hope, or maintain it by voluntary effort, we remove anxiety farther from us; and that as we are possessed by anxiety, hope recedes. The third law is that, (134) *If Hope succeeds in destroying Anxiety, it destroys itself, and the new emotion of Confidence takes the place of both.*

The fourth law is that (135) *If Anxiety succeeds in destroying Hope it also destroys itself, and the new emotion of Despair takes the place of both.*

It is more difficult to define the law of Despondency. The difference between the thoughts of despondency and of despair we have already had occasion to notice. In Despair the belief is present that no hope is possible; in Despondency we have not reached a conclusion so definite. Our hope is weakened; its disposition is rendered less active, but still remains active in some degree. We may therefore tentatively define this law as follows:—(136) *Despondency tends to destroy Hope, but never, while remaining itself, succeeds so far as to produce the belief that no hope is possible.* There must then be a secondary and consequential law: (137) *If Despondency destroys Hope it also destroys itself, and the emotion of Despair replaces both.*

While Despondency seems always to imply some activity of Hope, Hope does not always imply Despondency. We may be hopeful, or we may even be anxious, without feeling the least despondent. For despondency is an emotion of failure, and we may not yet have failed.

Finally, there is the tendency of Despair to lead to a renewal of hope in the same or some other desire, to which we referred in the last chapter. But this is 'tendency' in a loose sense of the word. For it amounts to no more than a probability that despair, in working itself out, may strike upon some line of action that will revive hope. It has no inherent tendency to produce this effect. Whereas there seems to be an inherent tendency in hope to exclude anxiety, and in anxiety to exclude hope, and for either, so far as it is successful, to exclude itself, and evoke either confidence or despair; and this is not merely a matter of probability.

The fluid relation which subsists between several of the emotions of desire, does not appear to include Disappointment. That emotion is always caused by some sudden and more or less unexpected event. There is no process by which any one of the preceding emotions evokes it; it always occurs by way of accident. But after the shock of

disappointment has passed things begin to go on again; the process renews itself, though without the same disposition to hope and confidence. There is no one of the previous emotions that must replace Disappointment, though despondency often succeeds to it. There is only the law, to which we have previously referred, that Disappointment tends to weaken the dispositions to hope and confidence, and that, like other emotions, it tends to be felt with greater intensity in proportion as it contrasts with the preceding emotion, and is sudden and unexpected: (138) *Disappointment is not, other things equal, felt so intensely after despondency as after hope, or after hope as after confidence.*

Passing from Disappointment to Confidence and Despair, we may suppose that there is a law that Despair tends to exclude Hope and Anxiety. Satan, in "Paradise Lost," thus expresses his despair:

> "So farewell hope, and with hope farewell fear,
> Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost:
> Evil, be thou my good . . ."[1]

And again, and implying the law of the mutual implication of hope and anxiety, he says: "Where no hope is left, is left no fear." But while despair arises when hope and anxiety have been excluded, is there a reciprocal tendency for despair to exclude the renewal of hope? The belief of despair that there is no room for hope, may be destroyed by some change in the situation, and, as we have seen, in the desperate struggles to which it may impel us, some faint hope may be renewed. But despair, because it is despair, tends to exclude hope, and is essentially antagonistic to that emotion; and its belief, like other beliefs, may become so fixed that it is little responsive to change of circumstance. It is also a law that (139) *Confidence, which arises when doubt and anxiety are excluded, in its turn, when established, tends to exclude a doubtful attitude.* And this we clearly see where confidence is strong, as in those of a confident temper. They will not admit of doubt; they are sure of the event; and it takes a long course of adversity and failure before the extravagance of their temper is corrected.

[1] 'Par. Lost,' B. iv. l. 108.

If the peculiar emotions of Desire have certain intimate relations among themselves, so that the change which one undergoes imports change in another, we must not forget that it is the function of these secondary emotions to represent and forecast changes of circumstances, through the thoughts which, in distinction from the primary emotions, belong essentially to them. Nor do they respond only to those changes that favour or impede the fulfilment of the desired end; they are responsive to another set of changes within the body, which make them too often untrustworthy indicators of the course of future events. There is a 'hopeful temper,' a 'despondent temper,' an 'anxious temper,' a 'confident temper'; and we seem to be peculiarly disposed by inherited endowment, by the state of health, by the course of experience to one or other of them. Thus the prospective emotions, whatever their uses, have to be held under constant control; and this control it is in the capacity and interest of Desire to exercise, seeing that it is both a more comprehensive system than that of any one of these emotions, and also has to employ them in the pursuit of its ends. Yet while we try to restrain these emotions from exaggeration, so that they may represent adequately the changing course of events, yet we make one exception. We believe that Hope is of such unique importance that, whatever our circumstances, we must sustain it, in one form or another, with all the courage we possess.

CHAPTER VII

OF THE LIMITATIONS OF DESIRE AND THE ANTAGONISM OF DESIRE AND JOY

BESIDES the emotions peculiar to the system of desire there are other emotions common to it with other systems. For while belonging to these systems, they may also be organised in it, and wherever they are serviceable to its end, desire will have a tendency to arouse them. Of these common emotions the most conspicuous is anger.

It is a general law that all impulses when obstructed tend to arouse anger; and desire is one kind of impulse. Interference with the course of desire is one of the most frequent causes of anger. And this anger is then not only dependent on desire, but belongs to its system, and in a general way subserves its end: for anger tends to overcome obstacles to this end. Fear may also belong to desire. Every great desire arouses fear when its end is in danger. We fear lest we shall fail in attaining it. Very different from this fear is that which the process of desire often arouses, when the means are dangerous. Such fear urges us to abandon the desire; is antagonistic to it, and therefore does not belong to its system.

The system of desire, though it is capable of organising many of the common and primary emotions, cannot contain all. It has its limitations; and of those emotions which it cannot contain, the most significant is Joy. There is generally felt to be some antagonism between Desire and Joy. Not only does the restless state of desire exclude joy, but joy, the contemplative emotion, excludes desire. Let us at once

express this antagonism as an empirical law: (140) *Desire and Joy tend mutually to exclude one another from their respective systems.* There are two other and subordinate laws: (141) *When Desire is active, the intrusion of Joy suspends or deranges its activity;* (142) *When Joy is present, the intrusion of Desire tends to extinguish it.*

The second of these subordinate laws has already been considered[1]; we shall here consider some generalised observations in literature which imply the first. There is an Armenian fable[2] of "a hungry hen" who, dreaming of grain, began to scratch with her claws, and fell from her perch. A fable of La Fontaine's, called "La Latière et le Pot-au-Lait,"[3] teaches the same lesson: A milk-maid, carrying her can balanced on her head, eagerly directs her steps to the town where she is to sell her milk; and to be quicker and more agile, she puts on a short and light skirt. But as she goes, feeling no anxiety and anticipating the fulfilment of her desire, she begins to dream of what she will buy with the proceeds of the sale: first eggs, from which there will come poultry; then a pig; and from the sale of the pig, a cow. Absorbed in these contemplations, she no longer watches her steps; she stumbles, and the milk is spilt.

Both fables exemplify the effect of day-dreaming, or of the joy in imagining that our desire is fulfilled, on the process of desire itself. This enjoyment is shown to suspend or to derange its process, so that we fail in attaining our end. And if Joy may have this effect even when the process of desire is almost mechanical, how much more certainly will it do so when the means require constant attention and thought.

Hence, we find many observations in literature on the weakening effect of day-dreaming on the character. For in Desire we are striving after a result in the future; in Joy we are contemplating a result in the present, even though it be in the imagination. All progress, therefore, arises from desire, and the strength and industry that make progress possible: 'Châteaux en Espagne,' and the indolence of the Spanish character go naturally together. Tourgueneff makes one of his characters express a similar reflection on the Russian

[1] B. ii. ch. vii. p. 2 5. [2] 'Armenian Fables.' [3] 'Fables.'

character: "Our cursed Slavonic slackness gets the better of us. While we dream of work, we soar in eagle flights; we fancy we are going to shake the earth from its place—but when it comes to doing anything we are weak and weary directly."[1] Another writer observes: "Les Esprits accoutumés à se plaire dans leur chez soi, meublé à leur fantaisie, ne s'aventurent qu'avec crainte dans la réalité extérieure, dans l'action. Le rêve, quand il n'est pas dirigé par une grande force intellectuelle finit par produire à la longue l'effet de ces drogues orientales, haschisch, bétel, opium, dont l'usage rend paresseux le plus actif et poltron le plus brave."[2]

Thus the joy of anticipation is antagonistic to Desire, deranges its higher processes even more than the lower, and enfeebles the great qualities of industry, patience, courage and perseverance, which are so often required for the attainment of its ends.

In attempting to investigate the range of this empirical law, we may profitably distinguish between three kinds of joy, all of which may be closely connected with desire. These are (1) the joy of attainment, (2) the joy of anticipation, and (3) the joy of retrospect. The first comes with the fruition of desire where there is no disappointment. When desire has attained its end, its striving ceases in attainment; its system comes to an end,[3] and joy succeeds. But as long as desire has not attained its end, it cannot feel this joy, and tends to exclude every other, because it is still pressing towards its goal. The joy of attainment is a very evanescent emotion, and soon gives place to new desires. It is a pause at a resting place interposed by nature between their restless states.

The second joy comes to us before we have attained the desired end, and in imaginative natures is often a substitute for it. It is often remarked that this joy of anticipation is greater than the joy of reality; for making things better than they are leads to disappointment. This joy of anticipation—we have seen—is no more part of desire than is the joy of

[1] Œuvres, 'Acia.'

[2] Catulle Mendes, 'La Demoiselle en Or,' ch. iv.

[3] Compare G. F. Stout, 'Manual of Psychology,' B. i. ch. i. § 5.

attainment. This, too, is an interruption; a pause at a resting place that we so often make when we should be active and watchful. And as long as we eagerly press forward to our goal, and are anxious to reach it, we cannot pause to enjoy such idle imaginations. Our restless state forbids it; and hope and confidence are the utmost we can feel. But with confidence there goes diminished energy; and then desire is apt to give place to the joy of anticipation, and, as the fables indicate, it is not always able to reassert itself before being overtaken by disaster.

The third kind of joy, which is retrospective, may be aroused by the recollection of past scenes of our life, or may intervene in the process of a present desire. We feel it when we have made some conspicuous advance. Our desire is interrupted; we stop to look around, and rejoice at the progress we have made. We take good heart from it, and with renewed vigour start afresh.

Thus in all three cases, where joy is preceded and conditioned by desire, it is a break and resting-place, which interrupts the course of single desires, or is interposed between several.

Those pauses of joy which follow the attainment of ends occur in social and national, as well as in individual life; and when unduly prolonged, stamp epochs with sterility. The systematic tendency of joy to maintain things as they are, excludes desire for change or progress. Such an epoch in the opinion of some was that between 1800 and 1830 in England, when "Political and legislative changes were first checked by that pride in the English constitution, and intense satisfaction with things as they were, which was inherited from a preceding generation, and is best represented by the studied optimism of Blackstone." [1]

2. *Of the Joys of Activity and their Relation to Desire*

There are certain facts which seem to contradict, to restrict, or at least to complicate the law of the antagonism of Desire and Joy. The three joys of Attainment, of Anticipation and

[1] A. V. Dicey, 'Law and Public Opinion in England,' lect. iv.

of Retrospect may be alike regarded as joys of Rest, by comparison with the preceding state of desire which conditions them. There are also joys of Activity. There may be supposed to be a physiological law that underlies both kinds of joy[1]: that state of relative activity or repose being, in some cases, a joy to us so far as it is conformable to the surplus energy of the nervous system, and especially of that part of it which is connected with the activity in question. Hence where there is this correspondence, our most active states may yield us enjoyment, as where there is not, the most complete state of repose may be repugnant to us.

What essential incompatibility, then, is there between desire and the joys of activity? We desire to take a walk, and the muscular exercise being adapted to our present state, affords us enjoyment. We desire to pursue knowledge, and possessing surplus energy which seeks an outlet in nervous rather than in muscular processes, we enjoy the mental exercise. These joys are, none the less, joys of attainment. The impulse for activity is satisfied by the kind of activity we have found for it. Besides this impulse, there is in addition a conscious desire which is directed not to this activity as its end, but to some ulterior result to which this activity is instrumental. We do not care to walk for the sake of walking: and if there is no place to which we must go, we still choose one that will furnish an 'object' for our walk. Nor do we care to exert our minds without having some aim in view; or, rather, we do not call it exercise unless we have one; since the mind, when awake, is always in some degree active. We must read a book, or, as in day-dreaming, imagine that our desires are fulfilled, or attempt to solve some of the intellectual difficulties that oppress us. And this tendency of the mind to direct itself to some end beyond its own activity, is as we have seen,[2] a fundamental law, that underlies all particular laws of the emotions, desires and sentiments. All games and sports are evidence of this innate tendency of mind and body toward systematic activity; so that when the work of our serious

[1] See 'Pleasure, Pain, and Aesthetics,' by H. R. Marshall, p. 200, *et seq.*; also G. F. Stout, *op. cit.* B. ii. ch. viii. § 6.

[2] B. i. ch. ii.

desires is over, and we look around for play and recreation, we make-believe that there is some other end beyond the exercise we are about to engage in.

In such cases there are two co-operating tendencies present. One is to find some activity adapted to the present condition of the organism,—of this we are often not conscious,—and on finding it we are so far disposed to feel enjoyment. The other is to find some actual system which gives this need a determinate character. This system may be either that of some game with its make-believe end, or it may be that of some emotion, desire or sentiment with its serious end. The first tendency again may be only a physiological impulse; but if its need of exercise is not responded to, it becomes a felt impulse. Then we want to do something, and wonder, sometimes, what we shall do. If we find no present system to utilise this surplus energy, if the things we think of doing arouse no responsive desire to do them, we experience the emotion of 'ennui.' If, on the other hand, the need of systematic exercise finds some desire awaiting accomplishment, then it incorporates itself in this system.

Now it would seem as if this first tendency must be satisfied by the mere fact of such incorporation, whether the end of that system is, or is not, realised. For its need is only for a systematic activity, which it obtains; and in obtaining this it would tend to evoke enjoyment. And this is what we often seem to experience in playing games. We enjoy the activity because it is the sort of activity we need, and we tend to enjoy it independently of whether or not we realise the make-believe end of the game. Here joy and desire appear to be harmonised, and to co-exist in the same experience. Yet they are frequently in antagonism. For if the desire to play the game is taken seriously—as it often is,—and not in the spirit of play, it excludes enjoyment, except at those moments when a stroke is well-played, or the game successfully terminated; but then desire is either suspended or at an end.

Now take the other case. The need of activity, at a given moment, we may suppose, finds ready to hand some principal system of a man, taken seriously, and not in the spirit of play.

There is the artist's love of his art, the scientist's of his science; the philanthropist's or politician's of dealing with the problems of ignorance, poverty and injustice. The active desire of one of these principal systems,—we will assume,—satisfies the physiological need of activity. There will, therefore, tend to arise the joy that accompanies the satisfaction of this need. But this desire is so serious, pressing and important, its end so often in suspense, that it counteracts the former tendency. Here we live wholly in the emotions of our desire, in its hopes and anxieties, its despondencies and disappointments. Here our thought is concentrated on its end and means. We shall not feel joy till we have fulfilled its end, or made some advance toward it.

Yet assuming that the work we are doing is in harmony with the physiological need of activity, its satisfaction must have some influence; and if it cannot make us rejoice, it will probably give a bias to the pleasing emotions of desire, and render us indisposed to despondency, disappointment and despair.

There appears then to be only one type of case in which desire and joy are not in antagonism: that in which we play a game, and the game is in harmony with the kind and amount of activity we need. The game must be played in the spirit of play; and its end must not be taken seriously. But if the end is not serious, the desire for the end is not serious; and if the desire is not serious it need not interfere with our enjoyment.

Now if we take any game such as cricket, or football, or golf, and suppose that it is throughout played in the spirit of play,—which it is not,—then the desire on either side to obtain the victory is as much a pretence as is the aim of two dogs that engage in mock combat to destroy or to defeat each other. The end of the game is, by playing it according to fixed rules, to make more 'runs' than the opposite side, or to force the ball more frequently between the goal-posts, or to insert a ball successively into eighteen holes in a fewer number of strokes than your opponent. This end is a make-believe, and so is the desire for it. It is there to give coherence to the succession of actions in which the game

consists, and to exhibit the strength and skill which these actions require. That is to say, the apparent end is only the means, and the apparent means,—the successive actions which exhibit strength and skill,—are the real end. The end of the game is for the sake of playing the game, and not the game for the sake of its apparent end. Hence the successive actions in which it consists may afford us joy so far as they are in harmony with the kind and amount of activity we need.

It follows that in play we are not, as in real desires, wishing to get the business over in order to attain the end. On the contrary, we like to prolong it, for in it consists the game, We do not want to defeat our opponents too soon or too easily; for then the strength and skill in which consists our enjoyment, will not be fully manifested and will be too soon over. But the delays, uncertainties and prolongation of the action in which the means consist, instead of causing annoyance, are a source and prolongation of our joy; because the means are the end, and the end, the means.

The means afford enjoyment for another reason. The game is a make-believe or pretence. It is this make-believe or pretence which is the source of the characteristic enjoyment of the game as a game. There is a kind of contradiction in it, which occasions a joyful surprise. That dogs should be apparently biting one another, and trying to obtain the mastery when they are not doing anything of the kind, but only providing an opportunity for the display of their strength and skill, is something that makes us smile with joy, so well is the outward action imitated, while the inward feeling is the opposite of what it would otherwise be. That men should be apparently in rivalry, and endeavouring to inflict bitter humiliation on one another, generally in the presence of spectators, while in reality they are only playing at all this, and endeavouring to exercise their strength, skill and endurance, affording themselves enjoyment and recreation in so doing, experiencing different emotions both in victory and defeat from those which they would feel were the end a real one,—this pretence and make-believe gives an added and characteristic joy to the game.

We conclude, therefore, that the enjoyment of games consists in the exercise of our instincts or aptitudes at the proper times, and when there is an impulse to exercise them, and in the proper amounts; and, secondly, in the fact that the game and the desire for its end is a pretence or make-believe, and therefore does not interfere with the enjoyment; and thirdly, in the fact that this pretence is itself a source of enjoyment. But in games as actually played, and especially by those nations which have little of the spirit of play, the pretence often gives place to the reality, and the game becomes a serious struggle for victory, which excludes joy till victory is attained. And in most cases there is something of both earnest and play; and we remind ourselves in defeat that it is only a game, and that its end is the exercise, enjoyment, and recreation we have obtained. But the law of these mixed cases appears to be that (143) *In all games, the less we desire the end, the more we can enjoy the means.*

Thus the law that desire and joy tend mutually to exclude one another appears to hold of all cases; but it applies to Desire only in a strict sense, and to Joy or enjoyment when understood to mean conscious joy, and defined by the essential tendency of its system. The law does not apply to impulse in general; for joy has itself an impulse. It applies only to those impulses that become desires through foresight of their ends, and in which prospective emotions are elicited. Still, the law applies to impulse thus far, that when the impulse of joy becomes prominent in consciousness, the joy itself is diminished or suppressed.[1]

Thus the system of Desire has its limits, and is not adapted to include Joy; and, as we shall see, is dependent on some other system for its end. It cannot be fully understood by itself. In the sentiment, we find the form of a system, the most comprehensive which the human mind can furnish, which reconciles these antagonistic forces. For love would not be love unless we could sometimes rest in joyful contemplation of its object, as at other times we are driven forward by its impetuous and unsatisfied desires.

[1] See *supra*, B. ii. p. 283, Law 55.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

THE complex system studied in this book is the last addition we have to make to that conception of character which it has been one of the principal aims of our work gradually to unfold. Indeed it may seem to many that Desire is the most important of all the systems and forces of character; and that if we could understand the laws of the origin, growth, and decline of its different varieties, we should also understand the laws of the origin, growth, and decline of different varieties of character. But notwithstanding the great part which our desires play in making our characters what they are known to be, yet they are never independent forces: they spring originally from our primary emotions and impulses, and have a second and most prolific source in our sentiments.

The old writers who classed Desire with the emotions overlooked perhaps one principal difference between it and them. Desire is an abstraction; however much it predominates in consciousness, and appears there as an independent force, it presupposes and always belongs to some other system from which it has sprung, and from which it derives its determinate end. However charged with emotion, however peculiar desire may be, we cannot, therefore, class it with the emotions.

Anger, fear, disgust, and curiosity have determinate ends. We can describe in general terms what they are, and how distinguished from one another. Desire has no determinate end; it only has some end. It is abstracted from something

else, and, by being treated in our thought independently, it has lost determinate character. If we want to know what the end of desire may be, we must say what the desire is, or to what it belongs. It may belong to anger or fear, or to any other primary emotion. If anger does not explode at once, if something arrests and delays it, we become aware of its end, and desire this end. If fear does not at once secure our safety, we become aware of our danger, and desire to escape from it. The impulse of this desire, with all the prospective emotions to which it may give rise, is none other than that of the anger or the fear; to that it belongs, and the end of the emotion alone gives it determinate character, and becomes its end. Desire is not an independent system.

We may then enunciate this law: (144) *Every emotion, when its end is obstructed, tends to develop its impulse into desire, and so to give rise to the prospective emotions: the system of every emotion potentially contains desire with its prospective emotions.*

This, then, is one way in which desires arise; and as desires may spring from the lesser systems of the emotions, so they may also spring from the greater systems of the sentiments. There are many desires that arise only because there is a preformed sentiment of love or hate. If a man loves knowledge he desires to possess and increase it; if a man loves his friend, he desires to see him frequently, and desires his happiness and welfare. All kinds of love are a perennial source of desires, because their ends are never fully satisfied.

It is then a complete mistake to represent desire as an independent force, and to suppose that it can be co-ordinated either with the emotions or with the sentiments. We cannot take desire as the base of a scientific study of character. We cannot satisfactorily interpret character as a collection of desires; because, though we may conceive of them as having ends, we do not know what are the forces behind them which have given them these ends, and to which they alone belong. Yet there are some desires so important that they seem to furnish the chief characteristics of a man, as the desire of fame, of power, or of wealth. For the sentiments are continually eliciting desires, and have two kinds of them: the one

temporary, and springing from their particular emotions, as the desire to console a friend in sorrow or to congratulate him in success,—the other, relatively fixed and permanent, because determined by the system acting as a whole,—as the desire of a man to pursue his friend's interest and happiness. Thus, loving wealth and power, and never having enough of them, or finding them necessary for many other things that we love, we spend our lives so much in desiring them.

It is, then, not through a study of the dependent systems of desire but through those of the emotions and sentiments that we should approach the problems of the science of character. We have conceived of character as constituted of these principal forces, and to them we have referred all its other constituents. For character, as ordinarily conceived, is supposed to consist of a number of isolated qualities, as 'independence,' 'servility,' 'generosity,' 'meanness,' 'gentleness,' 'harshness,' 'candour,' 'reserve,' 'deceitfulness,' and innumerable others, popularly regarded in most cases as either 'good' or 'bad,' and therefore leading to the summary conception of character as 'good' or 'bad.' These qualities, though there be an innate bias to one or other of them in individual persons, are, like our desires, not independent tendencies; and we have to trace them to those systems to which they belong, and with which they are inherited or acquired. If we treat them independently we can only distinguish, define, and classify them as M. Paulhan has so well done.[1] We do not understand why they appear in some men and not in others, nor how they develop and decay.

Thus we are gradually led up to a conception of character in which the first confusion of its diverse kinds of constituents is reduced to order, and we are presented with an interplay of systems, as complex as their ends require them to be; and the understanding of their laws—of their growth, constitution, decay, and interaction—becomes our principal problem. And as these laws are subject to conditions, of which at first we can only discern the most conspicuous, while many others remain undiscovered, we have to throw them into provisional forms, in which they both serve

[1] 'Les Caractères.'

us as working hypotheses, and lead to their own correction and improvement. That which has chiefly hindered the development of this important and dynamical science of human nature has been the perplexity and confusion into which the mind is thrown when we attempt to trace the intricacies of human character without a map or plan of its various departments to guide us.

INDEX

INDEX

A.

Admiration, as containing surprise, 448.
Aesop, character of his fables, 75, 76; on sorrow caused by ourselves, 343, 344.
Affection. See Parental love, Ch. IV., 2; injustice of, 109, 110.
Amiel, on sorrow and pessimism, 354; on hope, 479.
Anger, varieties of, Bk. II., Ch. III.–Ch. IV.; interaction with fear, Ch. V.; qualities of the conduct of, Ch. VI. For analysis of chapters, see Contents.
Antipathy, as a kind of repugnance; as opposed to sympathy; its connection with hate, 400, 401.
Anxiety, as one of prospective emotions of desire, 461–463; conditions of, 465–467; a development of fear, 472–476; tendencies of, 481–482; relation to other prospective emotions, 504–508.
Appetite, as distinguished from emotion; why classed with emotion, 28.
Aristotle, on character of youth and age, 73; on definition of anger, 232; on use of anger, 264; on wonder and philosophy, 449.
Arnold (Matthew), on Gray, 306, 307; on Amiel, 354.
Association, laws of; as useless for interpreting empirical laws of character, 16–19.
Astonishment, as the higher, cognitive variety of surprise, 446, 447.
Aversion, as implying repugnance; as an abstract conative tendency, 399.

B.

Bacon, on envy, 88, 91; on revenge and justice, 233; on sorrow and friendship, 341; on wonder, 444, 450.
Bain (Alexander), on love, 54; on problems of character, 83; on nervous temperament, 139: on emotion and intellect, 140; on anger directed to produce pain, 243; on tendency of anger and fear to exclude one another, 254; on tendency of opposite feelings to exclude one another, 261; on surprise as "neutral excitement," 435; on wonder as containing surprise, 443; on desire, 461.
Balzac, on relation of avarice to affection, 124; on his love for Madame Hanska, 165.
Bentham (J.), on disgust counteracting curiosity, 377.
Borrow, on influence of joy, 161; on fear, 199; on influence of sorrow, 364.
Bradley (A. C.), on connection of jealously and shame, 259; on the stages of sorrow, 366.

Brehm (A. E.), on fear on behalf of offspring, 205 ; on Felidae training their young in destruction, 226 ; on anger expressed by threats, 228 ; on love combats of birds, 229; on despotism of monkeys, 233 ; their punishment of disobedience, 233 ; on tigress's defence of young, 235 ; on anger of gorilla in defence of offspring, 236 ; on destructiveness of cockatoo, 294.
Browning (R.), on the injustice of affection, 110 ; on joy and valuation of object, 356 ; on disgust and shrinking, 378.
Burke, on anxiety and confidence, 483.
Burns, on sorrow with remembrance of joy, 335.
Burton (Robert), on connection of sorrow and fear, 306.
Byron, on fear and despair, 476.

C.

Campbell, on hope, 478, 479.
Chambre (Cureau de la), on hope and courage, 481.
Character, Bk. I., The conception of ; (for analysis of Bk. I., see Contents) ; present state of knowledge of, Introduction, II : Mill's conception of science of, Bk. I., Ch. I.; constitution of, Bk. I., Ch. III.; why conception of character indispensable to a science of, 82–87 ; constituents of, Chs. III., IV., V., VI., IX.: types of, Ch. XII.; influence of temperament on, Ch. XIII.; influence of tempers on, Chs. XIV., XV.
Charron, on despair, 496.
Cicero, on sorrow and consolation, 338 ; on confidence, 484.
Clarendon, his method of characterisation, 99, 100.
Clouston, Dr., on melancholia agitans, 308.
Cobbett, on despair, 498.
Conduct, conception of, 94–104,— see Contents, Ch. IX., 1, 2.
Confidence, as one of the prospective emotions of desire, 461–463 ; conditions of, 465–467 ; tendencies of, 482–487 ; relation of to other prospective emotions, 504–508 ; source of, 472–476.
Confucius, referred to, 7 ; on filial piety as source of loyalty, 91.
Conscience, the emotional system of, 57 ; distinction between it and relative ethics of the sentiments, 119, 120 ; as developed in sentiments, 114, 115.
Cortes, on sanguine temperament, 132 ; on bilious temperament, 134 ; on phlegmatic temperament, 141.
Cowper, on hope, 478.

D.

Dante, on sorrow with remembrance of happiness, 335.
Darwin (Ch.), on connection between filial affection and social sentiments, 92 ; on instinctive fear, 181 ; on expression of anger, 225 ; on revenge, 230 ; on parental instinct and love, 238 ; on manifestation of sorrow, 301 ; on disgust, 390 ; on disgust aroused by ideas, 393 ; on expression of amazement, 426, 432 ; on curiosity of monkeys, 438.
De Quincey, on types of sorrow, 302, 303.
Descartes, on the first sorrow, 31 ; on love, 54 : on definition of hope and fear, 220 ; on definition of love, 418 ; on surprise as the first emotion, 424 ; as having its maximum intensity from the commencement ; as directed to the knowledge of its object, 429.
Desire, Bk. III., difference between it and impulse, Ch. I., 1 ; emotional system of, Ch. I., 2 ; of its limitations and antagonism to joy, Ch. V., also Bk. II., Ch. VII., 283. (For an analysis of contents of Bk. III., see Contents)

Despair, as one of the prospective emotions of desire, 462, 463; conditions of, 467; source of, 475, 476; tendencies of, see Bk. III., Ch. V. (for analysis of chapter see Contents); relation of, to other prospective emotions, 506, 507.
Despondency, as one of the prospective emotions of desire, 461–463; conditions of, 465–467; tendencies of, 477–481; relation of, to other prospective emotions, 504–508; a probable differentiation of sorrow, 472–476.
Dicey (A. V.), on satisfaction, 512.
Dictionary, Johnson, art. displeasure, 399.
Dictionary (Larousse), art. repulsion, 396.
Dictionary (Littré), art., ennui, 412.
Dictionary (Murray), art., displeasure, 399; art. ennui, 412.
Diderot, character of actors, 74.
Disappointment, as one of the prospective emotions of desire, 461–463; conditions of, 465–467; tendencies of, 487–490; as a probable differentiation of sorrow, 475, 476.
Discontent, as a late variety of repugnance implying anger, its causation, 412–416.
Disgust, Bk. II., Ch. XIV.; (for analysis of chapter see Contents).
Disinterested action, nature and source of, 43–49.
Dislike, as one of the terms used to express repugnance, 396.
Displeasure, as a repugnance implying anger in usual signification of word, 398–400.
Distaste, ambiguity of, as repugnance and as also a weaker form of disgust, 400.
Dostoievsky, on sorrow and making laments, 343; on sorrow and degradation of character, 351.
Dryden, his portrait of Shaftesbury, 138; on despair, 501.
Duty, duties of sentiments, 113–119.

E.

Ecclesiastes, on value of sorrow, 363.
Elliot (G.), on anxiety, 482.
Ellis (William), on burial ceremony, 381.
Emotion, different senses of the term, 178; see Bk. II., Chapter I, (for analysis of contents of Ch. I., see Contents); James-Lange, theory of, 3–5.
Ethics, Relative ethics, see Bk. I., Ch. XI., and Contents.
Ethology, Mill's conception of, 13.

F.

Fables, nature of their wisdom, 75.
Fear, for varieties of, see Bk. II., Ch. II.; for interaction with anger, see Bk. II., Ch. V; for the qualities of conduct springing from it, Ch. VI. For analysis of chapters see Contents.
Fouillée (A), on sanguine temperament, 133; on nervous temperament, 138, 139; on mixed temperaments, 143.

G.

Galton (Francis), on twins, 132.
Gibson (Boyce) on use of term 'passion,' 50, note.
Goethe, on self-torture of sorrow, 321–322: on sorrow following amusement, 336.
Gogol, on violent sorrow, 301–302; on disgust with shaking of body, 380.
Gordon-Cumming, on anger of lion as expressed by threats, 228.
Grandeur (L), on expression of disgust, 376.
Gratian, character of his maxims, 78; on the times for making requests, 337: on the fault-finding temper, 404; on hope, 480; on confidence, 487.
Gratiolet, definition of ennui 412.

Gray, his description of his melancholy temper, 306–307 ; on value of adversity, 363.
Groos, his theory of play, 242 ; on play as an instinct, 287 ; of play as training instincts, 288 ; of youth and play, 289 ; play not serious activity, 292, yet useful, 294 ; on tormenting plays, 295 ; on social plays, 296, 297 ; on curiosity of dog, 439.

H.

Hamerton (P. G.), on melancholy, 310.
Hatred, analysis of, 58–61 ; as adopting two of the ends of anger, 244, 245.
Hazlitt, on moral disgust, 376 ; on instinctive repugnance, 396.
Head (Henry), on melancholy connected with visceral disease, 309.
Hebrews, on hope, as an anchor of the soul, 478.
Herrick, on despair evoking courage, 492, 494.
Hood, on sorrow, 342.
Hope, as one of the prospective emotions of desire, 461–463 ; its conditions, 465–466 ; its relation to joy, 470–471 ; hope and fear, 472 ; its tendencies, 477–480 ; its relation to other prospective emotions, 505.
Houzeau, on disgust and cleansing instinct of rat, 381.
Hudson, on instinctive fear, 181, 240 ; on instincts of cattle, 181 ; on fear expressed by silence, 200 ; on fear expressed by shrinking, 201 ; on fear expressed by pretence of death, 202 ; by cries, 202 ; by aggression followed by flight, 203, 204 ; conflict between egoistic and disinterested fear, 205 ; on anger expressed by threats, 228 ; on revenge of puma, 231, 232 ; on cruelty of hawks, 242 ; on play of fire-fly, 291, 292.
Hume (David), on definition of love, 54 ; on his sanguine temper, 146 ; on the restriction of it by his genius, 160 ; on derivation of fear, 221 ; on wonder at the marvellous, 451 ; on wonder and belief in miracles, 452 ; on effect of despair, 498.
Hutcheson, on derivation of fear, 221.

I.

Instinct, Bk. II., Ch. I. (for analysis of the contents of chapter see Contents) ; of the excitement of an instinct without the simultaneous excitement of the emotion ordinarily connected with it, 188–189, 249, 250, 329–330 ; of the feeling of impulse as the correlative in consciousness of the excitement of an instinct, 189.
Instinctive, meaning to be attached to the term, 180–181.
Intellect, its relation to the emotions and sentiments, 67 ; possibility of its independence as the 'reason,' 67.

J.

James (William) referred to, 1 ; his theory of emotion, 3–5 ; his definition of instinct, 187.
Jealousy, its derivation as a secondary emotion, 256–262 ; see Contents, Bk. II., Ch. V., 2.
Job (Book of), on sorrow and consolation, 348.
Johnson (Samuel), on hope, 480 ; on hope and courage, 481 ; on confidence, 482.
Joy, Bk. II., Ch. VII., joy and play, Bk. II., Ch. VIII. (for analysis of chapters see Contents) ; as an original source of judgments of value, 356–357.

K.

Kant, on the sanguine temperament, 133 ; on wonder and awe, 418.

Krepelin, on definition of melancholia, 309.

L.

La Bruyère, his methods of characterisation, 98; on change of natural temper due to course of life, 131; on relation of joyous temper to affection, 159; on influence of disgust on love, 392
La Fontaine, character of his fables, 76; on satisfaction and disgust, 376; on day dreaming, 510.
Lamartine, on influence of suffering on character, 370.
Lange, his physiological theory of emotion, 3; on the exclusion of emotion, 4; on sorrow, 303.
La Rochefoucauld, on the succession of the passions, 23; characteristics of his maxims, 78; on envy, 88; on the injustice of the passions, 109; on the influence of absence on love, 158, 159; on jealousy, 258; on the connection of jealousy with shame, 259; on hope, 479; on confidence, 484
Law: laws of association as incapable of interpreting laws of character, 16–19; laws of association as universally valid, 69; law of organisation, 20–23; as universally valid, 69; of reciprocal relation of the laws of association and laws of organisation, 70; Mill's conception of "laws of Mind" as laws of tendency, and as having superior validity to "empirical laws," 68–72; only provisional forms of laws attainable in most cases with regard to character, 71; of "empirical laws" or "approximate generalisations," 72–75.
Leibnitz, on sorrow and religion, 315.
Le Sage, on actors, 74.
Lewis (Bevan), on melancholia 307, 308.
Levy (A.), referred to, 83.
Lloyd-Morgan (C.), on meaning of the term 'instinctive,' 180; on restriction of the term 'instinct,' 184; a case of astonishment and fear, 432, 433.
Locke, on desire as 'uneasiness,' 462, 463; on despondency, 480; on confidence, 484; on opposite tendencies of despair, 500.
Love, of the innate system at the base of this sentiment, 35–38; of the various instincts included in parental love, 39, 40; of the dispositions of the emotions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow as organised in its system, 40–42; of the stimulus of maternal love, 42, 43; of the usual theory that love is an emotion, simple or complex, 54, 55; of the varieties of love, 56, 57. (See Contents, Bk. I., Chs. IV., V.)
Lowell, on regret as source of idealisation, 358.

M.

Malapert (P.), on neglect of the psychical side of the temperaments, 131; on the sanguine temperament, 133; on the nervous temperament, 139; on the phlegmatic temperament, 142.
Marie (Dr. A.), case of astonishment and fear, 434.
Marmontel, on attractive tendency of sorrow, 321; on correction of a misanthrope, 408.
Marshall (H. R.), on energy and enjoyment, 513
Martineau (James), on wonder and surprise, 446
Maxims, nature of, 75–78.
McDougall (W.), his theory of emotion, p. 6; on instincts of self-display and self-abasement, 32; on sympathetic and tender emotion, 44; his theory of instinct and emotion, 188; his description of disgust, 379; on surprise, 436; on curiosity as an instinct, 439; on wonder as the emotion of curiosity, 442.
Mendez (C.), on day-dreaming, 511.

Meredith (G.), on silent natures, 303; on sorrow and the tendency of restoration, 325; on sorrow and remembrance of joy, 325.
Method, of the science of character, Chs. VII., VIII. (for analysis of chapters see Contents); the method proposed in this work, 85–93.
Mill (J. S.), his conception of the science of character, 13–19; his conception of the "laws of mind," 68–72; his conception of the "empirical laws," 72–75; defects of his method, 82, 85; on the nervous temperament, 138.
Milton, on value of sorrow, 363; on connection of fear and hope, 472, 478.
Misanthropy, as connected with the mood of repugnance, 401–408.
Molière, on avarice, 126; on the temper of misanthropy, 405.
Montaigne, on value as determined by difficulty of attainment, 73; on sorrow and astonishment, 341; on his contempt of sorrow, 363.
Montesquieu, on despair and courage, 492.

O.

Organisation, laws of, as distinguished from laws of association, 20–23; as implying those systems that have impulse and end, 21; see under 'system.'
Ovid, on repressed sorrow, 342.

P.

Pascal, on the reasons of the heart, 86.
Patmore (Coventry), on the preference of sorrow for suffering, 323.
Paton (S.), on Dementia Praecox, 141.
Paulhan (Fr.), on "systematic association," 21 note; on lowest types of character, 22; on classification of character according to degree of organisation, 62.
Pérez (B.), on child's sadness at loss of light, 313.
Personification, its use and justification in a science of character for the purpose of isolating the systems of emotions and sentiments, 64, 65.
Pessimism, as connected with mood of repugnance, 406, 407.
Plato, on wonder and philosophy, 449.
Play, see Bk. II., Ch. VIII., on its connection with joy; for analysis of chapter see Contents.
Plutarch, on the courage of Fabius Maximus and that of Scipio Africanus, 267.
Preyer (W.), on instincts of sitting and standing, 183; on utilisation of experience as instinctive, 184; on instinctive movements, 186; on reflex clasping of the fingers, 190; on a child's disgust, 375; on an expression of disgust, 380.
Proverbs, on the nature of their wisdom, 77, 78.
Punishment, in revenge type of anger, 229–232; in the anger of love, 245, 246.

Q.

Qualities, of character, Bk. I., Ch. IX.; their relation to emotions and sentiments, Bk. I., Ch. X.: for analysis of chapters see Contents.
Quérat, referred to, 83.
Quincey (De), on sorrow, 302; his types of, 303.

R.

Racine, on hope in despair, 503.
Read (Carveth), on "chain-instincts," 371.
Renan, on Celtic character, 503.

Repugnance, Bk. II., Ch. XV. : for analysis of chapter see Contents ; its connection with sorrow, 360.
Repulsion, see repugnance.
Ribot (Th.), referred to, 21, note ; on impulses of self-display and self-abasement, 32 ; on sympathy and tender emotion, 44 ; on Spencer's theory of love, 55 ; on relation of emotions to instincts, 372 ; on disgust, 386.
Richerand, on sanguine temperament, 132 ; on nervous temperament, 138 ; on phlegmatic temperament, 141 ; on bilious temperament, 134.
Richet (C.), on disgust, 372, 377 ; on disgust and fear, 379.
Richter (J. P.), on hope, 479.
Romanes (G. J.), on instinct of fish ; on revenge of monkeys, 230 ; on jealousy of cockatoo, 257 ; of monkey, 258 ; on curiosity of fish, 439.

S.

Scott (Walter), on temperament of Lucy Ashton, 166, 167, 170, 171 ; on temper of a misanthrope, 405, 406.
Selous, on instinct of concealment in lions, 226 ; on expression of threats by elephants, 228.
Seneca, on connection of fear of death and courage, 202 ; on eradication of anger, 224 ; on definition of anger, 232 ; on his attempt to deny that animals feel anger, 249 ; on cruelty as independent of anger, 270 ; on obstinacy of sorrow, 321 ; on adversity, 338 ; on fellowship in sorrow, 338, on anticipating sorrows, 340 ; on two types of sorrow, 349 ; on the vanity of sorrow, 362 ; on disgust as excluding pity, 378.
Shaftesbury, on "self-system" ; on wonder and the love of mystery, 451.
Shakespeare, on hate, 58 ; on relation of hate and pity, 107 ; on relation of love and conscience, 120 ; of true love and adversity, 159 ; on sorrow and madness, 303 ; on sorrow and the tendency to restoration, 324 ; on sorrow and resolution, 326 ; on sorrow declining to hear of joy, 335 ; on fellowship in sorrow, 339 ; on sorrow and sympathy, 341 ; on sorrow and silence, 342 ; on sorrow and anger, 348 ; on sorrow and idealisation of the object, 358 ; on uselessness of sorrow, 362 ; on sorrow and pity, 364 ; on expression of disgust, 391 ; on wonder, 445, 451 ; on hope, 478 ; on over-confidence, 485 ; on despair overcoming cowardice, 494.
Shelley, on hope creating the event in which it hopes, 478.
Shinn (Miss M.), on sorrow of child, 311, 315 ; on joy of child, 312.
Smith (Adam), on law of emotional contrast, 324 ; on realising sudden grief and joy, 336 ; on effect of custom on sorrow ; on his theory of surprise and wonder, 417, 418, 421, 422 ; on wonder and curiosity, 444, 445.
Sorrow, Bk., II., Chs., IX., X., XI., XII., XIII. : for analysis of chapters, see Contents ; an original source of judgments of value, 357 ; its connection with repugnance, 360.
South (R.), on uselessness of sorrow, 362 ; on despair, 491.
Spencer (Herbert), on love as a compound emotion, 55 ; on anger as the destructive passion, 225 ; on parental instinct and love, 238 ; on play, 287, 289, 292.
Spenser (Edmund), on behaviour of sorrow, 321 ; on imparting sorrow, 342 ; on hope, 480.
Spinoza, on definition of love, 54 ; his laws of emotion, 73 ; on definition of fear, 220 ; of joy, 276 ; on the inferiority of sorrow to joy, 363.
St. Augustine, on relation of envy to pride, 88 ; on enjoyment of

tragedy, 299 ; on his own sorrow, 323 ; on sorrow and religious consolation ; on sorrow and repugnance, 352 ; on love and sorrow, 358.
Stanley (Hiram M.), on influence of disappointment on hope, 488.
Stevenson (R. L.), on Thoreau, 155 ; on Burns' capacity for love, 161.
Stewart (A.), on sanguine temperament, 132 ; on bilious temperament, 134, 135 ; on nervous temperament, 137 ; on phlegmatic temperament, 141.
Stout (G. F.), on emotion as involving an end, 64 ; on term instinctive as applied to emotion, 181 note ; as applied to appreciation of relative success and failure, 184 (note) ; on influence of intelligence on development of instinct, 185 ; on definition of anger, 226 ; on distinction between perceptional and ideational planes of mental development, 234.
Sully (J.), on emotion, 374.
Surprise, Bk. II., Ch. XVI. ; surprise and wonder, Bk. II., Ch. XVII., 2 : for analysis of, see Contents.
Sydney (Sir P.), on confidence, 484 ; on despair and courage, 492.
System, its meaning as applied to emotions and sentiments, assumes that mental activity has an impulse and an end, in relation to which other constituents tend to become organised, 20–23 ; the chief constituents of the system of an emotion, 27, 185 ; the chief constituents of the system of a sentiment as organising the lesser systems of emotions, 35 ; the systems of the sentiments, Bk. I., Chs. IV, V : for analysis of chapters see Contents ; of will and intelligence as organised in systems of emotion and sentiment, see Bk. I., Ch. VI ; of qualities of character as there organised, see Bk. I., Ch. IX ; surprise not an emotional system, 428–430 ; three orders of system, 460.

T.

Temper, Bk. I., Chs. XIV., XV. (for analysis of, see Contents.)
Temperament, Bk. I., Ch. XIII. (for analysis of chapter, see Contents.)
Tennent (E.), on revenge of elephants, 230, 231.
Theophrastus, analysis of his method of characterisation, 97.
Thoreau, on advantage of solitude to society, 155.
Tourgueneff, on sorrow and apathy, 351 ; on Slavonic character, 511.

V.

Value, of intrinsic and extrinsic value, 354 ; of joy and sorrow as distinct sources of valuation of their objects, 355–360 ; of negative values connected with disgust, repugnance and contempt, 356 ; of subjective value, 358.
Vauvenargues, on connection of great thoughts and the heart, 86 ; on obscurity and error, 87, 88.

W.

Wedgwood (H.), on expression of disgust, 375.
Westermarck (Edward), on anger as revenge, 229 ; on the stimulus of maternal love, 238.
Will, treated as dependent on impulse, emotion and sentiment, 64, 65 ; possibility of its independence as real choice, 66, 67.
Wisdom, nature of the wisdom of fables, proverbs and maxims, 6, 7, 75–80.
Wonder, curiosity and wonder, see Bk. II., Ch. XVII : for analysis of contents of chapter, see Contents.
Wordsworth, on the sorrow that excludes fear, 306 ; on value of sorrow, 366 ; on the shrinking tendency of disgust, 378 ; on wonder, 443, 450 ; on hope, 480.

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